Subject: Re: forwarding an encrypted message

From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2002 11:29:47 -0500

From: John Dlugosz

I agree with the way this is going.  Tools are made to help us, to do our
bidding.  Guns are made with safety switches, not (usually) locks.  The
microwave oven shuts off if I open the door, as does the refridgerator
light, but I -could- use a piece of tape over the button to defeat that.
The tools are acting to help me, but don't go to heroic lengths to be
tamper-proof.

I may trust someone in the sense that he keeps my interests in mind, but
not trust him with technical things.  So having flags that are understood
by the tools, not =only= human messages to explain allowed dispositions, is
a good thing.

Ben Laurie <[email-masked]>@mail.imc.org on 04-10-2002 08:41:50 AM

Sent by:  [email-masked]

To:   Matthew Byng-Maddick <[email-masked]>
cc:   [email-masked]
Subject:  Re: forwarding an encrypted message

Matthew Byng-Maddick wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 09, 2002 at 04:26:55PM -0400, vedaal wrote:
> > both of which can be 'denied' by the original sender, and can be proved
by
> > the forwarder, only by having someone witness the decryption.
>
> I've never put very much faith in the screen eyes-only thing for that
> reason. What is the point? If you don't trust the person, don't send the
> document to them. Once they have it it's their choice who they forward
to,
> and it's now out of your control. Tough.

I believe the original explanation - that it was requested by someone
having an
affair, who didn't trust the recipient not to _accidentally_ save to disk
and
get them caught.

Cheers,

Ben.

--
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html       http://www.thebunker.net/

"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff