Subject: Re: Further deprecating PGP2

From: [email-masked] (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2003 14:33:57 +1300

Jeroen van Gelderen <[email-masked]> writes:

>Or if that really, really is considered too weak: "An OpenPGP implementation
>[MAY/SHOULD] support decryption of IDEA-encrypted messages but MUST NOT 
>generate them."

Sounds good to me (with an additional MUST NOT for generation of v3 keys, to
nail that issue as well).

Peter.

---

From: [email-masked] (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2003 00:40:21 +1200

Jon Callas <[email-masked]> writes:
>On 3/11/03 9:28 AM, "Mike Markowitz" <[email-masked]> wrote:
>
>[Incidentally, what we're talking about is PGP's importing X.509
>certificates. It imports them as V3 keys. This is a meta-2440 issue, which
>is why I never brought it up.]
>
>[...]
>
>>Any chance this will be corrected in PGP8 the near future? (Converting
>>a cert into a V4 key with appropriate algorithm preferences is not that hard.)
>
>Personally, I think this is a misfeature. However, I *understand* why it was
>done that way. There are a whole host of little fiddly things about making
>one into a V4 key that can be completely sidestepped by making it a V3.

I've been using X.509 keys as v4 keys for PGP for ages without any problems.
You just format the key in the PGP manner and use the validity from the
cert to provide the date for the hashed key ID.

>There are so many of them that making it into a V4 key could be called "a
>can of worms." Certainly, it would require a couple of design meetings.
>(Example worm coming out of the can -- what if the X.509 cert has in its
>basic constraints that it's an encryption-only key? 2440 says that a
>top-level key must be capable of signing. Possible solutions include
>ignoring the issue, and making that key a sub-key while generating a new
>top-level key.)

I don't try and make the X.509-derived keys *that* PGP-ish.  It works fine
without going to that level, which sidesteps the whole issue.

Peter.