Subject: draft-ietf-opes-threats-03

From: "Abbie Barbir" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2003 11:07:21 -0500

Please publish the following 

draft-ietf-opes-threats-03

as a WG Draft.

Thanks
Abbie

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From: Markus Hofmann <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 09 Dec 2003 11:39:58 -0500

Folks,

this updated version of the draft addresses issues in Section 2.2.7 
that came back from IESG review.

The section has been re-written to clarify that - for now - the OPES 
work assumes either no encryption (in which case OPES services can be 
performed) or end-to-end encryption (in which case no OPES services 
can be performed). If encryption would be desired hop-by-hop, an 
appropriate model will have to be developed.

We'll re-submit this version to the IESG.

Thanks,
   Markus

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From: Alex Rousskov <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2003 10:02:51 -0700 (MST)

Markus,

	I am somewhat surprised there is something special that needs
to be developed for a hop-by-hop encryption model, but I do not know
what IESG had to say about this issue (beyond a cryptic statement on
the ID tracker). If IESG turns this revision around again, let's
discuss how we can document hop-by-hop encryption to address IESG
concerns.

Thanks,

Alex.