Subject: [ppsp] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-ppsp-peer-protocol-07.txt

From: Riccardo Petrocco <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2013 19:20:54 +0200

Hi all,

I just uploaded an updated version of the peer protocol draft.

We mostly focused on the issues presented in the recent AD review.
Unfortunately due to the lack of time, and the extensive review, some
points still need to be addressed.

See you in Berlin,
ciao,
Riccardo

=========================

  -07        2013-06-19 Revision following AD Review

           Quoting the AD review by Martin Stiemerling: ***High-level
           issues:

           1) Merkle Hash Trees I have found the document very confusing
           on whether Merkle Hash Trees (MHTs) and the for the MHT
           required bin numbering scheme are now optional or mandatory.
           Parts of the draft make the impression that either of them or
           both or optional (mainly in the beginning of the document),
           while Section 5 and later Sections are relying heavily on
           MHTs.  My naive reading of the current draft is that you
           could rely on start-end ranges for chunk addressing and MHTs
           for content protection.  However, I do know that this
           combination is not working.  If MHTs are really optional,
           including the bin numbering, the document should really state
           this and make clear what the operations of the protocol are
           with the mandatory to implement (MTI) mechanisms.  The MHT,
           bins, and all the protocol handling should go in an appendix.
           There is a call to make for the WG: I do know that MHTs were
           considered by some as burden and they have called for a
           leaner way, i.e., the start-end ranges.  The call for the
           leaner way has been implemented in the document but not
           fully.

           +   The text now states that MHTs SHOULD be used unless in
               benign environments and are mandatory-to-implement.  It
               also states that only start-end chunk range is mandatory-
               to-implement, and bins are optional.

           2) LEDBAT as congestion control vs. PPSPP The PPSP peer
           protocol is intended for the Standards Track and relies in a
           normative manner on LEDBAT (RFC 6817).  LEDBAT as such is an
           **experimental** delay-based congestion control algorithm.  A
           Standards Track protocol cannot normatively rely on an
           Experimental congestion control mechanism (or RFC in
           general).  There are ways out of this situation: i) Do not
           use ledbat: this would call for another congestion control
           mechanism to be described in the PPSPP draft. ii) Work on an
           'upgrade' of the LEDBAT specification to Standards Track:
           Possible, but a very long way. iii) Agree on having PPSPP
           also as Experimental protocol.  I'm currently leaning towards
           option iii), but this is my pure personal opinion as an
           individual in the IETF.

           +   A new paragraph has been added to Section 8.16 describing
               the feasibility of LEDBAT in P2P systems.

           3) No formal protocol message definition Section 7 and more
           specific Section 8 describe the protocol syntax of the
           protocol options and the messages, though Section 8 is
           talking about UDP encapsulation.  Section 7 is hard to digest
           if someone should implement the options, see also later, but
           Section 8 is almost impossible to understand by somebody who
           has not been involved in the PPSP working group.  See also
           further down for a more detailed review of the sections.  To
           give an example out of Section 8.4: This section describes
           the HANDSHAKE message and gives examples how such a HANDSHAKE
           message could look like.  But no formal definition of the
           message is given leaving a number of thins unclear, such as
           what the local channel number and what's the remote channel
           number is.  This is implicitly defined, but that is not a
           good way of writing Standards Track drafts.

           4) Implicit use of default values There are a number of
           places all over the draft where default values are defined.
           Many of those default values are used when there are no
           values explicitly signaled, e.g., the default chunk size of 1
           Kbyte in Section 8.4 or Section Section 7.5. with the default
           for the Content Integrity Protection Method.  I have the
           feeling that the protocol and the surroundings (e.g., what
           comes in via the 'tracker') are over-optimized, e.g., always
           providing the Content Integrity Protection Method as part of
           the Protocol options will not waste more than 2 bytes in a
           HANDSHAKE message.  Further, I do not see the need to define
           a default chunk size in the base protocol specification, as
           this default can look very different, depending on who is
           deploying the protocol and in what context.  This calls for a
           more dynamic way of handling the system chunk size, either as
           part of an external mechanisms (e.g. via the tracker) or in
           the HANDSHAKE message.

           +   Removed implicit defaults from protocol options.  Chunk
               size is part of the content's metadata and thus
               configurable.  The default 1KiB has been turned into a
               recommendation.

           5) Concept of channels The concept of channels is good but it
           is introduced too late in the draft, namely in Section 8.3,
           and it is introduced with very few words.  Why isn't this
           introduced as part of Section 2 or Section 3, also in the
           relationship to the used transport protocol?  I.e., the
           intention is to keep only one transport 'connection' between
           two distinct peers and to allow to run multiple swarm
           instances at the same time over the same transport.  And how
           do swarms and channels correlate?

           +   Concept now introduced in Section 3 with a figure.

           ***Technicals:

           - Section 2.1, 2nd paragraph, about the tracker: I haven't
           seen a single place where the interaction with a tracker is
           discussed or where the tracker less operation is discussed in
           contrast.  It is further unclear what type of information is
           really required from a tracker.  A tracker (or a resource
           directory) would need to provide more then IP address & port,
           e.g., the used transport protocol for the protocol exchange
           (given that other transports are allowed), used chunk size,
           chunk addressing scheme, etc

           - Section 2.3, the 1st paragraph, 'close-channel': This has
           been the first time where I stumbled over the channel without
           knowing the concept.

           +   Rephrased.

           - Section 3.1: ordering of messages The 1st sentence implies
           that ordering of messages in a datagram matters a lot.  This
           is outlined later in the document, but I would add this as
           part of 3., i.e., the messages are processed in the strict
           order or something along this line.

           - Section 3.1, 1st paragraph, options to include I would not
           say anything about 'SHOULD include options' here, as this is
           anyhow described in Section 8.

           +   Phrase removed.

           - Section 3.1, 2nd paragraph: "Datagrams exchanged MAY also
           contain some minor payload, e.g.  HAVE messages to indicate
           the current progress of a peer or a REQUEST (see Section
           3.7)." to be added, just to make it clear IMHO: ", but MUST
           NOT include any DATA message".

           +   Added.

           - Section 3.2, 2nd paragraph: "In particular, whenever a
           receiving peer has successfully checked the integrity of a
           chunk or interval of chunks it MUST send a HAVE message to
           all peers it wants to interact with in the near future."
           This looks like a place where a lot of traffic can be send
           out of a peer, i.e., whenever a chunk arrives a HAVE message
           must be sent.  I don't believe that this should be mandated
           by the protocol specification, but there should guidance on
           when to send this, e.g., peers might be also able to wait for
           a short period of time to gather more chunks to be reported
           in HAVE.  Or should in this case a single UDP datagram
           contain multiple HAVEs?

           +   Clarified.

           - Section 3.4 on ACKs This section looks pretty weak, as ACKs
           may be sent but on the other hand MUST be sent if ledbat is
           used.  I would simply say: - ACK MUST be sent if an
           unreliable transport protocol is used - ACK MAY be sent if a
           reliable transport protocol is used - keep clarification
           about ledbat.

           +   DONE.

           - Section 3.5: Give text where INTEGERITY is described at
           least for the MTI scheme.

           +   DONE.

           - Section 3.7, 2nd paragraph - all 'MAY' are actually not
           right here.  Please remove or replace them with lower letters
           if appropriate. - It is not clear what the 'sequentially'
           means exactly.  Is it in the received order?

           +   First point TODO.  "Sequentially" replaced with "received
               order".

           - Section 3.8: Please replace 'MAY' by can, as those are not
           normative behaviors but more the fact that peers can, for
           instance, request urgent data.

           +   DONE.

           - Section 3.9 Same comment as for the Section 3.8 just above
           this comment.

           +   DONE.

           - Section 3.9 waiting for responses OLD " When peer B
           receives a CHOKE message from A it MUST NOT send new REQUEST
           messages and SHOULD NOT expect answers to any outstanding
           ones."  NEW " When peer B receives a CHOKE message from A it
           MUST NOT send new REQUEST messages and it cannot expect
           answers to any outstanding ones, as the transfer of chunks is
           choked."

           +   DONE.

           - Section 3.10.2 This whole section about PEX hole punching
           reads very, very experimental.  The STUN method is ok, but
           PEX isn't.  First of all, the safe behavior for a peer when
           it receives unsolicited PEX messages, is to discard those
           messages.  Second, this unsolicited PEX messages trigger some
           behavior which may open an attack vector.  The best way, but
           this needs more discussion, is to include to some token in
           the messages that are exchanged in order to make avoid any
           blind attacks here.  However, this will need more and
           detailed discussions of the purpose of this.

           +   TODO: hole punching comment.

           +   We moved parts of the security analysis of PEX up, such
               that all mechanisms are explained in the main text, and
               the analysis of what attacks there are and how these
               mechanisms prevent them is in the Sec. Considerations
               section.

           - Section 3.11 I don't see the 'MUST send keep-alive' as a
           mandatory requirement, as peers might have good reasons not
           to send any keep alive.  Why not saying 'A peer can send a
           keep-alive' and it 'MUST use the simple datagram...' as
           already described.  Though there is also no really need to
           say MUST.

           +   Now Section 3.12.  Rephrased and clarified the reason and
               consequences of sending keep-alive msgs.

           - Section 4 The syntax definition for each of the chunk
           addressing schemes is missing.  This is not suitable for any
           specification that aims at interoperable implementations.

           - Section 4.3.2 PPSPP peers MUST use the ACK message if an
           unreliable transport protocol is used.

           +   DONE.

           - Section 4.4 Has been tested in an implementation?  I would
           like to understand the need for such a section, as in my
           understanding a peer implementation should chose one scheme
           and support this and there shouldn't be the need to convert
           between the different schemes.

           - Section 5 This reads that MHTs are mandatory to implement
           while the document makes the impression that MHTs are
           optional.

           +   Rephrased, see High-level issues.

           - Section 5.3 " so each datagram SHOULD be processed
           separately and a loss of one datagram MUST NOT disrupt the
           flow" The MUST NOT is not a protocol specification
           requirement, but more an informative part saying that a lost
           message shouldn't impact the protocol machinery, but it can
           impact the overall operation.  What is the flow here in that
           sentence?

           +   Rephrased.

           - Section 5.6.2.  An illustrative example explaining how the
           automatic size detection works is required here.

           +   Added a paragraph with an example that follows the figure
               used during the explanation.  A state diagram could also
               be added, but bight be a bit redundant.

           - Section 6.1, 4th paragraph: Where do I find the 1 byte
           algorithm field in the swarm ID?  The swarm ID is not really
           defined in a single place.

           +   Expanded.  TODO: Formal spec of swarm ID.

           - Section 7.3 The described min/max versioning relies on the
           fact that there are major and minor version numbers.  I
           cannot find any major and minor version number scheme in the
           draft.

           +   Actually, it does not.

           - Section 7.4, Length field It is not clear what the 'Length'
           field is referring to.  Further, it is not clear of the swam
           IDs are concatenated in one swarm ID option, of each swarm ID
           must be placed in a separate swam ID option.

           - Section 7.6 MHTs are mandatory to support though MHTs are
           optional?

           +   Clarified.

           - Section 7.7 'key size ... derived from the swarm ID'.  This
           relates to my high level comment no 4. on the use of implicit
           information.  Either it is clearly specified how this
           information is derived or there is a protocol field/
           information about the size.

           +   Key size derivation procedure added to description of
               SIGNED_INTEGRITY in UDP encapsulation.

           - Section 7.8 I would recommend to say that the default MUST
           be supported, but the peer must always signal what method it
           is supporting or at least using.

           +   Corrected, see High-level issues 4.)

           - Section 7.10 I have not understood how the 'Lenght' field
           relates to the message bitmap and how long the message bitmap
           can grow.  The figure looks like a maximum of 16 bits?

           +   Clarified.

           - Section 8 I do not see the value of the text in the preface
           of Section 8.  I would say that this text should say what is
           mandatory and what's not, i.e., MUST use UDP and MUST use
           LEDBAT.  Potentially saying that future protocol versions can
           also run over other transport protocols.

           +   Adjusted.

           - Section 8.1 about Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU) The text is
           discussing that a Ethernet can carry 1500 bytes.  This is
           true, but the Ethernet payload is not the normative MTU
           across all of the Internet.  For IPv6 the min MTU is 1280
           bytes and for IPv4 it is 576 bytes, though for IPv4 it can be
           theoretically much lower at 64 bytes.  It would move the
           definition of the default chunk size to a recommendation with
           text saying that this size has a high likelihood to travel
           end-to-end in the Internet without any fragmentation.
           Fragmentation might increase the loss of complete chunks, as
           one lost fragment will cause the loss of a complete chunk.
           One way of getting an informed decision on whether chunks can
           travel in their size is to use the Don't Fragment (DF) bit in
           IPv4 and also to watch for ICMP error messages.  However,
           ICMP error messages are not a reliable indication, but they
           can be some indication.

           +   1 KiB chunk size has been made a recommendation.

           - Section 8.1 Definition of the default chunk size There is
           no need to define a default chunk size, if the chunk size
           would be always signaled per swarm.  This is another default/
           implicit value places that is unnecessary.

           +   The chunk size is always part of the content's metadata.

           - Section 8.3: see also my comment no 3.  The concept of
           channels is introduced very late and with few words.  A
           figure to explain the concept will help a lot and also more
           formal text on what a channel is and how they are identified.
           Also what the init channel is.

           +   Concept now introduced in Section 3.11.  TODO init
               channel.

           - Section 8 in general: There is no formal definition of the
           messages, just bit pattern examples.

           - Section 8.4 (as example for the other Sections in 8.x): i)
           What is the '(CHANNEL' paramter?  Is it actually a parameter?
           ii) it is implicit that the first channel no (0000000) is the
           remote peer's channel and that the second channel no
           (00000011) is the local peer's channel, right?  This isn't
           clear from the text, but my guess.

           - Section 8.5 Can HAVE messages multiple bin specs in one
           message or do I have to make a HAVE message for each bin?

           +   Clarified.

           - Section 8.6 What is the formal defintion of a DATA message?
           That's completely missing or I have not understood it.

           - Section 8.7 looks just underspecified, especially as this
           is the link to LEDBAT.

           - Section 8.11 How are the chunks specified here?  The formal
           syntax definition or reference to one is missing.

           - Section 8.13 I'm lost on this section, as I haven't fully
           understood the concept of the PEX in this document.
           Especially not why there is the PEX_REScert.

           +   We moved parts of the security analysis of PEX up into
               3.10, such that all mechanisms are explained in the main
               text, and the analysis of what attacks there are and how
               these mechanisms prevent them is in the Sec.
               Considerations section.

           - Section 11 The RFC required for protocol extensions of a
           standards track protocol looks odd.  This must be at least
           IETF Review or Standards Action.

           ***Editorials:

           - Abstract (and probably also other places), 1st sentence of,
           PPSPP is not a transport protocol, just a protocol

           +   DONE

           - Section 1.1, 4th paragraph: I would remove the reference to
           rmcat, as it is not yet clear what the outcome of the rmcat
           wg will be

           +   DONE

           - Section 1.3, on page 8, about seeding/leeching: I would
           break it in to sub-bullets.

           +   DONE

           - Section 2.1 and following: These are examples, isn'it?  If
           so, this should be mentioned or clarified.

           +   DONE.  All subsections now labeled "Example:".

           - Section 2.1: What is the PPSP Url?

           - Section 2.3, the 1st paragraph, detection of dead peers: It
           would be good to say where this detection is described in the
           remainder of the draft.  Just for completeness.

           +   DONE.  Dead peer detection is now a separate section and
               referenced here.

           - Section 2.2, the very last paragraph, 'Peer A MAY also':
           This 'MAY' is not useful here.  I would just write 'Peer A
           can also', as there is nothing normative described here.

           +   DONE

           - Section 3.2, last paragraph: What is the latter
           confinement?  This is not clear to me.

           +   Rephrased.

           - Section 3.9, last sentence I am not sure to what the
           reference to Section 3.7 is pointing in this respect.

           +   Rephrased.

           - Section 3.10.1 about PEX messages The text says 'PPSPP
           optionally features...'.  I have not understood if this
           optionally refers to mandatory to implement but optionally to
           use, or if the PEX messages are optionally to implement.

           +   Made it clear that is OPTIONAL and not mandatory-to-
               implement.

           - Section 3.12 I'm not sure what this section is telling
           exactly.  Isn't just saying that PPSPP as such does not care
           how chunks are stored locally, as this is implementation
           dependent?

           +   Yes. Removed.

           - Section 4.2, page 15, 1st paragraph: OLD 'A PPSPP peer MAY
           support' NEW 'The support for this scheme is OPTIONAL'

           +   DONE, for byte ranges as well.

           - Section 6.1.1 This section is not describing sign-all, but
           rather a justification why it may still work.  This doesn't
           help at all.

           - Section 7, 1st paragraph Why is there a reference to RFC
           2132?

           +   Removed, just similarity in format.

           - Section 7 in general i) It is common to give bit positions
           in the figures where the syntax of options is described.
           This allows to count how many bits are used for a protocol
           field more easily and also way more reliable. ii) Please add
           also Figure labels to the syntax definitions of the options.
           This makes it easier to reference them later on if needed.

           - Section 8.1 1 kibibyte is 1 kbyte?

           +   We follow ISO/IEC 80000-13 to avoid the kilo = 1000 or
               1024 confusion.

           - Section 8.2, last paragraph i ) "All messages are
           idempotent" in what respect? ii) "or recognizable as
           duplicates" but how are the recognized as duplicates?

           +   Idempotent means that processing a message twice does not
               lead to a different state than processing them once.
               Resent handshakes can be recognized as duplicates because
               a peer already recorded the first connection attempt in
               its state.  Updated text.

           - Section 8.5, last sentence in brackets: What is this last
           sentence about?

           - Section 8.13 " If sender of the PEX_REQ message does not
           have a private or link-local address, then the PEX_RES*
           messages MUST NOT contain such addresses [RFC1918][RFC4291]."
           What is this text saying?  Do not include what you do not
           have anyway?

           +   Rephrased.  It tries to say that internal addresses must
               not be leaked to external peers.

           - Section 8.14 There is no single place where all the
           constants are collected and also documented what the default
           values or the recommended values.  For instance in this
           Section 8.14 where the dead peer time out is set to 3 minutes
           and also the number of datagrams that should have sent.  I
           would make a section or subsection to discuss dead peers and
           how they are detected and just link to the keep-alive
           mechanism in Section 8.14.

           +   A new section Section 12.1.1.1 "Summary of Default
               Values" was created for this in the Ops & Mgmt part.

           - Section 11 This section needs to be overhauled once the
           document is ready for the IESG.  The section is not wrong but
           can be improved to help IANA.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: <[email-masked]>
Date: 2013/7/15
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-ppsp-peer-protocol-07.txt
To: Riccardo Petrocco <[email-masked]>, Arno Bakker <[email-masked]>,
Victor Grishchenko <[email-masked]>

A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-ppsp-peer-protocol-07.txt
has been successfully submitted by Arno Bakker and posted to the
IETF repository.

Filename:        draft-ietf-ppsp-peer-protocol
Revision:        07
Title:           Peer-to-Peer Streaming Peer Protocol (PPSPP)
Creation date:   2013-07-15
Group:           ppsp
Number of pages: 84
URL:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ppsp-peer-protocol-07.txt
Status:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ppsp-peer-protocol
Htmlized:        http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ppsp-peer-protocol-07
Diff:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ppsp-peer-protocol-07

Abstract:
   The Peer-to-Peer Streaming Peer Protocol (PPSPP) is a protocol for
   disseminating the same content to a group of interested parties in a
   streaming fashion.  PPSPP supports streaming of both pre-recorded
   (on-demand) and live audio/video content.  It is based on the peer-
   to-peer paradigm, where clients consuming the content are put on
   equal footing with the servers initially providing the content, to
   create a system where everyone can potentially provide upload
   bandwidth.  It has been designed to provide short time-till-playback
   for the end user, and to prevent disruption of the streams by
   malicious peers.  PPSPP has also been designed to be flexible and
   extensible.  It can use different mechanisms to optimize peer
   uploading, prevent freeriding, and work with different peer discovery
   schemes (centralized trackers or Distributed Hash Tables).  It
   supports multiple methods for content integrity protection and chunk
   addressing.  Designed as a generic protocol that can run on top of
   various transport protocols, it currently runs on top of UDP using
   LEDBAT for congestion control.

The IETF Secretariat

---

From: 邓灵莉/Lingli Deng <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2013 13:26:07 +0800

Hi Riccardo,

Sorry I haven’t been able to finish the whole draft, but I gather a few
general comments for you to consider:

1, The reference implementation is not available, as it requires a login
account and password?

2, There are a few inconsistencies with the tracker protocol:

2.1 firstly, in terms of the MPD file acquisition, the tracker protocol
states that the MPD file is acquired by the peer from the service portal,
which is out of scope of PPSP’s specification. Whereas your statement says
that the MPD file is acquired by the peer from the tracker.

2.2 secondly, regarding the peer enrollment, the tracker protocol states
that there will be an offline CA instead of the central tracker to issue
peers’ security certificates, which contradicts the relevant description in
the current peer protocol draft.

3, As for the chunk availability specification schemes, being a highly
efficient scheme itself, the binnum scheme could be kind of heavy-weighted
for it requires every chunk be acknowledged a logarithmic number of times
(which may be costly and unnecessary if PPSPP is carried over a reliable
transport protocols, such as TCP). 

BTW, I have been proposing a lossy compression method to mitigate this
matter. (http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-deng-ppsp-bfbitmap/ )

I’d appreciate it if you would provide some comments about it:-)

BR

Lingli

发件人: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] 代表 Riccardo
Petrocco
发送时间: 2013年7月16日 1:21
收件人: ppsp
主题: [ppsp] Fwd: New Version Notification for
draft-ietf-ppsp-peer-protocol-07.txt

Hi all,

Unfortunately due to the lack of time, and the extensive review, some points
still need to be addressed.

See you in Berlin,
ciao,
Riccardo

           ***Technicals:

           +   Rephrased.

           +   Phrase removed.

           +   Added.

           +   Clarified.

           +   DONE.

           +   DONE.

           +   DONE.

           +   DONE.

           +   DONE.

           +   DONE.

           +   Rephrased.

           +   Actually, it does not.

           +   Clarified.

           +   Clarified.

           +   Adjusted.

           +   Clarified.

           ***Editorials:

           +   DONE

           +   DONE

           +   DONE

           +   DONE

           +   Rephrased.

           +   Rephrased.

           +   Yes. Removed.

 

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: <[email-masked]>
Date: 2013/7/15
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-ppsp-peer-protocol-07.txt
To: Riccardo Petrocco <[email-masked]>, Arno Bakker <[email-masked]>,

Abstract:

The IETF Secretariat

---

From: Riccardo Petrocco <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2013 18:54:02 +0200

Hi Lingli,

> account and password?
The reference implementation is available.
Just replace "https" with "http".

> ****
>
> 2, There are a few inconsistencies with the tracker protocol:****
>
I don't think we state that peers acquire the MPD file from the tracker,
since that file holds the addresses of the available trackers.
The main responsibility of trackers is to provide addresses of peers which
are interested in the same content.

> ****
I don't see how the two descriptions contradict.
>From the ppspp draft: "Several designs are possible for the security
environment for these membership certificates."
We provides just an example in which the tracker acts as CA, without
relying on the portal. The tracker specification also suggests peers to
retrieve the certificate from the portal, but it is not mandatory.
Indeed we can clarify the text providing a more suitable example.

> ****
Every chunk is acknowledged only once, and only in case an unreliable
protocol, such as UDP is used.
If the transmission is carried over a reliable protocol, such as TCP, each
packet is acknowledged by the protocol itself.

> ****
I think those are different subjects.
One thing is the acknowledgement of received packets, another is sending
announces of locally available content.

> I’d appreciate it if you would provide some comments about it:-)
I browsed through the draft.
Sorry but I'm currently on vacation till the meeting in Berlin :-).

In my personal opinion, I don't really see the need for it. In the PPSPP
peers are not announcing content to the swarm using bitmaps as in
BitTorrent.
The only time such an information, similar to bitmaps, is sent by a peer,
is during the handshake procedure.
During the handshake procedure, peers announce for the first time what they
have locally available, afterwards they just send "updates" to what they
have already announced.
I agree with you, original bitmaps are inefficient, but that is the reason
we use bin numbers or chunk/byte-ranges. Especially in a streaming
environment, content is mostly downloaded
in-order, hence bin numbers and chunk/byte-ranges are very well suited to
send update information.

See you in Berlin
regards,
Riccardo

BR****
>
> Lingli****
>
> ** **
>
> *发件人:* [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] *代表 *Riccardo
> Petrocco
> *发送时间:* 2013年7月16日 1:21
> *收件人:* ppsp
> *主题:* [ppsp] Fwd: New Version Notification for
> draft-ietf-ppsp-peer-protocol-07.txt****
>
> ** **
>
> Hi all,****
>
> I just uploaded an updated version of the peer protocol draft.****
>
> We mostly focused on the issues presented in the recent AD review.****
>
> points still need to be addressed.****
>
> See you in Berlin,
> ciao,
> Riccardo****
>
>
>
> ****
> ** **
> Htmlized:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ppsp-peer-protocol-07
> Diff:
> The IETF Secretariat****
> ** **