Subject: [Fwd: RE: COPS-over-TLS v05 draft review]

From: Uri Blumenthal <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2003 16:00:35 -0500

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Folks,

This is from your friendly Security Advisor. (:-)

And since I'm not the member of this mailing list,
please kindly copy me on the relevant e-mails that
might occur in response to this posting. (:-)

Regards,
Uri.

-------- Original Message --------
From: "Hahn, Scott" <[email-masked]>

...I think this should be posted to the list for discussion.
	-Scott

 > From: Uri Blumenthal [mailto:[email-masked]]
 >
 > Here are the issues I see with the draft
 > "draft-ietf-rap-cops-tls-05.txt".
 >
 > First, overall I want to see how it ensures that when both client and
 > server can do security, it will be enabled. For example, a
 > man-in-the-middle can modify the traffic to convince one party that
 > the other one doesn't support security ("bid-down") and thus force
 > them to establish an insecure connection even though they both are
 > capable of secure communications. I would like to see a capability
 > to enforce secure mode.
 >
 > Also, I would like to see scenarios based not [only] on whether
 > client/server SUPPORTS security - but also on whether its POLICY
 > REQUIRES secure connection to a given peer. If it was meant so,
 > it isn't clear from the document.
 >
 >
 > Details by sections:
 >
 > 4.2. So what should the client do after receiving the error?
 >
 > 4.3. So the server MAY send a ClientClose... Anything else
 >       it "may" do? Nothing it "should" do in this case...?
 >       What should an implementor do here?
 >
 > 4.4. Same as above.
 >
 > 4.7. Why is this subsection here? I'd say - remove it.
 >
 > 8. It is good to require PKI - what happens if CA isn't
 >     available, isn't accessible, whatever?
 >     Reverts to insecure?
 >
 >
 >
 >
 > Thanks!
 >
 > Regards,
 > Uri