
From nobody Thu Mar  1 01:59:24 2018
Return-Path: <bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch>
X-Original-To: secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C599412DA49 for <secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  1 Mar 2018 01:58:56 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.909
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.909 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id OR4O4Y25qjqg for <secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  1 Mar 2018 01:58:43 -0800 (PST)
Received: from softronics.hoeneisen.ch (softronics.hoeneisen.ch [62.2.86.178]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1D32D120721 for <secdispatch@ietf.org>; Thu,  1 Mar 2018 01:58:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]) by softronics.hoeneisen.ch with esmtp (Exim 4.86_2) (envelope-from <bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch>) id 1erKz2-0004zv-RA for secdispatch@ietf.org; Thu, 01 Mar 2018 10:58:40 +0100
Date: Thu, 1 Mar 2018 10:58:40 +0100 (CET)
From: Bernie Hoeneisen <bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch>
X-X-Sender: bhoeneis@softronics.hoeneisen.ch
To: IETF SEC DISPATCH list <secdispatch@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1803011037570.18559@softronics.hoeneisen.ch>
User-Agent: Alpine 2.20 (DEB 67 2015-01-07)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed
X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 127.0.0.1
X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch
X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on softronics.hoeneisen.ch); SAEximRunCond expanded to false
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdispatch/IGhfxtOBeqFryYqzjvq5Rdka_mU>
Subject: [Secdispatch] Opportunistic encryption for email with pEp
X-BeenThere: secdispatch@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Dispatch <secdispatch.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/secdispatch>, <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/secdispatch/>
List-Post: <mailto:secdispatch@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdispatch>, <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 01 Mar 2018 09:58:57 -0000

Please be informed that the follwoing pEp (pretty Easy pricacy) work is on 
the way and may end up in SecDispatch for dispatching. Therefore, Richard 
asked me to inform also this list (besides saag and dispatch).

After an introduction in SAAG during IETF-99 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/99/materials/minutes-99-saag , a 
successful BarBoF in Singapore and many hallway discussions we learned 
that there is considerable interest for secure interpersonal messaging, 
which is at the same time also usable and interoperable with systems 
already deployed out in the wild. The main concept of the pretty Easy 
privacy (pEp) work has already been published as I-D:

    https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-birk-pep

Basically it is about enhanced opportunistic encryption in email (and other 
messaging).

The Internet Society (ISOC) is diretly supporting the pEp work and it 
has been selected as an Innovative Projects for Beyond the Net Funding. 
Please find more information on:

    https://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2017/06/12-innovative-projects-selected-for-beyond-the-net-funding/


Just recently we published another piece out of the overall pEp work as 
I-D:

- Trustwords (similar to the PGP wordlist or RFC 2289) to make
   authenticated communications easy for end-users:
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-birk-pep-trustwords/
   There has been question some discusion on the saag mailing list on this.


In addtion (and among further I-Ds to come in the near future), we are 
currently working on the following I-D (to be published as I-Ds shortly), 
whose early drafts your may access already:

- New privacy-enhancing formats for email based upon already existing
   standards, e.g. PGP/MIME (minimizing unnecessarily exposed meta data,
   including encrypting the subject):
   https://pep.foundation/dev/repos/internet-drafts/file/tip/pep-email/draft-birk-pep-email-NN.txt

- Rating System and Privacy Status to label secure / private types of
   communications:
   https://pep.foundation/dev/repos/internet-drafts/file/tip/pep-rating/draft-birk-pep-rating-NN.txt

We are seeking more feedback on our existing work as well to find
the right venue (and scope) for this work to continue in the IETF.
We are also still trying to figure out whether this this work should be 
rather in SEC or ART.


What do you think of the pEp work in general? Is this something you 
consider useful also for you and/or your work? If the pEp approach is 
interestig to you, we kindly ask you to express your opinion to this list.

Looking forward to your feedback!

Best,
  Bernie et al.


From nobody Thu Mar  8 18:06:34 2018
Return-Path: <rdd@cert.org>
X-Original-To: secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 97DA2128954 for <secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  8 Mar 2018 18:06:33 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9,  DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, SPF_PASS=-0.001,  URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cert.org
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id y9KG7YiZUZ5Z for <secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu,  8 Mar 2018 18:06:32 -0800 (PST)
Received: from taper.sei.cmu.edu (taper.sei.cmu.edu [147.72.252.16]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1931012895E for <secdispatch@ietf.org>; Thu,  8 Mar 2018 18:06:31 -0800 (PST)
Received: from korb.sei.cmu.edu (korb.sei.cmu.edu [10.64.21.30]) by taper.sei.cmu.edu (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id w2926Usp028010 for <secdispatch@ietf.org>; Thu, 8 Mar 2018 21:06:30 -0500
DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 taper.sei.cmu.edu w2926Usp028010
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=cert.org; s=yc2bmwvrj62m; t=1520561190; bh=V8BHkqI3OH3YGvAcKy0SYY26J7CvqWZWcbQINmVBnPw=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:From; b=g7SwElJOWwXpDcZCuSQV/O94u+fqJGM3zCREuaIekW3tWjJQfN8/sEda0CoJlujZZ Ld0QS6IebzqBncpgIB1g1rRlCRkBcwjqI0KMIbavhiFnfUDZQl6vczaFRXOu90uH+Y wjxwqYx3li/AjM4Dxiasiu4cHTt1kH5Y1ToezF9U=
Received: from CASSINA.ad.sei.cmu.edu (cassina.ad.sei.cmu.edu [10.64.28.249]) by korb.sei.cmu.edu (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id w2926TnO004137 for <secdispatch@ietf.org>; Thu, 8 Mar 2018 21:06:29 -0500
Received: from MARATHON.ad.sei.cmu.edu ([10.64.28.250]) by CASSINA.ad.sei.cmu.edu ([10.64.28.249]) with mapi id 14.03.0361.001; Thu, 8 Mar 2018 21:06:29 -0500
From: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
To: "secdispatch@ietf.org" <secdispatch@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Draft agenda for IETF 101
Thread-Index: AdO3SrocwuYKIQIrRLmSOUZdvTiAAQ==
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 02:06:28 +0000
Message-ID: <359EC4B99E040048A7131E0F4E113AFC0137F72A07@marathon>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [10.64.22.6]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdispatch/b5bEzp6AegSkL6OEGqRsARvskao>
Subject: [Secdispatch] Draft agenda for IETF 101
X-BeenThere: secdispatch@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Dispatch <secdispatch.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/secdispatch>, <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/secdispatch/>
List-Post: <mailto:secdispatch@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdispatch>, <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Mar 2018 02:06:33 -0000

Hello!

SecDispatch plans to meet on Tuesday, March 20, 2018 from 9:30 - 12:00.  Th=
e working agenda [1] is as follows:

--[ draft agenda ]--
1. Logistics and introduction (chairs, 10 min)

2. Dispatch items
 (Each item is 15 minutes =3D 7 min presentation + 8 min discussion)

(a) A Method for Web Security Policies (security.txt)
draft: draft-foudil-securitytxt-03
presenter: Yakov Shafranovich

(b) Considerations For Using Short Term Certificates
draft: draft-nir-saag-star-00, Yoav Nir
presenter: Yoav Nir

(c) Use of the Hash-based Merkle Tree Signature (MTS) Algorithm in the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) draft: draft-housley-cms-mts-hash-sig
presenter: Russ Housley

(d) pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Trustwords concept
draft: draft-birk-pep-trustwords-00
presenter: Birk Volker

3. Closing (chairs, 5 min)
--[end]--

Regards,
Roman and Richard

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/101/materials/agenda-101-secdispat=
ch


From nobody Fri Mar  9 09:28:34 2018
Return-Path: <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: secdispatch@ietf.org
Delivered-To: secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 81979127333; Fri,  9 Mar 2018 09:28:23 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: "IETF-Announce" <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
X-Test-IDTracker: no
X-IETF-IDTracker: 6.74.0
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
Precedence: bulk
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, secdispatch@ietf.org, secdispatch-chairs@ietf.org 
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-ID: <152061650352.11064.11876783383900013307.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Fri, 09 Mar 2018 09:28:23 -0800
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdispatch/Jz3RwObkOUHQaFZn6wqqI6dRhTE>
Subject: [Secdispatch] WG Action: Formed Security Dispatch (secdispatch)
X-BeenThere: secdispatch@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
List-Id: Security Dispatch <secdispatch.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/secdispatch>, <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/secdispatch/>
List-Post: <mailto:secdispatch@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdispatch>, <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Mar 2018 17:28:24 -0000

A new IETF WG has been formed in the Security Area. For additional
information, please contact the Area Directors or the WG Chairs.

Security Dispatch (secdispatch)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Current status: Proposed WG

Chairs:
  Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
  Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>

Assigned Area Director:
  Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>

Security Area Directors:
  Kathleen Moriarty <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
  Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>

Mailing list:
  Address: secdispatch@ietf.org
  To subscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdispatch
  Archive: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/secdispatch/

Group page: https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/secdispatch/

Charter: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-secdispatch/

The Security Dispatch working group is a DISPATCH-style WG (see
[RFC7957]) chartered to consider proposals for new work in the SEC
area and if the work is appropriate for the IETF and there is
sufficient interest, identify, or help create, an appropriate venue
for the work. In order to help the proposed new work succeed, the
working group aims to assist the proposed new work in:

1. Providing a clear problem statement, motivation and deliverables.
2. Ensuring that there has been adequate mailing list discussion reflecting
sufficient interest, a sufficient number of individuals have expressed a
willingness to contribute, and there is WG consensus before the proposed new
work can be dispatched.
3. Looking for and identifying commonalities and
overlap amongst published or ongoing protocol work and the proposed new work.
Such commonalities may indicate the possibility of reusing existing protocols
or elements thereof published by other WGs, or expanding and/or refactoring
the scope of deliverables in an existing active WG. 4. Protecting the
architectural integrity of IETF protocols and ensuring that new work has
general applicability. 5. Ensuring that the new work considers and seeks to
improve security and privacy.

Precedence will be given to documents which have evidence of interest in the
form of active drafts and list discussion.

Options for handling new work include:

- Directing the work to an existing WG.
- Developing a proposal for a BOF.
- Developing a charter for a new WG.
- Making recommendations that documents be AD-sponsored (which ADs may or may
  not choose to follow).
- By agreement with SEC ADs, processing simple administrative documents.
- Deferring the decision for the new work.
- Rejecting the new work.

The WG will attempt to come to a prompt resolution of the appropriate
disposition of each proposal, either on the mailing list or
or during the WG meeting where it is presented.

If the group decides that a particular topic needs to be addressed by a new
WG, the normal IETF chartering process will be followed, including, for
instance, IETF-wide review of the proposed charter. Proposals for large work
efforts SHOULD lead to a BOF where the topic can be discussed in front of the
entire IETF community. The SECDISPATCH WG will not do any protocol work.
Specifically, SECDISPATCH will always opt to find a location for technical
work; the only work that SECDISPATCH is not required to delegate (or defer,
or reject) is administrative work such as IANA actions. Documents progressed
as AD-sponsored would typically include those that do not have general
applicability to IETF protocols, but rather are only applicable to specific
use cases and network deployments, for which the scope must be clearly
specified.

Proposed new work may be deferred in cases where the WG does not have enough
information for the chairs to determine consensus. New work may be rejected in
cases where there is not sufficient WG interest or the proposal has been
considered and rejected in the past, unless a substantially revised proposal
is put forth, including compelling new reasons for accepting the work.

A major objective of the SECDISPATCH WG is to provide timely, clear
dispositions of new efforts. Thus, where there is consensus to take on new
work, the WG will strive to quickly find a home for it. While most new work in
the SEC area is expected to be considered in the SECDISPATCH working group,
there may be times where that is not appropriate. At the discretion of the
area directors, new efforts may follow other paths beside SECDISPATCH. For
example work may go directly to BoFs (this is appropriate in cases of major
new work which would clearly need a new WG),  may be initiated in other
working groups when it clearly belongs in that group, or may be directly AD
sponsored.


From nobody Tue Mar 20 02:14:20 2018
Return-Path: <ofriel@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 170D012420B for <secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 02:14:18 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -14.53
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-14.53 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=-0.01, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=-0.01, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL=-7.5] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cisco.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 24rt0Kz8lc7Y for <secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 02:14:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from rcdn-iport-4.cisco.com (rcdn-iport-4.cisco.com [173.37.86.75]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7E87D120227 for <secdispatch@ietf.org>; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 02:14:16 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=@cisco.com; l=4091; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1521537256; x=1522746856; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version; bh=WKyO9qjbynChVXp8BxXLfHaIH7z7Gqa2DhvPDP9xeGg=; b=hZJjq5cYadOolH5orjxRtxR0Z143Gy3yXhxgJh1pkBM7ZyXGPVQIa7oH Z5XvgI6RyBiNyZ/2reMp7EG45ElHULwGpdYjRER/EHVwaPcYLaWxzOuQs tCk7rC4M90xpVonvVV6HJjanMuWq3XZdiIwb2cexGYDdnmTi/17dxmIsb M=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: =?us-ascii?q?A0CQAQBv0LBa/49dJa1eGQEBAQEBAQE?= =?us-ascii?q?BAQEBAQcBAQEBAYJadmZyMo1wjX2DGY5zhQ+CEguFEYNKITQYAQIBAQEBAQE?= =?us-ascii?q?Cax0LhVlMEgEMdCYBBA4NhC5kql2IX4IOhTOCFYFVgVSODwOYOwkCjyqNPZA?= =?us-ascii?q?SAhETAYEpAR44gVJwFYJ+kGqQPoEYAQEB?=
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.48,334,1517875200";  d="scan'208,217";a="369818235"
Received: from rcdn-core-7.cisco.com ([173.37.93.143]) by rcdn-iport-4.cisco.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 20 Mar 2018 09:14:15 +0000
Received: from XCH-ALN-011.cisco.com (xch-aln-011.cisco.com [173.36.7.21]) by rcdn-core-7.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id w2K9EFRl010637 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL); Tue, 20 Mar 2018 09:14:15 GMT
Received: from xch-rcd-012.cisco.com (173.37.102.22) by XCH-ALN-011.cisco.com (173.36.7.21) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1320.4; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 04:14:15 -0500
Received: from xch-rcd-012.cisco.com ([173.37.102.22]) by XCH-RCD-012.cisco.com ([173.37.102.22]) with mapi id 15.00.1320.000; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 04:14:15 -0500
From: "Owen Friel (ofriel)" <ofriel@cisco.com>
To: "secdispatch@ietf.org" <secdispatch@ietf.org>
CC: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
Thread-Topic: ATLS interest
Thread-Index: AdPAK6XzWBrvaqnqS7usm4tSFXh4Fw==
Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 09:14:14 +0000
Message-ID: <8d55e2018d5746febec06192344da493@XCH-RCD-012.cisco.com>
Accept-Language: en-GB, en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-ms-exchange-transport-fromentityheader: Hosted
x-originating-ip: [10.24.58.98]
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_8d55e2018d5746febec06192344da493XCHRCD012ciscocom_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdispatch/XQcbHb_Zas9p7p9dg56p_9r7gTw>
Subject: [Secdispatch] ATLS interest
X-BeenThere: secdispatch@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Dispatch <secdispatch.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/secdispatch>, <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/secdispatch/>
List-Post: <mailto:secdispatch@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdispatch>, <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 09:14:18 -0000

--_000_8d55e2018d5746febec06192344da493XCHRCD012ciscocom_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

We had a working lunch review of ATLS (draft-friel-tls-atls-00) yesterday a=
nd there was sufficient interest in the room to continue refining the propo=
sal. ATLS is seen as addressing some real world problems but there are some=
 concerns and issues with the approach that require further discussion. We =
would like to raise and discuss this at SECDISPATCH and hopefully reach con=
sensus on one of the following paths forward:
- dispatch to an existing WG
- make a new mini-WG

Rgds,
Owen, Hannes

--_000_8d55e2018d5746febec06192344da493XCHRCD012ciscocom_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-micr=
osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http:=
//www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
<meta name=3D"Generator" content=3D"Microsoft Word 15 (filtered medium)">
<style><!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
	{font-family:"Cambria Math";
	panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0cm;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:12.0pt;
	font-family:"Times New Roman",serif;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:#0563C1;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:#954F72;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.EmailStyle17
	{mso-style-type:personal-compose;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
	color:windowtext;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
	mso-fareast-language:EN-US;}
@page WordSection1
	{size:612.0pt 792.0pt;
	margin:72.0pt 72.0pt 72.0pt 72.0pt;}
div.WordSection1
	{page:WordSection1;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>
<body lang=3D"EN-IE" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sa=
ns-serif">We had a working lunch review of ATLS (draft-friel-tls-atls-00) y=
esterday and there was sufficient interest in the
 room to continue refining the proposal. ATLS is seen as addressing some re=
al world problems but there are some concerns and issues with the approach =
that require further discussion. We would like to raise and discuss this at=
 SECDISPATCH and hopefully reach
 consensus on one of the following paths forward:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sa=
ns-serif">- dispatch to an existing WG</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif">- make a new mini-WG<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif">Rgds,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,sans-serif">Owen, Hannes</span><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;=
font-family:&quot;Calibri&quot;,sans-serif;mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p=
></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_8d55e2018d5746febec06192344da493XCHRCD012ciscocom_--


From nobody Tue Mar 20 04:35:15 2018
Return-Path: <bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch>
X-Original-To: secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AC23B126DC2 for <secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 04:35:13 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.91
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.91 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id H64DQgXcBSS2 for <secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 04:35:11 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from softronics.hoeneisen.ch (softronics.hoeneisen.ch [62.2.86.178]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A9E8D1200F1 for <secdispatch@ietf.org>; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 04:35:11 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1]) by softronics.hoeneisen.ch with esmtp (Exim 4.86_2) (envelope-from <bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch>) id 1eyFXp-0005NX-Rt for secdispatch@ietf.org; Tue, 20 Mar 2018 12:35:09 +0100
Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 12:35:09 +0100 (CET)
From: Bernie Hoeneisen <bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch>
X-X-Sender: bhoeneis@softronics.hoeneisen.ch
To: IETF SEC DISPATCH list <secdispatch@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1803201231240.20481@softronics.hoeneisen.ch>
User-Agent: Alpine 2.20 (DEB 67 2015-01-07)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset=US-ASCII
X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 127.0.0.1
X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch
X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on softronics.hoeneisen.ch); SAEximRunCond expanded to false
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdispatch/Mry2KkC51thibwJc6b1aKgtdqQ0>
Subject: [Secdispatch] Hands-on Session pEp & Trustwords / Wed 21.03.2018 / 10:30 / Waterloo
X-BeenThere: secdispatch@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Dispatch <secdispatch.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/secdispatch>, <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/secdispatch/>
List-Post: <mailto:secdispatch@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdispatch>, <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 11:35:14 -0000

For those of you who want to know more about the pEp architecture and how 
Trustwords are used in this context we offer a short demonstration of the 
running code on Wed 21.03.2018 / 10:30-11:30 in meeting room Waterloo.

c.u.  Bernie et al.

--

http://ucom.ch/
Modern Telephony Solutions and Tech Consulting for Internet Technology


From nobody Thu Mar 29 09:45:39 2018
Return-Path: <hallam@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: secdispatch@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CB7B012E044; Thu, 29 Mar 2018 09:45:34 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.099
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.099 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN=0.25, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.249, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id GIxH2NeJiHZN; Thu, 29 Mar 2018 09:45:32 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-oi0-x234.google.com (mail-oi0-x234.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4003:c06::234]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C2A5212420B; Thu, 29 Mar 2018 09:45:31 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-oi0-x234.google.com with SMTP id e8-v6so5723565oii.4; Thu, 29 Mar 2018 09:45:31 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025;  h=mime-version:sender:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=n2jEbCixnUbo5RYP2TxSJUD4d0mZgYNuPNTn1qcphBg=; b=K6nnmxdCQ9kEh2+hXo1hxPZcbVJKh0romqQvLuCf9SCTxW+vBw+k/Z3xAiLDS+JKIf DU7amunwHDjc3lallGX/FDQgTfkHhH7GWtkMj9QbUzf8wBDZSpvNnLc3vJ96P8qw7lum b57+81/swk0Xlx6micATVZ1Es8M4It3QgRTtrIEfJzAHexBuuv6oMhNujnx1qR6kAnt6 z5PV8QZK0RxP7/NX7FfENxKaweaezGHkE6vs75oyqXlyCPE2/V8rcBwFKghQbSyHNpxy m12I0xz8Rf1j1U3WVw3a5X4fYfu984ma1c3HLUMPiARu02DafQyJph50CM1S0uCRjMuV RbcQ==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:sender:from:date:message-id:subject :to; bh=n2jEbCixnUbo5RYP2TxSJUD4d0mZgYNuPNTn1qcphBg=; b=AMStZwCZkkjGv/QvStDezaXgZcTAA9s70apBq+beWZ48OrIvtWqb2iGX2HNuD/MNLg WgemLTdodLuYTZsmpK3ytIs6StbSrC8rpoN9kqG6+8iUhavSgO0IHbPKVBEVlMQVZ4wG P1TwZJTBIZ6FutZnTjOoq8uzdXxvqqZvCuBlxhNDfRYzowA+vJ1QK2LiSUWPXelPbyoj iq/P3Y4jSrHDb3JGOxdKt3I5h85CflQt0mg+lG0qFl2ngwX1K+b9+V/KIbGl/Ld8pxDj 5PaFbDuPxR8ECzJJxEUf+eHnX06OgdFv7gbAl+AKjRdZvGVKCfSiUqzrn+hijtcYy33D GXqQ==
X-Gm-Message-State: ALQs6tB5WiOq3MzrwqEfMKKr2yGhG0BivD9Qq/rv/SCzwKoVA9axCkyk 9VKQIhBdNX0rjikEwrdisWEtWk90Jg6xQbG4faMIuw==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: AIpwx491/s9HdFzFLkvJMRIjMQpd8Gy0R6zQwfWuOsNrEu48TBOxhOBUlY6fH9MwNej36hc9ILHoGCFNt4AblNjjKGI=
X-Received: by 10.202.168.207 with SMTP id r198mr5118714oie.180.1522341930595;  Thu, 29 Mar 2018 09:45:30 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Sender: hallam@gmail.com
Received: by 2002:a9d:233c:0:0:0:0:0 with HTTP; Thu, 29 Mar 2018 09:45:30 -0700 (PDT)
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2018 12:45:30 -0400
X-Google-Sender-Auth: oiFKc_f7LgGyK2r7wn_6E-huAVs
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwirCgM1jGvXK5r9u782cvRDmd5n3gPOr2xiHfJX_uL0NA@mail.gmail.com>
To: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, secdispatch@ietf.org
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="001a113cd5e00002e405688fdad3"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdispatch/KfBxU5BKcMfYTAo1YXb1QosQubE>
Subject: [Secdispatch] Request for guidance on SIN
X-BeenThere: secdispatch@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Dispatch <secdispatch.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/secdispatch>, <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/secdispatch/>
List-Post: <mailto:secdispatch@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdispatch>, <mailto:secdispatch-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2018 16:45:36 -0000

--001a113cd5e00002e405688fdad3
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Strong Internet Names is a concept that I have been developing for about 4
years now. It is an extension of concepts that Brian LaMachia and team
applied to the design of dotNET security with great success and I think it
has value applied at the network level.

The current draft can be found in HTML format here:
http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-sin.html

The related draft describing UDFs can be found here:
http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-udf.html


The question I would like to pose is which group to raise the work in as it
is a security specification with DNS implications.

This is one of the technologies I am using to build the mathematical mesh
but it is not limited to that application. The relationship is similar to
that of URIs to HTTP, they are both used in the Web but URIs are much wider
in scope.


The basic concept of a SIN is to bind together an Internet address and a
security policy that constrains the interpretation and use of that address.

For example, Example Inc holds the domain name example.com and has deployed
a private CA whose root of trust is a PKIX certificate with the UDF
fingerprint MB2GK-6DUF5-YGYYL-JNY5E-RWSHZ.
<http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-sin.html#s-3-2>

Alice is an employee of Example Inc., she uses three email addresses:
<http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-sin.html#s-3-3>
alice@example.com
<http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-sin.html#s-3-4>A regular
email address (not a SIN).
<http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-sin.html#s-3-5>
alice@mm--mb2gk-6duf5-ygyyl-jny5e-rwshz.example.com
<http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-sin.html#s-3-6>A strong
email address that is backwards compatible.
<http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-sin.html#s-3-7>
alice@example.com.mm--mb2gk-6duf5-ygyyl-jny5e-rwshz
<http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-sin.html#s-3-8>A strong
email address that is backwards incompatible. These are addresses that can
be entered into the contacts directory of any existing email client. Note
the use of the mm-- prefix to identify this as a SIN. Existing policy means
these labels cannot be issued as ICANN TLDs etc. That coupled with the fact
that accidental collisions are statistically improbable and these names are
as robust as is possible.

Putting what is functionally a superset of an OpenPGP fingerprint into a
domain name means that we can cryptographically harden any system.


This is not necessarily a construct that would be put in front of a user,
most of the time we use SINs in the mesh it is to record the outcome of a
trust decision.

So in the example above, Alice might give me her business card, I send her
an email and when she replies, there is a header giving me her Strong email
address which is bound to a security policy such as 'always use end-to-end
encryption with either S/MIME or OpenPGP and here are my keys'.

Certificate Authorities are currently employed as trust providers. In the
SIN model, we can limit their role to that of Trusted Introducers who are
only required to make the initial connection.

There is of course an infinite amount of complexity in the specification
and application of security policies. And the design of UDFs takes account
of that with a construction that provides for isolation of semantic domains.

What I want to do at this point is to get the foundations laid to allow us
to build interesting stuff. The interesting stuff itself is a separate
matter.

--001a113cd5e00002e405688fdad3
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default">Strong Internet Names is a co=
ncept that I have been developing for about 4 years now. It is an extension=
 of concepts that Brian LaMachia and team applied to the design of dotNET s=
ecurity with great success and I think it has value applied at the network =
level.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_defa=
ult">The current draft can be found in HTML format here:</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_default"><a href=3D"http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-=
sin.html">http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-sin.html</a><br><=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_default"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default">Th=
e related draft describing UDFs can be found here:</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_default"><a href=3D"http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-udf.ht=
ml">http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-udf.html</a><br></div><=
div class=3D"gmail_default"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default"><br></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_default">The question I would like to pose is which g=
roup to raise the work in as it is a security specification with DNS implic=
ations.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_def=
ault">This is one of the technologies I am using to build the mathematical =
mesh but it is not limited to that application. The relationship is similar=
 to that of URIs to HTTP, they are both used in the Web but URIs are much w=
ider in scope.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_default"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default">The basic concept of a =
SIN is to bind together an Internet address and a security policy that cons=
trains the interpretation and use of that address.</div><div class=3D"gmail=
_default"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default">

<p id=3D"gmail-s-3-2" style=3D"padding:0px;margin:0px 0px 1em;text-align:le=
ft;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:&quot;Noto Sans&quot;,Arial,Helvetica,sa=
ns-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;fon=
t-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-indent:0px=
;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial=
">For example, Example Inc holds the domain name <a href=3D"http://example.=
com">example.com</a> and has deployed a private CA whose root of trust is a=
 PKIX certificate with the UDF fingerprint MB2GK-6DUF5-YGYYL-JNY5E-RWSHZ.<a=
 class=3D"gmail-pilcrow" href=3D"http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallam=
baker-sin.html#s-3-2" style=3D"text-decoration:none;color:rgb(119,119,119)"=
></a></p><p id=3D"gmail-s-3-3" style=3D"padding:0px;margin:0px 0px 1em;text=
-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:&quot;Noto Sans&quot;,Arial,Hel=
vetica,sans-serif;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-i=
ndent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backgroun=
d-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-colo=
r:initial">Alice is an employee of Example Inc., she uses three email addre=
sses:<a class=3D"gmail-pilcrow" href=3D"http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft=
-hallambaker-sin.html#s-3-3" style=3D"text-decoration:none;color:rgb(119,11=
9,119)"></a></p><dl id=3D"gmail-s-3-4-" class=3D"gmail-nohang" style=3D"col=
or:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:&quot;Noto Sans&quot;,Arial,Helvetica,sans-ser=
if;font-size:14px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-vari=
ant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text=
-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backgro=
und-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-co=
lor:initial"><dt id=3D"gmail-s-3-4" style=3D"float:none;margin-right:1em;fo=
nt-weight:bold"><code style=3D"background-color:rgb(249,249,249);font-famil=
y:&quot;Roboto Mono&quot;,monospace"><a href=3D"mailto:alice@example.com">a=
lice@example.com</a></code><a class=3D"gmail-pilcrow" href=3D"http://mathme=
sh.com/Documents/draft-hallambaker-sin.html#s-3-4" style=3D"text-decoration=
:none;color:rgb(119,119,119)"></a></dt><dd id=3D"gmail-s-3-5" style=3D"marg=
in-bottom:0.8em;min-height:1.3em">A regular email address (not a SIN).<a cl=
ass=3D"gmail-pilcrow" href=3D"http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallambak=
er-sin.html#s-3-5" style=3D"text-decoration:none;color:rgb(119,119,119)"></=
a></dd><dt id=3D"gmail-s-3-6" style=3D"float:none;margin-right:1em;font-wei=
ght:bold"><code style=3D"background-color:rgb(249,249,249);font-family:&quo=
t;Roboto Mono&quot;,monospace"><a href=3D"mailto:alice@mm--mb2gk-6duf5-ygyy=
l-jny5e-rwshz.example.com">alice@mm--mb2gk-6duf5-ygyyl-jny5e-rwshz.example.=
com</a></code><a class=3D"gmail-pilcrow" href=3D"http://mathmesh.com/Docume=
nts/draft-hallambaker-sin.html#s-3-6" style=3D"text-decoration:none;color:r=
gb(119,119,119)"></a></dt><dd id=3D"gmail-s-3-7" style=3D"margin-bottom:0.8=
em;min-height:1.3em">A strong email address that is backwards compatible.<a=
 class=3D"gmail-pilcrow" href=3D"http://mathmesh.com/Documents/draft-hallam=
baker-sin.html#s-3-7" style=3D"text-decoration:none;color:rgb(119,119,119)"=
></a></dd><dt id=3D"gmail-s-3-8" style=3D"float:none;margin-right:1em;font-=
weight:bold"><code style=3D"background-color:rgb(249,249,249);font-family:&=
quot;Roboto Mono&quot;,monospace">alice@example.com.mm--mb2gk-6duf5-ygyyl-j=
ny5e-rwshz</code><a class=3D"gmail-pilcrow" href=3D"http://mathmesh.com/Doc=
uments/draft-hallambaker-sin.html#s-3-8" style=3D"text-decoration:none;colo=
r:rgb(119,119,119)"></a></dt><dd id=3D"gmail-s-3-9" style=3D"margin-bottom:=
0.8em;min-height:1.3em">A strong email address that is backwards incompatib=
le.</dd></dl>

These are addresses that can be entered into the contacts directory of any =
existing email client. Note the use of the mm-- prefix to identify this as =
a SIN. Existing policy means these labels cannot be issued as ICANN TLDs et=
c. That coupled with the fact that accidental collisions are statistically =
improbable and these names are as robust as is possible.</div><div class=3D=
"gmail_default"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default">Putting what is func=
tionally a superset of an OpenPGP fingerprint into a domain name means that=
 we can cryptographically harden any system.</div><div class=3D"gmail_defau=
lt"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_de=
fault">This is not necessarily a construct that would be put in front of a =
user, most of the time we use SINs in the mesh it is to record the outcome =
of a trust decision.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default"><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default">So in the example above, Alice might give me her busines=
s card, I send her an email and when she replies, there is a header giving =
me her Strong email address which is bound to a security policy such as &#3=
9;always use end-to-end encryption with either S/MIME or OpenPGP and here a=
re my keys&#39;.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default"><br></div><div class=3D"=
gmail_default">Certificate Authorities are currently employed as trust prov=
iders. In the SIN model, we can limit their role to that of Trusted Introdu=
cers who are only required to make the initial connection.</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default">There is of cours=
e an infinite amount of complexity in the specification and application of =
security policies. And the design of UDFs takes account of that with a cons=
truction that provides for isolation of semantic domains.</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default">What I want to do=
 at this point is to get the foundations laid to allow us to build interest=
ing stuff. The interesting stuff itself is a separate matter.</div></div>

--001a113cd5e00002e405688fdad3--

