Vigil Security, LLC

Herndon VA United States of America housley@vigilsec.com

sn3rd

Washington DC United States of America sean@sn3rd.com

Ericsson

Kista Sweden john.mattsson@ericsson.com

Ericsson

Saint Laurent, QC Canada daniel.migault@ericsson.com

Security lamps Digital Certificate This document specifies the certificate extension for including Network Function Types (NFTypes) for the 5G System in X.509 v3 public key certificates as profiled in RFC 5280.

Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at .

Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents () in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

• .  Introduction
• .  Terminology
• .  Network Function Types Certificate Extension
• .  ASN.1 Module
• .  Security Considerations
• .  Privacy Considerations
• .  IANA Considerations
• .  References
  • .  Normative References
  • .  Informative References
• .  NFType Strings
• .  Example Certificate Containing a NFTypes Extension
• Acknowledgements
• Authors' Addresses

Introduction The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) has specified several Network Functions (NFs) as part of the service-based architecture within the 5G System. There are 56 NF Types defined for 3GPP Release 17; they are listed in Table 6.1.6.3.3-1 of , and each NF type is identified by a short ASCII string. Operators of 5G Systems make use of an internal PKI to identify interface instances in the NFs in a 5G System. X.509 v3 public key certificates are used, and the primary function of a certificate is to bind a public key to the identity of an entity that holds the corresponding private key, known as the certificate subject. The certificate subject and the SubjectAltName certificate extension can be used to support identity-based access control decisions. This document specifies the NFTypes certificate extension to support role-based access control decisions by providing a list of NF Types associated with the certificate subject. The NFTypes certificate extension can be used by operators of 5G Systems or later.

Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Network Function Types Certificate Extension This section specifies the NFTypes certificate extension, which provides a list of NF Types associated with the certificate subject. The NFTypes certificate extension MAY be included in public key certificates . The NFTypes certificate extension MUST be identified by the following object identifier: id-pe-nftype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 34 } This extension MUST NOT be marked critical. The NFTypes extension MUST have the following syntax: NFTypes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF NFType NFType ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..32)) The NFTypes MUST contain at least one NFType. Each NFType MUST contain only an ASCII string; however, the string MUST NOT include control characters (values 0 through 31), the space character (value 32), or the delete character (value 127). Each NFType MUST contain at least one ASCII character and MUST NOT contain more than 32 ASCII characters. The NFTypes MUST NOT contain the same NFType more than once. If the NFTypes contain more than one NFType, the NFTypes MUST appear in ascending lexicographic order using the ASCII values. The NFType uses the IA5String type to permit inclusion of the underscore character ('_'), which is not part of the PrintableString character set.

ASN.1 Module This section provides an ASN.1 Module for the NFTypes certificate extension, and it follows the conventions established in and . NFTypeCertExtn { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-nftype(106) } DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS EXTENSION FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- RFC 5912 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } ; -- NFTypes Certificate Extension ext-NFType EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX NFTypes IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-nftype } -- NFTypes Certificate Extension OID id-pe-nftype OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-pe(1) 34 } -- NFTypes Certificate Extension Syntax NFTypes ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF NFType NFType ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..32)) END

Security Considerations The security considerations of are applicable to this document. Some of the ASCII strings that specify the NF Types are standard. See for values defined in 3GPP Release 17. Additionally, an operator MAY assign its own NF Types for use in their own network. Since the NF Type is used for role-based access control decisions, an operator-assigned NF Type MUST NOT overlap with a value already defined in the commonly defined set. Use of the same ASCII string by two different operators for different roles could lead to confusion or incorrect access control decisions. The mechanism for an operator to determine whether an ASCII string associated with a NF Type is unique across operators is outside the scope of this document. The certificate extension supports many different forms of role-based access control to support the diversity of activities that NFs are trusted to perform in the overall system. Different levels of confidence that the NFTypes were properly assigned might be needed to contribute to the overall security of the 5G System. For example, more confidence might be needed to make access control decisions related to a scarce resource than implementation of filtering policies. As a result, different operators might have different trust models for the NFTypes certificate extension.

Privacy Considerations In some security protocols, such as TLS 1.2 , certificates are exchanged in the clear. In other security protocols, such as TLS 1.3 , the certificates are encrypted. The inclusion of the NFTypes certificate extension can help an observer determine which systems are of most interest based on the plaintext certificate transmission.

IANA Considerations For the NFTypes certificate extension defined in , IANA has assigned an object identifier (OID) for the certificate extension. The OID for the certificate extension has been allocated in the "SMI Security for PKIX Certificate Extension" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1). For the ASN.1 Module defined in , IANA has assigned an OID for the module identifier. The OID for the module has been allocated in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0).

References Normative References In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK] RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. 3rd Generation Partnership Project 3GPP TS:29.510 V17.8.0 3rd Generation Partnership Project 3GPP TS:33.310 V17.5.0 ITU-T ITU-T Recommendation X.680 ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021 Informative References This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK] The Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificate format, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates those ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2002 version of ASN.1. There are no bits-on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) format, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates some auxiliary ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2008 version of ASN.1; the 1988 ASN.1 modules remain the normative version. There are no bits- on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations. 3rd Generation Partnership Project 3GPP TS:29.571 V17.8.0

NFType Strings Table 6.1.6.3.3-1 of defines the ASCII strings for the NF Types specified in 3GPP documents; these enumeration values in 3GPP Release 17 are listed below in ascending lexicographic order. This list is not exhaustive. "5G_DDNMF" "LMF" "PKMF" "5G_EIR" "MBSF" "SCEF" "AANF" "MBSTF" "SCP" "ADRF" "MB_SMF" "SCSAS" "AF" "MB_UPF" "SCSCF" "AMF" "MFAF" "SEPP" "AUSF" "MME" "SMF" "BSF" "MNPF" "SMSF" "CBCF" "N3IWF" "SMS_GMSC" "CEF" "NEF" "SMS_IWMSC" "CHF" "NRF" "SOR_AF" "DCCF" "NSACF" "SPAF" "DRA" "NSSAAF" "TSCTSF" "EASDF" "NSSF" "UCMF" "GBA_BSF" "NSWOF" "UDM" "GMLC" "NWDAF" "UDR" "HSS" "PANF" "UDSF" "ICSCF" "PCF" "UPF" "IMS_AS" "PCSCF"

Example Certificate Containing a NFTypes Extension The example certificate conforms to the certificate profile in Table 6.1.3c.3-1 of . In addition, the NFTypes certificate is included with only one NFType, and it is "AMF". The SubjectAltName certificate extension contains a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) and a uniformResourceIdentifier, which carries the NF Instance ID as specified in Clause 5.3.2 of . -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- MIIC0DCCAlagAwIBAgIUDD5o44zEdfSghT2hMK+P/EjGHlowCgYIKoZIzj0EAwMw FTETMBEGA1UECgwKRXhhbXBsZSBDQTAeFw0yMjExMjkxODE0NThaFw0yMzExMjkx ODE0NThaMDkxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSowKAYDVQQKEyE1Z2MubW5jNDAwLm1jYzMx MS4zZ3BwbmV0d29yay5vcmcwdjAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAIgNiAATJ6IFHI683 q/JJjsJUfEiRFqGQ6uKDGJ0oqDP6wEhRAuvyEyz5pgRmz/7Mze1+s1qcnPU9mo1v rIW9rjKhb/Hm8H9TPvnMQwCRCtKvCD90MkWvc/G8qyCBpCms3zNOJOijggFBMIIB PTATBggrBgEFBQcBIgQHMAUWA0FNRjAXBgNVHSAEEDAOMAwGCmCGSAFlAwIBMDAw DgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMCMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRM Z5KgwYlYn885mKID55ZcEznIBzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSIf6IE6QtqjXR2+p/xCtRh 4PqzNTAxBgNVHR8EKjAoMCagJKAihiBodHRwOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vZXhhbXBs ZWNhLmNybDB1BgNVHREBAf8EazBpgjhhbWYxLmNsdXN0ZXIxLm5ldDIuYW1mLjVn Yy5tbmM0MDAubWNjMzExLjNncHBuZXR3b3JrLm9yZ4YtdXJuOnV1aWQ6ZjgxZDRm YWUtN2RlYy0xMWQwLWE3NjUtMDBhMGM5MWU2YmY2MAoGCCqGSM49BAMDA2gAMGUC MEtQEut9kelkiMIMR+QzkSNGIuR30Lr23ftarLi9wMp3ZRIJYQgaAWc6gmf3MVAp 7QIxAKMoYAtw5srkNjE+Zg6CqEkf9f2banFltRuPbTp4B0Xraz5z/jn3NDPM9ata SHUxOQ== -----END CERTIFICATE----- The following shows the example certificate. The values on the left are the ASN.1 tag (in hexadecimal) and the length (in decimal). 30 720: SEQUENCE { 30 598: SEQUENCE { A0 3: [0] { 02 1: INTEGER 2 : } 02 20: INTEGER : 0C 3E 68 E3 8C C4 75 F4 A0 85 3D A1 30 AF 8F FC : 48 C6 1E 5A 30 10: SEQUENCE { 06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA384 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 3) : } 30 21: SEQUENCE { 31 19: SET { 30 17: SEQUENCE { 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10) 0C 10: UTF8String 'Example CA' : } : } : } 30 30: SEQUENCE { 17 13: UTCTime 29/11/2022 18:14:58 GMT 17 13: UTCTime 29/11/2023 18:14:58 GMT : } 30 57: SEQUENCE { 31 11: SET { 30 9: SEQUENCE { 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) 13 2: PrintableString 'US' : } : } 31 42: SET { 30 40: SEQUENCE { 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10) 13 33: PrintableString '5gc.mnc400.mcc311.3gppnetwork.org' : } : } : } 30 118: SEQUENCE { 30 16: SEQUENCE { 06 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1) 06 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp384r1 (1 3 132 0 34) : } 03 98: BIT STRING : 04 C9 E8 81 47 23 AF 37 AB F2 49 8E C2 54 7C 48 : 91 16 A1 90 EA E2 83 18 9D 28 A8 33 FA C0 48 51 : 02 EB F2 13 2C F9 A6 04 66 CF FE CC CD ED 7E B3 : 5A 9C 9C F5 3D 9A 8D 6F AC 85 BD AE 32 A1 6F F1 : E6 F0 7F 53 3E F9 CC 43 00 91 0A D2 AF 08 3F 74 : 32 45 AF 73 F1 BC AB 20 81 A4 29 AC DF 33 4E 24 : E8 : } A3 321: [3] { 30 317: SEQUENCE { 30 19: SEQUENCE { 06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER nfTypes (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 34) 04 7: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 30 5: SEQUENCE { 16 3: IA5String 'AMF' : } : } : } 30 23: SEQUENCE { 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) 04 16: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 30 14: SEQUENCE { 30 12: SEQUENCE { 06 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '2 16 840 1 101 3 2 1 48 48' : } : } : } : } 30 14: SEQUENCE { 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) 01 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 04 4: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 03 2: BIT STRING 7 unused bits : '1'B (bit 0) : } : } 30 19: SEQUENCE { 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER extKeyUsage (2 5 29 37) 04 12: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 30 10: SEQUENCE { 06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER clientAuth (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 2) : } : } : } 30 29: SEQUENCE { 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) 04 22: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 04 20: OCTET STRING : 4C 67 92 A0 C1 89 58 9F CF 39 98 A2 03 E7 96 5C : 13 39 C8 07 : } : } 30 31: SEQUENCE { 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) 04 24: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 30 22: SEQUENCE { 80 20: [0] : 88 7F A2 04 E9 0B 6A 8D 74 76 FA 9F F1 0A D4 61 : E0 FA B3 35 : } : } : } 30 49: SEQUENCE { 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31) 04 42: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 30 40: SEQUENCE { 30 38: SEQUENCE { A0 36: [0] { A0 34: [0] { 86 32: [6] 'http://example.com/exampleca.crl' : } : } : } : } : } : } 30 117: SEQUENCE { 06 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectAltName (2 5 29 17) 01 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 04 107: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 30 105: SEQUENCE { 82 56: [2] : 'amf1.cluster1.net2.amf.5gc.mnc400.mcc311.3gppnet' : 'work.org' 86 45: [6] : 'urn:uuid:f81d4fae-7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6' : } : } : } : } : } : } 30 10: SEQUENCE { 06 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA384 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 3) : } 03 104: BIT STRING, encapsulates { 30 101: SEQUENCE { 02 48: INTEGER : 4B 50 12 EB 7D 91 E9 64 88 C2 0C 47 E4 33 91 23 : 46 22 E4 77 D0 BA F6 DD FB 5A AC B8 BD C0 CA 77 : 65 12 09 61 08 1A 01 67 3A 82 67 F7 31 50 29 ED 02 49: INTEGER : 00 A3 28 60 0B 70 E6 CA E4 36 31 3E 66 0E 82 A8 : 49 1F F5 FD 9B 6A 71 65 B5 1B 8F 6D 3A 78 07 45 : EB 6B 3E 73 FE 39 F7 34 33 CC F5 AB 5A 48 75 31 : 39 : } : } : }

Acknowledgements Many thanks to , , , , , and for their review, comments, and assistance.

Authors' Addresses Vigil Security, LLC

Herndon VA United States of America housley@vigilsec.com

sn3rd

Washington DC United States of America sean@sn3rd.com

Ericsson

Kista Sweden john.mattsson@ericsson.com

Ericsson

Saint Laurent, QC Canada daniel.migault@ericsson.com