Fastly

Amsterdam The Netherlands job@fastly.com

Workonline

Cape Town South Africa benm@workonline.africa

Carleton College

mlepinski@carleton.edu

Raytheon

derrick.kong@raytheon.com

Independent

kent@alum.mit.edu

Operations and Management Area (OPS) sidrops RPKI Routing Security BGP This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC 6482.

Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at .

Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents () in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

• .  Introduction
  • .  Requirements Language
  • .  Changes from RFC 6482
• .  Related Work
• .  The ROA Content Type
• .  The ROA eContent
  • .  The version Element
  • .  The asID Element
  • .  The ipAddrBlocks Element
    • .  Type ROAIPAddressFamily
    • .  Type ROAIPAddress
    • .  Canonical Form for ipAddrBlocks
• .  ROA Validation
• .  Security Considerations
• .  IANA Considerations
  • .  SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)
  • .  RPKI Signed Objects Registry
  • .  File Extension
  • .  SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)
  • .  Media Type
• .  References
  • .  Normative References
  • .  Informative References
• .  Example ROA eContent Payload
• Acknowledgements
• Authors' Addresses

Introduction The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security. (See for more information.) As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow entities to verify that an Autonomous System (AS) has been given permission by an IP address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes within that block. A Route Origin Authorization (ROA) provides this function. The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects , which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) wrapper for the ROA content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete the specification of the ROA (see ), this document defines:

• The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA. (This OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object.)
• The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent. (This is the payload that specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.) The ROA eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) .
• Additional steps required to validate ROAs (in addition to the validation steps specified in ).

Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Changes from RFC 6482 This section summarizes the significant changes between and the profile described in this document.

• Clarified the requirements for the IP address and AS identifier X.509 certificate extensions.
• Strengthened the ASN.1 formal notation and definitions.
• Incorporated errata for RFC 6482.
• Added an example ROA eContent payload, and a complete ROA (Appendix A).
• Specified a canonicalization procedure for the content of ipAddrBlocks.

Related Work It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts described in "" and "" . Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object profile ; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed. Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates adhering to the RPKI resource certificate profile ; thus, familiarity with that profile is also assumed.

The ROA Content Type The content-type for a ROA is defined as id-ct-routeOriginAuthz and has the numerical value 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24. This OID MUST appear within both the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object and the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object (see ).

The ROA eContent The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or more IP address prefixes that will be advertised. If the address space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS number. A ROA is formally defined as: RPKI-ROA-2023 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(75) } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS CONTENT-TYPE FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268] { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ; ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::= { TYPE RouteOriginAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz } id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) } RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0, asID ASID, ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily } ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295) ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE { addressFamily ADDRESS-FAMILY.&afi ({AddressFamilySet}), addresses ADDRESS-FAMILY.&Addresses ({AddressFamilySet}{@addressFamily}) } ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= CLASS { &afi OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE, &Addresses } WITH SYNTAX { AFI &afi ADDRESSES &Addresses } AddressFamilySet ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= { addressFamilyIPv4 | addressFamilyIPv6 } addressFamilyIPv4 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= { AFI afi-IPv4 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv4 } addressFamilyIPv6 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= { AFI afi-IPv6 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv6 } afi-IPv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'H afi-IPv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'H ROAAddressesIPv4 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv4} ROAAddressesIPv6 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv6} ub-IPv4 INTEGER ::= 32 ub-IPv6 INTEGER ::= 128 ROAIPAddress {INTEGER: ub} ::= SEQUENCE { address BIT STRING (SIZE(0..ub)), maxLength INTEGER (0..ub) OPTIONAL } END

The version Element The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation entry MUST be 0.

The asID Element The asID element contains the AS number that is authorized to originate routes to the given IP address prefixes.

The ipAddrBlocks Element The ipAddrBlocks element encodes the set of IP address prefixes to which the AS is authorized to originate routes. Note that the syntax here is more restrictive than that used in the IP address delegation extension defined in . That extension can represent arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only IP prefixes.

Type ROAIPAddressFamily Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, the addressFamily element contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family. This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6; therefore, addressFamily MUST be either 0001 or 0002. IPv4 prefixes MUST NOT appear as IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (). There MUST be only one instance of ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI in the ROA. Thus, the ROAIPAddressFamily structure MUST NOT appear more than twice. The addresses field contains IP prefixes as a sequence of type ROAIPAddress.

Type ROAIPAddress A ROAIPAddress structure is a sequence containing an address element of type BIT STRING and an optional maxLength element of type INTEGER.

The address Element The address element is of type BIT STRING and represents a single IP address prefix. This field uses the same representation of an IP address prefix as a BIT STRING as the IPAddress type defined in .

The maxLength Element When present, the maxLength element specifies the maximum length of the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise. The maxLength element SHOULD NOT be encoded if the maximum length is equal to the prefix length. Certification Authorities SHOULD anticipate that future Relying Parties will become increasingly stringent in considering the presence of superfluous maxLength elements an encoding error. If present, the maxLength element MUST be:

• an integer greater than or equal to the length of the accompanying prefix, and
• less than or equal to the maximum length (in bits) of an IP address in the applicable address family: 32 in the case of IPv4 and 128 in the case of IPv6.

For example, if the IP address prefix is 203.0.113.0/24 and maxLength is 26, the AS is authorized to advertise any more-specific prefix with a maximum length of 26. In this example, the AS would be authorized to advertise 203.0.113.0/24, 203.0.113.128/25, or 203.0.113.192/26, but not 203.0.113.0/27. See for more information on the use of maxLength. When the maxLength element is not present, the AS is only authorized to advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROAIPAddress structure's address element.

Note on Overlapping or Superfluous Information Encoding Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element). For example, a ROA may contain the prefix 203.0.113.0/24 with maxLength 26, as well as the prefix 203.0.113.0/28 with maxLength 28. This ROA would authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with 203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as well as the specific prefix 203.0.113.0/28. Additionally, a ROA MAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements, where the IP address prefix is identical in both cases. However, this is NOT RECOMMENDED, because in such a case, the ROAIPAddress element with the shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the indicated AS and thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of the ROA.

Canonical Form for ipAddrBlocks As the data structure described by the ROA ASN.1 module allows for many different ways to represent the same set of IP address information, a canonical form is defined such that every set of IP address information has a unique representation. In order to produce and verify this canonical form, the process described in this section SHOULD be used to ensure that information elements are unique with respect to one another and sorted in ascending order. Certification Authorities SHOULD anticipate that future Relying Parties will impose a strict requirement for the ipAddrBlocks field to be in this canonical form. This canonicalization procedure builds upon the canonicalization procedure specified in . In order to semantically compare, sort, and deduplicate the contents of the ipAddrBlocks field, each ROAIPAddress element is mapped to an abstract data element composed of four integer values:

afi

The AFI value appearing in the addressFamily field of the containing ROAIPAddressFamily as an integer.

addr

The first IP address of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress address field, as a 32-bit (IPv4) or 128-bit (IPv6) integer value.

plen

The length of the IP prefix appearing in the ROAIPAddress address field as an integer value.

mlen

The value appearing in the maxLength field of the ROAIPAddress element, if present; otherwise, the above prefix length value.

Thus, the equality or relative order of two ROAIPAddress elements can be tested by comparing their abstract representations.

Comparator The set of ipAddrBlocks is totally ordered. The order of two ipAddrBlocks is determined by the first non-equal comparison in the following list.

1. Data elements with a lower afi value precede data elements with a higher afi value.
2. Data elements with a lower addr value precede data elements with a higher addr value.
3. Data elements with a lower plen value precede data elements with a higher plen value.
4. Data elements with a lower mlen value precede data elements with a higher mlen value.

Data elements for which all four values compare equal are duplicates of one another.

Example Implementations

• A sorting implementation in ISO/IEC 9899:1999 ("ANSI C99").
• A sorting implementation in the Rust 2021 Edition.

ROA Validation Before a Relying Party can use a ROA to validate a routing announcement, the Relying Party MUST first validate the ROA. To validate a ROA, the Relying Party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in as well as the following additional ROA-specific validation steps:

• The IP address delegation extension is present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ROA), and every IP address prefix in the ROA payload is contained within the set of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP address delegation extension.
• The EE certificate's IP address delegation extension MUST NOT contain "inherit" elements as described in .
• The Autonomous System identifier delegation extension described in is not used in ROAs and MUST NOT be present in the EE certificate.
• The ROA content fully conforms with all requirements specified in Sections  and .

If any of the above checks fail, the ROA in its entirety MUST be considered invalid and an error SHOULD be logged.

Security Considerations There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication. Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA. The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to originate a route to the prefix or prefixes in the ROA. Thus, the integrity of a ROA MUST be established. This ROA specification makes use of the RPKI signed object format; thus, all security considerations discussed in also apply to ROAs. Additionally, the signed object profile uses the CMS signed message format for integrity; thus, ROAs inherit all security considerations associated with that data structure. The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate routes to the prefix or prefixes is established through the use of the address space and AS number PKI as described in . Specifically, one MUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate issued under this PKI and check that the prefix or prefixes in the ROA are contained within those in the certificate's IP address delegation extension.

IANA Considerations

SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) IANA has updated the id-ct-routeOriginAuthz entry in the "SMI Security for S⁠/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows:

Decimal	Description	References
24	id-ct-routeOriginAuthz	RFC 9582

RPKI Signed Objects Registry IANA has updated the Route Origination Authorization entry in the "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by as follows:

Name	OID	Reference
Route Origination Authorization	1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24	RFC 9582

File Extension IANA has updated the entry for the ROA file extension in the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry created by as follows:

Filename Extension	RPKI Object	Reference
.roa	Route Origination Authorization	RFC 9582

SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) IANA has allocated the following entry in the "SMI Security for S⁠/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:

Decimal	Description	References
75	id-mod-rpkiROA-2023	RFC 9582

Media Type IANA has updated the media type application/rpki-roa in the "Media Types" registry as follows:

Type name:

application

Subtype name:

rpki-roa

Required parameters:

N/A

Optional parameters:

N/A

Encoding considerations:

binary

Security considerations:

Carries an RPKI ROA (RFC 9582). This media type contains no active content. See Section 6 of RFC 9582 for further information.

Interoperability considerations:

None

Published specification:

RFC 9582

Applications that use this media type:

RPKI operators

Additional information:

Content:

This media type is a signed object, as defined in , which contains a payload of a list of prefixes and an AS identifier as defined in RFC 9582.

Magic number(s):

None

File extension(s):

.roa

Macintosh file type code(s):

None

Person & email address to contact for further information:

Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>

Intended usage:

COMMON

Restrictions on usage:

None

Change controller:

IETF

References Normative References In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This document defines two X.509 v3 certificate extensions. The first binds a list of IP address blocks, or prefixes, to the subject of a certificate. The second binds a list of autonomous system identifiers to the subject of a certificate. These extensions may be used to convey the authorization of the subject to use the IP addresses and autonomous system identifiers contained in the extensions. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This specification defines the addressing architecture of the IP Version 6 (IPv6) protocol. The document includes the IPv6 addressing model, text representations of IPv6 addresses, definition of IPv6 unicast addresses, anycast addresses, and multicast addresses, and an IPv6 node's required addresses. This document obsoletes RFC 3513, "IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture". [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This syntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message content. [STANDARDS-TRACK] The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) format, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates some auxiliary ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2008 version of ASN.1; the 1988 ASN.1 modules remain the normative version. There are no bits- on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This document defines a profile for the structure of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) distributed repository. Each individual repository publication point is a directory that contains files that correspond to X.509/PKIX Resource Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists and signed objects. This profile defines the object (file) naming scheme, the contents of repository publication points (directories), and a suggested internal structure of a local repository cache that is intended to facilitate synchronization across a distributed collection of repository publication points and to facilitate certification path construction. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for the purpose of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use" of Internet Number Resources (INRs). The certificates issued under this profile are used to convey the issuer's authorization of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-use" of the INRs that are described in the certificate. This document contains the normative specification of Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) syntax in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document also specifies profiles for the format of certificate requests and specifies the Relying Party RPKI certificate path validation procedure. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document defines a generic profile for signed objects used in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These RPKI signed objects make use of Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as a standard encapsulation format. [STANDARDS-TRACK] RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. ITU-T Informative References This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes an architecture for an infrastructure to support improved security of Internet routing. The foundation of this architecture is a Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) that represents the allocation hierarchy of IP address space and Autonomous System (AS) numbers; and a distributed repository system for storing and disseminating the data objects that comprise the RPKI, as well as other signed objects necessary for improved routing security. As an initial application of this architecture, the document describes how a legitimate holder of IP address space can explicitly and verifiably authorize one or more ASes to originate routes to that address space. Such verifiable authorizations could be used, for example, to more securely construct BGP route filters. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This document recommends ways to reduce the forged-origin hijack attack surface by prudently limiting the set of IP prefixes that are included in a Route Origin Authorization (ROA). One recommendation is to avoid using the maxLength attribute in ROAs except in some specific cases. The recommendations complement and extend those in RFC 7115. This document also discusses the creation of ROAs for facilitating the use of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation services. Considerations related to ROAs and RPKI-based Route Origin Validation (RPKI-ROV) in the context of destination-based Remotely Triggered Discard Route (RTDR) (elsewhere referred to as "Remotely Triggered Black Hole") filtering are also highlighted. commit 68969ea commit 023e756

Example ROA eContent Payload An example of a DER-encoded ROA eContent is provided below, with annotation following the "#" character. $ echo 16i 301802030100003011300F040200023009300703050020010DB8 P \ | dc | openssl asn1parse -inform DER -i -dump 0:d=0 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE # RouteOriginAttestation 2:d=1 hl=2 l= 3 prim: INTEGER :010000 # asID 65536 7:d=1 hl=2 l= 17 cons: SEQUENCE # ipAddrBlocks 9:d=2 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddressFamily 11:d=3 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OCTET STRING # addressFamily 0000 - 00 02 # IPv6 15:d=3 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE # addresses 17:d=4 hl=2 l= 7 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddress 19:d=5 hl=2 l= 5 prim: BIT STRING # 2001:db8::/32 0000 - 00 20 01 0d b8 Below is a complete RPKI ROA signed object, Base64 encoded per. MIIGgAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGcTCCBm0CAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwKwYLKoZI hvcNAQkQARigHAQaMBgCAwEAADARMA8EAgACMAkwBwMFACABDbigggR8MIIEeDCC A2CgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAvMS0wKwYDVQQDEyQ4NjUyNWNkNS00 NGQ3LTRkZjktODA3OS00YTlkY2RmMjY5NDQwHhcNMjQwNTAxMDAzNDEzWhcNMjUw NTAxMDAzNDEzWjAvMS0wKwYDVQQDEyRlYjg3NmJmMC1lYTlkLTRiMjItYTExZS0y YmNhZDA4MzliMTMwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCsPSYD JnGOFRSHUZuVxibx2TQfWWoPIHNKgQAwYn1Kz88HaGgVf63G1mJd/cxBNMj5AfNQ m2zKSAb83UAp97DUXf+lvoKj4F+lxCCjFaBpBeehc7X0XPDpbcbqo1YrzIzxxqou GijEwZ4k+BaM2avEFYMBszqWA+ZdneBSuZ3YbHPKp2royn4pJ9a1I5fYdqFQi0eo VZbAc8pZmwRVOuedYYqQiy9CSRGsbiGlB0fKt2m/zSsuvl4Zit7+NyGL3wAZecjZ XEInsTtQsjQuy5PeJjLDyfWi/ZFi0qPsNlK0M2lMsi5B7QKaagA1RbRVHZyrkWoe 20l5rfk1bIGMv/plAgMBAAGjggGdMIIBmTAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwHQYDVR0O BBYEFN4UWxk/syCyWnRDVSmMi/fCUj0iMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFNZyCOpHDp1t1mVA IvVTrcE4mrQ0MBgGA1UdIAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIwWgYIKwYBBQUHAQEE TjBMMEoGCCsGAQUFBzAChj5yc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwby8x bklJNmtjT25XM1daVUFpOVZPdHdUaWF0RFNnLmNlcjBRBgNVHR8ESjBIMEagRKBC hkByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwby9BLzFuSUk2a2NPblczV1pV QWk5Vk90d1RpYXREU2cuY3JsMFwGCCsGAQUFBwELBFAwTjBMBggrBgEFBQcwC4ZA cnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG8vQS8zaFJiR1QteklMSmFkRU5W S1l5TDk4SlNQU0tnLnJvYTAgBggrBgEFBQcBBwEB/wQRMA8wDQQCAAIwBwMFACAB DbgwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAKFoMax1Gdxb9mvSfKE2Jo+DudqCGjWF3mGv rkhag8CQYi2CBJZLrkpCRha8doBW4PbrL36waWG55A/TdLKvWzAf66/v3iL5QcXo Krb0+fp1pu/YVK4xFxwYJhbX4OnL4Gqh9+t4fFXhEDj2QemlgjWZyxvgx2Sra/iK fOt6gxUhie3oIT+FiYjqF//WIUBP/HjTf+E4IRGN8tCr3NDhMZG6c0njq2keW7w4 wnw1+GqSyDhqu0Rsr0m3XUbivkc+h0ZZBBS9SxPM+GfgdzEDV51VcK1SeMa3G3Ca j0cJA99eTM+j52tkNVupftv1Y+4Wt0XGLKmRNKw26XDaphzw3B8xggGqMIIBpgIB A4AU3hRbGT+zILJadENVKYyL98JSPSIwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAIBoGswGgYJKoZIhvcN AQkDMQ0GCyqGSIb3DQEJEAEYMBwGCSqGSIb3DQEJBTEPFw0yNDA1MDEwMDM0MTNa MC8GCSqGSIb3DQEJBDEiBCBlz4HExs5A69pxkJqTCbUvc2iTS7C4eDd3aJD4hYJS wjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCAQBa2wmuDHbcvfnMRIaOJ6m30zpCZtJVBLDELoA0 2kLb18TfFbxQhUi/jZ9g0hNYksV0n4vOJnCQ3qP6IIfm0ZsKzRnyzZf3f2xegw2p Wzi9Z8QYlc//eY3+XA3bQ37h+s0r7OZkQH7+KmIwDOCYaLh/YB37wp/7giC7bpvi c2Fv2illQmctrK7tYDHsNGq+svULTjemUaklqfcRAAJnQTRzTz8So9wKY9SR2VVZ 68DDItTBUx8jPYeNQtvxxoVA6HuW9wyurlYQ9m/cF8CzlizVmsHgxzjO9ifmYJj9 YZWMLtjF7Xw1fQZLYMrD5DCZzUw3nv4GyyHxckm2kLF38mze The object in this appendix has the following properties: Object size: 1668 octets Object SHA256 message digest: 3a39e0b652e79ddf6efdd178ad5e3b29e0121b1e593b89f1e0ac18f3ba60d5e7 CMS signing time: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000 X.509 end-entity certificate Subject key id: DE145B193FB320B25A744355298C8BF7C2523D22 Authority key id: D67208EA470E9D6DD6654022F553ADC1389AB434 Issuer: CN=86525cd5-44d7-4df9-8079-4a9dcdf26944 Serial: 3 Not before: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000 Not after: Thu 01 May 2025 00:34:13 +0000 IP address delegation: 2001:db8::/32 ROA eContent asID: 65536 addresses: 2001:db8::/32

Acknowledgements The authors wish to thank , , , , , , , and for their help and contributions. Additionally, the authors thank , , , , , , , , and for their careful reviews and helpful comments.

Authors' Addresses Fastly

Amsterdam The Netherlands job@fastly.com

Workonline

Cape Town South Africa benm@workonline.africa

Carleton College

mlepinski@carleton.edu

Raytheon

derrick.kong@raytheon.com

Independent

kent@alum.mit.edu