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<rfc
  xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
  category="info"
  docName="draft-liu-trust-enhanced-path-routing-00"
  ipr="trust200902"
  obsoletes=""
  updates=""
  submissionType="IETF"
  xml:lang="en"
  version="3">
<!-- [REPLACE] 
       * docName with name of your draft
     [CHECK] 
       * category should be one of std, bcp, info, exp, historic
       * ipr should be one of trust200902, noModificationTrust200902, noDerivativesTrust200902, pre5378Trust200902
       * updates can be an RFC number as NNNN
       * obsoletes can be an RFC number as NNNN 
-->

  <front>
    <title abbrev="Trust enhanced Path Routing">Trust-enhanced Path Routing: Problem Statement and Use Cases</title>
    <!--  [REPLACE/DELETE] abbrev. The abbreviated title is required if the full title is longer than 39 characters -->

    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-liu-trust-enhanced-path-routing-00"/>
   
    <author fullname="Xiang Liu" initials="X." role="editor" surname="Liu">
      <!-- [CHECK]
             * initials should not include an initial for the surname
             * role="editor" is optional -->
    <!-- Can have more than one author -->
      
    <!-- all of the following elements are optional -->
      <organization>Pengcheng Laboratory</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <!-- Reorder these if your country does things differently -->
          <street>No.2 Xingke 1 Street</street>
          <city>Shenzhen</city>
          <code>518055</code>
          <country>China</country>
          <!-- Uses two letter country code -->
        </postal>        
        <email>liux15@pcl.ac.cn</email>  
      </address>
    </author>
   
    <author fullname="Yanchen Qiao" initials="Y." role="editor" surname="Qiao">
      <!-- [CHECK]
             * initials should not include an initial for the surname
             * role="editor" is optional -->
    <!-- Can have more than one author -->
      
    <!-- all of the following elements are optional -->
      <organization>Pengcheng Laboratory</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <!-- Reorder these if your country does things differently -->
          <street>No.2 Xingke 1 Street</street>
          <city>Shenzhen</city>
          <code>518055</code>
          <country>China</country>
          <!-- Uses two letter country code -->
        </postal>        
        <email>qiaoych@pcl.ac.cn</email>  
      </address>
    </author>

    <author fullname="Yu Zhang" initials="Y." role="editor" surname="Zhang">
      <!-- [CHECK]
             * initials should not include an initial for the surname
             * role="editor" is optional -->
    <!-- Can have more than one author -->
      
    <!-- all of the following elements are optional -->
      <organization>Pengcheng Laboratory</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <!-- Reorder these if your country does things differently -->
          <street>No.2 Xingke 1 Street</street>
          <city>Shenzhen</city>
          <code>518055</code>
          <country>China</country>
          <!-- Uses two letter country code -->
        </postal>        
        <email>zhangy08@pcl.ac.cn</email>  
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2024"/>
    <!-- On draft subbmission:
         * If only the current year is specified, the current day and month will be used.
         * If the month and year are both specified and are the current ones, the current day will
           be used
         * If the year is not the current one, it is necessary to specify at least a month and day="1" will be used.
    -->

    <area>General</area>
    <workgroup>Internet Engineering Task Force</workgroup>
    <!-- "Internet Engineering Task Force" is fine for individual submissions.  If this element is 
          not present, the default is "Network Working Group", which is used by the RFC Editor as 
          a nod to the history of the RFC Series. -->

    <keyword>keyword</keyword>
    <!-- [REPLACE/DELETE]. Multiple allowed. Keywords are incorporated into HTML output files for 
         use by search engines. -->

    <abstract>
      <t>Digital trust refers to the measurable confidence of one entity posts on another about accomplishing some task in the digital world. 
        This document introduces the concept of trust into the networking and routing area, and proposes the idea of trust-enhanced path routing, 
        elaborates the key technical problems and design goals, and also lists some use cases.</t>
    </abstract>
 
  </front>

  <middle>
    
    <section>
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>In current Internet architecture, the network layer provides best-effort services to endpoints<xref target="RFC9217"></xref>. 
        Data packets are forwarded by the routers along the data transmisison path. To provide better user experience, 
        data packet may be forwarded based on the Quality of Service specified in the packet headers. In recent years,
        as more and more high-value services are brought online, criminals targeting on these services are also moved from 
        offline to online. Security and trustworthiness of data transmission become a severe concern of Internet users. 
        Existing security techonologies such as end-to-end encryption are not sufficient, there still exist several issues which undermines the security and trustworthiness of data transmission over Internet.
      </t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>Routing attacks, including prefix hijack, route injectin, route leak<xref target="RFC7908"></xref>,and etc.</li>
        <li>Users are unaware of and have no control on how traffic is steered from  the sender to the recepient, therefore lack of confidence that the transmission can be trusted.</li>
        <li>End-to-end encryption is not sufficient to protect the confidentiality of highly sensitive traffic, since there
          may exist backdoors or malicious codes inside the network functions or network devices. Even though strong encrytion mechanisms have been implemented, the adversaries
          may break it down several years later once crypto-attacking techniques such as quantum computing are powerful enough.
        </li>
        <li>The trustworthiness of network entities is not attested, so end users actually cannot be sure of to what extent they can trust the underlying Internent infrastructure.</li>
      </ul>
      <t>To overcome these issues, one way is to integrate the concept of trust into networking and data transmission, so the trustworthiness of the underlaying network infrastructures can be guaranteed
        to the services and users. Trusted path routing scheme has been proposed in the IETF RATS working group, where the trustworthiness of routers is attested based on the evidence received via
         remote attestation protocols<xref target="I-D.draft-voit-rats-trustworthy-path-routing-09"></xref>. However, simply classifying routers into two levels, trusted or untrusted, are too coarse-grained
          to satisfy the requrements of diversified applications. Data packets from different applications have different requirements on
         the trustworthiness. For instance, military or secret government applications may have very strict requirements on the data confidentiality and integrity, therefore require 
         the routers to be very highly trusted. On the other hand, some kinds of entertainment applications like web browsing may only require the routers to be moderately or even minimally trusted.   
      </t>
      <t>In this case, it is appropraite to introcude the concept of trust-enhanced path routing, to create a mechanism by which end-to-end routing path with different trust levels can 
        be established to satisfy the diversed applications. 
        This raises the question of how to select end-to-end routing path for diverse services and end users with different requirement for trust level. 
        To be more specific, the question can be further divided into three parts.</t>
      <ul>
        <li>First, how different service providers and end users can quantatively evaluate their trust requirements, and then map their requirements to the trust level of the routing path</li>
        <li>Second, for a specific routing and transmission task, how to implement trust-aware end-to-end routing. The may exist two approaches. 
          The first is that the sender and recipient can be aware of the trust-related information of the network, and then selecta path which can meet their requirement. 
          The second is that the sender may convey the requirements to the network, and the network controller or path calculation element can derive the path accordingly.</li>
        <li>Third, given a routing path for a specific service, how can the sender and recipient be sure that the data traffic is strictly steered along it.</li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section>
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL",
          "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT
          RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be
          interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/>
          <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in
          all capitals, as shown here.</t>
    </section>
      <!-- [CHECK] The 'Requirements Language' section is optional -->
      <section>
        <name>Design Goals</name>
        <t>The trust-enhanced path routing mechanism aims to achieve three main goals.</t>
        
        <ol>
          <li>Measurable: The trust value of any given object or entity can be quantitatively measured.</li>
          <li>Configurable: Mechanisms should be provided to enable trust configuration, including but not limited to: 
            (1) interfaces, protocols, or extensions supporting exchange of trust-related information between transmission-layer and control-layer; (2) interfaces, protocols and extensions supporting network devices to exchange trust-related information ,both intra-domain and inter-domain; (3) mechanisms supporting trust-aware routing and path calculation</li>
          <li>Verifiable: Given a routing path calculated according to the specific trust requirement of the service, it can be verified that the traffic is exactly steered along this path.</li>
        </ol>
      </section>   

    <section>
      <name>Use Cases</name>
      <section>
        <name>Use case 1: end-to-end routing paths with different trust levels to meet diverse service requirements</name>
      <t>There are various types of services consumed by various end uers, which relying on the underlying Internet to provide data transmission capability. In essence, different Internet services and applications have different requirements on the trust level of routing paths and network devices. For instance, some
        applications where highly sensitive data are exchanged might require the network devices to be high trusted, whereas other applications like on-line gaming and video streaming do not have stringent requirement on the trust level. 
      </t>
      <t>As shown in Figure 1, for customers with different requirements on the trust level of network devices, ISPs need to provide different options for them to choose the data transmission path which can satisfy their demands. In this example, assuming that the requirements on the trust levle of User A, B, and C are high-trust, medium-trust and low-trust respectively, then the network domain can provide different end-to-end path for them to meet their diversified requirements.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
        

  +--------+     +---------+     +----+----+     +--------+     +-----------+
  | User A |<--->|         |<--->|  Router |<--->|        |<--->| Service A |
  +--------+     |         |     +----+----+     |        |     +-----------+
                 |         |                     |        |
                 |         |                     |        |
  +--------+     |         |     +----+----+     |        |     +-----------+
  | User B |<--->| Ingress |<--->|  Router |<--->| Egress |<--->| Service B |
  +--------+     |         |     +----+----+     |        |     +-----------+
                 |         |                     |        |
                 |         |                     |        |
  +--------+     |         |     +----+----+     |        |     +-----------+
  | User C |<--->|         |<--->|  Router |<--->|        |<--->| Service C |
  +--------+     +---------+     +----+----+     +-----+--+     +-----------+           

Figure 1: Different services with different trust levels
]]></artwork> 
    </section>

    <section>
      <name>Use case 2:  Wireless network with heterogeneous equipment in both radio access network and core network</name>
      <t>Wireless networks are one of the most critical part of communication infrastructure. Over billions of devices are connected to the internet via wireless networks, such as Wi-Fi networks at home, 
        coffee shop, airport or shopping malls. In these networks, many equipment are manufectured by different vendors, and comply with different specifications or generations. For example, wireless access 
        point (AP) may consists of Wi-Fi APs which comply with different specifications, e.g. 802.11n, 802.11ac, 802.11ad, etc. The technologies used in these equipment span over 20 years and have signifgicant 
        differences. One example is that some Wi-Fi deployed at coffee shop does not require authentication and data packets are transmitted over the air without protection. On the other hand, 
        Wi-Fi APs deployed by operators or enterprises provide solid authentication and encryption algorithms, and data packets and user privacy are well protected. Obviously, equally treating
         the network equipment of different generations and different deployment scenario in the sense of trustworthiness is not appropriate. The level of trust of those heterogenous network equipment 
         should be evaluated, and end-users and service providers should be aware of the evaluation results so that the appropriate network equipment with required trust level can be used to perform
          data transmission tasks.
      </t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
        

        +--------+     +-------------+     +----------------+     +----------+     
        |        |<--->|   Wi-Fi AP  |<--->| Core Network 1 |<--->|          |
        |        |     | (Operators) |     |                |     |          |
        |        |     +-------------+     +----------------+     |          | 
        |        |                                                |          |
        |        |     +-------------+     +----------------+     |          |
        | Mobile |     |  Wi-Fi AP   |     |                |     |Internet  |
        | Device |<--->|  (Home)     |<--->| Core Network 2 |<--->|          |     
        |        |     +-------------+     +----------------+     |          |
        |        |                                                |          |
        |        |     +-------------+     +----------------+     |          |
        |        |     |  Wi-Fi AP   |     |                |     |          |
        |        |<--->|   (Shop)    |<--->| Core Network 3 |<--->|          |
        +--------+     +-------------+     +----------------+     +----------+         
      Figure 2: Mobile devices access to the Internet via different generations of mobile communication networks
      ]]></artwork> 
    </section>

      <section>
      <name>Use case 3: Proof of Service Funtion Chaining with Different Trust Level Assurance</name>
      <t> Service Function Chaining enables the provisioning of a series of services to a specific data flow, such as firewall filtering and intrusion detection/prevention systems. For any kind of service, service Providers 
      may have different service nodes with different service qualities or trust assurance levels, and deservedly with different prices. In this context, it is reasonable for the customers to choose 
      services with specific trust auusrance levels which can optimally map their requirements, from both technical and financial aspects. And for the service providers, it is obligated to provide end-to-end
      service functions with demanding trust assurance levels to the customers and provide a method such that customers can verify that all requirements are satified. 
      </t>
    </section>

    </section>
  
  

    
    <section anchor="IANA">
    <!-- All drafts are required to have an IANA considerations section. See RFC 8126 for a guide.-->
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This memo includes no request to IANA. </t>
    </section>
    
    <section anchor="Security">
      <!-- All drafts are required to have a security considerations section. See RFC 3552 for a guide. -->
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>As discussed above, the core spirit of trust-enhanced path routing is to enable applications choose an end-to-end path with a certain trust level that can meet its requirement, and 
        at the same time it can verify that the selected path is indeed validated without any unintended modifications. In this context, several key security issues should be considered.</t>
        <ol>
          <li>Authentication and authorization: when a user or application request to build a tansmission path with a certain trust level, it should be authenticated and verified to be authority-granted.
          </li>
          <li>Path verification: the user or application should be able to verify that the data flow is exactly traversed along the designated path. An IETF draft where a mechanism call "path validation" has 
            been introduced has recently been proposed to address this problem <xref target="I-D.draft-liu-path-validation-problem-statement-00"></xref>.
          </li>
        </ol>
    </section>
    
    <!-- NOTE: The Acknowledgements and Contributors sections are at the end of this template -->
  </middle>

  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references>
        <name>Normative References</name>
        
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/>
        <!-- The recommended and simplest way to include a well known reference -->
        
      </references>
 
      <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC7908">
          <front>
            <title>Problem Definition and Classification of BGP Route Leaks</title>
            <author fullname="K. Sriram" initials="K." surname="Sriram"/>
            <author fullname="D. Montgomery" initials="D." surname="Montgomery"/>
            <author fullname="D. McPherson" initials="D." surname="McPherson"/>
            <author fullname="E. Osterweil" initials="E." surname="Osterweil"/>
            <author fullname="B. Dickson" initials="B." surname="Dickson"/>
            <date month="June" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A systemic vulnerability of the Border Gateway Protocol routing system, known as "route leaks", has received significant attention in recent years. Frequent incidents that result in significant disruptions to Internet routing are labeled route leaks, but to date a common definition of the term has been lacking. This document provides a working definition of route leaks while keeping in mind the real occurrences that have received significant attention. Further, this document attempts to enumerate (though not exhaustively) different types of route leaks based on observed events on the Internet. The aim is to provide a taxonomy that covers several forms of route leaks that have been observed and are of concern to the Internet user community as well as the network operator community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7908"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7908"/>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="RFC9217">
          <front>
            <title>Current Open Questions in Path-Aware Networking</title>
            <author fullname="B. Trammell" initials="B." surname="Trammell"/>
            <date month="March" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In contrast to the present Internet architecture, a path-aware internetworking architecture has two important properties: it exposes the properties of available 
                Internet paths to endpoints, and it provides for endpoints and applications to use these properties to select paths through the Internet for their traffic. 
                While this property of "path awareness" already exists in many Internet-connected networks within single domains and via administrative interfaces to the network 
                layer, a fully path-aware internetwork expands these concepts across layers and across the Internet.</t>
                <t>This document poses questions in path-aware networking, open as of 2021, that must be answered in the design, development, and deployment of path-aware 
                  internetworks. It was originally written to frame discussions in the Path Aware Networking Research Group (PANRG), and has been published to snapshot
                   current thinking in this space.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9217"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9217"/>
        </reference>

        <reference anchor="I-D.draft-voit-rats-trustworthy-path-routing-09">
        <!-- [REPLACE/DELETE] Example minimum reference -->
          <front>
            <title>Trusted path routing</title>
            <author fullname="E. Voit" initials="E." surname="Voit"/>
            <author fullname="G. Gaddam" initials="G." surname="Gaddam"/>
            <author fullname="G. Fedorkow" initials="G." surname="Fedorkow"/>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="M. Chen" initials="M." surname="Chen"/>
            <date month="February" year="2024"/>
            <!-- [CHECK] -->
          </front>
        </reference>
        
        <reference anchor="I-D.draft-liu-path-validation-problem-statement-00">
          <!-- [REPLACE/DELETE] Example minimum reference -->
            <front>
              <title>Path validation problem statement history gap analysis and use cases</title>
              <author fullname="C. Liu" initials="C." surname="Liu"/>
              <author fullname="Q. Wu" initials="Q." surname="Wu"/>
              <author fullname="L. Xia" initials="L." surname="Xia"/>
              <date month="October" year="2023"/>
              <!-- [CHECK] -->
            </front>
          </reference>
    
       
      </references>
    </references>
    
 </back>
</rfc>
