]> Using GOST Cryptographic Algorithms in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) ELVIS-PLUS
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Streebog Kuznyechik Magma MGM This document defines a set of cryptographic transforms for use in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2). The transforms are based on Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (called "GOST" algorithms). Use of GOST ciphers in IKEv2 is defined in RFC 9227. This document aims to define the use of GOST algorithms for the rest of the cryptographic transforms used in IKEv2. This specification was developed to facilitate implementations that wish to support the GOST algorithms. This document does not imply IETF endorsement of the cryptographic algorithms used in this document.
Introduction The Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) defined in is an important part of the IP Security (IPsec) architecture. It is used for the authenticated key exchange and for the negotiation of various protocol parameters and features. This document defines a number of transforms for IKEv2, based on Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (often referred to as "GOST" algorithms) for hash function, digital signature, and key exchange method. These definitions are based on the recommendations established by the Standardisation Technical Committee "Cryptographic information protection", which describe how Russian cryptographic standard algorithms are used in IKEv2 . Along with the transforms defined in , the transforms defined in this specification allow for the use of GOST cryptographic algorithms in IPsec protocols. This specification was developed to facilitate implementations that wish to support the GOST algorithms. This document does not imply IETF endorsement of the cryptographic algorithms used in this document.
Terminology and Notation The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
Overview Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (GOST algorithms) are a set of cryptographic algorithms of different types -- ciphers, hash functions, digital signatures, etc. In particular, Russian cryptographic standard defines the "Kuznyechik" and "Magma" block ciphers (also defined in and , respectively). Cryptographic standard defines the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (also defined in ), while defines two cryptographic hash functions with different output lengths (also defined in ). These hash functions are often referred to as "Streebog" hash functions, although this is not an official name and is not used in the provided references. The parameters for the elliptic curves used in GOST signature and key exchange algorithms are defined in .
IKE SA Protection IKE Security Association (SA) protection using GOST algorithms is defined in . In particular, two transforms of Type 1 (Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs) can be used for IKE SA protection: ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE (32) based on the "Kuznyechik" block cipher and ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE (33) based on the "Magma" block cipher, both in Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM). The information here is provided for convenience. For full details, please see .
Pseudorandom Function This specification defines a new transform of Type 2 (Pseudorandom Function Transform IDs): PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512 (9). This transform uses the Pseudorandom Function (PRF) HMAC_GOSTR3411_2012_512 defined in . The PRF uses the GOST R 34.11-2012 ("Streebog") hash function with a 512-bit output defined in and with HMAC construction. The PRF has a 512-bit block size and a 512-bit output length.
Shared Key Calculation This specification defines two new transforms of Type 4 (Key Exchange Method Transform IDs): GOST3410_2012_256 (33) and GOST3410_2012_512 (34). These transforms use the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange algorithm over twisted Edwards curves. The parameters for these curves are defined in . In particular, transform GOST3410_2012_256 uses the id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA parameter set and GOST3410_2012_512 uses the id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC parameter set (both defined in ). The shared secret is computed as follows. The initiator randomly selects its private key d_i from {1,..,q - 1}, where q is the subgroup order and is a parameter of the selected curve. Then a public key Q_i is computed as a point on the curve: where G is the generator for the selected curve. It is then sent to the responder. The responder makes the same calculations to get d_r and Q_r and sends Q_r to the initiator. After peers exchange Q_i and Q_R, both sides can compute a point on the curve: where m is the group order and is a parameter of the selected curve. The shared secret K is an x coordinate of S in a little-endian representation. The size of K is determined by the size of the used curve and is either 256 or 512 bits. When the GOST public key is transmitted in the Key Exchange payload (), it MUST be represented as x coordinate immediately followed by y coordinate, each in a little-endian representation. The size of each coordinate is determined by the size of the used curve and is either 256 or 512 bits, so that the size of the Key Exchange Data field in the Key Exchange payload is either 64 or 128 octets.
Recipient Tests Upon receiving a peer's public key, implementations MUST check that the key is actually a point on the curve. Otherwise, the exchange fails. Implementations MUST check that the calculated public value S is not an identity element of the curve. If S appears to be the identity element of the curve, the exchange fails. The INVALID_SYNTAX notification MAY be sent in these cases.
Authentication IKEv2 allows various authentication methods to be used for IKE SA establishment. Some methods are tied to a particular algorithm, while others may be used with different algorithms. This specification makes no restrictions on using the latter ones with the GOST algorithms. In particular, "Shared Key Message Integrity Code" (2), defined in , and "NULL Authentication" (13), defined in , can be used with GOST algorithms with no changes to the process of the AUTH payload content calculation. When the GOST digital signature algorithm is used in IKEv2 for authentication purposes, the "Digital Signature" (14) authentication method, defined in , MUST be specified in the AUTH payload. The GOST digital signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-2012 is defined in and . There are two variants of the GOST digital signature algorithm -- one over a 256-bit elliptic curve and the other over a 512-bit key elliptic curve. The signature value, as defined in and , consists of two integers: r and s. The size of each integer is either 256 or 512 bits depending on the elliptic curve used. The content of the Signature Value field in the AUTH payload MUST consist of s immediately followed by r, each in a big-endian representation, so that the size of the field is either 64 or 128 octets. The AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 objects for the GOST digital signature algorithm are defined in .
Hash Functions The GOST digital signature algorithm uses the GOST R 34.11-2012 ("Streebog") hash functions defined in and . There are two "Streebog" hash functions: one with a 256-bit output length and the other with a 512-bit output length. The former is used with the GOST digital signature algorithm over a 256-bit elliptic curve and the latter over a 512-bit key elliptic curve. This specification defines two new values for the "IKEv2 Hash Algorithms" registry: STREEBOG_256 (6) for the GOST hash function with a 256-bit output length and STREEBOG_512 (7) for the GOST hash function with a 512-bit output length. These values MUST be included in the SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS notification if a corresponding GOST digital signature algorithm is supported by the sender and its local policy allows the use of this algorithm (see for details).
ASN.1 Objects This section lists GOST digital signature algorithm ASN.1 AlgorithmIdentifier objects in binary form. With GOST digital signature algorithms, optional parameters in AlgorithmIdentifier objects are always omitted. These objects are defined in and and are provided here for convenience.
id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256 The optional parameters field must be omitted.
id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512 The optional parameters field must be omitted.
Security Considerations The security considerations of and apply. The security of GOST elliptic curves is discussed in . The security of the "Streebog" hash functions is discussed in . A second preimage attack on "Streebog" hash functions is described in if the message size exceeds 2259 blocks. This attack is not relevant to how "Streebog" hash functions are used in IKEv2.
IANA Considerations IANA has assigned one Transform ID in the "Transform Type 2 - Pseudorandom Function Transform IDs" registry: New Pseudorandom Function Transform ID
Number Name Reference
9 PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512 RFC 9385
IANA has assigned two Transform IDs in the "Transform Type 4 - Key Exchange Method Transform IDs" registry: New Key Exchange Method Transform IDs
Number Name Recipient Tests Reference
33 GOST3410_2012_256 RFC 9385, Section 6.1 RFC 9385
34 GOST3410_2012_512 RFC 9385, Section 6.1 RFC 9385
IANA has assigned two values in the "IKEv2 Hash Algorithms" registry: New IKEv2 Hash Algorithms
Number Hash Algorithm Reference
6 STREEBOG_256 RFC 9385
7 STREEBOG_512 RFC 9385
References Normative References Informative References Information technology. Cryptographic data security. Signature and verification processes of [electronic] digital signature Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology (In Russian) Information technology. Cryptographic data security. Hashing function Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology (In Russian) Information technology. Cryptographic data security. Block ciphers Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology (In Russian) Information technology. Cryptographic data security. Using Russian cryptographic algorithms in the Internet Key Exchange protocol version 2 (IKEv2) Standardisation Technical Committee "Cryptographic information protection" (In Russian) Information technology. Cryptographic data security. The test vectors for the use of Russian cryptographic algorithms in the IKEv2 key exchange protocol Standardisation Technical Committee "Cryptographic information protection" (In Russian) Information technology. Cryptographic data security. Usage of GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012 algorithms in certificate, CRL and PKCS#10 certificate request in X.509 public key infrastructure Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology (In Russian) On the security properties of Russian standardized elliptic curves Cryptanalysis of GOST R hash function The Usage of Counter Revisited: Second-Preimage Attack on New Russian Standardized Hash Function Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/675
Test Vectors This appendix contains test vectors for two scenarios. The test vectors were borrowed from . In both scenarios, peers establish, rekey, and delete an IKE SA and ESP SAs. The IP addresses of the peers used in both scenarios are the same:
  • initiator's IP address is 10.111.10.171
  • responder's IP address is 10.111.10.45
The test vectors also cover IKE message protection for transforms defined in . The keys SK_ei and SK_er are transform keys (see ), and the keys K1i, K2i, K3i, K1r, K2r, and K3r represent nodes in the key tree for the initiator and responder correspondently. The leaf keys K3i and K3r are effectively message protection keys (K_msg in terms of ). MGM nonces (also known as Initial Counter Nonces) are defined in . The Initialization Vector (IV) format is defined in , and the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) format is defined in . All other keys and entities used in the test vectors are defined in .
Scenario 1 In this scenario, peers establish, rekey, and delete an IKE SA and ESP SAs using the following prerequisites:
  • Peers authenticate each other using a Pre-Shared Key (PSK).
  • Initiator's ID is "IKE-Initiator" of type ID_FQDN.
  • Responder's ID is "IKE-Responder" of type ID_FQDN.
  • No NAT is present between the peers.
  • IKE fragmentation is not used.
  • IKE SA is created with the following transforms:
    • ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE
    • PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512
    • GOST3410_2012_512
  • ESP SAs are created with the following transforms:
    • ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE
    • ESN off
The 256-bit PSK used for authentication: This scenario includes four sub-scenarios, which are described below.
Sub-Scenario 1: Establishment of IKE and ESP SAs Using the IKE_SA_INIT and the IKE_AUTH Exchanges <--- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr [,N+] HDR, SK {IDi, [IDr,] [N+,] AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr} ---> <--- HDR, SK {IDr, [N+,] AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr} ]]> Initiator's actions:
  1. Generates random SPIi for IKE SA
  2. Generates random IKE nonce Ni
  3. Generates ephemeral private key
  4. Computes public key
  5. Creates message
  6. Sends message, peer receives message 10.111.15.45:500 [316] 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000010: 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 3c 22 00 00 34 00000020: 00 00 00 30 01 01 00 05 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20 00000030: 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 09 00000040: 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 22 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 21 00000050: 28 00 00 88 00 22 00 00 96 1b 9b 21 4f 7e e9 83 00000060: ec 27 a0 64 0c 77 4f be 78 31 be fd 1e 63 7d 6e 00000070: 76 eb 2f 81 23 80 62 87 ba 2c f7 31 a2 70 b7 3e 00000080: 8a 1d 91 93 72 cf 61 c8 d3 18 f6 bc f7 a0 44 c8 00000090: 11 a7 fe d2 99 ea 8b 4d 59 fa a7 38 ae 03 48 d2 000000A0: aa f7 ff 11 e0 60 29 dd 16 59 58 78 8e 3b e2 b5 000000B0: 48 36 3c ca 07 1a 5d be a7 42 79 81 74 22 6f 53 000000C0: 15 d2 c2 f6 06 d4 0f ed 70 f0 1c cf 89 2e ac 3c 000000D0: fe 01 02 91 85 06 7b d4 29 00 00 24 48 b6 d3 b3 000000E0: ab 56 f2 c8 f0 42 d5 16 e7 21 d9 31 f9 ac 10 f9 000000F0: 7f 80 8c 51 2b d6 f4 59 93 a7 4d 13 29 00 00 1c 00000100: 00 00 40 04 92 b2 91 d3 9b 53 51 c8 33 c2 1f 2e 00000110: 92 ef 24 88 ef f4 e2 bf 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 00000120: 77 e1 99 fe 3b 7e 33 42 b5 af ad 51 cf 97 91 4b 00000130: 08 98 a6 13 00 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e ]]>
Responder's actions:
  1. Parses received message R[316] SA[52]{ P[48](#1:IKE::5#){ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512, KE=GOST3410_2012_512, GOST3410_2012_256}}, KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){961B9B...067BD4}, NONCE[36]{48B6D3...A74D13}, N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){92B291...F4E2BF}, N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){77E199...98A613}, N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED) ]]>
  2. Generates random SPIr for IKE SA
  3. Generates random IKE nonce Nr
  4. Generates ephemeral private key
  5. Computes public key
  6. Creates message
  7. Sends message, peer receives message
Initiator's actions:
  1. Parses received message I[300] SA[36]{ P[32](#1:IKE::3#){ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512, KE=GOST3410_2012_512}}, KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){ADB4E4...390548}, NONCE[36]{FB81C8...FE63F0}, N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){6D7A48...683D59}, N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){481A5B...905499}, N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED) ]]>
  2. Computes shared key
  3. Computes SKEYSEED
  4. Computes SK_d
  5. Computes SK_ei
  6. Computes SK_er
  7. Computes SK_pi
  8. Computes SK_pr
  9. Computes prf(SK_pi, IDi)
  10. Uses PSK
  11. Computes prf(PSK,"Key Pad for IKEv2")
  12. Computes content of AUTH payload
  13. Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
  14. Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
  15. Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
  16. Selects SPI for incoming ESP SA
  17. Creates message
  18. Composes MGM nonce
  19. Composes AAD
  20. Composes plaintext
  21. Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
  22. Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg
  23. Composes IV
  24. Sends message, peer receives message 10.111.15.45:500 [334] 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14 00000010: 2e 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 4e 23 00 01 32 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a5 7d 65 70 aa c3 ef f7 00000030: df d6 5c 58 f6 2e ea 80 82 15 dc 9d ae 42 1c f0 00000040: 4c e4 cd 2a 45 f0 22 96 ea d2 06 cc 9b 59 97 9e 00000050: 45 5d 27 5f b4 fd 55 6a 90 bb 14 da df 9f 56 b0 00000060: e8 4c 89 a5 d8 f1 f6 55 a9 f0 82 90 57 28 86 a5 00000070: bd 12 85 2f 2e 51 54 29 fe 04 45 a4 90 f0 f8 0e 00000080: 8b e9 c7 37 05 8f 6b bb 36 b0 24 8a 5f a3 ca f3 00000090: 7e 7d f9 8e 73 4b b0 14 ce b0 af 63 4c 4f ea 60 000000A0: f6 46 4c 61 76 7c 9f 18 0c 61 73 fa 30 9f 91 c4 000000B0: 22 c9 ab 61 80 5a de 8e 06 40 36 7a 71 59 a5 ad 000000C0: 1c 67 25 03 9b af 2b 04 9f c1 de 51 11 7b f1 16 000000D0: 20 81 78 3f a8 01 d6 c8 79 89 d9 65 3e ea 58 6d 000000E0: ac 48 fc 4a 9a b9 48 02 d7 2b 01 5d 6a 2d cb 65 000000F0: bb ad 99 86 e2 03 08 76 1b dd 7c 56 3c 49 a4 2c 00000100: da 24 1f ad 54 79 f5 d8 0e 52 8a 49 92 90 66 80 00000110: 85 00 b7 d8 89 5f b7 f4 92 c1 5b ed 8a 16 00 f3 00000120: 9a f8 90 4b fa 6a b2 de 2a 89 74 9f 99 c7 c3 57 00000130: 88 5b 88 95 5c ec 46 52 04 c4 49 08 05 ab ee 1c 00000140: 80 f6 7a 4f 14 38 e6 5f 6b 8c f5 5d 55 f5 ]]>
Responder's actions:
  1. Computes shared key
  2. Computes SKEYSEED
  3. Computes SK_d
  4. Computes SK_ei
  5. Computes SK_er
  6. Computes SK_pi
  7. Computes SK_pr
  8. Extracts IV from message
  9. Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
  10. Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
  11. Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
  12. Composes MGM nonce
  13. Extracts ICV from message
  14. Extracts AAD from message
  15. Extracts ciphertext from message
  16. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg, resulting in plaintext
  17. Parses received message R[334] E[306]{ IDi[21](FQDN){"IKE-Initiator"}, AUTH[72](Preshared-Key){C99B01...741EE3}, N[8](INITIAL_CONTACT), N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){4}, CP[16](REQUEST){IP4.Address[0], IP4.DNS[0]}, SA[56]{ P[52](#1:ESP:0ADE5FCD:5#){ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE, ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE, ESN=Off}}, TSi[40](2#){10.111.10.171:icmp:8.0, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255}, TSr[40](2#){10.0.0.2:icmp:8.0, 10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255}, N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED), N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)} ]]>
  18. Computes prf(SK_pi, IDi)
  19. Uses PSK
  20. Computes prf(PSK,"Key Pad for IKEv2")
  21. Computes content of AUTH payload and compares it with the received one
  22. Computes keys for ESP SAs
  23. Computes prf(SK_pr,IDr)
  24. Uses PSK
  25. Computes prf(PSK,"Key Pad for IKEv2")
  26. Computes content of AUTH payload
  27. Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
  28. Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
  29. Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
  30. Selects SPI for incoming ESP SA
  31. Creates message
  32. Composes MGM nonce
  33. Composes AAD
  34. Composes plaintext
  35. Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
  36. Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg
  37. Composes IV
  38. Sends message, peer receives message
Initiator's actions:
  1. Extracts IV from message
  2. Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
  3. Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
  4. Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
  5. Composes MGM nonce
  6. Extracts ICV from message
  7. Extracts AAD from message
  8. Extracts ciphertext from message
  9. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg, resulting in plaintext
  10. Parses received message I[286] E[258]{ IDr[21](FQDN){"IKE-Responder"}, AUTH[72](Preshared-Key){35CE8A...D2D12D}, N[8](INITIAL_CONTACT), N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){64}, CP[16](REPLY){IP4.Address[4]=10.1.1.2}, SA[32]{ P[28](#1:ESP:503C8DAF:2#){ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, ESN=Off}}, TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.2}, TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255}, N[8](ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE), N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED), N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)} ]]>
  11. Computes prf(SK_pr, IDr)
  12. Uses PSK
  13. Computes prf(PSK,"Key Pad for IKEv2")
  14. Computes content of AUTH payload and compares it with the received one
  15. Computes keys for ESP SAs
Sub-Scenario 2: IKE SA Rekeying Using the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange <--- HDR, SK {SAr, Nr, KEr [,N+]} ]]> Initiator's actions:
  1. Generates random SPIi for new IKE SA
  2. Generates random IKE nonce Ni
  3. Generates ephemeral private key
  4. Computes public key
  5. Creates message
  6. Uses previously computed key K3i
  7. Composes MGM nonce
  8. Composes AAD
  9. Composes plaintext
  10. Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
  11. Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg
  12. Composes IV
  13. Sends message, peer receives message 10.111.15.45:500 [281] 00000000: e9 d3 f3 78 19 1c 38 40 8d df f4 01 fb fb 0b 14 00000010: 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 02 00 00 01 19 21 00 00 fd 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 16 cf 92 8a 87 4c 02 00000030: 79 31 04 22 c3 d9 5f fd 5a 19 23 62 25 d1 99 c2 00000040: af 75 4d f1 3c ac c0 c1 c7 db d0 fd 93 ac 6d 25 00000050: b4 19 01 e6 df e8 51 c2 88 a9 8a 26 92 98 ec ce 00000060: c1 2f cf ca ce 9b 5a 6d 4c 8b cf 97 63 5a a3 e6 00000070: 46 49 0f 1f 05 54 00 49 6b d8 14 f4 e2 ee b3 66 00000080: 2a 13 9b dd 63 53 7a 82 2a d8 bf 48 aa db 79 21 00000090: d3 d8 ac b1 ac 8f 9b 41 a7 49 81 95 d7 54 46 e2 000000A0: 00 9b 17 3a ab 9a 4c 8f 19 9e ac 61 cc f6 02 47 000000B0: a1 7e f4 48 5b e7 3c a7 53 dc 03 9e ea 5f c4 99 000000C0: 60 6e db 6a 21 fe 7c 7b 11 ed bf 44 59 73 fa 65 000000D0: 01 98 e4 e6 10 63 87 27 8b f0 8c bb 94 52 dd 97 000000E0: ee dc ce 88 c4 45 b4 16 f2 8b d4 74 cb 46 38 57 000000F0: f4 44 88 23 44 06 d9 91 00 ea 81 2c e7 f6 66 0f 00000100: a8 45 0f 1d 8c 2d f1 02 a2 06 78 c7 e0 b1 2f da 00000110: a5 96 fa 27 ee 67 de 9e 95 ]]>
Responder's actions:
  1. Extracts IV from message
  2. Uses previously computed key K3i
  3. Composes MGM nonce
  4. Extracts ICV from message
  5. Extracts AAD from message
  6. Extracts ciphertext from message
  7. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg, resulting in plaintext
  8. Parses received message R[281] E[253]{ SA[44]{ P[40](#1:IKE:4387648D6C9E28FF:3#){ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512, KE=GOST3410_2012_512}}, NONCE[36]{6C8367...085A4C}, KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){04DB0B...8B9566}, N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){4}} ]]>
  9. Generates random SPIr for new IKE SA
  10. Generates random IKE nonce Nr
  11. Generates ephemeral private key
  12. Computes public key
  13. Computes shared key
  14. Computes SKEYSEED for new SA
  15. Computes SK_d for new SA
  16. Computes SK_ei for new SA
  17. Computes SK_er for new SA
  18. Creates message
  19. Uses previously computed key K3r
  20. Composes MGM nonce
  21. Composes AAD
  22. Composes plaintext
  23. Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
  24. Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg
  25. Composes IV
  26. Sends message, peer receives message
Initiator's actions:
  1. Extracts IV from message
  2. Uses previously computed key K3r
  3. Composes MGM nonce
  4. Extracts ICV from message
  5. Extracts AAD from message
  6. Extracts ciphertext from message
  7. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg, resulting in plaintext
  8. Parses received message I[281] E[253]{ SA[44]{ P[40](#1:IKE:82D9FAF87449B936:3#){ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512, KE=GOST3410_2012_512}}, NONCE[36]{5A2DD2...96437B}, KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){B9F927...B5AC4A}, N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){64}} ]]>
  9. Computes shared key
  10. Computes SKEYSEED for new SA
  11. Computes SK_d for new SA
  12. Computes SK_ei for new SA
  13. Computes SK_er for new SA
Sub-Scenario 3: ESP SAs Rekeying with PFS Using the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange <--- HDR, SK {SAr, Nr, KEr, TSi, TSr [,N+]} ]]> Initiator's actions:
  1. Generates random IKE nonce Ni
  2. Generates ephemeral private key
  3. Computes public key
  4. Selects SPI for new incoming ESP SA
  5. Creates message
  6. Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
  7. Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
  8. Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
  9. Composes MGM nonce
  10. Composes AAD
  11. Composes plaintext
  12. Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
  13. Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg
  14. Composes IV
  15. Sends message, peer receives message 10.111.15.45:500 [341] 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36 00000010: 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 55 29 00 01 39 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 9b 13 cb cb f1 18 53 00000030: fc 81 2e 75 c3 03 e0 ca 55 c1 fb 55 c0 29 40 48 00000040: fc 20 f4 a8 51 5b 97 6b c6 07 4c 7d 45 54 51 0f 00000050: 18 7f 43 a4 df 4b e8 e3 b4 eb 68 24 4b f0 1c df 00000060: 8f 1e a2 21 31 02 29 68 38 4d 68 fd 42 66 34 3e 00000070: 82 46 f0 17 02 bf 65 19 b0 f7 09 62 0d 12 6a 7e 00000080: ad 76 57 0d 19 55 cf 01 89 9c 7e f5 5a fa 20 4f 00000090: 8c 6d a4 83 b9 94 ad 4e 2a 46 08 5a 58 a1 4b 8e 000000A0: 53 2b a4 e6 3b fc 33 de cf cb ee 50 6d a1 9f e4 000000B0: 94 06 19 39 39 6b 7e 4b 83 f7 07 c0 bb 15 21 8d 000000C0: 8f 2d 5f 6c f6 97 68 21 3c ce c6 67 82 00 8f f3 000000D0: d7 d6 c3 f2 87 47 b8 b9 a3 0f f8 e2 0a 62 e8 f5 000000E0: 98 df bc f0 02 6a 3f 47 c4 f0 24 a4 80 95 bf cf 000000F0: 32 5a a5 22 3c a5 a8 f1 57 d6 3b b8 06 1c b6 d7 00000100: c7 b3 58 e7 ee 69 eb 31 d6 09 db 8b 8a 1d 2b a1 00000110: f7 46 e5 b9 99 13 73 30 1f ed 0c 82 4b cc ce 5e 00000120: 25 79 1b ff 8b ca f0 b2 1e 7e 70 03 66 c7 7b 6c 00000130: 10 92 f2 34 b6 e9 ce bb 65 ce d4 b5 99 f3 70 78 00000140: 5f 06 f4 fe 0a 3c 00 28 68 fc 85 a4 7e 0b 41 77 00000150: 54 ef 1a 03 cb ]]>
Responder's actions:
  1. Extracts IV from message
  2. Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
  3. Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
  4. Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
  5. Composes MGM nonce
  6. Extracts ICV from message
  7. Extracts AAD from message
  8. Extracts ciphertext from message
  9. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg, resulting in plaintext
  10. Parses received message R[341] E[313]{ N[12](ESP:0ADE5FCD:REKEY_SA), SA[40]{ P[36](#1:ESP:A4FE65A1:3#){ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, KE=GOST3410_2012_512, ESN=Off}}, NONCE[36]{5952B2...0F209B}, KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){1C5508...8AC360}, TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.2}, TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255}, N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED), N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)} ]]>
  11. Generates random IKE nonce Nr
  12. Generates ephemeral private key
  13. Computes public key
  14. Selects SPI for new incoming ESP SA
  15. Computes keys for new ESP SAs
  16. Creates message
  17. Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
  18. Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
  19. Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
  20. Composes MGM nonce
  21. Composes AAD
  22. Composes plaintext
  23. Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
  24. Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg
  25. Composes IV
  26. Sends message, peer receives message
Initiator's actions:
  1. Extracts IV from message
  2. Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
  3. Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
  4. Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
  5. Composes MGM nonce
  6. Extracts ICV from message
  7. Extracts AAD from message
  8. Extracts ciphertext from message
  9. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg, resulting in plaintext
  10. Parses received message I[337] E[309]{ SA[40]{ P[36](#1:ESP:290A8E3F:3#){ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, KE=GOST3410_2012_512, ESN=Off}}, NONCE[36]{F1C13F...D59412}, KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){DE1D91...802D00}, TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.2}, TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255}, N[8](ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE), N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED), N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)} ]]>
  11. Computes keys for new ESP SAs
Sub-Scenario 4: IKE SA Deletion Using the INFORMATIONAL Exchange <--- HDR, SK { } ]]> Initiator's actions:
  1. Creates message
  2. Uses previously computed key K3i
  3. Composes MGM nonce
  4. Composes AAD
  5. Composes plaintext
  6. Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
  7. Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg
  8. Composes IV
  9. Sends message, peer receives message 10.111.15.45:500 [61] 00000000: 43 87 64 8d 6c 9e 28 ff 82 d9 fa f8 74 49 b9 36 00000010: 2e 20 25 08 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 3d 2a 00 00 21 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 3e 17 6f 6c 23 48 06 e9 00000030: fd 23 7b a2 fc d5 1c 6f 2c c0 1e 21 e4 ]]>
Responder's actions:
  1. Extracts IV from message
  2. Uses previously computed key K3i
  3. Composes MGM nonce
  4. Extracts ICV from message
  5. Extracts AAD from message
  6. Extracts ciphertext from message
  7. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg, resulting in plaintext
  8. Parses received message R[61] E[33]{ D[8](IKE)} ]]>
  9. Creates message
  10. Uses previously computed key K3r
  11. Composes MGM nonce
  12. Composes AAD
  13. Composes plaintext
  14. Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
  15. Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg
  16. Composes IV
  17. Sends message, peer receives message
Initiator's actions:
  1. Extracts IV from message
  2. Uses previously computed key K3r
  3. Composes MGM nonce
  4. Extracts ICV from message
  5. Extracts AAD from message
  6. Extracts ciphertext from message
  7. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg, resulting in plaintext
  8. Parses received message I[53] E[25]{} ]]>
Scenario 2 In this scenario, peers establish, rekey, and delete an IKE SA and ESP SAs using the following prerequisites:
  • Peers authenticate each other using digital signatures.
  • Initiator's ID is "CN=IKE Interop Test Client, O=ELVIS-PLUS, C=RU" of type ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
  • Responder's ID is "CN=IKE Interop Test Server, O=ELVIS-PLUS, C=RU" of type ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
  • No NAT is present between the peers, but using UDP encapsulation is forced by the initiator by setting the NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP notification data to all zeroes.
  • IKE fragmentation is used in the IKE_AUTH exchange.
  • IKE SA is created with the following transforms:
    • ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE
    • PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512
    • GOST3410_2012_256
  • ESP SAs are created with the following transforms:
    • ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE
    • ESN off
The certificates for this scenario were obtained from the public testing CA service . The initiator's certificate private key (little endian): The initiator's certificate: The responder's certificate private key (little endian): The responder's certificate: CA certificate: This scenario includes four sub-scenarios, which are described below.
Sub-Scenario 1: Establishment of IKE and ESP SAs Using the IKE_SA_INIT and the IKE_AUTH Exchanges <--- HDR, N(INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD) HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni [,N+] ---> <--- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr [,CERTREQ] [,N+] HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,] [IDr,] [N+,] AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr} ---> <--- HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] [N+,] AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr} ]]> Initiator's actions:
  1. Generates random SPIi for IKE SA
  2. Generates random IKE nonce Ni
  3. Generates ephemeral private key (512 bit)
  4. Computes public key
  5. Creates message
  6. Sends message, peer receives message 10.111.15.45:500 [328] 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000010: 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 48 22 00 00 34 00000020: 00 00 00 30 01 01 00 05 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20 00000030: 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 09 00000040: 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 22 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 21 00000050: 28 00 00 88 00 22 00 00 89 77 c6 d7 2b 08 5d d5 00000060: 48 b1 ea 5d 99 c5 03 09 c6 62 fe d7 7d 84 a4 d8 00000070: 8b 9b a5 c8 3a 7a 05 86 e2 0d 8d 9b 5d ce 01 18 00000080: e2 d2 da 73 83 ee 30 ad 49 88 44 6f bd 18 78 b4 00000090: bb da c9 df 1a ca d1 2a 05 98 75 da 9e 9a 21 e4 000000A0: db 71 8f af d1 96 c7 8b de 9a b2 98 f7 55 bb 74 000000B0: 38 34 a4 da 47 ab 86 15 d4 c8 33 70 b7 02 79 b8 000000C0: 7f c2 97 6d 03 8f 2d 08 d7 ab ac 85 4c bf 5a f6 000000D0: 27 57 ad fe 61 50 5e 45 29 00 00 24 98 44 d5 40 000000E0: ef 89 46 f4 55 20 0a 55 73 dc ad 73 dd 2a 6f a8 000000F0: 31 f8 49 05 f5 8e 17 a2 6c cc 01 1f 29 00 00 1c 00000100: 00 00 40 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000110: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 00000120: 7d 21 24 87 89 d7 95 71 bd a2 2d 22 9d 51 d0 71 00000130: e9 4e 6f 10 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e 00 00 00 0c 00000140: 00 00 40 2f 00 06 00 07 ]]>
Responder's actions:
  1. Parses received message R[328] SA[52]{ P[48](#1:IKE::5#){ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512, KE=GOST3410_2012_512, GOST3410_2012_256}}, KE[136](GOST3410_2012_512){8977C6...505E45}, NONCE[36]{9844D5...CC011F}, N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){000000...000000}, N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){7D2124...4E6F10}, N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED), N[12](SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS){STREEBOG_256, STREEBOG_512} ]]>
  2. Creates message
  3. Sends message, peer receives message
Initiator's actions:
  1. Parses received message I[38] N[10](INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD){GOST3410_2012_256}} ]]>
  2. Generates ephemeral private key (256 bit)
  3. Computes public key
  4. Creates message
  5. Sends message, peer receives message 10.111.15.45:500 [264] 00000000: 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000010: 21 20 22 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 08 22 00 00 34 00000020: 00 00 00 30 01 01 00 05 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 20 00000030: 03 00 00 08 01 00 00 21 03 00 00 08 02 00 00 09 00000040: 03 00 00 08 04 00 00 22 00 00 00 08 04 00 00 21 00000050: 28 00 00 48 00 21 00 00 7d b0 49 81 88 6d 1b 02 00000060: b2 a6 35 c5 8b ea 90 8c 3e 16 de e5 43 13 22 0b 00000070: ad f5 89 9f 7f 85 54 2d 3e db 1e de 85 f7 d5 5d 00000080: 6f 83 c5 d0 31 bd 31 49 dd 29 c5 16 16 7d ec 86 00000090: 16 d8 85 e6 e4 50 ab 46 29 00 00 24 98 44 d5 40 000000A0: ef 89 46 f4 55 20 0a 55 73 dc ad 73 dd 2a 6f a8 000000B0: 31 f8 49 05 f5 8e 17 a2 6c cc 01 1f 29 00 00 1c 000000C0: 00 00 40 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 000000D0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 29 00 00 1c 00 00 40 05 000000E0: 7d 21 24 87 89 d7 95 71 bd a2 2d 22 9d 51 d0 71 000000F0: e9 4e 6f 10 29 00 00 08 00 00 40 2e 00 00 00 0c 00000100: 00 00 40 2f 00 06 00 07 ]]>
Responder's actions:
  1. Parses received message R[264] SA[52]{ P[48](#1:IKE::5#){ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512, KE=GOST3410_2012_512, GOST3410_2012_256}}, KE[72](GOST3410_2012_256){7DB049...50AB46}, NONCE[36]{9844D5...CC011F}, N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){000000...000000}, N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){7D2124...4E6F10}, N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED), N[12](SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS){STREEBOG_256, STREEBOG_512} ]]>
  2. Generates random SPIr for IKE SA
  3. Generates random IKE nonce Nr
  4. Generates ephemeral private key
  5. Computes public key
  6. Computes hash of CA public key
  7. Creates message
  8. Sends message, peer receives message
Initiator's actions:
  1. Parses received message I[273] SA[36]{ P[32](#1:IKE::3#){ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512, KE=GOST3410_2012_256}}, KE[72](GOST3410_2012_256){49C240...9E07A2}, NONCE[36]{6CDE24...B50048}, N[28](NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP){A4DCA3...2F5B3F}, N[28](NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP){BA7D7A...7AB7C9}, CERTREQ[25](X.509 Cert){5E9E50...677198}, N[8](IKEV2_FRAGMENTATION_SUPPORTED), N[12](SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS){STREEBOG_256, STREEBOG_512} ]]>
  2. Computes shared key
  3. Computes SKEYSEED
  4. Computes SK_d
  5. Computes SK_ei
  6. Computes SK_er
  7. Computes SK_pi
  8. Computes SK_pr
  9. Computes prf(SK_pi, IDi)
  10. Uses private key for signing (little endian)
  11. Uses random number for signing
  12. Computes signature using algorithm id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512
  13. Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
  14. Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
  15. Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
  16. Selects SPI for incoming ESP SA
  17. Computes hash of CA public key
  18. Creates message splitting it into 4 fragments 4*EF[...]{ IDi[78](DN){CN=IKE Interop Test Client,O=ELVIS-PLUS,C=RU}, CERT[1280](X.509 Cert){308204...A6C40A}, CERTREQ[25](X.509 Cert){5E9E50...677198}, IDr[78](DN){CN=IKE Interop Test Server,O=ELVIS-PLUS,C=RU}, AUTH[149](Sig){id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512[12]: 6A3E59...58A820}, N[8](INITIAL_CONTACT), N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){4}, CP[16](REQUEST){IP4.Address[0], IP4.DNS[0]}, SA[56]{ P[52](#1:ESP:6C0CA570:5#){ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE, ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE, ESN=Off}}, TSi[40](2#){10.111.10.171:icmp:8.0, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255}, TSr[40](2#){10.0.0.2:icmp:8.0, 10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255}, N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED), N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)} ]]>
  19. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 1)
  20. Composes AAD (fragment 1)
  21. Composes plaintext (fragment 1)
  22. Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext (fragment 1)
  23. Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg (fragment 1)
  24. Composes IV (fragment 1)
  25. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 2)
  26. Composes AAD (fragment 2)
  27. Composes plaintext (fragment 2)
  28. Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext (fragment 2)
  29. Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg (fragment 2)
  30. Composes IV (fragment 2)
  31. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 3)
  32. Composes AAD (fragment 3)
  33. Composes plaintext (fragment 3)
  34. Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext (fragment 3)
  35. Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg (fragment 3)
  36. Composes IV (fragment 3)
  37. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 4)
  38. Composes AAD (fragment 4)
  39. Composes plaintext (fragment 4)
  40. Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext (fragment 4)
  41. Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg (fragment 4)
  42. Composes IV (fragment 4)
  43. Sends message fragment (1), peer receives message fragment (1) 10.111.15.45:4500 [548] 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 00000020: 23 00 02 04 00 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000030: 03 45 60 11 15 25 f5 45 bb 0e f4 25 26 e2 14 8c 00000040: a7 01 82 f6 9c 6e 42 f1 a3 9b 9e ac a6 dd 0d 9c 00000050: ff 79 15 ed b9 0c 81 a0 b4 29 61 fb 55 1b c1 73 00000060: 4d de 1f b2 5f 1f cb 84 5d 12 24 85 52 c4 f2 1d 00000070: 01 a7 92 ad 55 4d 90 d0 58 d2 1a 5e f6 dc 4e 73 00000080: d4 9b 08 66 d7 64 de 10 e6 75 69 20 e3 7b 6c f0 00000090: 4b 8b ff 60 39 f1 19 31 72 dd c1 09 33 5b 1d 56 000000A0: ee 0c 1c 42 d7 f3 04 d3 5b 9a 6e cf 7f b3 1f ac 000000B0: 34 a6 ee e0 ac 87 b8 88 99 75 a6 ae dc b5 30 38 000000C0: eb 3d 48 fd cc 69 64 f8 c6 61 ce e9 e1 24 ba aa 000000D0: 25 5e e6 ea 8b 0c ef 20 31 bf a9 ae 6d e2 82 d4 000000E0: ab 2c d7 af ca 62 fe bd 7c 8f a9 dc d3 63 05 d7 000000F0: ba 92 56 66 44 ad 5d 9d 1e 9a 27 2e 22 6e 5b 0c 00000100: af 84 6b c6 a7 cf ca 72 f8 8e d3 a1 bc d4 7c 5b 00000110: 7e 26 7f b3 05 d8 62 ef ad d6 07 70 d7 4b 33 e4 00000120: 26 84 e6 eb 5b 65 5c a7 71 29 45 15 d9 b0 83 6a 00000130: 52 5f a9 d8 dd f1 d8 62 c7 d7 3d e9 69 0e c5 b1 00000140: e1 de 20 6c 3d 5f f7 f7 9f f6 a5 7b 4d a5 4e e9 00000150: b4 c4 c2 7d cc 43 62 77 57 37 d3 40 48 b2 c0 5b 00000160: 48 ab d0 94 79 ef 3d 04 e3 d8 6d 42 56 ed cd 94 00000170: b4 23 2c fa f0 6b 39 ad 41 a3 b3 8f ec b8 6c ef 00000180: e1 98 3a b2 fb a8 fd 21 96 8a bf 3a 65 47 8a e9 00000190: 69 60 44 02 2c ec 7a 86 74 fe 1d 9b 08 5e b8 5e 000001A0: f8 ca 37 20 5f a7 74 8c 12 88 f2 d8 9e d4 94 29 000001B0: c2 db f9 fb 35 a0 cf 21 2b da 8b 9e cc 52 84 eb 000001C0: c4 12 39 3e e6 18 fb f7 57 6c b5 1e 10 3d 11 9c 000001D0: 29 9c 41 73 69 d8 d0 9d 71 2b 77 66 87 65 51 19 000001E0: db 27 a0 dd aa 64 ba fd c0 5f e1 4e da 7c 20 fc 000001F0: 8c 13 ab 2d c2 9c 37 9d 7e 51 cb 29 03 10 52 dc 00000200: f8 09 61 cc 12 9a a0 8e 1b e4 52 f8 72 bd 7a 86 00000210: db 93 7c 55 b8 1e 7f 21 d4 e6 02 f2 b1 51 cd e6 00000220: dc 64 12 1c ]]>
  44. Sends message fragment (2), peer receives message fragment (2) 10.111.15.45:4500 [548] 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 00000020: 00 00 02 04 00 02 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00000030: 3c b1 b4 aa 04 56 27 1b 45 04 f7 70 1b 17 16 16 00000040: 85 16 ee b3 88 7d 08 64 2d 24 b8 1d 7e ac c9 72 00000050: 73 07 d3 d9 ef 5d 08 8b 47 97 5a 98 53 00 ec 13 00000060: cc 5a 46 7b 16 a2 14 6a f1 ea 17 71 9b 75 1d 46 00000070: 9d 6d 8c 3a a2 b2 75 c5 c9 4c 16 56 73 03 16 40 00000080: 42 fe a2 5a cc c7 ed 37 91 b1 eb e5 56 2a 01 bc 00000090: a2 83 ac 05 f1 a7 56 e5 f2 bb f4 18 7f 05 82 14 000000A0: 70 de af 44 d4 cc a9 0a 95 6d c1 96 11 3d cf e1 000000B0: aa 27 f1 87 60 d2 32 c1 1e 91 bf 60 00 5f d3 fb 000000C0: a4 55 2e f0 0b 08 14 ed a3 63 54 4c b8 7b 5c 71 000000D0: 69 d1 3b 0c 6c 93 f3 99 2e fe 36 98 90 a1 05 ee 000000E0: 35 d2 da f8 81 59 f5 17 23 33 40 99 99 42 37 b0 000000F0: 0d 94 0a bd 00 cf 1c be 0e d0 13 93 e2 27 5a a5 00000100: c5 e8 a0 25 5a 2d ad 6c b4 bc 64 37 05 ac cd 22 00000110: 92 13 83 ab e8 87 93 29 82 dc 47 b4 1c 92 4d 36 00000120: ef ba 10 3d 42 2d d6 2c d5 6b 95 99 2d 17 61 c4 00000130: c5 13 ed 55 a5 e5 b2 65 ac 25 24 21 c4 25 7f 6f 00000140: 68 fb ce 8f 17 60 e9 ac 9c 52 9f d5 d4 a7 14 35 00000150: 89 a4 1f de 21 a9 51 3c 1d 73 00 10 ba a6 7c 24 00000160: fb b9 20 21 5e df 63 8a c8 1f b1 55 05 5a 70 a8 00000170: b5 f4 23 9e 22 c0 2a 7c a5 11 01 c3 5e 3d 52 2a 00000180: b8 1d c5 19 b5 55 cc 8e f0 8d 6e 93 36 10 cd e3 00000190: c8 a5 a6 2e 90 53 fa 92 64 16 6c 4f da 9b e5 f8 000001A0: 91 c5 ea b4 60 64 db ed d5 bc fc 3a 73 62 ce b2 000001B0: ff 7a 15 95 0d 77 00 ee 5c a8 c5 89 2f 39 13 59 000001C0: dd 52 ea 11 ae 28 82 36 be aa 29 68 4c f6 63 d5 000001D0: 93 a5 54 3d 8f 13 26 0a 87 34 b9 81 1c 2c cd d5 000001E0: 79 3a 65 6d 1c 6e 32 be b0 77 b7 b3 e4 ae b8 72 000001F0: f9 44 59 e9 14 46 67 56 93 ca 70 d1 ac 25 05 62 00000200: f7 55 c2 9e 2e 11 a7 29 01 24 77 4a 6f 1c ba f6 00000210: 4a 4f 83 75 29 1e c7 a9 68 29 02 d0 b4 68 c7 4d 00000220: eb dd bd 92 ]]>
  45. Sends message fragment (3), peer receives message fragment (3) 10.111.15.45:4500 [548] 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 02 20 00000020: 00 00 02 04 00 03 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00000030: e7 72 d9 51 90 b1 a2 bc 81 8d d6 56 bf 7a 81 e0 00000040: 1a a1 70 8b 35 a0 7e 5f e8 df 58 3d 75 5d d2 4c 00000050: 4c ce 17 77 3f 28 9c ca 7a a4 23 23 f0 c7 ff ff 00000060: 98 ee e3 1a 27 39 4d 90 1a b7 5b 44 11 16 11 3a 00000070: ea bf 83 66 da 92 2a 3a 3d bd b5 40 c8 bc f6 ed 00000080: cb 1d 5a 8e 30 f0 06 72 dc 6c da c1 45 7b e8 25 00000090: ca 93 2a b2 fe 4a db 00 90 e3 31 78 26 8d ae c8 000000A0: 39 66 80 7d e5 01 5f 21 d6 c3 40 46 19 e4 43 9d 000000B0: 23 c6 c1 18 06 49 bd f5 dc 8c 1b 19 b0 60 0c a3 000000C0: ad f5 5c 57 e8 8e 37 e6 ea b6 79 11 b8 f1 16 ba 000000D0: a6 d9 09 1f 0d e0 3c 07 b8 ce 9d 11 a3 c6 f7 e4 000000E0: 62 e8 94 7b ad b9 8a 6b 9c f1 f8 43 cf 7e fc 5e 000000F0: 44 ab bf b1 88 f5 67 1e 84 5f 82 63 f3 13 89 55 00000100: f5 ef 86 c3 db 48 37 f8 26 3c c4 6d a5 fc b5 69 00000110: 56 0d 2d f3 c0 98 dd e7 53 da 0a 28 87 2f 38 ab 00000120: a9 ec 60 a6 c4 54 c6 68 e7 6b e3 4b 54 bf b5 82 00000130: 44 c9 b9 45 bc 9e f5 58 d8 76 63 92 cd 52 ec 82 00000140: 80 d6 43 86 10 16 eb 7b 32 e4 ee ba ec 09 b6 4f 00000150: 35 1a bf da d7 de 40 fa b5 d2 40 f2 73 09 2d 52 00000160: 83 bd 56 a6 6b d3 9f 8a c2 c5 66 c6 6b 22 fb 6a 00000170: 00 b2 8a ac 9d 8b fc 8d 41 af 80 92 16 51 e2 cb 00000180: 89 62 9b 77 2b 1e 38 01 df fc 1f 81 2d 95 8b 9e 00000190: 1d 1e ad 9c c0 0d fc 77 6e 35 13 16 26 28 1a 29 000001A0: 19 7f f8 08 5a 0f 09 4f 6f ba 7f 4c 5b cd 0c c2 000001B0: 71 ab ea 82 a2 d2 d1 1b 17 fd dc c3 54 03 85 14 000001C0: f4 90 47 2e 67 d7 93 c3 67 7e 8a f7 43 1a b3 41 000001D0: 32 f7 b0 58 38 6e 24 c8 96 d9 94 d3 54 89 2d 61 000001E0: 10 a9 9c 22 51 52 02 c9 b7 8d cc 5b 28 6d cb 55 000001F0: 5d 2f 97 8a 8f 3f 27 56 73 eb ec 5d e4 64 91 49 00000200: 3b 88 f2 0a fc ed a5 67 a9 e3 71 ef 31 ce a0 33 00000210: fc d8 ea 4d 1e 3f dc 89 c8 89 e2 c3 54 4f 9b aa 00000220: dd af bd ca ]]>
  46. Sends message fragment (4), peer receives message fragment (4) 10.111.15.45:4500 [382] 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 35 20 23 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 01 7a 00000020: 00 00 01 5e 00 04 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00000030: e0 8a 0b 04 ee f8 47 c2 52 96 71 9f 9d 39 0c 91 00000040: ea 6a 16 7c 80 31 a0 fd 76 cc c4 f1 8f 1a d3 be 00000050: fa 78 6b df c1 c6 73 83 be 36 69 c4 8a 87 ed 11 00000060: 90 31 a8 fd f9 0a 5c e4 d4 23 c9 e6 b3 96 ac b6 00000070: 8e bd fc 27 58 79 9f cc 8b ac 6b 59 e4 70 4b 05 00000080: 23 16 ed 49 25 f3 de 02 2e ce ae 86 e8 b4 ca b4 00000090: 96 ad 5b f6 2b c2 47 33 6f da f3 97 3c 13 ed 1f 000000A0: 7a da 93 b5 69 6a b5 10 93 38 75 ea b7 34 a3 87 000000B0: b6 83 c7 da 8a a1 d9 2a 0b 22 e2 ab 63 2b 57 2b 000000C0: 88 e3 ea be 7b fc dc 26 ac b8 bb 15 96 f9 c2 f4 000000D0: 60 17 e4 09 18 ae 78 b8 73 02 6b 0e 20 cc b1 cd 000000E0: b4 4d 94 7f f3 16 28 9a d2 bd 26 77 4b a5 85 56 000000F0: b1 81 8b 9c c3 0a 7f 67 fe 6a 61 15 f1 45 66 f3 00000100: 36 fc a5 bb 1f d7 6d e7 1d 9f 3f b5 cc 60 19 48 00000110: 17 f7 08 28 1c 58 9f 2b 7a 0b b9 50 bd 02 ea b8 00000120: 1e 03 1f 52 6a 7a fc e5 b4 6b 00 cf 0d 83 1f d2 00000130: 3f f2 ad 43 d4 86 6e c1 88 d2 87 d6 1f ac a3 30 00000140: 7b c1 5b 6a 3d 4c 20 72 5d 2c ca bf 87 a2 ce 1d 00000150: b3 fa c7 7c 22 cd 66 fc be 49 22 32 17 ee 6e 5e 00000160: 62 c1 ca 12 2b 5d 3d 7b ae b5 3e 53 c5 98 05 1f 00000170: 42 53 49 d1 2c c2 d2 25 f1 d0 38 65 b7 b6 ]]>
Responder's actions:
  1. Computes shared key
  2. Computes SKEYSEED
  3. Computes SK_d
  4. Computes SK_ei
  5. Computes SK_er
  6. Computes SK_pi
  7. Computes SK_pr
  8. Extracts IV from message (fragment 1)
  9. Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
  10. Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
  11. Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
  12. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 1)
  13. Extracts ICV from message (fragment 1)
  14. Extracts AAD from message (fragment 1)
  15. Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 1)
  16. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg, resulting in plaintext (fragment 1)
  17. Extracts IV from message (fragment 2)
  18. Uses previously computed key K3i
  19. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 2)
  20. Extracts ICV from message (fragment 2)
  21. Extracts AAD from message (fragment 2)
  22. Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 2)
  23. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg, resulting in plaintext (fragment 2)
  24. Extracts IV from message (fragment 3)
  25. Uses previously computed key K3i
  26. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 3)
  27. Extracts ICV from message (fragment 3)
  28. Extracts AAD from message (fragment 3)
  29. Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 3)
  30. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg, resulting in plaintext (fragment 3)
  31. Extracts IV from message (fragment 4)
  32. Uses previously computed key K3i
  33. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 4)
  34. Extracts ICV from message (fragment 4)
  35. Extracts AAD from message (fragment 4)
  36. Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 4)
  37. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg, resulting in plaintext (fragment 4)
  38. Reassembles message from received fragments and parses it R[1847] 4*EF[...]->E[1819]{ IDi[78](DN){CN=IKE Interop Test Client,O=ELVIS-PLUS,C=RU}, CERT[1280](X.509 Cert){308204...A6C40A}, CERTREQ[25](X.509 Cert){5E9E50...677198}, IDr[78](DN){CN=IKE Interop Test Server,O=ELVIS-PLUS,C=RU}, AUTH[149](Sig){id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512[12]: 6A3E59...58A820}, N[8](INITIAL_CONTACT), N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){4}, CP[16](REQUEST){IP4.Address[0], IP4.DNS[0]}, SA[56]{ P[52](#1:ESP:6C0CA570:5#){ Encryption=ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_KTREE, ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, ENCR_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_MAC_KTREE, ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_MAC_KTREE, ESN=Off}}, TSi[40](2#){10.111.10.171:icmp:8.0, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255}, TSr[40](2#){10.0.0.2:icmp:8.0, 10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255}, N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED), N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)} ]]>
  39. Computes prf(SK_pi, IDi)
  40. Uses initiator's public key
  41. Verifies signature from AUTH payload using algorithm id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-512
  42. Computes keys for ESP SAs
  43. Computes prf(SK_pr,IDr)
  44. Uses private key for signing (little endian)
  45. Uses random number for signing
  46. Computes signature using algorithm id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256
  47. Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
  48. Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
  49. Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
  50. Selects SPI for incoming ESP SA
  51. Creates message splitting it into 4 fragments 4*EF[...]{ IDr[78](DN){CN=IKE Interop Test Server,O=ELVIS-PLUS,C=RU}, CERT[1211](X.509 Cert){308204...FB346D}, AUTH[85](Sig){id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256[12]: C840AF...A75AD3}, N[8](INITIAL_CONTACT), N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){64}, CP[16](REPLY){IP4.Address[4]=10.1.1.3}, SA[32]{ P[28](#1:ESP:34FF8A25:2#){ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, ESN=Off}}, TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.3}, TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255}, N[8](ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE), N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED), N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)} ]]>
  52. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 1)
  53. Composes AAD (fragment 1)
  54. Composes plaintext (fragment 1)
  55. Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext (fragment 1)
  56. Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg (fragment 1)
  57. Composes IV (fragment 1)
  58. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 2)
  59. Composes AAD (fragment 2)
  60. Composes plaintext (fragment 2)
  61. Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext (fragment 2)
  62. Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg (fragment 2)
  63. Composes IV (fragment 2)
  64. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 3)
  65. Composes AAD (fragment 3)
  66. Composes plaintext (fragment 3)
  67. Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext (fragment 3)
  68. Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg (fragment 3)
  69. Composes IV (fragment 3)
  70. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 4)
  71. Composes AAD (fragment 4)
  72. Composes plaintext (fragment 4)
  73. Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext (fragment 4)
  74. Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg (fragment 4)
  75. Composes IV (fragment 4)
  76. Sends message fragment (1), peer receives message fragment (1)
  77. Sends message fragment (2), peer receives message fragment (2)
  78. Sends message fragment (3), peer receives message fragment (3)
  79. Sends message fragment (4), peer receives message fragment (4)
Initiator's actions:
  1. Extracts IV from message (fragment 1)
  2. Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
  3. Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
  4. Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
  5. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 1)
  6. Extracts ICV from message (fragment 1)
  7. Extracts AAD from message (fragment 1)
  8. Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 1)
  9. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg, resulting in plaintext (fragment 1)
  10. Extracts IV from message (fragment 2)
  11. Uses previously computed key K3r
  12. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 2)
  13. Extracts ICV from message (fragment 2)
  14. Extracts AAD from message (fragment 2)
  15. Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 2)
  16. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg, resulting in plaintext (fragment 2)
  17. Extracts IV from message (fragment 3)
  18. Uses previously computed key K3r
  19. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 3)
  20. Extracts ICV from message (fragment 3)
  21. Extracts AAD from message (fragment 3)
  22. Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 3)
  23. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg, resulting in plaintext (fragment 3)
  24. Extracts IV from message (fragment 4)
  25. Uses previously computed key K3r
  26. Composes MGM nonce (fragment 4)
  27. Extracts ICV from message (fragment 4)
  28. Extracts AAD from message (fragment 4)
  29. Extracts ciphertext from message (fragment 4)
  30. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg, resulting in plaintext (fragment 4)
  31. Reassembles message from received fragments and parses it I[1563] 4*EF[...]->E[1535]{ IDr[78](DN){CN=IKE Interop Test Server,O=ELVIS-PLUS,C=RU}, CERT[1211](X.509 Cert){308204...FB346D}, AUTH[85](Sig){id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256[12]: C840AF...A75AD3}, N[8](INITIAL_CONTACT), N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){64}, CP[16](REPLY){IP4.Address[4]=10.1.1.3}, SA[32]{ P[28](#1:ESP:34FF8A25:2#){ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, ESN=Off}}, TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.3}, TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255}, N[8](ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE), N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED), N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)} ]]>
  32. Computes prf(SK_pr, IDr)
  33. Uses responder's public key
  34. Verifies signature from AUTH payload using algorithm id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-12-256
  35. Computes keys for ESP SAs
Sub-Scenario 2: IKE SA Rekeying Using the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange <--- HDR, SK {SAr, Nr, KEr [,N+]} ]]> Initiator's actions:
  1. Generates random SPIi for new IKE SA
  2. Generates random IKE nonce Ni
  3. Generates ephemeral private key
  4. Computes public key
  5. Creates message
  6. Computes K3i (i3 = 1)
  7. Composes MGM nonce
  8. Composes AAD
  9. Composes plaintext
  10. Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
  11. Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg
  12. Composes IV
  13. Sends message, peer receives message 10.111.15.45:4500 [217] 00000000: 00 00 00 00 92 80 e0 82 2e 75 87 78 db 57 8d 97 00000010: de 11 9d 1e 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 d5 00000020: 21 00 00 b9 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 f4 d1 2b 1e 00000030: 51 65 d1 0b 7f 38 c6 16 3f 6e 5e f7 e0 48 24 15 00000040: 6a 45 50 51 1a 6e fb 1c 1d b8 52 75 80 56 e4 da 00000050: fb e5 fe 42 08 71 79 99 ef 17 7a 03 fc c3 c6 b0 00000060: 15 a5 72 a4 1b de e2 b5 e6 46 56 73 3f 78 57 9e 00000070: 6b b4 05 4c 86 91 c3 61 00 2d 9b 89 c0 0c 8b 11 00000080: 0b 41 e7 92 16 7f f8 f6 5d ef f4 29 27 ef ba 8c 00000090: 5f 30 fd a9 12 4c 5f 8d e9 39 97 48 9a e1 6a 91 000000A0: 01 c7 8c 94 aa 3b 89 bb 54 40 3b f1 8d 2b 0e 75 000000B0: d8 f6 98 d2 74 e4 b7 2f f5 ac a0 41 df 73 7f 1c 000000C0: 37 18 b9 79 8e 9d 6f ea e5 8a b6 9f 35 d9 d4 b3 000000D0: cd 49 96 ac 4c 3f c4 fc 1d ]]>
Responder's actions:
  1. Extracts IV from message
  2. Computes K3i (I = 1)
  3. Composes MGM nonce
  4. Extracts ICV from message
  5. Extracts AAD from message
  6. Extracts ciphertext from message
  7. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg, resulting in plaintext
  8. Parses received message R[213] E[185]{ SA[44]{ P[40](#1:IKE:FDD9358950D5DB22:3#){ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512, KE=GOST3410_2012_256}}, NONCE[36]{2E9899...8AEC37}, KE[72](GOST3410_2012_256){137888...02D4EF}, N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){4}} ]]>
  9. Generates random SPIr for new IKE SA
  10. Generates random IKE nonce Nr
  11. Generates ephemeral private key
  12. Computes public key
  13. Computes shared key
  14. Computes SKEYSEED for new SA
  15. Computes SK_d for new SA
  16. Computes SK_ei for new SA
  17. Computes SK_er for new SA
  18. Creates message
  19. Computes K3r (i3 = 1)
  20. Composes MGM nonce
  21. Composes AAD
  22. Composes plaintext
  23. Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
  24. Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg
  25. Composes IV
  26. Sends message, peer receives message
Initiator's actions:
  1. Extracts IV from message
  2. Computes K3r (i3 = 1)
  3. Composes MGM nonce
  4. Extracts ICV from message
  5. Extracts AAD from message
  6. Extracts ciphertext from message
  7. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg, resulting in plaintext
  8. Parses received message I[213] E[185]{ SA[44]{ P[40](#1:IKE:81275DA298901A06:3#){ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, PRF=PRF_HMAC_STREEBOG_512, KE=GOST3410_2012_256}}, NONCE[36]{CF8E80...204396}, KE[72](GOST3410_2012_256){BA9CBB...B7F5C9}, N[12](SET_WINDOW_SIZE){64}} ]]>
  9. Computes shared key
  10. Computes SKEYSEED for new SA
  11. Computes SK_d for new SA
  12. Computes SK_ei for new SA
  13. Computes SK_er for new SA
Sub-Scenario 3: ESP SAs Rekeying without PFS Using the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange <--- HDR, SK {SAr, Nr, TSi, TSr [,N+]} ]]> Initiator's actions:
  1. Generates random IKE nonce Ni
  2. Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
  3. Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
  4. Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
  5. Selects SPI for new incoming ESP SA
  6. Creates message
  7. Composes MGM nonce
  8. Composes AAD
  9. Composes plaintext
  10. Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
  11. Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg
  12. Composes IV
  13. Sends message, peer receives message 10.111.15.45:4500 [197] 00000000: 00 00 00 00 fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22 81 27 5d a2 00000010: 98 90 1a 06 2e 20 24 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 c1 00000020: 29 00 00 a5 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 47 71 bb 57 00000030: 2a 1a 58 a6 44 cb 60 d4 8e 5c cc 0a b9 34 0f 34 00000040: 80 cf a2 38 54 f6 70 3b 98 4e 8f 9f 3b 5c 5a 04 00000050: 06 dc e9 d4 d3 54 c6 4d 73 09 10 c5 4e 26 c4 27 00000060: fd cb 54 e1 cf e0 fd b4 9f f8 00 41 41 c8 58 b2 00000070: c9 3a d8 e0 19 40 a3 89 ee 26 d4 84 69 e9 52 68 00000080: d5 e1 ee f0 89 6e d3 95 34 62 ad 2e e6 77 17 b8 00000090: 6c 25 52 7f d8 70 9c 36 0b c8 1d 1a 43 50 82 2a 000000A0: be b6 31 ff 2f 43 11 f7 d0 60 bf 62 b9 08 c3 09 000000B0: a3 78 fb 5e 76 57 91 5d 48 1c aa d2 a3 b3 05 bd 000000C0: 43 2f 87 0c 3f ]]>
Responder's actions:
  1. Extracts IV from message
  2. Computes K1i (i1 = 0)
  3. Computes K2i (i2 = 0)
  4. Computes K3i (i3 = 0)
  5. Composes MGM nonce
  6. Extracts ICV from message
  7. Extracts AAD from message
  8. Extracts ciphertext from message
  9. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg, resulting in plaintext
  10. Parses received message R[193] E[165]{ N[12](ESP:6C0CA570:REKEY_SA), SA[32]{ P[28](#1:ESP:9A8C6A9B:2#){ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, ESN=Off}}, NONCE[36]{B54818...F44823}, TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.3}, TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255}, N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED), N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)} ]]>
  11. Generates random IKE nonce Nr
  12. Selects SPI for new incoming ESP SA
  13. Computes keys for new ESP SAs
  14. Creates message
  15. Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
  16. Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
  17. Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
  18. Composes MGM nonce
  19. Composes AAD
  20. Composes plaintext
  21. Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
  22. Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg
  23. Composes IV
  24. Sends message, peer receives message
Initiator's actions:
  1. Extracts IV from message
  2. Computes K1r (i1 = 0)
  3. Computes K2r (i2 = 0)
  4. Computes K3r (i3 = 0)
  5. Composes MGM nonce
  6. Extracts ICV from message
  7. Extracts AAD from message
  8. Extracts ciphertext from message
  9. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg, resulting in plaintext
  10. Parses received message I[189] E[161]{ SA[32]{ P[28](#1:ESP:154F3539:2#){ Encryption=ENCR_MAGMA_MGM_KTREE, ESN=Off}}, NONCE[36]{415EA7...F35806}, TSi[24](1#){10.1.1.3}, TSr[24](1#){10.0.0.0-10.0.0.255}, N[8](ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE), N[8](ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED), N[8](NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)} ]]>
  11. Computes keys for new ESP SAs
Sub-Scenario 4: IKE SA Deletion Using the INFORMATIONAL Exchange <--- HDR, SK { } ]]> Initiator's actions:
  1. Creates message
  2. Uses previously computed key K3i
  3. Composes MGM nonce
  4. Composes AAD
  5. Composes plaintext
  6. Encrypts plaintext using K3i as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
  7. Computes ICV using K3i as K_msg
  8. Composes IV
  9. Sends message, peer receives message 10.111.15.45:4500 [61] 00000000: 00 00 00 00 fd d9 35 89 50 d5 db 22 81 27 5d a2 00000010: 98 90 1a 06 2e 20 25 08 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 39 00000020: 2a 00 00 1d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 4f ff 67 66 00000030: 41 9c d3 ec 8e d2 bf 0e b7 8f c5 53 03 ]]>
Responder's actions:
  1. Extracts IV from message
  2. Uses previously computed key K3i
  3. Composes MGM nonce
  4. Extracts ICV from message
  5. Extracts AAD from message
  6. Extracts ciphertext from message
  7. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3i as K_msg, resulting in plaintext
  8. Parses received message R[57] E[29]{ D[8](IKE)} ]]>
  9. Creates message
  10. Uses previously computed key K3r
  11. Composes MGM nonce
  12. Composes AAD
  13. Composes plaintext
  14. Encrypts plaintext using K3r as K_msg, resulting in ciphertext
  15. Computes ICV using K3r as K_msg
  16. Composes IV
  17. Sends message, peer receives message
Initiator's actions:
  1. Extracts IV from message
  2. Uses previously computed key K3r
  3. Composes MGM nonce
  4. Extracts ICV from message
  5. Extracts AAD from message
  6. Extracts ciphertext from message
  7. Decrypts ciphertext and verifies ICV using K3r as K_msg, resulting in plaintext
  8. Parses received message I[49] E[21]{} ]]>