Subject: Re: [core] New Version Notification for draft-mattsson-core-coap-actuators-00.txt

From: John Mattsson <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2015 15:34:04 +0200

Dear CORE,

We have submitted a new draft on Controlling Actuators with CoAP. We
describe several serious attacks ANY on-path attacker can do, and
discuss tougher requirements and mechanisms to mitigate the attacks.

Some of the attacks apply only to actuators, others to both sensors
and actuators. Some attacks apply only to DTLS, others to both DTLS
and OSCOAP. In common for all the attacks are that we think they can
be mitigated on the application (CoAP) layer. One of these mitigations
is a new CoAP option called the Repeat Option.

Comments are very welcome!

I think the lesson of this is that we as a community need to take
security in consideration already from the start. Some IoT deployments
require much stronger security properties than just hob-by-hob
integrity of individual messages. For example:

- Message bundle integrity - Protecting the integrity of a message
bundle, such as request and response.
- Time integrity - Binding a message to a specific point in time.
- Location integrity – Binding a message to a specific (relative) location.

Cheers,
John

On 19/10/15 20:50, "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
wrote:

A new version of I-D, draft-mattsson-core-coap-actuators-00.txt
has been successfully submitted by John Mattsson and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name: draft-mattsson-core-coap-actuators
Revision: 00
Title: Controlling Actuators with CoAP
Document date: 2015-10-19
Group: Individual Submission
Pages: 15
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mattsson-core-coap-actuators-00.txt
Status:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mattsson-core-coap-actuators/
Htmlized:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mattsson-core-coap-actuators-00

Abstract:
   Being able to trust information from sensors and to securely control
   actuators is essential in a world of connected and networking things
   interacting with the physical world.  In this memo we show that just
   using COAP with a security protocol like DTLS or OSCOAP is not
   enough.  We describe several serious attacks any on-path attacker can
   do, and discuss tougher requirements and mechanisms to mitigate the
   attacks.  While this document is focused on actuators, one of the
   attacks applies equally well to sensors using DTLS.

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