Subject: [lisp] RTG-DIR REVIEW: draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-06.txt

From: Danny McPherson <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2016 17:06:50 -0400

RTG-DIR REVIEW: draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-06.txt

Hello,

I have been selected as the Routing Directorate reviewer for this draft.
The Routing Directorate seeks to review all routing or routing-related
drafts as they pass through IETF last call and IESG review, and
sometimes on special request. The purpose of the review is to provide
assistance to the Routing ADs. For more information about the Routing
Directorate, please see
http://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/rtg/trac/wiki/RtgDir

Although these comments are primarily for the use of the Routing ADs, it
would be helpful if you could consider them along with any other IETF
Last Call comments that you receive, and strive to resolve them through
discussion or by updating the draft.

Document: draft-ietf-lisp-crypto-06.txt

Reviewer: Danny McPherson

Review Date: August 24, 2016

Intended Status: Experimental

Summary:

 I have some minor concerns about this document that should be
considered before publication.

Comments:

I believe the draft is technically sound. 

Major Issues:

I have no "Major" issues with this I-D.

Minor Issues:

In the Security Considerations section a small amount of text might be
useful that discusses end-end v. encryption from middle boxes, and the
risks therein. There are clearly benefits to this over no encryption,
but there are risks about assumptions that may be made thereafter as
well.

Nits:

S.1: s/typically not modified. Which means/typically not modified, which
means/

S.1: Is there in fact a case where asymmetries result in the *same*
egress xTRs but different keys are used? I believe this would just apply
to "different xTRs", no? :

 However, return traffic uses the same procedures but with different key
values by the same xTRs or potentially different xTRs when the paths
between LISP sites are asymmetric.

S.1: Regarding "[t]his document has the following requirements for the
solutions space", it might be useful to reference some general IETF
privacy work, even RFC 6973 or the like. Given that it's Experimental I
think it's fine as is, but some references for the broader community may
be in order. In particular, references to not requiring a separate PKI
(and therefore external or circular dependencies!), avoiding third party
trust anchor, rekeying as good operational practice, not just
compromises, and other such arguments might be reinforced. 

S.3: Could include LCAF here, perhaps.

S.4: You could probably strike this entire sentence and lessen
confusion: "When an ETR (when it is also an ITR) encapsulates packets to
this ITR (when it is also an ETR), a separate key exchange and
shared-secret computation is performed."

S.7: It's unclear what constitutes "Diffie-Hellman *group*".

S.7: s/the the/the/

S.7: s/integrity-check/integrity check/

S.8: Editors note to strike text in last paragraph here, unclear what
resolution was from this text. 

S.12.1: A reference to the SAAG comments might be useful here?

S 13: Are you sure you want a default FCFS allocation policy here and
not a slightly higher bar?

Throughout: Consistent hyphenation in the document would help (e.g.,
"network-byte" ..). 

Throughout: Expanding on first use of each acronym would be useful,
perhaps with references.