Ericsson

8275 Trans Canada Route Saint Laurent QC H4S 0B6 Canada daniel.migault@ericsson.com

LMU Munich

Oettingenstr. 67 Munich 80538 Germany guggemos@nm.ifi.lmu.de http://mnm-team.org/~guggemos

Dell Technologies

9 Andrei Sakharov St Haifa 3190500 Israel ynir.ietf@gmail.com

INTERNET IPSECME IKE IPsec GCM CCM ChaCha20 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) sends an initialization vector (IV) in each packet. The size of the IV depends on the applied transform and is usually 8 or 16 octets for the transforms defined at the time this document was written. When used with IPsec, some algorithms, such as AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and ChaCha20-Poly1305, take the IV to generate a nonce that is used as an input parameter for encrypting and decrypting. This IV must be unique but can be predictable. As a result, the value provided in the ESP Sequence Number (SN) can be used instead to generate the nonce. This avoids sending the IV itself and saves 8 octets per packet in the case of AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and ChaCha20-Poly1305. This document describes how to do this.

Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at .

Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents () in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

• .  Introduction
• .  Requirements Notation
• .  Terminology
• .  Implicit IV
• .  IKEv2 Initiator Behavior
• .  IKEv2 Responder Behavior
• .  Security Considerations
• .  IANA Considerations
• .  References
  • .  Normative References
  • .  Informative References
• Acknowledgements
• Authors' Addresses

Introduction Counter-based AES modes of operation such as AES-CCM and AES-GCM require the specification of a nonce for each ESP packet. The same applies for ChaCha20-Poly1305 . Currently, this nonce is generated thanks to the initialization vector (IV) provided in each ESP packet . This practice is designated in this document as "explicit IV". In some contexts, such as the Internet of Things (IoT), it may be preferable to avoid carrying the extra bytes associated to the IV and instead generate it locally on each peer. The local generation of the IV is designated in this document as "implicit IV". The size of this IV depends on the specific algorithm, but all of the algorithms mentioned above take an 8-octet IV. This document defines how to compute the IV locally when it is implicit. It also specifies how peers agree with the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) on using an implicit IV versus an explicit IV. This document limits its scope to the algorithms mentioned above. Other algorithms with similar properties may later be defined to use similar mechanisms. This document does not consider AES-CBC , as AES-CBC requires the IV to be unpredictable. Deriving it directly from the packet counter as described below is insecure, as mentioned in , and has led to real-world chosen plaintext attacks such as BEAST . This document does not consider AES-CTR , as it focuses on the recommended Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) suites provided in .

Requirements Notation The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Terminology

IoT:

Internet of Things

IV:

Initialization Vector

IIV:

Implicit Initialization Vector

Nonce:

A fixed-size octet string used only once. In this document, the IV is used to generate the nonce input for the encryption/decryption.

Implicit IV With the algorithms listed in , the 8-byte IV MUST NOT repeat for a given key. The binding between an ESP packet and its IV is provided using the Sequence Number or the Extended Sequence Number. Figures and represent the IV with a regular 4-byte Sequence Number and an 8-byte Extended Sequence Number, respectively.

Implicit IV with a 4-Byte Sequence Number 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Zero | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Sequence Number | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Sequence Number:

The 4-byte Sequence Number carried in the ESP packet.

Zero:

A 4-byte array with all bits set to zero.

Implicit IV with an 8-Byte Extended Sequence Number 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Extended | | Sequence Number | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Extended Sequence Number:

The 8-byte Extended Sequence Number of the Security Association. The four low-order bytes are carried in the ESP packet.

This document solely defines the IV generation of the algorithms defined in for AES-GCM, for AES-CCM, and for ChaCha20-Poly1305. All other aspects and parameters of those algorithms are unchanged and are used as defined in their respective specifications.

IKEv2 Initiator Behavior An initiator supporting this feature SHOULD propose implicit IV (IIV) algorithms in the Transform Type 1 (Encryption Algorithm) Substructure of the Proposal Substructure inside the Security Association (SA) payload in the IKEv2 Exchange. To facilitate backward compatibility with non-supporting peers, the initiator SHOULD also include those same algorithms with explicit IV as separate transforms.

IKEv2 Responder Behavior The rules of SA payload processing require that the responder pick its algorithms from the proposal sent by the initiator, thus ensuring that the responder will never send an SA payload containing the IIV transform to an initiator that did not propose it.

Security Considerations Nonce generation for these algorithms has not been explicitly defined. It has been left to the implementation as long as certain security requirements are met. Typically, for AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and ChaCha20-Poly1305, the IV is not allowed to be repeated for one particular key. This document provides an explicit and normative way to generate IVs. The mechanism described in this document meets the IV security requirements of all relevant algorithms. As the IV must not repeat for one SA when Counter-Mode ciphers are used, implicit IV as described in this document MUST NOT be used in setups with the chance that the Sequence Number overlaps for one SA. The sender's counter and the receiver's counter MUST be reset (by establishing a new SA and thus a new key) prior to the transmission of the 2^32nd packet for an SA that does not use an Extended Sequence Number and prior to the transmission of the 2^64th packet for an SA that does use an Extended Sequence Number. This prevents Sequence Number overlaps for the mundane point-to-point case. Multicast as described in , , and is a prominent example in which many senders share one secret and thus one SA. As such, implicit IV may only be used with Multicast if some mechanisms are employed that prevent the Sequence Number from overlapping for one SA; otherwise, implicit IV MUST NOT be used with Multicast. This document defines three new encryption transforms that use implicit IV. Unlike most encryption transforms defined to date, which can be used for both ESP and IKEv2, these transforms are defined for ESP only and cannot be used in IKEv2. The reason for this is that IKEv2 messages don't contain a unique per-message value that can be used for IV generation. The Message-ID field in the IKEv2 header is similar to the SN field in the ESP header, but recent IKEv2 extensions do allow it to repeat, so there is not an easy way to derive unique IV from IKEv2 header fields.

IANA Considerations IANA has updated the "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters" registry by adding the following new code points to the "Transform Type 1 - Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" subregistry under the "Transform Type Values" registry : Additions to "Transform Type 1 - Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" Registry

Number	Name	ESP Reference	IKEv2 Reference
29	ENCR_AES_CCM_8_IIV	RFC 8750	Not allowed
30	ENCR_AES_GCM_16_IIV	RFC 8750	Not allowed
31	ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305_IIV	RFC 8750	Not allowed

References Normative References In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This document describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher Algorithm in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode, with an explicit Initialization Vector (IV), as a confidentiality mechanism within the context of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). This document describes the use of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode, with an explicit initialization vector, as an IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) confidentiality mechanism. This memo describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) as an IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) mechanism to provide confidentiality and data origin authentication. This method can be efficiently implemented in hardware for speeds of 10 gigabits per second and above, and is also well-suited to software implementations. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes an updated version of the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol, which is designed to provide a mix of security services in IPv4 and IPv6. ESP is used to provide confidentiality, data origin authentication, connectionless integrity, an anti-replay service (a form of partial sequence integrity), and limited traffic flow confidentiality. This document obsoletes RFC 2406 (November 1998). [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes the use of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) Mode, with an explicit initialization vector (IV), as an IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) mechanism to provide confidentiality, data origin authentication, and connectionless integrity. [STANDARDS-TRACK] The Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol describes security services for traffic at the IP layer. That architecture primarily defines services for Internet Protocol (IP) unicast packets. This document describes how the IPsec security services are applied to IP multicast packets. These extensions are relevant only for an IPsec implementation that supports multicast. [STANDARDS-TRACK] The IPsec protocol suite is widely used for business-critical network traffic. In order to make IPsec deployments highly available, more scalable, and failure-resistant, they are often implemented as IPsec High Availability (HA) clusters. However, there are many issues in IPsec HA clustering, and in particular in Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) clustering. An earlier document, "IPsec Cluster Problem Statement", enumerates the issues encountered in the IKEv2/IPsec HA cluster environment. This document resolves these issues with the least possible change to the protocol. This document defines an extension to the IKEv2 protocol to solve the main issues of "IPsec Cluster Problem Statement" in the commonly deployed hot standby cluster, and provides implementation advice for other issues. The main issues solved are the synchronization of IKEv2 Message ID counters, and of IPsec replay counters. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes the Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) protocol specified in RFC 3547. The GDOI provides group key management to support secure group communications according to the architecture specified in RFC 4046. The GDOI manages group security associations, which are used by IPsec and potentially other data security protocols. This document replaces RFC 3547. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes version 2 of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. IKE is a component of IPsec used for performing mutual authentication and establishing and maintaining Security Associations (SAs). This document obsoletes RFC 5996, and includes all of the errata for it. It advances IKEv2 to be an Internet Standard. This document describes a way to avoid IP fragmentation of large Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) messages. This allows IKEv2 messages to traverse network devices that do not allow IP fragments to pass through. This document describes the use of the ChaCha20 stream cipher along with the Poly1305 authenticator, combined into an AEAD algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) and for IPsec. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document replaces RFC 7321, "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)". The goal of this document is to enable ESP and AH to benefit from cryptography that is up to date while making IPsec interoperable. Informative References This document presents a set of IKEv2 exchanges that comprise a group key management protocol. The protocol is in conformance with the Multicast Security (MSEC) key management architecture, which contains two components: member registration and group rekeying. Both components require a Group Controller/Key Server to download IPsec group security associations to authorized members of a group. The group members then exchange IP multicast or other group traffic as IPsec packets. This document obsoletes RFC 6407. Work in Progress IANA

Acknowledgements We would like to thank , , , , and (security directorate) as well as our three Security ADs -- , , and -- for their valuable comments. We also would like to thank for his implementation as well as and (the IPSECME Chairs) for moving this work forward.

Authors' Addresses Ericsson

8275 Trans Canada Route Saint Laurent QC H4S 0B6 Canada daniel.migault@ericsson.com

LMU Munich

Oettingenstr. 67 Munich 80538 Germany guggemos@nm.ifi.lmu.de http://mnm-team.org/~guggemos

Dell Technologies

9 Andrei Sakharov St Haifa 3190500 Israel ynir.ietf@gmail.com