justin@uberti.name

Cisco

fluffy@iii.ca

Millicast

sergio.garcia.murillo@cosmosoftware.io

ART AVTCORE SRTP While the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) provides confidentiality for the contents of a media packet, a significant amount of metadata is left unprotected, including RTP header extensions and contributing sources (CSRCs). However, this data can be moderately sensitive in many applications. While there have been previous attempts to protect this data, they have had limited deployment, due to complexity as well as technical limitations. This document updates RFC 3711, the SRTP specification, and defines Cryptex as a new mechanism that completely encrypts header extensions and CSRCs and uses simpler Session Description Protocol (SDP) signaling with the goal of facilitating deployment.

Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at .

Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents () in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

• .  Introduction
  • .  Problem Statement
  • .  Previous Solutions
  • .  Goals
• .  Terminology
• .  Design
• .  SDP Considerations
• .  RTP Header Processing
  • .  Sending
  • .  Receiving
• .  Encryption and Decryption
  • .  Packet Structure
  • .  Encryption Procedure
  • .  Decryption Procedure
• .  Backward Compatibility
• .  Security Considerations
• .  IANA Considerations
• . References
  • .  Normative References
  • .  Informative References
• .  Test Vectors
  • .  AES-CTR
    • .  RTP Packet with One-Byte Header Extension
    • .  RTP Packet with Two-Byte Header Extension
    • .  RTP Packet with One-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields
    • .  RTP Packet with Two-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields
    • .  RTP Packet with Empty One-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields
    • .  RTP Packet with Empty Two-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields
  • .  AES-GCM
    • .  RTP Packet with One-Byte Header Extension
    • .  RTP Packet with Two-Byte Header Extension
    • .  RTP Packet with One-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields
    • .  RTP Packet with Two-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields
    • .  RTP Packet with Empty One-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields
    • .  RTP Packet with Empty Two-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields
• Acknowledgements
• Authors' Addresses

Introduction

Problem Statement The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) mechanism provides message authentication for the entire RTP packet but only encrypts the RTP payload. This has not historically been a problem, as much of the information carried in the header has minimal sensitivity (e.g., RTP timestamp); in addition, certain fields need to remain as cleartext because they are used for key scheduling (e.g., RTP synchronization source (SSRC) and sequence number). However, as noted in , the security requirements can be different for information carried in RTP header extensions, including the per-packet sound levels defined in and , which are specifically noted as being sensitive in the Security Considerations sections of those RFCs. In addition to the contents of the header extensions, there are now enough header extensions in active use that the header extension identifiers themselves can provide meaningful information in terms of determining the identity of the endpoint and/or application. Accordingly, these identifiers can be considered a fingerprinting issue. Finally, the CSRCs included in RTP packets can also be sensitive, potentially allowing a network eavesdropper to determine who was speaking and when during an otherwise secure conference call.

Previous Solutions Encryption of Header Extensions in SRTP was proposed in 2013 as a solution to the problem of unprotected header extension values. However, it has not seen significant adoption and has a few technical shortcomings. First, the mechanism is complicated. Since it allows encryption to be negotiated on a per-extension basis, a fair amount of signaling logic is required. And in the SRTP layer, a somewhat complex transform is required to allow only the selected header extension values to be encrypted. One of the most popular SRTP implementations had a significant bug in this area that was not detected for five years. Second, the mechanism only protects the header extension values and not their identifiers or lengths. It also does not protect the CSRCs. As noted above, this leaves a fair amount of potentially sensitive information exposed. Third, the mechanism bloats the header extension space. Because each extension must be offered in both unencrypted and encrypted forms, twice as many header extensions must be offered, which will in many cases push implementations past the 14-extension limit for the use of one-byte extension headers defined in . Accordingly, in many cases, implementations will need to use two-byte headers, which are not supported well by some existing implementations. Finally, the header extension bloat combined with the need for backward compatibility results in additional wire overhead. Because two-byte extension headers may not be handled well by existing implementations, one-byte extension identifiers will need to be used for the unencrypted (backward-compatible) forms, and two-byte for the encrypted forms. Thus, deployment of encryption for header extensions will typically result in multiple extra bytes in each RTP packet, compared to the present situation.

Goals From the previous analysis, the desired properties of a solution are:

• Built on the existing SRTP framework (simple to understand)
• Built on the existing header extension framework (simple to implement)
• Protection of header extension identifiers, lengths, and values
• Protection of CSRCs when present
• Simple signaling
• Simple crypto transform and SRTP interactions
• Backward compatibility with unencrypted endpoints, if desired
• Backward compatibility with existing RTP tooling

The last point deserves further discussion. While other possible solutions that would have encrypted more of the RTP header (e.g., the number of CSRCs) were considered, the inability to parse the resultant packets with current tools and a generally higher level of complexity outweighed the slight improvement in confidentiality in these solutions. Hence, a more pragmatic approach was taken to solve the problem described in .

Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Design This specification proposes a mechanism to negotiate encryption of all RTP header extensions (ids, lengths, and values) as well as CSRC values. It reuses the existing SRTP framework, is accordingly simple to implement, and is backward compatible with existing RTP packet parsing code, even when support for the mechanism has been negotiated. Except when explicitly stated otherwise, Cryptex reuses all the framework procedures, transforms, and considerations described in .

SDP Considerations Cryptex support is indicated via a new "a=cryptex" SDP attribute defined in this specification. The new "a=cryptex" attribute is a property attribute as defined in ; it therefore takes no value and can be used at the session level or media level. The presence of the "a=cryptex" attribute in the SDP (in either an offer or an answer) indicates that the endpoint is capable of receiving RTP packets encrypted with Cryptex, as defined below. Once each peer has verified that the other party supports receiving RTP packets encrypted with Cryptex, senders can unilaterally decide whether or not to use the Cryptex mechanism on a per-packet basis. If BUNDLE is in use as per and the "a=cryptex" attribute is present for a media line, it MUST be present for all RTP-based "m=" sections belonging to the same bundle group. This ensures that the encrypted Media Identifier (MID) header extensions can be processed, allowing RTP streams to be associated with the correct "m=" section in each BUNDLE group as specified in . When used with BUNDLE, this attribute is assigned to the TRANSPORT category . Both endpoints can change the Cryptex support status by modifying the session as specified in . Generating subsequent SDP offers and answers MUST use the same procedures for including the "a=cryptex" attribute as the ones on the initial offer and answer.

RTP Header Processing A General Mechanism for RTP Header Extensions defines two values for the "defined by profile" field for carrying one-byte and two-byte header extensions. In order to allow a receiver to determine if an incoming RTP packet is using the encryption scheme in this specification, two new values are defined:

• 0xC0DE for the encrypted version of the one-byte header extensions (instead of 0xBEDE).
• 0xC2DE for the encrypted versions of the two-byte header extensions (instead of 0x100).

In the case of using two-byte header extensions, the extension identifier with value 256 MUST NOT be negotiated, as the value of this identifier is meant to be contained in the "appbits" of the "defined by profile" field, which are not available when using the values above. Note that as per , it is not possible to mix one-byte and two-byte headers on the same RTP packet. Mixing one-byte and two-byte headers on the same RTP stream requires negotiation of the "extmap-allow-mixed" SDP attribute as defined in . Peers MAY negotiate both Cryptex and the Encryption of Header Extensions mechanism defined in via SDP offer/answer as described in , and if both mechanisms are supported, either one can be used for any given packet. However, if a packet is encrypted with Cryptex, it MUST NOT also use header extension encryption , and vice versa. If one of the peers has advertised the ability to receive both Cryptex and header extensions encrypted as per in the SDP exchange, it is RECOMMENDED that the other peer use Cryptex rather than the mechanism in when sending RTP packets so that all the header extensions and CSRCS are encrypted. However, if there is a compelling reason to use the mechanism in (e.g., a need for some header extensions to be sent in the clear so that so they are processable by RTP middleboxes), the other peer SHOULD use the mechanism in instead.

Sending When the mechanism defined by this specification has been negotiated, sending an RTP packet that has any CSRCs or contains any header extensions follows the steps below. This mechanism MUST NOT be used with header extensions other than the variety described in . If the RTP packet contains one-byte headers, the 16-bit RTP header extension tag MUST be set to 0xC0DE to indicate that the encryption has been applied and the one-byte framing is being used. If the RTP packet contains two-byte headers, the header extension tag MUST be set to 0xC2DE to indicate encryption has been applied and the two-byte framing is being used. If the packet contains CSRCs but no header extensions, an empty extension block consisting of the 0xC0DE tag and a 16-bit length field set to zero (explicitly permitted by ) MUST be appended, and the X bit MUST be set to 1 to indicate an extension block is present. This is necessary to provide the receiver an indication that the CSRCs in the packet are encrypted. The RTP packet MUST then be encrypted as described in ("Encryption Procedure").

Receiving When receiving an RTP packet that contains header extensions, the "defined by profile" field MUST be checked to ensure the payload is formatted according to this specification. If the field does not match one of the values defined above, the implementation MUST instead handle it according to the specification that defines that value. Alternatively, if the implementation considers the use of this specification mandatory and the "defined by profile" field does not match one of the values defined above, it MUST stop the processing of the RTP packet and report an error for the RTP stream. If the RTP packet passes this check, it is then decrypted as described in ("Decryption Procedure") and passed to the next layer to process the packet and its extensions. In the event that a zero-length extension block was added as indicated above, it can be left as is and will be processed normally.

Encryption and Decryption

Packet Structure When this mechanism is active, the SRTP packet is protected as follows:

A Protected SRTP Packet 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+ |V=2|P|X| CC |M| PT | sequence number | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | timestamp | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | synchronization source (SSRC) identifier | | +>+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ | | | contributing source (CSRC) identifiers | | | | .... | | +>+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | X | 0xC0 or 0xC2 | 0xDE | length | | +>+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | RFC 8285 header extensions | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | payload ... | | | | +-------------------------------+ | | | | RTP padding | RTP pad count | | +>+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+ | ~ SRTP Master Key Identifier (MKI) (OPTIONAL) ~ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | : authentication tag (RECOMMENDED) : | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | +- Encrypted Portion Authenticated Portion ---+

Note that, as required by , the 4 bytes at the start of the extension block are not encrypted. Specifically, the Encrypted Portion MUST include any CSRC identifiers, any RTP header extension (except for the first 4 bytes), and the RTP payload.

Encryption Procedure The encryption procedure is identical to that of except for the Encrypted Portion of the SRTP packet. The plaintext input to the cipher is as follows: Plaintext = CSRC identifiers (if used) || header extension data || RTP payload || RTP padding (if used) || RTP pad count (if used) Here "header extension data" refers to the content of the RTP extension field, excluding the first four bytes (the extension header ). The first 4 * CSRC count (CC) bytes of the ciphertext are placed in the CSRC field of the RTP header. The remainder of the ciphertext is the RTP payload of the encrypted packet. To minimize changes to surrounding code, the encryption mechanism can choose to replace a "defined by profile" field from with its counterpart defined in ("RTP Header Processing") and encrypt at the same time. For Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphers (e.g., AES-GCM), the 12-byte fixed header and the four-byte header extension header (the "defined by profile" field and the length) are considered additional authenticated data (AAD), even though they are non-contiguous in the packet if CSRCs are present. Associated Data: fixed header || extension header (if X=1) Here "fixed header" refers to the 12-byte fixed portion of the RTP header, and "extension header" refers to the four-byte extension header ("defined by profile" and extension length). Implementations can rearrange a packet so that the AAD and plaintext are contiguous by swapping the order of the extension header and the CSRC identifiers, resulting in an intermediate representation of the form shown in . After encryption, the CSRCs (now encrypted) and extension header would need to be swapped back to their original positions. A similar operation can be done when decrypting to create contiguous ciphertext and AAD inputs.

An RTP Packet Transformed to Make Cryptex Cipher Inputs Contiguous 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<+ |V=2|P|X| CC |M| PT | sequence number | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | timestamp | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | synchronization source (SSRC) identifier | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | 0xC0 or 0xC2 | 0xDE | length | | +>+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+<+ | | contributing source (CSRC) identifiers | | | | .... | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | RFC 8285 header extensions | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | payload ... | | | | +-------------------------------+ | | | | RTP padding | RTP pad count | | +>+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | +- Plaintext Input AAD Input ---+

Note that this intermediate representation is only displayed as reference for implementations and is not meant to be sent on the wire.

Decryption Procedure The decryption procedure is identical to that of except for the Encrypted Portion of the SRTP packet, which is as shown in the section above. To minimize changes to surrounding code, the decryption mechanism can choose to replace the "defined by profile" field with its no-encryption counterpart from and decrypt at the same time.

Backward Compatibility This specification attempts to encrypt as much as possible without interfering with backward compatibility for systems that expect a certain structure from an RTPv2 packet, including systems that perform demultiplexing based on packet headers. Accordingly, the first two bytes of the RTP packet are not encrypted. This specification also attempts to reuse the key scheduling from SRTP, which depends on the RTP packet sequence number and SSRC identifier. Accordingly, these values are also not encrypted.

Security Considerations All security considerations in are applicable to this specification; the exception is Section , because confidentiality of the RTP Header is the purpose of this specification. The risks of using weak or NULL authentication with SRTP, described in , apply to encrypted header extensions as well. This specification extends SRTP by expanding the Encrypted Portion of the RTP packet, as shown in ("Packet Structure"). It does not change how SRTP authentication works in any way. Given that more of the packet is being encrypted than before, this is necessarily an improvement. The RTP fields that are left unencrypted (see rationale above) are as follows:

• RTP version
• padding bit
• extension bit
• number of CSRCs
• marker bit
• payload type
• sequence number
• timestamp
• SSRC identifier
• number of header extensions

These values contain a fixed set (i.e., one that won't be changed by extensions) of information that, at present, is observed to have low sensitivity. In the event any of these values need to be encrypted, SRTP is likely the wrong protocol to use and a fully encapsulating protocol such as DTLS is preferred (with its attendant per-packet overhead).

IANA Considerations This document updates the "attribute-name (formerly "att-field")" subregistry of the "Session Description Protocol (SDP) Parameters" registry (see ). Specifically, it adds the SDP "a=cryptex" attribute for use at both the media level and the session level.

Contact name:

IETF AVT Working Group or IESG if the AVT Working Group is closed

Contact email address:

avt@ietf.org

Attribute name:

cryptex

Attribute syntax:

This attribute takes no values.

Attribute semantics:

N/A

Attribute value:

N/A

Usage level:

session, media

Charset dependent:

No

Purpose:

The presence of this attribute in the SDP indicates that the endpoint is capable of receiving RTP packets encrypted with Cryptex as described in this document.

O/A procedures:

SDP O/A procedures are described in Section of this document.

Mux Category:

TRANSPORT

References Normative References In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This document defines a mechanism by which two entities can make use of the Session Description Protocol (SDP) to arrive at a common view of a multimedia session between them. In the model, one participant offers the other a description of the desired session from their perspective, and the other participant answers with the desired session from their perspective. This offer/answer model is most useful in unicast sessions where information from both participants is needed for the complete view of the session. The offer/answer model is used by protocols like the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). [STANDARDS-TRACK] This memorandum describes RTP, the real-time transport protocol. RTP provides end-to-end network transport functions suitable for applications transmitting real-time data, such as audio, video or simulation data, over multicast or unicast network services. RTP does not address resource reservation and does not guarantee quality-of- service for real-time services. The data transport is augmented by a control protocol (RTCP) to allow monitoring of the data delivery in a manner scalable to large multicast networks, and to provide minimal control and identification functionality. RTP and RTCP are designed to be independent of the underlying transport and network layers. The protocol supports the use of RTP-level translators and mixers. Most of the text in this memorandum is identical to RFC 1889 which it obsoletes. There are no changes in the packet formats on the wire, only changes to the rules and algorithms governing how the protocol is used. The biggest change is an enhancement to the scalable timer algorithm for calculating when to send RTCP packets in order to minimize transmission in excess of the intended rate when many participants join a session simultaneously. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP), a profile of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), which can provide confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection to the RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP, the Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP). [STANDARDS-TRACK] RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document provides a general mechanism to use the header extension feature of RTP (the Real-time Transport Protocol). It provides the option to use a small number of small extensions in each RTP packet, where the universe of possible extensions is large and registration is decentralized. The actual extensions in use in a session are signaled in the setup information for that session. This document obsoletes RFC 5285. The purpose of this specification is to provide a framework for analyzing the multiplexing characteristics of Session Description Protocol (SDP) attributes when SDP is used to negotiate the usage of a single 5-tuple for sending and receiving media associated with multiple media descriptions. This specification also categorizes the existing SDP attributes based on the framework described herein. This memo defines the Session Description Protocol (SDP). SDP is intended for describing multimedia sessions for the purposes of session announcement, session invitation, and other forms of multimedia session initiation. This document obsoletes RFC 4566. This specification defines a new Session Description Protocol (SDP) Grouping Framework extension called 'BUNDLE'. The extension can be used with the SDP offer/answer mechanism to negotiate the usage of a single transport (5-tuple) for sending and receiving media described by multiple SDP media descriptions ("m=" sections). Such transport is referred to as a "BUNDLE transport", and the media is referred to as "bundled media". The "m=" sections that use the BUNDLE transport form a BUNDLE group. This specification defines a new RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) Source Description (SDES) item and a new RTP header extension. This specification updates RFCs 3264, 5888, and 7941. This specification obsoletes RFC 8843. Informative References This document defines a mechanism by which packets of Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) audio streams can indicate, in an RTP header extension, the audio level of the audio sample carried in the RTP packet. In large conferences, this can reduce the load on an audio mixer or other middlebox that wants to forward only a few of the loudest audio streams, without requiring it to decode and measure every stream that is received. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes a mechanism for RTP-level mixers in audio conferences to deliver information about the audio level of individual participants. Such audio level indicators are transported in the same RTP packets as the audio data they pertain to. [STANDARDS-TRACK] The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) provides authentication, but not encryption, of the headers of Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) packets. However, RTP header extensions may carry sensitive information for which participants in multimedia sessions want confidentiality. This document provides a mechanism, extending the mechanisms of SRTP, to selectively encrypt RTP header extensions in SRTP. This document updates RFC 3711, the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol specification, to require that all future SRTP encryption transforms specify how RTP header extensions are to be encrypted. This document defines how the AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data family of algorithms can be used to provide confidentiality and data authentication in the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP).

Test Vectors All values are in hexadecimal and represented in network order (big endian).

AES-CTR The following subsections list the test vectors for using Cryptex with AES-CTR as per . Common values are organized as follows: Rollover Counter: 00000000 Master Key: e1f97a0d3e018be0d64fa32c06de4139 Master Salt: 0ec675ad498afeebb6960b3aabe6 Crypto Suite: AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80 Session Key: c61e7a93744f39ee10734afe3ff7a087 Session Salt: 30cbbc08863d8c85d49db34a9ae1 Authentication Key: cebe321f6ff7716b6fd4ab49af256a156d38baa4

RTP Packet with One-Byte Header Extension RTP Packet: 900f1235 decafbad cafebabe bede0001 51000200 abababab abababab abababab abababab Encrypted RTP Packet: 900f1235 decafbad cafebabe c0de0001 eb923652 51c3e036 f8de27e9 c27ee3e0 b4651d9f bc4218a7 0244522f 34a5

RTP Packet with Two-Byte Header Extension RTP Packet: 900f1236 decafbad cafebabe 10000001 05020002 abababab abababab abababab abababab Encrypted RTP Packet: 900f1236 decafbad cafebabe c2de0001 4ed9cc4e 6a712b30 96c5ca77 339d4204 ce0d7739 6cab6958 5fbce381 94a5

RTP Packet with One-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields RTP Packet: 920f1238 decafbad cafebabe 0001e240 0000b26e bede0001 51000200 abababab abababab abababab abababab Encrypted RTP Packet: 920f1238 decafbad cafebabe 8bb6e12b 5cff16dd c0de0001 92838c8c 09e58393 e1de3a9a 74734d67 45671338 c3acf11d a2df8423 bee0

RTP Packet with Two-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields RTP Packet: 920f1239 decafbad cafebabe 0001e240 0000b26e 10000001 05020002 abababab abababab abababab abababab Encrypted RTP Packet: 920f1239 decafbad cafebabe f70e513e b90b9b25 c2de0001 bbed4848 faa64466 5f3d7f34 125914e9 f4d0ae92 3c6f479b 95a0f7b5 3133

RTP Packet with Empty One-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields RTP Packet: 920f123a decafbad cafebabe 0001e240 0000b26e bede0000 abababab abababab abababab abababab Encrypted RTP Packet: 920f123a decafbad cafebabe 7130b6ab fe2ab0e3 c0de0000 e3d9f64b 25c9e74c b4cf8e43 fb92e378 1c2c0cea b6b3a499 a14c

RTP Packet with Empty Two-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields RTP Packet: 920f123b decafbad cafebabe 0001e240 0000b26e 10000000 abababab abababab abababab abababab Encrypted RTP Packet: 920f123b decafbad cafebabe cbf24c12 4330e1c8 c2de0000 599dd45b c9d687b6 03e8b59d 771fd38e 88b170e0 cd31e125 eabe

AES-GCM The following subsections list the test vectors for using Cryptex with AES-GCM as per . Common values are organized as follows: Rollover Counter: 00000000 Master Key: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f Master Salt: a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9aaab Crypto Suite: AEAD_AES_128_GCM Session Key: 077c6143cb221bc355ff23d5f984a16e Session Salt: 9af3e95364ebac9c99c5a7c4

RTP Packet with One-Byte Header Extension RTP Packet: 900f1235 decafbad cafebabe bede0001 51000200 abababab abababab abababab abababab Encrypted RTP Packet: 900f1235 decafbad cafebabe c0de0001 39972dc9 572c4d99 e8fc355d e743fb2e 94f9d8ff 54e72f41 93bbc5c7 4ffab0fa 9fa0fbeb

RTP Packet with Two-Byte Header Extension RTP Packet: 900f1236 decafbad cafebabe 10000001 05020002 abababab abababab abababab abababab Encrypted RTP Packet: 900f1236 decafbad cafebabe c2de0001 bb75a4c5 45cd1f41 3bdb7daa 2b1e3263 de313667 c9632490 81b35a65 f5cb6c88 b394235f

RTP Packet with One-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields RTP Packet: 920f1238 decafbad cafebabe 0001e240 0000b26e bede0001 51000200 abababab abababab abababab abababab Encrypted RTP Packet: 920f1238 decafbad cafebabe 63bbccc4 a7f695c4 c0de0001 8ad7c71f ac70a80c 92866b4c 6ba98546 ef913586 e95ffaaf fe956885 bb0647a8 bc094ac8

RTP Packet with Two-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields RTP Packet: 920f1239 decafbad cafebabe 0001e240 0000b26e 10000001 05020002 abababab abababab abababab abababab Encrypted RTP Packet: 920f1239 decafbad cafebabe 3680524f 8d312b00 c2de0001 c78d1200 38422bc1 11a7187a 18246f98 0c059cc6 bc9df8b6 26394eca 344e4b05 d80fea83

RTP Packet with Empty One-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields RTP Packet: 920f123a decafbad cafebabe 0001e240 0000b26e bede0000 abababab abababab abababab abababab Encrypted RTP Packet: 920f123a decafbad cafebabe 15b6bb43 37906fff c0de0000 b7b96453 7a2b03ab 7ba5389c e9331712 6b5d974d f30c6884 dcb651c5 e120c1da

RTP Packet with Empty Two-Byte Header Extension and CSRC Fields RTP Packet: 920f123b decafbad cafebabe 0001e240 0000b26e 10000000 abababab abababab abababab abababab Encrypted RTP Packet: 920f123b decafbad cafebabe dcb38c9e 48bf95f4 c2de0000 61ee432c f9203170 76613258 d3ce4236 c06ac429 681ad084 13512dc9 8b5207d8

Acknowledgements The authors wish to thank for pointing out many of the issues with the existing header encryption mechanism, as well as suggestions for this proposal. Thanks also to , , and for their reviews and suggestions.

Authors' Addresses

justin@uberti.name

Cisco

fluffy@iii.ca

Millicast

sergio.garcia.murillo@cosmosoftware.io