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Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 21:23:50 -0400 (EDT)
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
To: abfab@ietf.org
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Subject: [abfab] comments on draft-ietf-abfab-usability-ui-considerations-01
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Hi all,

I'm just a visitor to abfab at the moment, but I ended up with this draft 
open in my browser after listening to today's session.

It generally seems reasonable, but I had a few editorial notes:

In the last paragraph of 6.3.1, there's a typo in "a secure a manner as 
possible" -- the first 'a' should be "as".  The last sentence of that 
paragraph is also a little unclear, as to what the 'this' is which may be 
not done properly.

In the second paragraph of section 7, "manipulate it and control" should 
have an "it" after "control" (the "it" after "manipulate" could optionally 
be removed).

-Ben


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draft-ietf-abfab-usability-ui-considerations-01 Review

>From reading the draft I feel like I understand the majority of the
language and what this draft is trying to accomplish. I did not find
any fundamental flaws with the draft. My comments are minor text changes.

Below are my comments.

Section 3 Considerations
- ------------------------
Could be useful to have examples of each terminology, and what they
look like. Helps readers get context. In Section 5.1 last sentence of
Paragraph 1 it mentions that a NAI looks like an email address. It
would be nice to have examples at the beginning of the document so
readers can wrap their brains around what NAI and other terminology
mean specific to this document.

GSS-API is used several times in the document but is never explained
or defined. Add it to section 3 as bullet point of the terminology of
the document, or the first time it is used, define it.


Section 3 Last Paragraph
- ------------------------
      "Trust anchor: An authoritative source of verification of a
      particular ABFAB service or Identity Provider, used to allow
      authentication of a server using X.509 [RFC5280].  Typically a
      commercial CA to allow authentication via chain of trust, or a
      preconfigured non-commercial certificate (e.g. self-signed)."

I am unaware of what 'CA' is referring to. I assume it means a
'Certificate Authority' but I am making that assumption from context.
Replace 'CA' with 'Certificate Authority (CA)', or whatever CA
represents.

Section 4 Paragraph 1 Last Sentence
- -----------------------------------
"The simplest way to achieve the desired effect would be a process
that simply takes the credentials from the currently logged in user"

Remove 'simply'. It is already known that this is the simplest way.


Section 5.1 Last Paragraph First Sentence
- ----------------------------------------

" Beyond terminology, careful thought needs to be given to the paradigm
   to use when presenting identity to users, as identities and services
   are abstract concepts that some users may not find is easily
   understandable."

Turn into two separate sentences:
"Beyond terminology, careful thought needs to be given to the paradigm
to use when presenting identity to users."

"Identities and services are abstract concepts that some users may not
find easy to understand."


Section 5.1 Last Paragraph Last Sentence
- ----------------------------------------
"Implementers may wish to keep such abstract
   concepts, or may wish to examine attempts to map to real world
   paradigms, e.g. the idea of using "Identity Cards" that are held in
   the user's "Wallet", as used by Microsoft Cardspace."

Unsure of what this sentence is trying to say. Seems like a run on.


Section 5.2 Last Sentence
- -------------------------
"But for simplicity just the word "service" probably usually suffice."

Remove 'probably' or 'usually'. Use one or the other but not both.


Section 6 Second Sentence
- -------------------------
"This section first looks at what information associated with an
identity will need to managed"

add 'be' to the sentence above to look like the following:

"This section first looks at what information associated with an
identity will need to 'be' managed"


Section 6.1 Paragraph 5
- -----------------------
Unsure of what EAP means. Define in line, or define in Section 3.


Section 6.2 Paragraph 1 Last sentence
- -------------------------------------
Mac and Linux options are listed. Maybe list a Windows option if there
is one. (I personally don't like Windows, so if you don't add this I
won't be mad :) )


Section 6.3.1 Last Paragraph
- -----------------------------
"An Identity Selector that allows for manual addition of identity
   information SHOULD try to ensure that trust anchor information is
   gathered and checked in a secure a manner as possible - where users
   have to enter and confirm all trust anchor information, or be
   required to explicitly agree to an insecure configuration if this is
   not done properly."

Needs to be reworded. Especially this part 'gathered and checked in a
secure a manner as possible'

Possible option
'gathered and checked in a secure manner'



Section 7.1.1 Numbered List 1
- -----------------------------
"such as its GSS Acceptor Name."

Unaware of what GSS Acceptor Name means. Define in line or in Section 3.


Spelling considerations:
- ------------------------

Section 6.1 Paragraph 6 Middle of the paragraph

Replace 'make' with 'makes'

"any implementer is free to use whatever make sense in their
   implementation and conforms to good HCI/UX guidelines."


Great draft, looks good, keep up the good work!

- --Colton









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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE--=
---<br>
Hash: SHA512<br>
<br>
draft-ietf-abfab-usability-ui-considerations-01 Review<br>
<br>From reading the draft I feel like I understand the majority of the<br>
language and what this draft is trying to accomplish. I did not find<br>
any fundamental flaws with the draft. My comments are minor text changes.<b=
r>
<br>
Below are my comments.<br>
<br>
Section 3 Considerations<br>
- ------------------------<br>
Could be useful to have examples of each terminology, and what they<br>
look like. Helps readers get context. In Section 5.1 last sentence of<br>
Paragraph 1 it mentions that a NAI looks like an email address. It<br>
would be nice to have examples at the beginning of the document so<br>
readers can wrap their brains around what NAI and other terminology<br>
mean specific to this document.<br>
<br>
GSS-API is used several times in the document but is never explained<br>
or defined. Add it to section 3 as bullet point of the terminology of<br>
the document, or the first time it is used, define it.<br>
<br>
<br>
Section 3 Last Paragraph<br>
- ------------------------<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;Trust anchor: An authoritative source of verific=
ation of a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 particular ABFAB service or Identity Provider, used to=
 allow<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 authentication of a server using X.509 [RFC5280]. =C2=
=A0Typically a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 commercial CA to allow authentication via chain of tru=
st, or a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 preconfigured non-commercial certificate (e.g. self-si=
gned).&quot;<br>
<br>
I am unaware of what &#39;CA&#39; is referring to. I assume it means a<br>
&#39;Certificate Authority&#39; but I am making that assumption from contex=
t.<br>
Replace &#39;CA&#39; with &#39;Certificate Authority (CA)&#39;, or whatever=
 CA<br>
represents.<br>
<br>
Section 4 Paragraph 1 Last Sentence<br>
- -----------------------------------<br>
&quot;The simplest way to achieve the desired effect would be a process<br>
that simply takes the credentials from the currently logged in user&quot;<b=
r>
<br>
Remove &#39;simply&#39;. It is already known that this is the simplest way.=
<br>
<br>
<br>
Section 5.1 Last Paragraph First Sentence<br>
- ----------------------------------------<br>
<br>
&quot; Beyond terminology, careful thought needs to be given to the paradig=
m<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0to use when presenting identity to users, as identities and se=
rvices<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0are abstract concepts that some users may not find is easily<b=
r>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0understandable.&quot;<br>
<br>
Turn into two separate sentences:<br>
&quot;Beyond terminology, careful thought needs to be given to the paradigm=
<br>
to use when presenting identity to users.&quot;<br>
<br>
&quot;Identities and services are abstract concepts that some users may not=
<br>
find easy to understand.&quot;<br>
<br>
<br>
Section 5.1 Last Paragraph Last Sentence<br>
- ----------------------------------------<br>
&quot;Implementers may wish to keep such abstract<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0concepts, or may wish to examine attempts to map to real world=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0paradigms, e.g. the idea of using &quot;Identity Cards&quot; t=
hat are held in<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the user&#39;s &quot;Wallet&quot;, as used by Microsoft Cardsp=
ace.&quot;<br>
<br>
Unsure of what this sentence is trying to say. Seems like a run on.<br>
<br>
<br>
Section 5.2 Last Sentence<br>
- -------------------------<br>
&quot;But for simplicity just the word &quot;service&quot; probably usually=
 suffice.&quot;<br>
<br>
Remove &#39;probably&#39; or &#39;usually&#39;. Use one or the other but no=
t both.<br>
<br>
<br>
Section 6 Second Sentence<br>
- -------------------------<br>
&quot;This section first looks at what information associated with an<br>
identity will need to managed&quot;<br>
<br>
add &#39;be&#39; to the sentence above to look like the following:<br>
<br>
&quot;This section first looks at what information associated with an<br>
identity will need to &#39;be&#39; managed&quot;<br>
<br>
<br>
Section 6.1 Paragraph 5<br>
- -----------------------<br>
Unsure of what EAP means. Define in line, or define in Section 3.<br>
<br>
<br>
Section 6.2 Paragraph 1 Last sentence<br>
- -------------------------------------<br>
Mac and Linux options are listed. Maybe list a Windows option if there<br>
is one. (I personally don&#39;t like Windows, so if you don&#39;t add this =
I<br>
won&#39;t be mad :) )<br>
<br>
<br>
Section 6.3.1 Last Paragraph<br>
- -----------------------------<br>
&quot;An Identity Selector that allows for manual addition of identity<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0information SHOULD try to ensure that trust anchor information=
 is<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0gathered and checked in a secure a manner as possible - where =
users<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0have to enter and confirm all trust anchor information, or be<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0required to explicitly agree to an insecure configuration if t=
his is<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0not done properly.&quot;<br>
<br>
Needs to be reworded. Especially this part &#39;gathered and checked in a<b=
r>
secure a manner as possible&#39;<br>
<br>
Possible option<br>
&#39;gathered and checked in a secure manner&#39;<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Section 7.1.1 Numbered List 1<br>
- -----------------------------<br>
&quot;such as its GSS Acceptor Name.&quot;<br>
<br>
Unaware of what GSS Acceptor Name means. Define in line or in Section 3.<br=
>
<br>
<br>
Spelling considerations:<br>
- ------------------------<br>
<br>
Section 6.1 Paragraph 6 Middle of the paragraph<br>
<br>
Replace &#39;make&#39; with &#39;makes&#39;<br>
<br>
&quot;any implementer is free to use whatever make sense in their<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0implementation and conforms to good HCI/UX guidelines.&quot;<b=
r>
<br>
<br>
Great draft, looks good, keep up the good work!<br>
<br>
- --Colton<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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From nobody Wed Aug  6 19:32:32 2014
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From: "Takeshi Takahashi" <takeshi_takahashi@nict.go.jp>
To: <abfab@ietf.org>
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Subject: [abfab] on the draft-ietf-abfab-usability-ui-considerations-01
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Hello Rhys,

I was reading the draft draft-ietf-abfab-usability-ui-considerations-01.
It was an interesting document that provides assorted consideration on the
user interface.
Here are some minor comments and questions.

Comment 1:
In Section "5.1 Identity", you mentioned the possible confusion of the terms
for NAI.
It could be also true that some webpage use the term "username" in English
while the other uses the translated term in Japanese (or any other
language).

Comment 2:
In section "6.3.2 Manually Triggered Automated Addition", you have a
paragraph "One approach to accomplishing this . into the identity selector".
That is convenient, but careful setup of the website is needed.
A malicious person may wish to get the piece of data of the others.
The malicious person could be an internal personnel who has right to access
the webpage.
I bit of sentence that ask careful setup would be helpful since this
document is intended to be a guideline for the impelemnters.

Comment 3:
In section "7.3 Listing Services and Identities", the section tiltle could
be "7.3 Listing Services" since current text talks about the listing
services, but does not talk about listing identities, I guess.

Comment 4:
It could be outside the scope of this draft, but is it better for us to talk
about multiple use of a single identity at the same time?
I mean, there are two active sessions with a single identity. It could be
that third party may be using your identity. (e.g., two simultaneous login
to a signle webmail account) Some alert needs to be shown to the user?

Comment 5:
In the terminology, you have defined the term "identity", but you also say
that the definition is a bit different from the ordinary sense and the word
"identifier" may fit better.
Can you tell me why you dared to define the term "identity" rather than
"identifier" then?

Trivial comment:
It would be helpful if you could spell out acronyms and abbreviations when
they appear at the first time, such as HCI.

Thank you.

Take





From nobody Wed Aug  6 19:36:01 2014
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From: "Takeshi Takahashi" <takeshi_takahashi@nict.go.jp>
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Here is the typo. Sorry...

> I bit of sentence that ask careful setup would be helpful since this
document
> is intended to be a guideline for the impelemnters.

A bit of sentences that ask careful setup would be helpful since this
document is intended to be a guideline for the implementers.

Take



> -----Original Message-----
> From: abfab [mailto:abfab-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Takeshi Takahashi
> Sent: Thursday, August 7, 2014 11:32 AM
> To: abfab@ietf.org
> Subject: [abfab] on the draft-ietf-abfab-usability-ui-considerations-01
> 
> Hello Rhys,
> 
> I was reading the draft draft-ietf-abfab-usability-ui-considerations-01.
> It was an interesting document that provides assorted consideration on the
> user interface.
> Here are some minor comments and questions.
> 
> Comment 1:
> In Section "5.1 Identity", you mentioned the possible confusion of the
terms
> for NAI.
> It could be also true that some webpage use the term "username" in English
> while the other uses the translated term in Japanese (or any other
language).
> 
> Comment 2:
> In section "6.3.2 Manually Triggered Automated Addition", you have a
> paragraph "One approach to accomplishing this . into the identity
selector".
> That is convenient, but careful setup of the website is needed.
> A malicious person may wish to get the piece of data of the others.
> The malicious person could be an internal personnel who has right to
access
> the webpage.
> I bit of sentence that ask careful setup would be helpful since this
document
> is intended to be a guideline for the impelemnters.
> 
> Comment 3:
> In section "7.3 Listing Services and Identities", the section tiltle could
> be "7.3 Listing Services" since current text talks about the listing
> services, but does not talk about listing identities, I guess.
> 
> Comment 4:
> It could be outside the scope of this draft, but is it better for us to
> talk about multiple use of a single identity at the same time?
> I mean, there are two active sessions with a single identity. It could be
> that third party may be using your identity. (e.g., two simultaneous login
> to a signle webmail account) Some alert needs to be shown to the user?
> 
> Comment 5:
> In the terminology, you have defined the term "identity", but you also say
> that the definition is a bit different from the ordinary sense and the
word
> "identifier" may fit better.
> Can you tell me why you dared to define the term "identity" rather than
> "identifier" then?
> 
> Trivial comment:
> It would be helpful if you could spell out acronyms and abbreviations when
> they appear at the first time, such as HCI.
> 
> Thank you.
> 
> Take
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> abfab mailing list
> abfab@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/abfab


From nobody Tue Aug 12 20:16:05 2014
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

I don't have any major notes or concerns addressing the draft as a
whole as it was concise and easy to read through. Below are notes on
my questions and suggestions for improvement on some specific areas.


Section 2, Paragraph 5
> This document aspires to the guidelines stipulated by...

"Aspires" seems like a weird word choice, consider replacing with
"adheres".


Section 4, Paragraph 1

> The RADIUS SAML binding defined by this binding Section 5 uses two 
> attributes to convey SAML assertions and protocol messages 
> respectively [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] .

This sentence does not compute and can be reworded to be more
meaningful.


Section 4, Paragraph 1

> The Length of both of these attributes is >=5.

Greater than or equal to 5 what?


Section 5.2, Paragraph 2

> Support for fragmentation over UDP is not mandatory.

Is support for fragmentation over UDP RECOMMENDED or OPTIONAL? May be
beneficial to be more explicit here on what this draft's opinion is.
If the draft doesn't care at all, then consider removing this sentence
entirely.


Section 5.3.2, Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 4

> The following methods are sufficient:
> 
> o  NAS identity in trusted digitally signed request.
> 
> o  NAS identity in trusted SAML federation metadata.

> The following methods are sufficient:
> 
> o  RADIUS realm in trusted digitally signed request.
> 
> o  RADIUS realm in trusted SAML federation metadata.

The wording here makes it unclear whether one of these alone is
sufficient or whether both are required. Rewording to say something
like "Satisfying the following two conditions is sufficient:" is more
clear.


Section 5.3.3, Paragraph 1

> This bindings calls...

Correct to "This binding calls..."


Section 7, Paragraph 1

> The Relying Party, acting as a NAS, attempts to validate the 
> Principal's credentials against a RADIUS server acting the 
> Principal's Identity Provider.

Correct to "...Principal's credentials against a RADIUS server acting
as the Principal's Identity Provider."


Section 7.3.3, Paragraph 1

> If the ForceAuthn attribute on the <samlp:AuthnRequest> element
> (if sent by the requester) is present and true, the Identity
> Provider MUST freshly establish this identity rather than relying
> on any existing session state it may have with the Principal (for
> example, TLS state that may be used for session resumption).

Consider breaking this sentence up more and explaining why the
Identity Provider must freshly establish the identity.


Section 7.3.4, Paragraph 1

> The Identity Provider MUST conclude the authentication in a manner 
> consistent with the RADIUS authentication result, and MAY issue a 
> <samlp:Response> message to the Relying Party consisent with the 
> authentication result and as described in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] 
> and delivered to the Relying Party using the SAML RADIUS binding.

Break this sentence up and fix the typo in "consistent".

Something like, "The Identity Provider MUST conclude the
authentication in a manner consistent with the RADIUS authentication
result. The Identity Provider MAY issue a <samlp:Response> message to
the Relying Party that is consistent with the authentication result,
as described in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]."

(The last part of this sentence doesn't make sense to me, so reword
that as necessary).


Section 7.3.5, Paragraph 1

> Any subsequent use of the <saml:Assertion> elements is at the 
> discretion of the Relying Party, subject to any restrictions on
> use contained within the assertions themselves or previously 
> established out-of-band policy governing interactions between the 
> Identity Provider and the Relying Party.

Reword to something like: "Any subsequent use of the <saml:Assertion>
elements is at the discretion of the Relying Party, subject to any
restrictions contained within the assertions themselves or from any
previously established out-of-band policy that governs the interaction
between the Identity Provider and the Relying Party."


Section 7.4.2, Paragraph 2

> ... the <samlp:Response> element MUST conform to the following:
> 
> o  It MAY be signed.

Extremely minor, but I found it a little distracting/funny that the
first bullet in a list of MUSTs is a MAY. My recommendation is to
reword the introduction to this: "... the <samlp:Response> element is
subject to the following conditions."


Section 7.4.3, Bullet 3

> If a <saml:AuthnStatement> used to establish a security context for
> the Principal contains a SessionNotOnOrAfter attribute, the 
> security context SHOULD be discarded once this time is reached, 
> unless the service provider reestablishes the Principal's identity 
> by repeating the use of this profile.

Why is this a SHOULD and not a MUST? If it is a SHOULD merely to allow
for the situation described above (where the service provider
reestablishes the identity), then it actually should be a MUST. "The
security context MUST be discarded unless the service provider
reestablishes the Principal's identity" is a perfectly sound requirement.

- -- 
Troy Shields
Developer of Awesome | Jive Communications, Inc.
Jive.com | tshields@jive.com


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From nobody Wed Aug 13 06:45:55 2014
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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@painless-security.com>
To: tshields <tshields@jive.com>
References: <53EAD86D.105@jive.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Aug 2014 09:45:47 -0400
In-Reply-To: <53EAD86D.105@jive.com> (tshields@jive.com's message of "Tue, 12 Aug 2014 21:15:57 -0600")
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Subject: Re: [abfab] Review of draft-ietf-abfab-aaa-saml-09
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>>>>> "tshields" == tshields  <tshields@jive.com> writes:
Hi.
most of your comments were editorial wording comments and can be
addressed in editing the document.
We appreciate both the editorial comments and the more technical
comments I'm responding to in this message.

    tshields> Section 5.3.2, Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 4

    >> The following methods are sufficient:
    >> 
    >> o NAS identity in trusted digitally signed request.
    >> 
    >> o NAS identity in trusted SAML federation metadata.

    >> The following methods are sufficient:
    >> 
    >> o RADIUS realm in trusted digitally signed request.
    >> 
    >> o RADIUS realm in trusted SAML federation metadata.

    tshields> The wording here makes it unclear whether one of these
    tshields> alone is sufficient or whether both are
    tshields> required. Rewording to say something like "Satisfying the
    tshields> following two conditions is sufficient:" is more clear.

Sticking the information either in metadata or in the SAML message is
sufficient, both is not required.





    tshields> Section 7.4.3, Bullet 3

    >> If a <saml:AuthnStatement> used to establish a security context
    >> for the Principal contains a SessionNotOnOrAfter attribute, the
    >> security context SHOULD be discarded once this time is reached,
    >> unless the service provider reestablishes the Principal's
    >> identity by repeating the use of this profile.

    tshields> Why is this a SHOULD and not a MUST? If it is a SHOULD
    tshields> merely to allow for the situation described above (where
    tshields> the service provider reestablishes the identity), then it
    tshields> actually should be a MUST. "The security context MUST be
    tshields> discarded unless the service provider reestablishes the
    tshields> Principal's identity" is a perfectly sound requirement.

Well, we've found in the GSS community that the user experience of
ending some sorts of sessions prematurely is sufficiently bad that
everyone has gone out of their way not to do it.  For example if you're
in the middle of downloading a file, it's far better to finish that than
to kill your session because it reached an authentication time out.
We're hoping to make the text in this draft consistent with what people
will do rather than an ideal that would break stuff.

The Kerberos community went through a lot of pain convincing themselves
to do this over the years, and so that's where we're taking this from.
It's certainly something that we can discuss if we think our
requirements are different.


From nobody Fri Aug 22 16:16:42 2014
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Subject: [abfab] Document Action: 'Application Bridging for Federated Access Beyond Web (ABFAB) Architecture' to Informational RFC (draft-ietf-abfab-arch-13.txt)
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The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'Application Bridging for Federated Access Beyond Web (ABFAB)
   Architecture'
  (draft-ietf-abfab-arch-13.txt) as Informational RFC

This document is the product of the Application Bridging for Federated
Access Beyond web Working Group.

The IESG contact persons are Stephen Farrell and Kathleen Moriarty.

A URL of this Internet Draft is:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-abfab-arch/





Technical Summary

   This memo describes an architecture that makes use of extensions to
   the commonly used security mechanisms for both federated and non-
   federated access management, including the Remote Authentication Dial
   In User Service (RADIUS) and the Diameter protocol, the Generic
   Security Service (GSS), the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
   and the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML).  The architecture
   addresses the problem of federated access management to primarily
   non-web-based services, in a manner that will scale to large numbers
   of identity providers, relying parties, and federations.

Working Group Summary

  The WG process, although it took some time, hasn't been particularly contentious. 
  Instead there has been a lot of feedback from the core spec work and this   
  specification which has necessarily delayed the work a bit.

Document Quality

  This is an informational document that describes abfab architecture. The abfab suite    
  of protocols has been implemented once by the moonshot project. Afaik there are no  
  other implementations but the night is young. 

  The work of Jim Schaad in particular has been excellent. His thoroughness 
  and dedication to quality has meant a lot for getting this document done.

Personnel
 
  The document shepherded is Leif Johansson (WG chair). 
  The responsible AD is Stephen Farrell. 

RFC Editor Note

   (1) I-D nits notes a couple of outdated references which is fine and 
easy fix, but also...

   (2) There're some URL references of the form [1], [2] etc that need
fixing - the xml is apparently correct but the txt file is not. The authors
and AD know how to fix it, so please just check at AUTH-48 

