From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct  1 11:49:19 2001
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To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: list policy
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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namedroppers@ops.ietf.org is the mailing list for the ietf dnsext wg.  see
<http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/dnsext-charter.html> for the wg charter.
messages should be on topics appropriate to the dnsext wg, which are various
discussion of the dns protocols or administrivia of the wg itself.  the list
is moderated.

calls for papers, announcements of events not directly relevant to the dns
protocols, etc. are not appropriate.  discussion of problems with particular
implementations, announcements of releases, sites' misconfigurations, etc.
should be done on mailing lists for the particular implementations.

there is a wg for dns operational practice, dnsop, whose charter can be
found at <http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/dnsop-charter.html>.

there is a mailing list for discussion of whose implementation is better,
and why someone else's is broken.  it is weenie-war@ops.ietf.org.  all
discussions of such nature should occur there or on /dev/null.  unlike the
namedroppers list, weenie-war@ops.ietf.org is not archived.

questions or concerns related to the acceptance or rejection of
specific messages to the namedroppers mailing list should first be
discussed with the wg chairs, with followup appeals using the normal
appeals process of rfc 2026 (i.e., follup with area directors, then
iesg, etc.).

there is a mailing list for the discussion of ietf processes, which
includes any general discussion of the moderation of ietf mailing
lists.  it is ietf-process@lists.elistx.com.

---

NOTE WELL:

All statements related to the activities of the IETF and addressed to the 
IETF are subject to all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026, which grants 
to the IETF and its participants certain licenses and rights in such 
statements.

Such statements include verbal statements in IETF meetings, as well as 
written and electronic communications made at any time or place, which are 
addressed to

    - the IETF plenary session,
    - any IETF working group or portion thereof,
    - the IESG, or any member thereof on behalf of the IESG,
    - the IAB or any member thereof on behalf of the IAB,
    - any IETF mailing list, including the IETF list itself,
      any working group or design team list, or any other list
      functioning under IETF auspices,
    - the RFC Editor or the Internet-Drafts function

Statements made outside of an IETF meeting, mailing list or other function, 
that are clearly not intended to be input to an IETF activity, group or 
function, are not subject to these provisions.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct  1 12:15:08 2001
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From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt 
In-Reply-To: <g3ofnud8kq.fsf@as.vix.com> 
References: <g3ofnud8kq.fsf@as.vix.com>  <200109281109.HAA09046@ietf.org> <5.1.0.14.2.20010928141318.028528f0@localhost> 
Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2001 18:57:12 +0700
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On the off chance this pseudo-last-call ends before I have a chance to
get on the net again, I object to this draft as well - certainly to it
going anywhere until there's some actual evidence, rather than superstition
to support it.

eg: 2(c) which is currently ...

   c) It is not known if the benefits of A6 outweigh the costs and
      risks.

can exactly equivalently be written as ...

   c) It is not known if the costs and risks of A6 outweigh the benefits.

which when read gives exactly the opposite impression as the former
choice of words.

What's more, that's true whether the term "A6" there is shorthand for
"deployment of A6 RRs" or "failure to deploy A6 records".

kre



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct  1 12:16:59 2001
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Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2001 08:54:00 -0500
From: Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov>
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt
In-reply-to: "28 Sep 2001 14:17:29 EDT."
 <5.1.0.14.2.20010928141318.028528f0@localhost>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Cc: iesg@ietf.org
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> > Just a note; I support this but in all honesty, perhaps s/consensus/rough
> > consensus/ would be closer to the community opinion. :-)
> 
> The point of the document is to judge consensus, editors tried to
> capture the "sense of the room" in London and this is now put out
> for judging what kind consensus is  for the recommendations, by the
> working group.

In London we were told that the last part of the joint meeting, but
there was only a voice poll.  The minutes told us that consensus
would be judged on the mailing list.  On the mailing list we were
told to wait for this document.  This document asserts a consensus
that did not exist in the meeting, the minutes or on the list.  (I
have re-read the archives and still maintain this opinion.)

Furthermore, this document makes some purely technical claims that
were soundly rebutted on the mailing list before and after the
meeting.
			Matt Crawford


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct  2 03:57:42 2001
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Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2001 14:17:01 -0500 (CDT)
From: Matt Crawford <crawdad@gungnir.fnal.gov>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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From vixie@as.vix.com Mon Oct 01 10: 17:07 2001
Message-Id: <200110011715.f91HFeH65528@as.vix.com>
To: Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov>
cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, iesg@ietf.org
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt 
In-Reply-To: Message from Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov> 
   of "Mon, 01 Oct 2001 08:54:00 CDT." <200110011354.f91Ds1m29955@gungnir.fnal.gov> 
Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2001 10:15:40 -0700
From: Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
Resent-To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Resent-Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2001 14:17:01 -0500
Resent-From: Matt Crawford <crawdad@gungnir.fnal.gov>

> ...
> Furthermore, this document makes some purely technical claims that
> were soundly rebutted on the mailing list before and after the
> meeting.
> 			Matt Crawford

uh-oh.  matt, i thought you knew the secret handshake so i wasn't worried
that i didn't (know it).  i guess things are worse than they seemed.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct  2 03:57:44 2001
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To: Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, iesg@ietf.org
Reply-To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt 
In-Reply-To: Message from Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov> 
   of "Mon, 01 Oct 2001 08:54:00 CDT." <200110011354.f91Ds1m29955@gungnir.fnal.gov> 
Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2001 13:01:26 -0400
From: Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>
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   Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2001 08:54:00 -0500
   From: Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov>

   Furthermore, this document makes some purely technical claims that
   were soundly rebutted on the mailing list before and after the
   meeting.

Please specify.

(Is it really necessary to CC the IESG on this discussion?)


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct  2 03:58:16 2001
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Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2001 13:57:32 -0500
From: Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov>
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt
In-reply-to: "01 Oct 2001 13:01:26 EDT."
 <20011001170127.0A6C61B2D@thrintun.hactrn.net>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Cc: iesg@ietf.org
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>    Furthermore, this document makes some purely technical claims that
>    were soundly rebutted on the mailing list before and after the
>    meeting.
> 
> Please specify.

1. That the time to collect an N-link chain of A6 records is
proportional to N.

2. That the chance of failure to complete a chain is "roughly
proportional to N, since each of the queries involved in resolving an
A6 chain has roughly the same probability of failure as a single AAAA
query."

Finally, one that was either invented out of whole cloth for this new
document or the result of a gross misunderstanding of something you
wrote in -ipv6-dns-tradeoffs-00:

3. That "The issues for DNAME chaining in the reverse tree are
substantially identical to the issues for A6 chaining in the forward
tree."

> (Is it really necessary to CC the IESG on this discussion?)

If we are to believe what the chairs have said, then yes.  In a
strictly logical universe, perhaps not.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct  2 03:59:10 2001
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Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2001 15:10:39 -0500
From: Matt Crawford <crawdad@gungnir.fnal.gov>
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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Forwarded by request, ...

------- Forwarded Message

Resent: Mon, 01 Oct 2001 14:17:02 -0500
Resent: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
X-rationale: "could you fwd my note to namedroppers, please?  randy's not willing."
To: Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov>
cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, iesg@ietf.org
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt 
In-Reply-To: Message from Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov> 
   of "Mon, 01 Oct 2001 08:54:00 CDT." <200110011354.f91Ds1m29955@gungnir.fnal.gov> 
Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2001 10:15:40 -0700
From: Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com>

> ...
> Furthermore, this document makes some purely technical claims that
> were soundly rebutted on the mailing list before and after the
> meeting.
> 			Matt Crawford

uh-oh.  matt, i thought you knew the secret handshake so i wasn't worried
that i didn't (know it).  i guess things are worse than they seemed.


------- End of Forwarded Message



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct  2 04:00:00 2001
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To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Reply-To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt 
In-Reply-To: Message from Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov> 
   of "Mon, 01 Oct 2001 08:54:00 CDT." <200110011354.f91Ds1m29955@gungnir.fnal.gov> 
From: Rob Austein <sra+namedroppers@hactrn.net>
Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2001 14:04:00 -0400
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   Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2001 08:54:00 -0500
   From: Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov>

   Furthermore, this document makes some purely technical claims that
   were soundly rebutted on the mailing list before and after the
   meeting.

Please specify.

(Is it really necessary to CC the IESG on this discussion?)


to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct  2 12:20:28 2001
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To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: DNAME (was: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt)
References: <200109281109.HAA09046@ietf.org>
From: Johan Ihren <johani@autonomica.se>
Date: 02 Oct 2001 17:38:30 +0200
In-Reply-To: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org's message of "Fri, 28 Sep 2001 07:09:25 -0400"
Message-ID: <2cbsjqcart.fsf@snout.autonomica.se>
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In the draft I stumbled upon this:

> 4 DNAME in IPv6 reverse tree

>    The issues for DNAME chaining in the reverse tree are substantially
>    identical to the issues for A6 chaining in the forward tree.
>    Therefore, in moving RFC 2874 to experimental, the intent of this
>    document is that use of DNAME RRs in the reverse tree be deprecated.

I cannot remember anything about explicitly deprecating DNAME
anywhere. The contentious issue was obviously A6 vs AAAA, the
bitstrings were more or less non-starters and DNAME was more or less
glanced over and deferred back to DNSEXT as purely a DNS issue.

But regardless of that, there is one issue of DNAME that did not come
up and that I think is worth pointing out explicitly:

        With DNAME it is possible to renumber (i.e. change the prefix)
        without changing the *name of the zone* containing the data.

Without DNAME that is no longer possible. And this is true regardless
of whether the reverse tree is based upon bitstrings or nibbles.

And regardless of how often various people think we will or should
renumber, there is from an operations point of view a rather sharp
difference between a change in zone contents (which happens all the
time) and a change in zone names (which require new nameserver
configurations, new agreements with slaves, new delegations, etc,
etc). And all this recursively all the way down the tree from the
point of the prefix change...

AAAA in the forward tree will cause more changes to forward
zones in time of a prefix change but at least the changes will be in
the *same* zone. Not so in the reverse tree without DNAME.

In short: the maintenance headaches in the reverse tree go way up
without DNAME regardless of whether we have A6 or AAAA in the forward
tree. And since they are orthogonal issues the future of DNAME in the
reverse tree should be decoupled from whatever happens to A6.

And I believe that deprecating DNAME in the reverse tree will either
cement a no-renumbering future or kill of the reverse tree for v6
entirely.

Regards,

Johan Ihren
Autonomica


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct  3 03:31:32 2001
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Date: 2 Oct 2001 17:30:19 -0000
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From: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Cc: iesg@ietf.org
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt
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If you're following a chain of n out-of-bailiwick pointers, and each
pointer has probability p of succeeding, independently of the other
pointers, then your chance of reaching the end of the chain is p^n. A
more sophisticated analysis, taking account of timeouts and retries and
multiple servers, produces essentially the same formula. 

As I put it in http://cr.yp.to/djbdns/killa6.html, the success chance
decreases exponentially with the number of out-of-bailiwick pointers.

p^n is approximately 1 - (1-p)n if n is not very large and p is close to
1, so the failure chance is roughly proportional to n.

---Dan


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct  3 03:36:18 2001
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Date: 2 Oct 2001 18:02:01 -0000
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From: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNAME (was: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt)
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Johan Ihren writes:
> there is from an operations point of view a rather sharp difference
> between a change in zone contents (which happens all the time) and a
> change in zone names

This is a local problem, and you are wildly exaggerating the difficulty
of solving it.

None of IETF's DNS-replication protocols handle new zones. That's why
ISPs use better replication protocols, such as rsync. Better protocols
are becoming increasingly popular at small sites too.

See http://cr.yp.to/djbdns/faq/axfrdns.html#what for a more detailed
discussion of DNS replication.

Similar comments apply to configuration-file formats, web-based DNS
administration tools, etc. Saying ``This rare operation is difficult
with our current tools; what a disaster it would be if the operation
were more frequent!'' ignores the fact that tools can and do change.

---Dan


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct  3 10:21:58 2001
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Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2001 09:36:14 -0400
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt
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At 3:42 PM -0400 9/28/01, Paul Vixie wrote:
>indeed, that is true.  i am a strong dissenter.  A6 has to be mandatory if
>IPv6 is going to solve more problems than it creates.

As someone who really has no strong opinion (yet) in the A6-vs-AAAA debate:
one obstacle to the adoption of A6 is tied to a lack of clarity as to how
it will solve problems.

I don't know of a clear, concise discussion of the problems that need to be
addressed. As a consequence there is no clear indication what A6 will
achieve.  (Unfortunately, I am not in position to supply such a document.)

<<One may note that this is the same problem facing DNSSEC.  But let's not
go off-thread on this.>>

I think A6 is cool because I am an engineer and tend to like Rube Goldberg
devices.  (Not to imply that A6 is a lot of activity for no benefit, but to
imply that A6 is a simply a lot of activity.)  However, I really can't back
the A6-as-standards track because I don't know whether "A6" is good or not.

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

You fly too often when ... the airport taxi is on speed-dial.

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct  3 11:11:09 2001
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Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2001 09:41:37 -0500
From: Matt Crawford <crawdad@fnal.gov>
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt
In-reply-to: "02 Oct 2001 17:30:19 -0000." <20011002173019.1816.qmail@cr.yp.to>
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> If you're following a chain of n out-of-bailiwick pointers, and each
> pointer has probability p of succeeding, independently of the other
> pointers,

With or without the undefined "out-of-bailiwick" modifier, this is a
large *if* not supported by facts in evidence, and directly
contradicted by recommendations of RFC 2874, section 6.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct  4 04:11:45 2001
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To: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNAME (was: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt)
References: <200109281109.HAA09046@ietf.org> <2cbsjqcart.fsf@snout.autonomica.se> <20011002180201.12250.qmail@cr.yp.to>
From: Johan Ihren <johani@autonomica.se>
Date: 03 Oct 2001 18:19:28 +0200
In-Reply-To: "D. J. Bernstein"'s message of "2 Oct 2001 18:02:01 -0000"
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"D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to> writes:

> Johan Ihren writes:
> > there is from an operations point of view a rather sharp difference
> > between a change in zone contents (which happens all the time) and a
> > change in zone names
> 
> This is a local problem, and you are wildly exaggerating the difficulty
> of solving it.

How is it a local problem when it recursively propagates down the
entire hierarchy below the point of the prefix change?

> None of IETF's DNS-replication protocols handle new zones. That's why
> ISPs use better replication protocols, such as rsync. Better protocols
> are becoming increasingly popular at small sites too.
> 
> See http://cr.yp.to/djbdns/faq/axfrdns.html#what for a more detailed
> discussion of DNS replication.
> 
> Similar comments apply to configuration-file formats, web-based DNS
> administration tools, etc. Saying ``This rare operation is difficult
> with our current tools; what a disaster it would be if the operation
> were more frequent!'' ignores the fact that tools can and do change.

While I'm all in favour of new tools I see no tool on the horizon that
will make reconstructing an entire delegation hierarchy even
semi-automatic.

The main problem as I see it is not one of better zone-replication
protocols, nor tools automating inclusion of new zones, etc, but
rather one of delegation management and to some extent
trust. Automation of new delegations, in a possibly quite deep
hierarchy implies a certain amount of trust between several layers and
I think that is very far off. As it should be, for security reasons.

Regards,

Johan Ihren
Autonomica


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct  4 04:11:47 2001
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Message-ID: <3BBB4407.D8F7C972@unixpeople.com>
Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2001 09:59:51 -0700
From: "Andy W. Barclay" <abarclay@unixpeople.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt
References: <20011001170127.0A6C61B2D@thrintun.hactrn.net> <200110011857.f91IvWm01604@gungnir.fnal.gov> <20011002173019.1816.qmail@cr.yp.to>
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I feel you are over-simplifying the problem.

You are assuming that each of the queries is independent. I know
that its not an absolute, but I feel that generally, a dependency
exists,
such that if query "n" succeeds, query "n+1" has an increased chance
of success.
This would imply that the p^n is too pessimistic.


"D. J. Bernstein" wrote:
> 
> If you're following a chain of n out-of-bailiwick pointers, and each
> pointer has probability p of succeeding, independently of the other
> pointers, then your chance of reaching the end of the chain is p^n. A
> more sophisticated analysis, taking account of timeouts and retries and
> multiple servers, produces essentially the same formula.
> 
> As I put it in http://cr.yp.to/djbdns/killa6.html, the success chance
> decreases exponentially with the number of out-of-bailiwick pointers.
> 
> p^n is approximately 1 - (1-p)n if n is not very large and p is close to
> 1, so the failure chance is roughly proportional to n.
> 
> ---Dan
> 
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.

--
Regards,
Andy W. Barclay.        abarclay@unixpeople.com
fax  (781) 823-8276
Always a UNIX Evangelist (and sometimes a system and network architect)

And The Lord said unto the Good Shepherd "Get
lost...This is cattle country"


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct  4 04:41:07 2001
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Message-ID: <3BBB7D53.CB7ACA8F@daimlerchrysler.com>
Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2001 17:04:19 -0400
From: Kevin Darcy <kcd@daimlerchrysler.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNAME (was: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt)
References: <200109281109.HAA09046@ietf.org> <2cbsjqcart.fsf@snout.autonomica.se> <20011002180201.12250.qmail@cr.yp.to>
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D. J. Bernstein wrote:

> Johan Ihren writes:
> > there is from an operations point of view a rather sharp difference
> > between a change in zone contents (which happens all the time) and a
> > change in zone names
>
> This is a local problem, and you are wildly exaggerating the difficulty
> of solving it.
>
> None of IETF's DNS-replication protocols handle new zones. That's why
> ISPs use better replication protocols, such as rsync. Better protocols
> are becoming increasingly popular at small sites too.

As much as it surprises me, I'm mostly in agreement with Dan here. The
lack of automatic zone-creation and -deletion is a *MAJOR* shortcoming of
the DNS protocol suite -- every vendor of DNS management tools seems to do
it differently, and interoperability between the different methodologies
is basically non-existent. This is creating a high degree of "vendor
lock-in" to specific products.

I keep hearing vague claims that automatic zone-creation and -deletion is
barred by some sort of insurmountable security issue, but, frankly
speaking, that's a crock of you-know-what. Even if it were true, any such
security issue would be out of the scope of the DNS protocol _per_se_.

Where I part ways with Dan is in the solution to the problem. He seems to
feel that generic tools like rsync and ssh are appropriate for the task. I
would prefer for automatic zone-creation and -deletion to be made part of
the protocol so that the solution could be self-contained within a
DNS implementation and not have as much dependency on operating-system
architecture and configuration.


- Kevin





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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct  4 06:13:05 2001
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To: Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNAME (was: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt)
References: <200110040809.f9489PH25841@as.vix.com>
From: Johan Ihren <johani@autonomica.se>
Date: 04 Oct 2001 11:48:31 +0200
In-Reply-To: Paul A Vixie's message of "Thu, 04 Oct 2001 01:09:25 -0700"
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Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com> writes:

Paul,

I am fairly sure that you and I are misunderstanding each other
here. I'll try to make my point somewhat clearer...

> and you think an AAAA/PTR tree will have fewer redelegation points
> than an A6/DNAME tree?  why?

No, no, no, no.

> please answer on-list, i can't post there right now.

I make no claims whatsoever about the number of delegation points in
the tree. For the sake of discussion I like to assume that there are
exactly the same number of delegations regardless of the metod used
for delegation. Also, I only talk about the reverse tree here, and
usage of DNAME in it. The AAAA vs A6 issue is completely orthogonal to
this.

My point is that regardless of how many delegations there are below
the point of a prefix change, these delgations

* with DNAME will survive, since only the DNAMEs at the apex has
  to be changed (a maximum of sixteen given nibbles).

* with traditional NS delegations the entire subtree will break apart,
  since the names of every single down-tree old delegation point will
  change.

A very contrived example: let's say that 192.in-addr.arpa gets changed
to 193.in-addr.arpa (yes, I said it was contrived...):

With DNAME: change

1.192.in-addr.arpa.       DNAME   ip6.isp1.net.
2.192.in-addr.arpa.       DNAME   ip6.isp2.net.
...

into 

1.193.in-addr.arpa.       DNAME   ip6.isp1.net.
2.193.in-addr.arpa.       DNAME   ip6.isp2.net.
...

and we're done.

Without DNAME: recursively update every single delegation point in the
set

*.*.192.in-addr.arpa.       NS      ...
...

For 192.in-addr.arpa this is roughly 2000+ delegation points as far as
I know, but that's only because 192 is unusually clean. And because
the v6 nibbles have a much deeper hierarchy I guess that it is not
unreasonable to expect more delegations in the v6 reverse trees.

My claim is that an hierarchy with thousands of delegation points will
not simply reconstruct itself if you break it apart from above unless
there is a *really* driving force for it, and then they will still be
rather unpleased about all the extra work.

Regards,

Johan Ihren
Autonomica


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct  4 12:09:57 2001
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To: Kevin Darcy <kcd@daimlerchrysler.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNAME (was: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt)
References: <200109281109.HAA09046@ietf.org> <2cbsjqcart.fsf@snout.autonomica.se> <20011002180201.12250.qmail@cr.yp.to> <3BBB7D53.CB7ACA8F@daimlerchrysler.com>
From: Johan Ihren <johani@autonomica.se>
Date: 04 Oct 2001 17:28:56 +0200
In-Reply-To: Kevin Darcy's message of "Wed, 03 Oct 2001 17:04:19 -0400"
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Kevin Darcy <kcd@daimlerchrysler.com> writes:

> D. J. Bernstein wrote:
> 
> > Johan Ihren writes:
> > > there is from an operations point of view a rather sharp difference
> > > between a change in zone contents (which happens all the time) and a
> > > change in zone names
> >
> > This is a local problem, and you are wildly exaggerating the difficulty
> > of solving it.
> >
> > None of IETF's DNS-replication protocols handle new zones. That's why
> > ISPs use better replication protocols, such as rsync. Better protocols
> > are becoming increasingly popular at small sites too.
> 
> As much as it surprises me, I'm mostly in agreement with Dan here. The
> lack of automatic zone-creation and -deletion is a *MAJOR* shortcoming of
> the DNS protocol suite -- every vendor of DNS management tools seems to do
> it differently, and interoperability between the different methodologies
> is basically non-existent. This is creating a high degree of "vendor
> lock-in" to specific products.
> 
> I keep hearing vague claims that automatic zone-creation and -deletion is
> barred by some sort of insurmountable security issue, but, frankly
> speaking, that's a crock of you-know-what. Even if it were true, any such
> security issue would be out of the scope of the DNS protocol _per_se_.
> 
> Where I part ways with Dan is in the solution to the problem. He seems to
> feel that generic tools like rsync and ssh are appropriate for the task. I
> would prefer for automatic zone-creation and -deletion to be made part of
> the protocol so that the solution could be self-contained within a
> DNS implementation and not have as much dependency on operating-system
> architecture and configuration.

...and I still think that you are both focusing on the wrong
issue. Zone creation is a problem, yes, but it is possibly a question
of implementation (mostly).

The real issue is reconstructing the delegation hierarchy for the
entire subtree when every single owner name has changed.

Regards,

Johan Ihren
Autonomica



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct  5 05:03:12 2001
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Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2001 22:45:07 -0700 (PDT)
From: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
cc: dthaler@microsoft.com
Subject: IPv6 mDNS configuration issue
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It has been pointed out that just because a DNS server may be configured
for IPv4 (such as via DHCPv4 DNS server option), doesn't mean that it is
available for IPv6. For example, a router might support stateless
autoconfig, but have not support DHCPv6, so that the only way to get
dynamic naming on the home network is to enable mDNS. 

Therefore, it appears that the decision on use of mDNS needs to be made
separately for IPv4 and IPv6. On a network with a router with stateless
autoconfig, but no DNS discovery, and no DHCPv6, mDNS SHOULD be enabled. 

Does this make sense?



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct  5 05:03:51 2001
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Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2001 22:19:32 -0700 (PDT)
From: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Resolution of comments on mdns-05
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Changes proposed to draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-05.txt
Bernard Aboba

---------------------------------------------------------------
Section 2:

Submitted by: Bernard Aboba
Justification: The specification is not clear about why mDNS
is not enabled by default for home networks where a DHCP server
is present. It is also not clear about whether mDNS is enabled
when there is a router, but no DHCP or DNS server (as might be
the case when using IPv6 with stateless autoconfig).  

Change:

"Propagation of multicast DNS packets within the local subnet is 
considered sufficient to enable DNS name resolution in small
adhoc networks. The assumption is that if a network has a router, 
then the network either has a DNS server or the router can function 
as a DNS proxy, possibly implementing dynamic DNS."

To:

"Propagation of multicast DNS packets within the local subnet is 
considered sufficient to enable DNS name resolution in small
adhoc networks. The assumption is that if a network has a router, 
then the network either has a DNS server support dynamic DNS, 
or the router can function as a DNS proxy. 
By implementing DHCP as well as a DNS proxy
and dynamic DNS, routers can provide name resolution for the 
names of the hosts on the local network. This functionality
is easily provided, and so in such cases it is assumed that
multicast DNS need not be enabled by default."

Proposed resolution: Accept

---------------------------------------------------------------
Section 3:

Submitted by: Levon Esibov
Justification: Sending a unicast query for a name ending with the
".local.arpa" suffix should be ok over any transport after a response
to a multicast request is received with the TC bit set, not just TCP.

Change:

"  a. A sender repeats a query over TCP after it received a response 
     to the previous multicast query with the TC bit set, or 
"

To:

"
  a. A sender repeats a query after it received a response 
     to the previous multicast query with the TC bit set, or 
"

Proposed resolution: Accept


---------------------------------------------------------------
Section 3:

Submitted by: Levon Esibov
Justification: Prohibiting DNS servers from listening to or
responding to mDNS queries seems a bit extreme. Why can't DNS
servers listen to and respond to queries for their own name?

Change:

"If a DNS server is running on a host, the host MUST NOT listen for
multicast DNS queries, to prevent the host from listening on port 53
and intercepting DNS queries directed to a DNS server. 
By default, a DNS server MUST NOT listen to multicast DNS queries."

To:

"If a DNS server is running on a host, only the DNS server MAY listen for
multicast DNS queries. Other services running on such a host MUST NOT listen
for multicast DNS queries on port 53, since otherwise they would intercept
DNS queries directed to a DNS server."

Proposed resolution: Discuss

---------------------------------------------------------------
Section 3.1:

Submitted by: Levon Esibov, Aidan Williams
Justification: In some cases, it might make sense to enable mDNS
by default, so this shouldn't be prohibited.

Change:

"
Multicast DNS usage can be configured manually or automatically. 
On interfaces where no manual or automatic configuration has been 
performed, multicast DNS is enabled by default."

To:

"Multicast DNS usage can be configured manually or automatically. 
On interfaces where no manual or automatic configuration has been 
performed, multicast DNS SHOULD be enabled by default."

Proposed resolution: Accept


---------------------------------------------------------------
Section 3.1:

Submitted by: Levon Esibov, Aidan Williams
Justification: A DNS server shouldn't be prohibited from answering
mDNS queries for its own name. Also, the prohibition on enabling
of mDNS in situations where there is configuration seems a bit harsh.

Change:

"If an interface has been configured via any automatic configuration
mechanism which is able to supply DNS configuration information,
then multicast DNS MUST NOT be used on that interface 
unless it has been explicitly
enabled, whether via that mechanism or any other. This
ensures that upgraded hosts do not change their default behavior,
without requiring the source of the configuration information to
be simultaneously updated. 
This implies that on the interface, the host will neither
listen on the DNS LINKLOCAL multicast address, nor will it 
send queries to that address.
For a DNS server, automatic configuration mechanisms
MUST NOT  enable multicast DNS on any interface."

To:

"If an interface has been configured via any automatic configuration
mechanism which is able to supply DNS configuration information,
then multicast DNS SHOULD NOT be used on that interface 
unless it has been explicitly
enabled, whether via that mechanism or any other. This
ensures that upgraded hosts do not change their default behavior,
without requiring the source of the configuration information to
be simultaneously updated. 
This implies that on the interface, the host will neither
listen on the DNS LINKLOCAL multicast address, nor will it 
send queries to that address."

Proposed resolution: Accept

---------------------------------------------------------------
Section 5:

Submitted by: Levon Esibov
Justification: not isn't capitalized when it has standards language meaning.
"the" is missing from the sentence.

Change:

"After client receives an YXRRSET response to its dynamic update request that a 
UNIQUE resource record does not exist, the host MUST not use the UNIQUE 
resource record in responses to multicast queries and dynamic update requests."

To:

"After the client receives an YXRRSET response to its dynamic update request that a 
UNIQUE resource record does not exist, the host MUST NOT use the UNIQUE 
resource record in responses to multicast queries and dynamic update requests."

Proposed resolution: Accept


---------------------------------------------------------------

Section 5.1:

Submitted by: Levon Esibov
Justification: name conflicts will only exist in situations where
hosts use a name on an interface. If the name is not used, then
conflicts will not occur. 

Change:

"In this situation, the multi-homed myhost will probe for, and defend,
its host name on both interfaces. A conflict will be detected on one
interface, but not the other, and as a result, the multi-homed myhost
will not be able to respond with a host RR for "myhost."

To:

"In this situation, the multi-homed myhost will probe for, and defend,
its host name on both interfaces. A conflict will be detected on one
interface, but not the other, and as a result, the multi-homed myhost
will not be able to respond with a host RR for 'myhost', unless the
host is configured to use the 'myhost' name only on the left (see
Figure 1) network connection."

Proposed resolution: Discuss

---------------------------------------------------------------

Section 7:

Submitted by: Levon Esibov
Justification: Recursive resolution of mDNS queries shouldn't
be allowable. Rather than replying with non-authoritative NXDOMAIN,
it makes more sense for a DNS server not to reply at all. 

Change:

"
    - DNS servers SHOULD NOT forward queries for domain names 
      in the local.arpa domain - if the server cannot answer 
      the query from its own database, it should reply with a  
      non-authoritative NXDOMAIN.
"

To:

"
    - DNS servers SHOULD NOT forward or recursively resolve 
      queries for domain names in the local.arpa domain - if the 
      server cannot answer  the query from its own database, 
      it MUST NOT reply.
"

Proposed resolution: Accept

---------------------------------------------------------------

Section 9:

Submitted by: Levon Esibov
Justification: The current specification wording doesn't distinguish
between behavior of mDNS senders and ordinary hosts.

Change:

"The  mechanism specified in this draft does not require use of the
DNSSEC, which means that the responses to the multicast DNS queries may
not be authenticated. If a network contains a "signed key distribution
center" for all (or at least some) of the DNS zones that the responders
are authoritative for, then hosts on such a network are
configured with the key for the top zone, "local.arpa." (hosted by
"signed keys distribution center") and may use DNSSEC for authentication
of the responders using DNSSEC."

To:

"The  mechanism specified in this draft does not require use of
DNSSEC. As a result, responses to multicast DNS queries MAY NOT
be authenticated. If a network contains a "signed key distribution
center" for some of the DNS zones that the responders
are authoritative for, and senders on that network are
configured with the key for the top zone "local.arpa." (hosted by
"signed keys distribution center"), then senders MAY authenticate
the responses using DNSSEC."

Proposed resolution: Accept





 





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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Sat Oct  6 19:41:57 2001
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To: Kevin Darcy <kcd@daimlerchrysler.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt
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From: gson@isc.org (Andreas Gustafsson)
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Kevin Darcy writes:
> EDNS0 undercuts the rationale for prohibiting compression in new record types,
> because it provides a "safe", point-to-point way to compress records of those
> types. Agreed, that's not technically the same as "obsoleting" the
> prohibition, but it does raise a significant likelihood that exceptions will
> become necessary.

It doesn't raise the likelihood that exceptions are necessary, it
just makes it easier to implement such exceptions if they turn out to
be necessary.  I don't think they will be.

> I think there should at least be some language in the
> document acknowledging this fact, because -- let's face it -- you're not just
> "documenting" an existing prohibition, you're *reinforcing* it.

And reinforced it should be.  If we leave an explicit loophole for
negotiated compression schemes, people will come up with them whether
they are truly necessary or not.

> It wouldn't necessarily be a manual operation, and it wouldn't necessarily be
> burdensome. If the new record type has only a specialized use, then perhaps
> implementations will default it OFF and only those administrators who go out
> of their way to do so -- presumably with a full understanding of their local
> network/DNS environment and/or the tradeoffs of using the new record type --
> will turn it ON.

All that just to save a couple of bytes?  It's just not worth the effort.
-- 
Andreas Gustafsson, gson@isc.org


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Sat Oct  6 19:44:44 2001
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Date: 6 Oct 2001 01:55:30 -0000
Message-ID: <20011006015530.21390.qmail@cr.yp.to>
From: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNAME (was: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt)
References: <200109281109.HAA09046@ietf.org> <2cbsjqcart.fsf@snout.autonomica.se> <20011002180201.12250.qmail@cr.yp.to> <3BBB7D53.CB7ACA8F@daimlerchrysler.com> <2cn137toef.fsf@snout.autonomica.se>
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Johan Ihren writes:
> The real issue is reconstructing the delegation hierarchy for the
> entire subtree when every single owner name has changed.

What's the big deal? If you're changing 128.248.* to 131.193.*, for
example, then obviously you're also changing *.248.128.in-addr.arpa to
*.193.131.in-addr.arpa. This is a straightforward one-pass operation if
the DNS data file format was designed by a competent programmer.

---Dan


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Sun Oct  7 06:39:06 2001
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From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?M=E5ns_Nilsson?= <mansaxel@besserwisser.org>
To: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNAME (was: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt)
Message-ID: <20011007110019.A19854@besserwisser.org>
References: <200109281109.HAA09046@ietf.org> <2cbsjqcart.fsf@snout.autonomica.se> <20011002180201.12250.qmail@cr.yp.to> <3BBB7D53.CB7ACA8F@daimlerchrysler.com> <2cn137toef.fsf@snout.autonomica.se> <20011006015530.21390.qmail@cr.yp.to>
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Subject: Re: DNAME (was: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt) Date: Sat, Oct 06, 2001 at 01:55:30AM -0000 Quoting D. J. Bernstein (djb@cr.yp.to):
> Johan Ihren writes:
> > The real issue is reconstructing the delegation hierarchy for the
> > entire subtree when every single owner name has changed.
> 
> What's the big deal? If you're changing 128.248.* to 131.193.*, for
> example, then obviously you're also changing *.248.128.in-addr.arpa to
> *.193.131.in-addr.arpa. This is a straightforward one-pass operation if
> the DNS data file format was designed by a competent programmer.

You obviously haven't tried in real life. 

I'm really sorry, Dan. This is something you can't use to throw
blame on the Bind company; the master file format is the small (if
any at all) problem.

The big issue is to find people that run subzones and get them to
understand that they must perform the necessary steps, as well as
updating the rest of the network structure, since all must happen
in coordination.

As this now is a matter for the DNSOP wg (if at all an IETF matter)
I will stop.

Regards,
-- 
Måns Nilsson			MN1334-RIPE
http://vvv.besserwisser.org	


GOOD-NIGHT, everybody ... Now I have to go administer FIRST-AID to my
pet LEISURE SUIT!!


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Date: 7 Oct 2001 20:13:31 -0000
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From: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNAME (was: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt)
References: <200109281109.HAA09046@ietf.org> <2cbsjqcart.fsf@snout.autonomica.se> <20011002180201.12250.qmail@cr.yp.to> <3BBB7D53.CB7ACA8F@daimlerchrysler.com> <2cn137toef.fsf@snout.autonomica.se> <20011006015530.21390.qmail@cr.yp.to> <20011007110019.A19854@besserwisser.org>
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Nilsson writes:
> You obviously haven't tried in real life. 

UIC renumbered half its network a few years ago. DNS records were the
easiest part of the process.

UIC had already delegated math.uic.edu to the math department. That zone
had a bunch of records referring to 128.248.178.*, for example. The
math.uic.edu administrator had to change those to 131.193.178.*.

You seem to be claiming that DNAME would have eliminated the need for
UIC to notify the math.uic.edu administrator that the network was being
renumbered. That's ridiculous.

Ihren was talking about something different: namely, the difficulty of
renaming the 178.248.128.in-addr.arpa zone to 178.193.131.in-addr.arpa.
Automating this change is difficult with BIND's configuration-file
format. But it's easy with the tinydns data format.

Ihren was claiming that, in a world of frequent renumbering, renaming
zones of this type would be a serious problem. My point is that, in a
world of frequent renumbering, people would use tools that make the
renaming easy. This is a purely local issue.

Coming back to the protocol issues: We could use DNAME to eliminate
zones of this type. But Ihren was wildly overestimating the benefits of
eliminating these zones. Meanwhile, there are huge costs:

   * We'd have to change the DNS software on millions of computers
     before we could start deploying DNAME records.

   * Deploying DNAME records would hurt the reliability of DNS lookups,
     as explained in http://cr.yp.to/djbdns/killa6.html.

So I continue to object to DNAME.

> The big issue is to find people that run subzones and get them to
> understand that they must perform the necessary steps,

In case you haven't noticed, your DNS data includes a list of all your
child zones. It even tells you the names of the relevant servers!

Finding all the relevant DNS servers is trivial compared to finding all
the other places---in disk files and, for machines that shouldn't be
rebooted, in RAM---where IP addresses are stored.

Of course, there's also the _really_ big issue of eliminating long-lived
TCP connections from the Internet protocol suite. I've seen a few people
talking about renumbering sites every day; I haven't seen them give any
details of how they'll keep their ssh login sessions going.

None of this is rocket science. If the idea of frequent renumbering is
meant to be taken seriously then all the problems will be solved. This
doesn't mean that we should mindlessly adopt a proposal merely because
it is labelled as ``support for renumbering.''

---Dan


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct  8 04:02:16 2001
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Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2001 13:18:56 -0700 (PDT)
From: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Additional proposed changes to mdns-05
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Additional changes proposed to draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-05.txt
Bernard Aboba

---------------------------------------------------------------
Section 3.1

Submitted by: Bernard Aboba
Justification: IPv6 and IPv4 mDNS configuration are handled
separately. It is possible for mDNS to be enabled for IPv6 at
the same time it is disabled for IPv4. The text needs to be
modified to clarify this. 

Change:

"Multicast DNS usage can be configured manually or automatically.  On
interfaces where no manual or automatic configuration has been
performed, multicast DNS SHOULD be enabled by default.

For IPv6, the stateless DNS discovery mechanisms described in "IPv6
Stateless DNS Discovery" [19] can be used to discover whether multicast
DNS is globally enabled or disabled.

Where DHCPv4 or DHCPv6 is implemented, DHCP options can be used to
configure multicast DNS on an interface.  The mDNS Enable Option,
described in [6], can be used to explicitly enable or disable use of
multicast DNS on an interface, as well as to specify the order in which
DNS and multicast DNS is used on that interface.

The mDNS Enable Option affects only DNS resolver behavior, that is, how
DNS resolution is performed, and whether multicast DNS is used.  The
mDNS Enable Option does not determine whether or in which order DNS
itself is used for name resolution.  This can be specified, for example,
using the Name Service Search Option for DHCP, RFC 2937 [3], which can
be used to globally determine where DNS is used within the name service
search order.

If an interface has been configured via any automatic configuration
mechanism which is able to supply DNS configuration information, then
multicast DNS SHOULD NOT be used on that interface unless it has been
explicitly enabled, whether via that mechanism or any other. This
ensures that upgraded hosts do not change their default behavior,
without requiring the source of the configuration information to be
simultaneously updated.  This implies that on the interface, the host
will neither listen on the DNS LINKLOCAL multicast address, nor will it
send queries to that address."

To:

"Multicast DNS usage can be configured manually or automatically.  On
interfaces where no manual or automatic configuration has been
performed for a given protocol (IPv4 or IPv6), multicast DNS SHOULD be enabled by default
for that protocol.

For IPv6, the stateless DNS discovery mechanisms described in "IPv6
Stateless DNS Discovery" [19] can be used to discover whether multicast
DNS is globally enabled or disabled.

Where DHCPv4 or DHCPv6 is implemented, DHCP options can be used to
configure multicast DNS on an interface.  The mDNS Enable Option,
described in [6], can be used to explicitly enable or disable use of
multicast DNS on an interface for a given protocol, as well as to 
specify the order in which DNS and multicast DNS is used on that 
interface.

The mDNS Enable Option affects only DNS resolver behavior, that is, how
DNS resolution is performed, and whether multicast DNS is used.  The
mDNS Enable Option does not determine whether or in which order DNS
itself is used for name resolution.  This can be specified, for example,
using the Name Service Search Option for DHCP, RFC 2937 [3], which can
be used to globally determine where DNS is used within the name service
search order.

If an interface has been configured for a given protocol
via any automatic configuration mechanism which is able to 
supply DNS configuration information, then multicast DNS 
SHOULD NOT be used on that interface for that protocol 
unless it has been explicitly enabled, whether via that 
mechanism or any other. This ensures that upgraded hosts 
do not change their default behavior, without requiring 
the source of the configuration information to be simultaneously 
updated.  This implies that on the interface, the host will neither 
listen on the DNS LINKLOCAL multicast address, nor will it send 
queries to that address.

Note that it is possible for mDNS to be enabled for use with IPv6
at the same time it is disabled for IPv4, and vice versa. For example,
where a home gateway implements a DNS proxy and DHCPv4, but not 
DHCPv6 or DNS autoconfiguration, there may be no mechanism for 
allowing IPv6 hosts to resolve the names of other IPV6 hosts on the
home network. In this situation, mDNS is useful for resolution of
dynamic names, and it will be enabled for use with IPv6, even though
it is disabled for use with IPv4."

Proposed resolution: Accept

---------------------------------------------------------------




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct  8 04:44:39 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNAME (was: Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-ipv6-addresses-00.txt)
References: <200109281109.HAA09046@ietf.org>
	<2cbsjqcart.fsf@snout.autonomica.se>
	<20011002180201.12250.qmail@cr.yp.to>
	<3BBB7D53.CB7ACA8F@daimlerchrysler.com>
	<2cn137toef.fsf@snout.autonomica.se>
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> If the idea of frequent renumbering is meant to be taken seriously then
> all the problems will be solved. This doesn't mean that we should
> mindlessly adopt a proposal merely because it is labelled as ``support
> for renumbering.''
                 ^ without clearly and simply describing how the ENTIRE
                   frequent and/or fast system will COMPLETELY work.
                   without hand-waving.

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct  8 11:19:02 2001
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Date: Mon, 8 Oct 2001 14:22:02 +0200 (MET DST)
From: Erik Guttman <Erik.Guttman@sun.com>
Reply-To: Erik Guttman <Erik.Guttman@sun.com>
Subject: Re: Proposed changes to mdns-05
To: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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Bernard, 

I include comments on discussion items.

> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> Section 3:
> 
> Submitted by: Levon Esibov
> Justification: Prohibiting DNS servers from listening to or
> responding to mDNS queries seems a bit extreme. Why can't DNS
> servers listen to and respond to queries for their own name?
> 
> Change:
> 
> "If a DNS server is running on a host, the host MUST NOT listen for
> multicast DNS queries, to prevent the host from listening on port 53
> and intercepting DNS queries directed to a DNS server. 
> By default, a DNS server MUST NOT listen to multicast DNS queries."
> 
> To:
> 
> "If a DNS server is running on a host, only the DNS server MAY listen for
> multicast DNS queries. Other services running on such a host MUST NOT listen
> for multicast DNS queries on port 53, since otherwise they would intercept
> DNS queries directed to a DNS server."
> 
> Proposed resolution: Discuss

What should the DNS server do with the requests it receives?
Should the DNS server only respond to multicast requests for
its own name - or should it respond to multicast requests for
any name.  Or, should we just be silent about this?  If the
DNS server responds for names other than its own, there is 
the possibility that another host will respond with a different
answer.


> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> Section 5.1:
> 
> Submitted by: Levon Esibov
> Justification: name conflicts will only exist in situations where
> hosts use a name on an interface. If the name is not used, then
> conflicts will not occur. 
> 
> Change:
> 
> "In this situation, the multi-homed myhost will probe for, and defend,
> its host name on both interfaces. A conflict will be detected on one
> interface, but not the other, and as a result, the multi-homed myhost
> will not be able to respond with a host RR for "myhost."
> 
> To:
> 
> "In this situation, the multi-homed myhost will probe for, and defend,
> its host name on both interfaces. A conflict will be detected on one
> interface, but not the other, and as a result, the multi-homed myhost
> will not be able to respond with a host RR for 'myhost', unless the
> host is configured to use the 'myhost' name only on the left (see
> Figure 1) network connection."
> 
> Proposed resolution: Discuss

By limiting the scope of the problem, it can be solved.  I like
this.  The wording is pretty awkward though.  How about:

  In this situation, the multi-homed myhost will probe for, and defend,
  its host name on both interfaces. A conflict will be detected on one
  interface, but not the other.  The multi-homed myhost will not be able 
  to respond with a host RR for 'myhost' on the interface on the right 
  (see Figure 1).  The multi-homed host may, however, be configured to 
  use the 'myhost' name on the interface on left.
 
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Section 7:
> 
> Submitted by: Levon Esibov
> Justification: Recursive resolution of mDNS queries shouldn't
> be allowable. Rather than replying with non-authoritative NXDOMAIN,
> it makes more sense for a DNS server not to reply at all. 
> To:
>     - DNS servers SHOULD NOT forward or recursively resolve 
>       queries for domain names in the local.arpa domain - if the 
>       server cannot answer  the query from its own database, 
>       it MUST NOT reply.

Excellent.


Erik



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct  9 15:06:16 2001
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To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: EDNS1
Date: Tue, 09 Oct 2001 09:19:37 -0700
From: Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
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several folks in the last few weeks have asked me about EDNS1 and so i'd
like to revive the draft and give it the discussion (and/or decent burial)
that it needs.  here's the last published version, which i'd like to hear
some comments about so i can improve it (somehow?) and officially resubmit.







   DNSIND Working Group                                         Paul Vixie
   INTERNET-DRAFT                                                      ISC
   <draft-dnsind-edns1-03.txt>                                  June, 1999


                          Extensions to DNS (EDNS1)


   Status of this Memo

      This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
      all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

      Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
      Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
      other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
      Drafts.

      Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
      and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
      time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
      material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

      The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
      http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

      The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
      http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   Abstract

      This document specifies a number of extensions within the Extended
      DNS framework defined by [EDNS0], including several new extended
      label types and the ability to ask multiple questions in a single
      request.

   1 - Rationale and Scope

   1.1. EDNS (see [EDNS0]) specifies an extension mechanism to DNS (see
   [RFC1035]) which provides for larger message sizes, additional label
   types, and new message flags.

   1.2. This document makes use of the EDNS extension mechanisms to add
   several new extended label types and message options, and the ability to
   ask multiple questions in a single request.



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   2 - Affected Protocol Elements

   2.1. Compression pointers are 14 bits in size and are relative to the
   start of the DNS Message, which can be 64KB in length.  14 bits restrict
   pointers to the first 16KB of the message, which makes labels introduced
   in the last 48KB of the message unreachable by compression pointers.  A
   longer pointer format is needed.

   2.2. DNS Messages are limited to 65535 octets in size when sent over
   TCP.  This acts as an effective maximum on RRset size, since multiple
   TCP messages are only possible in the case of zone transfers.  Some
   mechanism must be created to allow normal DNS responses (other than zone
   transfers) to span multiple DNS Messages when TCP is used.

   2.3. Multiple queries in a question section have not been supported in
   DNS due the applicability of some DNS Message Header flags (such as AA)
   and of the RCODE field only to a single QNAME, QTYPE, and QCLASS.
   Multiple questions per request are desirable, and some way of asking
   them must be made available.

   3 - Extended Label Types

   3.1. In [EDNS0], the ``0 1'' label type was specified to denote an
   extended label type, whose value is encoded in the lower six bits of the
   first octet of a label, and an extended label type of ``1 1 1 1 1 1''
   was further reserved for use in future multibyte extended label types.

   3.2. The ``0 0 0 0 0 0'' extended label type will indicate an extended
   compression pointer, such that the following two octets comprise a
   16-bit compression pointer in network byte order.  Like the normal
   compression pointer, this pointer is relative to the start of the DNS
   Message.

   3.3. The ``0 0 0 0 0 1'' extended label type will indicate a counted bit
   string label as described in [CRAW98].

   3.4. The ``0 0 0 0 1 0'' extended label type will indicate a ``long
   local compression pointer'' as described in [KOCH98].










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   4 - OPT pseudo-RR Flags and Options 4.1. The extended RCODE and flags
   are structured as follows:

                    +0 (MSB)                            +1 (LSB)
         +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
      0: |         EXTENDED-RCODE        |            VERSION            |
         +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
      2: |MD |FM |RRD|LM |                       Z                       |
         +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+


   EXTENDED-RCODE  Forms upper 8 bits of extended 12-bit RCODE.  (As
                   defined by [EDNS0].)

   VERSION         Indicates the implementation level of whoever sets it.
                   Full conformance with the draft standard version of this
                   specification is version ``1.''  Note that both
                   requestors and responders should set this to the highest
                   level they implement, that responders should send back
                   RCODE=BADVERS and that requestors should be prepared to
                   probe using lower version numbers if they receive an
                   RCODE=BADVERS.

   MD              ``More data'' flag.  Valid only in TCP streams where
                   message ordering and reliability are guaranteed.  This
                   flag indicates that the current message is not the
                   complete request or response, and should be aggregated
                   with the following message(s) before being considered
                   complete.  Such messages are called ``segmented.''  It
                   is an error for the RCODE (including the EXTENDED-
                   RCODE), AA flag, or DNS Message ID to differ among
                   segments of a segmented message.  It is an error for TC
                   to be set on any message of a segmented message.  Any
                   given RR must fit completely within a message, and all
                   messages will both begin and end on RR boundaries.  Each
                   section in a multipart message must appear in normal
                   message order, and each section must be complete before
                   later sections are added.  All segments of a message
                   must be transmitted contiguously, without interleaving
                   of other messages.

   FM              ``First match'' flag.  Notable only when multiple
                   questions are present.  If set in a request, questions
                   will be processed in wire order and the first question
                   whose answer would have NOERROR AND ANCOUNT>0 is treated



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                   as if it were the only question in the query message.
                   Otherwise, questions can be processed in any order and
                   all possible answer records will be included in the
                   response.  Response FM should be ignored by requestors.

   RRD             ``Recursion really desired'' flag.  Notable only when a
                   request is processed by an intermediate name server
                   (``forwarder'') who is not authoritative for the zone
                   containing QNAME, and where QTYPE=ANY or QDCOUNT>1.  If
                   set in a request, the intermediate name server can only
                   answer using unexpired cached answers (either positive
                   or negative) which were atomically acquired using (a)
                   the same QTYPE or set of QTYPEs present in the current
                   question and whose TTLs were each minimized to the
                   smallest among them when first cached, and (b) the same
                   FM and LM settings present in the current question.

   LM              ``Longest match'' flag.  If this flag is present in a
                   query message, then for any question whose QNAME is not
                   fully matched by zone or cache data, the longest
                   trailing label-bounded suffix of the QNAME for which
                   zone or cache data is present will be eligible for use
                   as an answer.  Note that an intervening wildcard name
                   shall supercede this behaviour and the rules described
                   in [RFC1034 4.3.2, 4.3.3] shall apply, except that the
                   owner name of the answer will be the wildcard name
                   rather than the QNAME.  Any of: QTYPE=ANY, or
                   QCLASS=ANY, or QCOUNT>1, shall be considered an error if
                   the LM flag is set.

                   If LM is set in a request, then LM has meaning in the
                   response as follows: If the content of the response
                   would have been different without the LM flag being set
                   on the request, then the response LM will be set; If the
                   content of the response was not determined or affected
                   by the request LM, then the response LM will be cleared.
                   If the request LM was not set, then the response LM is
                   not meaningful and should be set to zero by responders
                   and ignored by requestors.

   Z               Set to zero by senders and ignored by receivers, unless
                   modified in a subsequent specification.






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   INTERNET-DRAFT                    EDNS1                        June 1999


   5 - Multiple Questions for QUERY

   5.1. If QDCOUNT>1, multiple questions are present.  All questions must
   be for the same QNAME and QCLASS; only the QTYPE is allowed to vary.  It
   is an error for QDCOUNT>1 and any QTYPE=ANY or QCLASS=ANY.

   5.2. RCODE and AA apply to all RRs in the answer section having the
   QNAME that is shared by all questions in the question section.  AA
   applies to all matching answers, and will not be set unless the exact
   original request was processed by an authoritative server and the
   response forwarded in its entirety.

   5.3. If a multiple question request is processed by an intermediate
   server and the authority server does not support multiple questions, the
   intermediate server must generate an answer iteratively by making
   multiple requests of the authority server.  In this case, AA must never
   be set in the final answer due to lack of atomicity of the contributing
   authoritative responses.

   5.4. If iteratively processing a multiple question request using an
   authority server which can only process single question requests, if any
   contributing request generates a SERVFAIL response, then the final
   response's RCODE should be SERVFAIL.

   6 - Acknowledgements

   Paul Mockapetris, Mark Andrews, Robert Elz, Don Lewis, Bob Halley,
   Donald Eastlake, Rob Austein, Matt Crawford, Randy Bush, Michael Patton,
   and Michael Graff were each instrumental in creating this specification.

   7 - References

   [RFC1035]  P. Mockapetris, ``Domain Names - Implementation and
              Specification,'' RFC 1035, USC/Information Sciences
              Institute, November 1987.

   [EDNS0]    P. Vixie, ``Extension mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0),'' Draft
              draft-ietf-dnsind-edns0-XX, IETF DNSIND, September 1998

   [CRAW98]   M. Crawford, ``Binary Labels in the Domain Name System,''
              Draft draft-ietf-dnsind-binary-labels-XX, IETF DNSIND, March
              1998.

   [KOCH98]   P. Koch, ``A New Scheme for the Compression of Domain
              Names,'' Draft draft-ietf-dnsind-local-compression-XX.txt.



   Expires December 1999                                           [Page 5]

   INTERNET-DRAFT                    EDNS1                        June 1999


              IETF DNSIND, March 1998.

   8 - Author's Address

                 Paul Vixie
                    Internet Software Consortium
                    950 Charter Street
                    Redwood City, CA 94063
                    +1 650 779 7001
                    <vixie@isc.org>






































   Expires December 1999                                           [Page 6]



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 10 02:03:12 2001
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Message-ID: <3BC3AE2A.30095FEF@daimlerchrysler.com>
Date: Tue, 09 Oct 2001 22:10:50 -0400
From: Kevin Darcy <kcd@daimlerchrysler.com>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt
References: <E15m6zI-000NCA-00@rip.psg.com>
		<20010926111745.A10616@outpost.ds9a.nl>
		<200109261904.MAA03755@gulag.araneus.fi>
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		<200109282314.QAA05401@gulag.araneus.fi>
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gson@isc.org wrote:

> Kevin Darcy writes:
> > EDNS0 undercuts the rationale for prohibiting compression in new record types,
> > because it provides a "safe", point-to-point way to compress records of those
> > types. Agreed, that's not technically the same as "obsoleting" the
> > prohibition, but it does raise a significant likelihood that exceptions will
> > become necessary.
>
> It doesn't raise the likelihood that exceptions are necessary, it
> just makes it easier to implement such exceptions if they turn out to
> be necessary.

This is getting a little convoluted. The bottom line is that EDNS0 makes it
*possible* to implement compression safely in new types. If your rationale for
forbidding name compression in new types is that it is invariably unsafe, then to
put it bluntly, that is a false rationale, given EDNS0. So, either the prohibition
is a raw edict with no legitimate rationale, or you make an exception to the
prohibition so that the rationale holds true. Your choice.

> > I think there should at least be some language in the
> > document acknowledging this fact, because -- let's face it -- you're not just
> > "documenting" an existing prohibition, you're *reinforcing* it.
>
> And reinforced it should be.  If we leave an explicit loophole for
> negotiated compression schemes, people will come up with them whether
> they are truly necessary or not.

I don't think it's appropriate for the draft to be making broad assumptions about
what future extensions may be "necessary" or not. It should be
clarifying/standardizing/documenting how unknown RRs are handled, and leaving the
specifics of how *known* RRs are implemented, up to those who are proposing them,
without imposing unnecessary burdens on them to explicitly override your document
in this regard.

> > It wouldn't necessarily be a manual operation, and it wouldn't necessarily be
> > burdensome. If the new record type has only a specialized use, then perhaps
> > implementations will default it OFF and only those administrators who go out
> > of their way to do so -- presumably with a full understanding of their local
> > network/DNS environment and/or the tradeoffs of using the new record type --
> > will turn it ON.
>
> All that just to save a couple of bytes?  It's just not worth the effort.

1. By the same reasoning, why bother with compression at all?

2. Who is to say it is only "a couple of bytes"? If a future record type were
adopted, with literally dozens of names in its RDATA, ripe for compression, would
that change your answer? We have to look not at just the format of extant record
types, but at the *possible* formats of record types yet to be conceived.
Compression is a tool -- albeit a fairly crude one -- for dealing with the
packet-space impact of resource records, and it may save a little space, or a lot,
depending on the record format and how many resource records are being compressed
in a given packet. To deny the use of that tool based on a fuzzy prediction of what
record formats may or may not be adopted in the future, strikes me as rather
short-sighted. We should leave that tool available for situations where it may come
in useful and can be employed in a safe, interoperable way.


- Kevin





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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 10 02:05:47 2001
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From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
To: Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: EDNS1 
In-Reply-To: <200110091619.f99GJbH36924@as.vix.com> 
References: <200110091619.f99GJbH36924@as.vix.com> 
Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2001 11:48:07 +0700
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    Date:        Tue, 09 Oct 2001 09:19:37 -0700
    From:        Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
    Message-ID:  <200110091619.f99GJbH36924@as.vix.com>

  |    2 - Affected Protocol Elements

I'd like to see ...

    2.4.  Only a subset of DNS RR types support compression of labels in
    the RDATA, as explained in [...whatever that new draft is...].  Where
    it is known that the requestor, and the server, both recognise other
    RR types, and so can locate labels in the RDATA, and decompress them,
    name compression can be permitted in the RDATA of additional RR types.

added, and then:

  |    4 - OPT pseudo-RR Flags and Options 4.1. The extended RCODE and flags
  |    are structured as follows:
  | 
  |                     +0 (MSB)                            +1 (LSB)
  |          +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
  |       0: |         EXTENDED-RCODE        |            VERSION            |
  |          +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
  |       2: |MD |FM |RRD|LM |XC |                   Z                       |
  |          +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
  | 
       XC		If set to 1 by the sender, then the sender understands
			label compression in the extended set of RR types as
			defined for the VERSION specified.   If set to 1 in
			a response, the server indicates that it is able to
			compress labels for the extended set of RR types as
			defined for the VERSION specified.   Any label
			compression scheme defined by the DNS for the EDNS
			VERSION agreed between sender and responder may be used.

and then add a new section (6) below (and renumber those that were 6, 7, 8
into 7, 8, 9, of course)

    6.  Extended Label Compression RDATA RR types

	Any DNS system that supports extended compression (sets the XC
	bit in the OPT RR) and supports EDNS version 1, must support
	label compression in all domain names included in the RDATA of
	the followingRR types, as well as all of those defined by RFC1035.

	NXT (rfc2535) SRV (rfc2782) A6 (rfc2874) TKEY (rfc2930)
	NAPTR (rfc2915) TSIG (rfc2845) DNAME (rfc2672) KX (rfc2230)
	PX (rfc2163) AFSDB (rfc1183) RP (rfc1183)

(OK, including the algorithm "domain name" from TKEY and TSIG might
be going a bit overboard, deleting those from this list wouldn't harm
a lot I don't think).

If I missed any that should be added, then add them...  (if any of those
I found are so obsolete that no-one will ever use them, then we should
drop them from the list, so as to avoid requiring people to support rubbish).

I know NXT allows compression anyway, according to 2535 anyway, though
I'm not sure that is really appropriate ... it is intended to only be used
between servers that understand it, but I'm not sure how that is actually
enforced.   In any case, explicitly specifying it to be OK for EDNS1 can't
hurt.

(continuing the above section to be inserted...)

	A DNS server capable of compressing the domain labels in the
	RDATA of all of the RR types listed above (plus all of the
	RR types defined to support compression in rfc1035) MAY set the
	XC bit in the OPT RR in responses it sends that include that RR,
	where the version indicated as supported is 1.   If support for
	a higher version number is available, the XC bit MUST NOT be set
	in responses unless any additional RRs defined for that EDNS
	version are also supported.

	In any case, a server MUST NOT compress labels for any of the above
	RR types, unless it is responding to a query received containing an
	OPT RR with the XC bit set, and a version of at least 1.
	When responding to a query wich was received with the XC bit set
	in an included OPT RR which has a version of 1 or greater, the
	server MAY compress labels in the above RR formats using any
	compression scheme available to be used in the EDNS version applicable.

	Domain names in the RDATA field of RR types not listed here, or in
	rfc1035, or in the specification of some later EDNS version agreed
	between sender and server, MUST NOT be compressed.

Aside from that, I'd fix ...

  |    5.4. If iteratively processing a multiple question request using an
  |    authority server which can only process single question requests, if any
  |    contributing request generates a SERVFAIL response, then the final
  |    response's RCODE should be SERVFAIL.

to be
	5.4. If iteratively processing a multiple question request using an
	authority server which can only process single question requests, if any
	contributing request generates only a SERVFAIL response, then the final
	response's RCODE should be SERVFAIL.

That is, if there are 2 auth servers listed for a QNAME, the intermediate
server tries one, and gets SERVFAIL, but then tries the other, and gets all
the answers it needs, it shouldn't be setting SERVFAIL in the response, only
if it is unable to get an answer to one of the questions from any of the
auth servers for the QNAME (that it chooses to try).

  |    7 - References

Most of the ones in this list that were drafts are RFCs now...

except ...

  |    [KOCH98]   P. Koch, ``A New Scheme for the Compression of Domain
  |               Names,'' Draft draft-ietf-dnsind-local-compression-XX.txt.

which seems to have vanished completely.  If it isn't coming back, the
reference, and the label code tentatively allocated for it, need to go
as well.

kre



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 10 15:53:49 2001
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Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2001 10:38:32 -0400 (EDT)
From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
To: Kevin Darcy <kcd@daimlerchrysler.com>
cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt
In-Reply-To: <3BC3AE2A.30095FEF@daimlerchrysler.com>
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On Tue, 9 Oct 2001, Kevin Darcy wrote:

> gson@isc.org wrote:
> 
> > Kevin Darcy writes:
> > > EDNS0 undercuts the rationale for prohibiting compression in new record types,
> > > because it provides a "safe", point-to-point way to compress records of those
> > > types. Agreed, that's not technically the same as "obsoleting" the
> > > prohibition, but it does raise a significant likelihood that exceptions will
> > > become necessary.
> >
> > It doesn't raise the likelihood that exceptions are necessary, it
> > just makes it easier to implement such exceptions if they turn out to
> > be necessary.
> 
> This is getting a little convoluted. The bottom line is that EDNS0 makes it
> *possible* to implement compression safely in new types. If your rationale for
> forbidding name compression in new types is that it is invariably unsafe, then to
> put it bluntly, that is a false rationale, given EDNS0. So, either the prohibition
> is a raw edict with no legitimate rationale, or you make an exception to the
> prohibition so that the rationale holds true. Your choice.

<Flame on>
DNS Compression is evil, adding compression to new types is a
real bad idea. (I speak from personal experiance of implementing new types
allowing compression and test deployment). 
We need a blanket ban on compression of RDATA of new types. 
This is the  only safe thing to do, as it improves the chances that a new
type can  pass through a server that does not know the format of that type. 
<Flame off>

We need to learn from experience, even if a standards document says
something is possible we must be able restrict that based on experience. 
Remember RFC1034 and RFC1035 did not go through the 3 stage standards
process, but the one step to full standard.

The time it takes to upgrade DNS servers is measured in many years. 
First we need to wait the next release of the DNS software (0-12
months), then we wait for the OS vendors to add this to their release
(6-24 months) then customers install (0-36 months), then wait for 
the computer to die or be upgraded (0-120 months).

For the most recently defined  type (APL) we will probably have to wait
for 16 years before over 99% of the DNS servers on the Internet know APL.

> 
> > > I think there should at least be some language in the
> > > document acknowledging this fact, because -- let's face it -- you're not just
> > > "documenting" an existing prohibition, you're *reinforcing* it.
> >
> > And reinforced it should be.  If we leave an explicit loophole for
> > negotiated compression schemes, people will come up with them whether
> > they are truly necessary or not.
> 
> I don't think it's appropriate for the draft to be making broad assumptions about
> what future extensions may be "necessary" or not. It should be
> clarifying/standardizing/documenting how unknown RRs are handled, and leaving the
> specifics of how *known* RRs are implemented, up to those who are proposing them,
> without imposing unnecessary burdens on them to explicitly override your document
> in this regard.

It it quite appropriate (see below). 

> 
> > > It wouldn't necessarily be a manual operation, and it wouldn't necessarily be
> > > burdensome. If the new record type has only a specialized use, then perhaps
> > > implementations will default it OFF and only those administrators who go out
> > > of their way to do so -- presumably with a full understanding of their local
> > > network/DNS environment and/or the tradeoffs of using the new record type --
> > > will turn it ON.
> >
> > All that just to save a couple of bytes?  It's just not worth the effort.
> 
> 1. By the same reasoning, why bother with compression at all?

Historical background: DNS was designed in the middle 80's, at that
time general purpose compression was advancing rapidly, but it was not
clear what compression would work well on DNS packets and general purpose
compression was real expensive. Network bandwidth was limited and 
reassembly was not reliable, thus requiring some compression made sense.
The choice of name compression was a reasonable one, it looks inexpensive
and has no complicated binary encodings, but keeping track of compression
pointers and ordering them is more complicated than it seems. Further the
code dealing with compression is interspersed all through the RR type 
processing. 

A better choice would have been to make the RRset the main DNS
wire envelope rather than the RR, something like 
	<name> <type> <class> <ttl> <no in set> [<size> <rdata>]+
Requires a 1 extra byes for RRset structure, but for each additional
RR there is a 2 byte header instead of 12 byte one (assuming full
compression) at much lower cost in computation.

Today the choice could simply be that a header bit signals that 
the remainder of the message is compressed (with zlib). In this case
the transmitting server can make the choice AFTER the message is
assembled and only apply compression when it is beneficial and 
resources are available. Further benefit is that all new types
are covered without any extra complexity.

But we do not have the luxury at this time to change the protocol in
this radical way, instead making the protocol more reliable 
is more important than possibly saving few bytes from some
hyperthetical future RR type. 

> 
> 2. Who is to say it is only "a couple of bytes"? If a future record type were
> adopted, with literally dozens of names in its RDATA, ripe for compression, would
> that change your answer? We have to look not at just the format of extant record
> types, but at the *possible* formats of record types yet to be conceived.
> Compression is a tool -- albeit a fairly crude one -- for dealing with the
> packet-space impact of resource records, and it may save a little space, or a lot,
> depending on the record format and how many resource records are being compressed
> in a given packet. To deny the use of that tool based on a fuzzy prediction of what
> record formats may or may not be adopted in the future, strikes me as rather
> short-sighted. We should leave that tool available for situations where it may come
> in useful and can be employed in a safe, inter-operable way.
> 

Such a type is a bad idea and I do not think a type like this will ever
get passed the working group and/or IESG. 

DNS main role is to hand out small chucks of data and provide pointers to
data stores containing the larger chucks.

	Olafur 




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 11 01:49:05 2001
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Message-ID: <3BC4FA5F.4CCA35C@daimlerchrysler.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2001 21:48:15 -0400
From: Kevin Darcy <kcd@daimlerchrysler.com>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt
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Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:

> On Tue, 9 Oct 2001, Kevin Darcy wrote:
>
> > gson@isc.org wrote:
> >
> > > Kevin Darcy writes:
> > > > EDNS0 undercuts the rationale for prohibiting compression in new record types,
> > > > because it provides a "safe", point-to-point way to compress records of those
> > > > types. Agreed, that's not technically the same as "obsoleting" the
> > > > prohibition, but it does raise a significant likelihood that exceptions will
> > > > become necessary.
> > >
> > > It doesn't raise the likelihood that exceptions are necessary, it
> > > just makes it easier to implement such exceptions if they turn out to
> > > be necessary.
> >
> > This is getting a little convoluted. The bottom line is that EDNS0 makes it
> > *possible* to implement compression safely in new types. If your rationale for
> > forbidding name compression in new types is that it is invariably unsafe, then to
> > put it bluntly, that is a false rationale, given EDNS0. So, either the prohibition
> > is a raw edict with no legitimate rationale, or you make an exception to the
> > prohibition so that the rationale holds true. Your choice.
>
> <Flame on>
> DNS Compression is evil, adding compression to new types is a
> real bad idea. (I speak from personal experiance of implementing new types
> allowing compression and test deployment).
> We need a blanket ban on compression of RDATA of new types.
> This is the  only safe thing to do, as it improves the chances that a new
> type can  pass through a server that does not know the format of that type.
> <Flame off>
>
> We need to learn from experience, even if a standards document says
> something is possible we must be able restrict that based on experience.
> Remember RFC1034 and RFC1035 did not go through the 3 stage standards
> process, but the one step to full standard.
>
> The time it takes to upgrade DNS servers is measured in many years.
> First we need to wait the next release of the DNS software (0-12
> months), then we wait for the OS vendors to add this to their release
> (6-24 months) then customers install (0-36 months), then wait for
> the computer to die or be upgraded (0-120 months).
>
> For the most recently defined  type (APL) we will probably have to wait
> for 16 years before over 99% of the DNS servers on the Internet know APL.
>
> >
> > > > I think there should at least be some language in the
> > > > document acknowledging this fact, because -- let's face it -- you're not just
> > > > "documenting" an existing prohibition, you're *reinforcing* it.
> > >
> > > And reinforced it should be.  If we leave an explicit loophole for
> > > negotiated compression schemes, people will come up with them whether
> > > they are truly necessary or not.
> >
> > I don't think it's appropriate for the draft to be making broad assumptions about
> > what future extensions may be "necessary" or not. It should be
> > clarifying/standardizing/documenting how unknown RRs are handled, and leaving the
> > specifics of how *known* RRs are implemented, up to those who are proposing them,
> > without imposing unnecessary burdens on them to explicitly override your document
> > in this regard.
>
> It it quite appropriate (see below).
>
> >
> > > > It wouldn't necessarily be a manual operation, and it wouldn't necessarily be
> > > > burdensome. If the new record type has only a specialized use, then perhaps
> > > > implementations will default it OFF and only those administrators who go out
> > > > of their way to do so -- presumably with a full understanding of their local
> > > > network/DNS environment and/or the tradeoffs of using the new record type --
> > > > will turn it ON.
> > >
> > > All that just to save a couple of bytes?  It's just not worth the effort.
> >
> > 1. By the same reasoning, why bother with compression at all?
>
> Historical background: DNS was designed in the middle 80's, at that
> time general purpose compression was advancing rapidly, but it was not
> clear what compression would work well on DNS packets and general purpose
> compression was real expensive. Network bandwidth was limited and
> reassembly was not reliable, thus requiring some compression made sense.
> The choice of name compression was a reasonable one, it looks inexpensive
> and has no complicated binary encodings, but keeping track of compression
> pointers and ordering them is more complicated than it seems. Further the
> code dealing with compression is interspersed all through the RR type
> processing.
>
> A better choice would have been to make the RRset the main DNS
> wire envelope rather than the RR, something like
>         <name> <type> <class> <ttl> <no in set> [<size> <rdata>]+
> Requires a 1 extra byes for RRset structure, but for each additional
> RR there is a 2 byte header instead of 12 byte one (assuming full
> compression) at much lower cost in computation.
>
> Today the choice could simply be that a header bit signals that
> the remainder of the message is compressed (with zlib). In this case
> the transmitting server can make the choice AFTER the message is
> assembled and only apply compression when it is beneficial and
> resources are available. Further benefit is that all new types
> are covered without any extra complexity.
>
> But we do not have the luxury at this time to change the protocol in
> this radical way, instead making the protocol more reliable
> is more important than possibly saving few bytes from some
> hyperthetical future RR type.

Well, I would have to agree that, in hindsight, the record-format-dependent compression
scheme of DNS is rather old-fashioned and awful. Something more flexible and effective
should replace it. But I'm still not convinced that "forbid it now, relax the ban later
if appropriate" is the right tack to take with respect to *safe* implementations of
compression in new types, e.g. through EDNS OPTIONs or whatever. I'd still like to see
some sort of limitation or exception in the prohibition, but if that's not the concensus
of the WG, then so be it.

By the way, I'm totally in agreement that RRsets should have been the main DNS wire
envelope from the very beginning. Not only that, but there should have been an
"options" section or something similar, to allow for future extensibility, e.g. new
compression schemes or the use of new record types, without all of this pain. Isn't
hindsight wonderful?

> > 2. Who is to say it is only "a couple of bytes"? If a future record type were
> > adopted, with literally dozens of names in its RDATA, ripe for compression, would
> > that change your answer? We have to look not at just the format of extant record
> > types, but at the *possible* formats of record types yet to be conceived.
> > Compression is a tool -- albeit a fairly crude one -- for dealing with the
> > packet-space impact of resource records, and it may save a little space, or a lot,
> > depending on the record format and how many resource records are being compressed
> > in a given packet. To deny the use of that tool based on a fuzzy prediction of what
> > record formats may or may not be adopted in the future, strikes me as rather
> > short-sighted. We should leave that tool available for situations where it may come
> > in useful and can be employed in a safe, inter-operable way.
> >
>
> Such a type is a bad idea and I do not think a type like this will ever
> get passed the working group and/or IESG.
>
> DNS main role is to hand out small chucks of data and provide pointers to
> data stores containing the larger chucks.

As a general rule, I agree. But who knows what the future may bring? Maybe the benefit
of such large RRs might be perceived to outweigh the costs. After all, did anyone in the
RFC 1034/1035 era think that we'd ever be comfortable routinely slinging around RRs the
size of SIGs?


- Kevin




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 11 13:16:36 2001
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To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: EDNS1
References: <200110091619.f99GJbH36924@as.vix.com> <1297.1002689287@brandenburg.cs.mu.OZ.AU>
From: Paul Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
Date: 11 Oct 2001 09:48:23 -0700
In-Reply-To: Robert Elz's message of "9 Oct 2001 22:59:38 -0700"
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so far in response to my reposting of the 1999 EDNS1 draft i've seen:

	1. several requests to kill it

	2. one statement (from a WG cochair) indicating that it was already
	dead, was nonrevivable, and that DNS-NG was the next great thing

	3. one request to attach a rider based on the current compression
	debate

every feature in the 1999 draft was topical at the time it was released, but
may be less so now.  if we've moved on and don't need any of that stuff then
there's no reason to revive it.

unless someone publically indicates support for any of the features described
in the 1999 EDNS1 draft, i'm going to move it to historic, i.e., kill it.

the thing that would surprise me is if noone in the IPv6 arena wanted to be
able to ask multiple questions in the same query, for AAAA and A.  (if A6
dies, then QDCOUNT>1 would be a performance win for an AAAA world.)


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 11 18:19:29 2001
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To: IETF-Announce: ;
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Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
Subject: Protocol Action: DNS Server MIB Extensions to Historic Standard
Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2001 17:42:04 -0400
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The IESG has approved reclassifying the following RFCs as Historic
documents:

RFC1611 DNS Server MIB Extensions
RFC1612 DNS Resolver MIB Extensions

In the same action, the IESG approved publication of Applicability
Statement for DNS MIB Extensions <draft-ietf-dnsext-dnsmib-historical-00.txt>
as an Informational RFC.

This document is the product of the DNS Extensions Working Group.

The contact persons are Erik Nordmark and Thomas Narten.

Technical Summary
 
   The document states the reasons for moving RFC 1611 and RFC 1612 to
   historical:

   More than six years after the DNS Server and Resolver MIB extensions
   became proposed standards, there still has not been any significant
   deployment of these MIB extensions.  This note examines the reasons
   why these MIB extensions were never deployed, and recommends retiring
   these MIB extensions by moving them to Historical status.

Working Group Summary

   There was consensus in the working group to reclassify the DNS MIB
   documents.  Interested parties where encouraged to form a design team
   to produce more usable MIBs for DNS and bring them to the DNSEXT WG
   when they are ready for review.

Protocol Quality

   This document has been reviewed for the IESG by Erik Nordmark.


Note to RFC Editor:

Please replace the Security Considerations section in
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnsmib-historical-00.txt with the following text:

   Re-classifying an existing MIB document from Proposed Std
   to Historic does not have any negative impact on security for
   the Internet.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 11 21:33:20 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-03.txt
References: <E15mJrH-000Bmg-00@rip.psg.com>
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> Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2001 11:56:35 -0700 
> this starts a two week wg last call on draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-03.txt
> for proposed standard.

the wg last call has ended.  there seems to have been zero comment on
this draft.  unless i hear to the contrary, i will assume that no one
is sufficiently interssted in adding yarr, and we can let it die.

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 11 21:37:50 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt
References: <E15m6zI-000NCA-00@rip.psg.com>
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> Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2001 22:12:00 -0700
> two week last call starts for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt for
> proposed standard.

the last call has ended.  there has been much discussion of this draft.  see
the thread off

    http://psg.com/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2001/msg01066.html

my read is that there is NOT rough consensus.  please feel free to disabuse
me of that notion.

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 12 13:01:18 2001
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Message-Id: <4.3.2.7.2.20011012091725.01ad4a60@funnel.cisco.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2001 09:32:56 -0400
To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
From: Mark Stapp <mjs@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-03.txt
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>, dhcwg@ietf.org
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I wonder whether the lack of objections to this draft might be interpreted 
another way. The rr is designed for use in networks where dhcp servers and 
clients are updating A and PTR rrs as dhcp protocol interactions take 
place. Since the dhcid rr doesn't have any special dns protocol semantic 
significance, it doesn't raise any contentious issues for the dns server 
community. It's not surprising, then, if the dns community doesn't have 
much objection to the new rr.

The dhcp community has a dependency on this specification, however, and the 
use of this rr does have significance for us. Perhaps I've misunderstood 
the point of the wg last call: I thought it was a way of soliciting 
suggestions and complaints. I didn't realize that if no one objected, that 
the draft would die. That doesn't quite make sense to me, actually. In any 
case, I'm cross-posting this to the dhc working group list in the hope that 
some of that group's participants will express some support for this dnsext 
draft. If it dies, however quietly, the dhc group will have to start 
designing dhcp-dns interaction specifications from scratch.

-- Mark

At 06:17 PM 10/11/2001 -0700, Randy Bush wrote:
> > Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2001 11:56:35 -0700
> > this starts a two week wg last call on draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-03.txt
> > for proposed standard.
>
>the wg last call has ended.  there seems to have been zero comment on
>this draft.  unless i hear to the contrary, i will assume that no one
>is sufficiently interssted in adding yarr, and we can let it die.
>
>randy
>
>
>to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
>the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 12 13:02:19 2001
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Message-ID: <006c01c1532f$29984d60$b9370681@antd.nist.gov>
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@antd.nist.gov>
To: "DNSEXT WG Mailing list" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: DNSSEC and backward compatiblity
Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2001 11:04:16 -0400
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I've noticed the slow down on discussion of backwards compatiblity within
DNSSEC, or optionally:  How to best state a child's security status in a
delegation.

First question:  what are all the options we want to have the child state?

The next one:  How best to do that:  A new RR, or a flag field in the DS
record (assuming there is one)?  or EDNS variables in the OPT record?


Just trying to get a debate going

Scott



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 12 13:04:41 2001
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Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2001 10:41:24 -0400
Subject: Re: draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-03.txt
From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
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> the wg last call has ended.  there seems to have been zero comment on
> this draft.  unless i hear to the contrary, i will assume that no one
> is sufficiently interssted in adding yarr, and we can let it die.

We absolutely need the dhcid rr.   We have been trying to get this draft to 
happen for several years now, and there have been repeated efforts to kill 
it.   This is the silliest one yet - "the draft isn't controversial, so 
that must mean nobody wants it."

Randy, please send this draft along.   This isn't funny.

				_MelloN_



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 12 13:30:42 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Mark Stapp <mjs@cisco.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>, dhcwg@ietf.org
Subject: Re: draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-03.txt
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if folk want it, they should speak up.  we don't need a hoard.  just a
few folk to say "yes, we want this."

randy


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Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2001 13:11:40 -0400
To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
From: Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [dhcwg] Re: draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-03.txt
Cc: Mark Stapp <mjs@cisco.com>, namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>,
        dhcwg@ietf.org
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I have no objections to draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-03.txt and
recommend that it be accepted by the WG for submission as
a Proposed Standard.

This new RR is crucial to the standard mechanism under
review in the DHC WG to support the interaction of DHCP
and DNS in dynamic updates to DNS.

The DHCID RR is of specific interest to the DHCP
community, so posting to the DHC WG mailing list is likely
to reach the widest audience of interested persons.  Randy,
now that we know you're looking for positive responses as well
comments, the DHC WG will be able to respond to indicate our
interest in seeing this draft move forward.

- Ralph



At 09:32 AM 10/12/2001 -0400, Mark Stapp wrote:
>I wonder whether the lack of objections to this draft might be interpreted 
>another way. The rr is designed for use in networks where dhcp servers and 
>clients are updating A and PTR rrs as dhcp protocol interactions take 
>place. Since the dhcid rr doesn't have any special dns protocol semantic 
>significance, it doesn't raise any contentious issues for the dns server 
>community. It's not surprising, then, if the dns community doesn't have 
>much objection to the new rr.
>
>The dhcp community has a dependency on this specification, however, and 
>the use of this rr does have significance for us. Perhaps I've 
>misunderstood the point of the wg last call: I thought it was a way of 
>soliciting suggestions and complaints. I didn't realize that if no one 
>objected, that the draft would die. That doesn't quite make sense to me, 
>actually. In any case, I'm cross-posting this to the dhc working group 
>list in the hope that some of that group's participants will express some 
>support for this dnsext draft. If it dies, however quietly, the dhc group 
>will have to start designing dhcp-dns interaction specifications from scratch.
>
>-- Mark
>
>At 06:17 PM 10/11/2001 -0700, Randy Bush wrote:
>> > Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2001 11:56:35 -0700
>> > this starts a two week wg last call on draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-03.txt
>> > for proposed standard.
>>
>>the wg last call has ended.  there seems to have been zero comment on
>>this draft.  unless i hear to the contrary, i will assume that no one
>>is sufficiently interssted in adding yarr, and we can let it die.
>>
>>randy
>>
>>
>>to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
>>the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>dhcwg mailing list
>dhcwg@ietf.org
>http://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dhcwg



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 12 13:49:34 2001
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Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2001 13:25:27 -0400
Subject: Re: [dhcwg] Re: draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-03.txt
Cc: Mark Stapp <mjs@cisco.com>, namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>,
        dhcwg@ietf.org
To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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> if folk want it, they should speak up.  we don't need a hoard.  just a
> few folk to say "yes, we want this."

Folk have flown to IETF in foreign countries specifically for the purpose 
of saying "yes, we want this."   I have done it on several occasions.   I 
know Mark has as well.   That is why it was before the working group.   You 
now have three people who have publically stated on namedroppers that they 
want it, all within a matter of minutes of you unexpectedly proposing to 
kill it.   So please send it along.

Thanks!

				_MelloN_



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 12 14:21:40 2001
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From: "Barr Hibbs" <Barr.Hibbs@Nominum.com>
To: "namedroppers" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Cc: "Dhcwg" <dhcwg@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-03.txt
Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2001 11:01:02 -0700
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
> [mailto:owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org]On Behalf Of Randy Bush
> Sent: Thursday, October 11, 2001 18:17

> the wg last call has ended.  there seems to have been zero comment on
> this draft.  unless i hear to the contrary, i will assume that no one
> is sufficiently interested in adding yarr, and we can let it die.
>

I don't see why "zero comment" is equivalent to "no one is sufficiently
interested" but aside from that, this RR type is necessary for a DHCP server
to dynamically update a DNS server on behalf of a client that has received
an IP address lease from the DHCP server.  Do not let this simply slip into
oblivion.

--Barr



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 15 12:32:42 2001
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Multicast DNS
	Author(s)	: L. Esibov, B. Aboba, D. Thaler
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-06.txt
	Pages		: 18
	Date		: 12-Oct-01
	
Today, with the rise of home networking, there are an increasing number
of ad-hoc networks operating without a DNS server. In order to allow DNS
name resolution in such environments, the use of a multicast DNS is
proposed.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 15 19:09:38 2001
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Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2001 15:40:32 -0700 (PDT)
Message-Id: <200110152240.PAA11260@gulag.araneus.fi>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt
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Randy Bush writes:
> my read is that there is NOT rough consensus.  please feel free to disabuse
> me of that notion.

This is how I would summarize the discussion:

  Bert Hubert expressed worry about the lack of support for mandatory
  additional section processing, but still said it was a "very good
  proposal".

  Mark Gritter worried about the treatment of meta-RRs, which are
  outside the scope of the draft.

  Dan Bernstein opposed the draft for multiple reasons.

  Kevin Darcy opposed the unconditional prohibition of compression
  in new types and asked that the draft specifically allow for
  compression when negotiated using some future mechanism (e.g.,
  based on EDNS).

  The author, Roy Arends, Mark Andrews, Robert Elz, and Olafur 
  Gudmundsson defended the current text of the draft.

Of these, I view only Dan's and Kevin's messages as significant
opposition to the draft.  Interestingly, these two cases of opposition
represent almost diametrically opposed viewpoints: Dan is saying that
the draft is unnecessary because there already is an absolute
prohibition on compression in new types and that the draft is too
loose, while Kevin is effectively saying that the draft is harmful
because the existing prohibition on compression is not absolute, and
that the draft is too strict.  To me this suggests that the draft
actually is a reasonably compromise consistent with the views of the
majority of the working group.

I'd like to ask all those who have an opinion either for or against
the draft and who have not yet expressed it on the list to please
speak up.
-- 
Andreas Gustafsson, gson@isc.org


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 15 19:55:36 2001
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Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2001 16:44:53 -0700
From: Mark Gritter <mgritter@CS.Stanford.EDU>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt
Message-ID: <20011015164452.A14155@Xenon.Stanford.EDU>
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While I still feel that meta-RRs need to be addressed, I accept Andreas'
argument that they are out of the scope of the draft (particularly
since they are likely to be contentious, and I _am_ very interested in
getting something done in this area as soon as possible.)  

So, I support the draft going forward in its current form; I agree that the
proposal is the correct way to handle individual RRs.

Mark Gritter

On Mon, Oct 15, 2001 at 03:40:32PM -0700, Andreas Gustafsson wrote:
> Randy Bush writes:
> > my read is that there is NOT rough consensus.  please feel free to disabuse
> > me of that notion.
> 
> This is how I would summarize the discussion:
> 
>   Bert Hubert expressed worry about the lack of support for mandatory
>   additional section processing, but still said it was a "very good
>   proposal".
> 
>   Mark Gritter worried about the treatment of meta-RRs, which are
>   outside the scope of the draft.
> 
[snip]
> -- 
> Andreas Gustafsson, gson@isc.org
> 
> 
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.

-- 
Mark Gritter <mgritter@cs.stanford.edu>
http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~mgritter/


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 15 20:04:29 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: gson@isc.org (Andreas Gustafsson)
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt
References: <E15m6zI-000NCA-00@rip.psg.com>
	<E15rqt2-000ORk-00@psg.com>
	<200110152240.PAA11260@gulag.araneus.fi>
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> Dan is saying that the draft is unnecessary because there already is an
> absolute prohibition on compression in new types and that the draft is
> too loose, while Kevin is effectively saying that the draft is harmful
> because the existing prohibition on compression is not absolute, and that
> the draft is too strict.  To me this suggests that the draft actually is
> a reasonably compromise consistent with the views of the majority of the
> working group.

two other hypotheses:
  o compromises are not always the best solution.  sofa beds make neither
    good sofas nor good beds
  o the document is not sufficiently clear

> I'd like to ask all those who have an opinion either for or against
> the draft and who have not yet expressed it on the list to please
> speak up.

voting, schmoting.  i'd rather one comment for each issue, stating the
issue clearly enough that, if folk feel it is salient, that the document
could be revised based on the comment.

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 15 20:19:10 2001
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From: "Jesper G. Hoy" <jhoy@jhsoft.com>
To: "'Andreas Gustafsson'" <gson@isc.org>,
        "'namedroppers'" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: RE: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt
Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2001 20:05:03 -0400
Message-ID: <000a01c155d6$34929af0$6400a8c0@hp>
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I am for the draft - but...

I agree that we need to establish exactly which RR types may have
compressed RDATA.
And I welcome the formalization of text representation for unknown RR
types.

But banning compression (and additional section processing) for ALL new
RR types could be a problem with the 512 byte limit on UDP messages.

Wouldn't it be possible to set aside a certain range of RR type numbers
that are "safe to cache as unknown" ?
Meaning those RR type numbers (when assigned) won't use compression in
RDATA and won't require additional section processing.
And another "unsafe" range which would be dropped or result in SERVFAIL
when encountered and unknown.

Also, the document does not address compression of record labels.
As far as I can tell this should never cause any problems.
I would like to see an addition to section 4 like "record labels MAY be
compressed for ALL record types"

Jesper G. Hoy
 

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
[mailto:owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org] On Behalf Of Andreas Gustafsson
Sent: Monday, October 15, 2001 6:41 PM
To: namedroppers
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt


Randy Bush writes:
> my read is that there is NOT rough consensus.  please feel free to
disabuse
> me of that notion.

This is how I would summarize the discussion:

  Bert Hubert expressed worry about the lack of support for mandatory
  additional section processing, but still said it was a "very good
  proposal".

  Mark Gritter worried about the treatment of meta-RRs, which are
  outside the scope of the draft.

  Dan Bernstein opposed the draft for multiple reasons.

  Kevin Darcy opposed the unconditional prohibition of compression
  in new types and asked that the draft specifically allow for
  compression when negotiated using some future mechanism (e.g.,
  based on EDNS).

  The author, Roy Arends, Mark Andrews, Robert Elz, and Olafur 
  Gudmundsson defended the current text of the draft.

Of these, I view only Dan's and Kevin's messages as significant
opposition to the draft.  Interestingly, these two cases of opposition
represent almost diametrically opposed viewpoints: Dan is saying that
the draft is unnecessary because there already is an absolute
prohibition on compression in new types and that the draft is too
loose, while Kevin is effectively saying that the draft is harmful
because the existing prohibition on compression is not absolute, and
that the draft is too strict.  To me this suggests that the draft
actually is a reasonably compromise consistent with the views of the
majority of the working group.

I'd like to ask all those who have an opinion either for or against
the draft and who have not yet expressed it on the list to please
speak up.
-- 
Andreas Gustafsson, gson@isc.org


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 15 20:19:55 2001
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Message-ID: <3BCB79D0.8926441B@daimlerchrysler.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2001 20:05:36 -0400
From: Kevin Darcy <kcd@daimlerchrysler.com>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt
References: <E15m6zI-000NCA-00@rip.psg.com>
		<E15rqt2-000ORk-00@psg.com> <200110152240.PAA11260@gulag.araneus.fi>
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Well, I think I've already stated my opinion in sufficient detail. I'd have
preferred that the prohibition on RDATA compression contained an exception for
situations in which it can be used safely, e.g. when negotiated via EDNS or some
similar mechanism. But, as Andreas pointed out, such exceptions can always be
made on a case-by-case basis by whomever may be proposing the new types. As
such, I have no *strong* objection to the advancement of the draft.


- Kevin


gson@isc.org wrote:

> Randy Bush writes:
> > my read is that there is NOT rough consensus.  please feel free to disabuse
> > me of that notion.
>
> This is how I would summarize the discussion:
>
>   Bert Hubert expressed worry about the lack of support for mandatory
>   additional section processing, but still said it was a "very good
>   proposal".
>
>   Mark Gritter worried about the treatment of meta-RRs, which are
>   outside the scope of the draft.
>
>   Dan Bernstein opposed the draft for multiple reasons.
>
>   Kevin Darcy opposed the unconditional prohibition of compression
>   in new types and asked that the draft specifically allow for
>   compression when negotiated using some future mechanism (e.g.,
>   based on EDNS).
>
>   The author, Roy Arends, Mark Andrews, Robert Elz, and Olafur
>   Gudmundsson defended the current text of the draft.
>
> Of these, I view only Dan's and Kevin's messages as significant
> opposition to the draft.  Interestingly, these two cases of opposition
> represent almost diametrically opposed viewpoints: Dan is saying that
> the draft is unnecessary because there already is an absolute
> prohibition on compression in new types and that the draft is too
> loose, while Kevin is effectively saying that the draft is harmful
> because the existing prohibition on compression is not absolute, and
> that the draft is too strict.  To me this suggests that the draft
> actually is a reasonably compromise consistent with the views of the
> majority of the working group.
>
> I'd like to ask all those who have an opinion either for or against
> the draft and who have not yet expressed it on the list to please
> speak up.





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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 15 22:07:48 2001
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Message-Id: <200110160153.f9G1r0986115@drugs.dv.isc.org>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
From: Mark.Andrews@isc.org
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Mon, 15 Oct 2001 16:50:37 MST."
             <E15tHVE-000BK3-00@rip.psg.com> 
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 11:53:00 +1000
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	This draft is really just documenting existing practice as
	described in existing RFCs (not just 1034 and 1035) and how
	to deal some of the mistakes in those RFCs.

	There is only one thing new in this draft.  That is that
	it describes a text format that can be used to in master
	files to describe the contents of a RR and have it be read
	by multiple implementations instead of each implementation
	going and doing it there own way.

	This draft was not intended to extend on wire functionality.

	Mark
--
Mark Andrews, Internet Software Consortium
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark.Andrews@isc.org


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 15 22:07:55 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: dnssec key manglement
Message-Id: <E15tJPa-000EhB-00@rip.psg.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2001 18:52:54 -0700
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from a discussion with a secret friend :-)

> current techniques are oob via a web page or email.  these do not
> do well for frequent re-keying.  i am not sure if this has been
> thought out at any scale.

This is a good time to think it out:

   DS is a lot simpler keying scenario to manage
   than sig@child

   Maybe there's a simple key exchange protocol buried
   in IKE or coming in JFK that can be used to meet dnssec
   requirements.

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 15 23:28:02 2001
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Date: 16 Oct 2001 03:04:05 -0000
Message-ID: <20011016030405.745.qmail@cr.yp.to>
From: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt
References: <E15m6zI-000NCA-00@rip.psg.com> <E15rqt2-000ORk-00@psg.com> <200110152240.PAA11260@gulag.araneus.fi>
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Andreas Gustafsson writes:
> Dan is saying that the draft is unnecessary because there already is
> an absolute prohibition on compression in new types and that the draft
> is too loose,

That is an astoundingly inaccurate summary. Here's what I actually said:

: Gustafsson's document says that caches ``SHOULD also decompress RRs of
: type RP, AFSDB, RT, SIG, PX, NXT, NAPTR, and SRV.''
: 
: I objected to that text in December 2000, and I continue to object to
: it, for several reasons:
: 
:    * RFC 1035 clearly prohibits compression except in owner names, NS
:      data, CNAME data, PTR data, MX data, and SOA data. Compression in
:      RP, AFSDB, etc. is inexcusable. There are no legitimate situations
:      where decompression of RP, AFSDB, etc. will accomplish anything.
: 
:    * My cache, which is deployed at tens of thousands of sites, handles
:      exactly the forms of compression allowed by RFC 1035. It does _not_
:      decompress RP, AFSDB, etc. It works just fine.
: 
:    * Gustafsson's text violates RFC 2119, section 6. It is not necessary
:      for interoperability. It is an abuse of the standards process.
: 
:    * BIND's support for bogus compressed records was exactly what led to
:      the http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-20.html disaster. We do
:      _not_ want more of these disasters.
: 
: The text should be replaced by the opposite recommendation. Implementors
: should be encouraged to make their decompression code as limited as
: possible, handling RFC 1035 compression and nothing else.
: 
: Gustafsson's only response to these points has been ``it's a SHOULD, not
: a MUST,'' completely ignoring the substance of my objections.
: 
: I also object to this document's failure to point out that transparent
: handling of new types is already required by the existing DNS standards.
: See http://cr.yp.to/djbdns/newtypes.html.

---Dan


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 16 00:32:01 2001
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To: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Mark.Andrews@isc.org
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt 
In-reply-to: Your message of "16 Oct 2001 03:04:05 GMT."
             <20011016030405.745.qmail@cr.yp.to> 
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> Andreas Gustafsson writes:
> > Dan is saying that the draft is unnecessary because there already is
> > an absolute prohibition on compression in new types and that the draft
> > is too loose,
> 
> That is an astoundingly inaccurate summary. Here's what I actually said:
> 
	Dan, we can all look up what you said.  It appears to have
	little bearing on reality and is more based on wishful
	thinking that no RFC was written that said you could use
	compression.  Deal with reality.

	Mark

--
Mark Andrews, Internet Software Consortium
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark.Andrews@isc.org


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 16 12:38:21 2001
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From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
To: "Jesper G. Hoy" <jhoy@jhsoft.com>
cc: "'Andreas Gustafsson'" <gson@isc.org>,
        "'namedroppers'" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt 
In-Reply-To: <000a01c155d6$34929af0$6400a8c0@hp> 
References: <000a01c155d6$34929af0$6400a8c0@hp> 
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 17:20:30 +0700
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    Date:        Mon, 15 Oct 2001 20:05:03 -0400
    From:        "Jesper G. Hoy" <jhoy@jhsoft.com>
    Message-ID:  <000a01c155d6$34929af0$6400a8c0@hp>

  | But banning compression (and additional section processing) for ALL new
  | RR types could be a problem with the 512 byte limit on UDP messages.

Other than knowing RDATA encodings, and knowing that they're known, it
is the only way.

  | Wouldn't it be possible to set aside a certain range of RR type numbers
  | that are "safe to cache as unknown" ?
  | Meaning those RR type numbers (when assigned) won't use compression in
  | RDATA and won't require additional section processing.

Additional section processing isn't a big issue - it's really just an
efficiency win, so there's no real need to say anything about that at all.
If it doesn't happen because a cache doesn't understand the RR type, then
more queries happen.   Not optimal, but not fatal either.

For compression, define the "certain range" as "all except for the magic N",
and that's what we have today.

  | And another "unsafe" range which would be dropped or result in SERVFAIL
  | when encountered and unknown.

This is what you're really proposing - defining a range of RR identifiers
which might contain weird stuff (compressed labels) and which thus can
never be cached by anyone who doesn't understand them.   The effect of that
would be largely to set aside a range of RR identifiers as unusable, as in
practice, an RR that can't get through random caches isn't going to work
very well.   Just about anyone who wants a new RR type will define it to
not permit compression of any labels in its RDATA just to avoid this.

And even if it was to be considered, there's still the problem of all those
other caches out there which don't know there's this magic set of RR types
they've never heard of, and they're not allowed to cache.

  | Also, the document does not address compression of record labels.
  | As far as I can tell this should never cause any problems.
  | I would like to see an addition to section 4 like "record labels MAY be
  | compressed for ALL record types"

It wouldn't hurt adding that, but that's also pretty much given - compression
of labels is allowed in 1035, there's nothing new about that - it isn't really
in any doubt at all.

kre



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Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 14:31:55 -0400
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_Gu=F0mundsson?=
  <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: Admitting more documents: TKEY secret removal 
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This document has requested to be added to the working group
work items. This document is within the working charter is there any
objection to admitting it ?

draft-kamite-dnsext-tkey-secret-removal-00.txt
Abstract:
    TKEY [RFC2930] provides methods of setting up shared secret keys for
    TSIG [RFC2845] other than manual exchange. But TKEY itself cannot
    control timing of key renewal very well though it can add or delete
    shared keys.  Since continuing to sign messages with old keys
    permanently is not safe, hosts which make use of TSIG should pay
    attention to the time limit of secret usage.

    This document proposes a new Secret Key Renewal Mode in TKEY which
    periodically changes secret shared between two hosts. Servers check
    valid period of secret when they receive messages from clients, and
    if they have already expired, the servers demand that clients should
    send TKEY key renewal requests which are based on Diffie-Hellman
    exchange. After secret establishment by exchange, new secret keys
    become valid and the previous old keys are completely invalidated.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 16 15:13:35 2001
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From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_Gu=F0mundsson?=
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Subject: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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These two documents take a different approach on how applications can
store key information in DNS, one uses generic key protocol value, the
other one proposes a new RR type.
If admitted it is expected that at most one of these documents will advance.
Is there any objection to adding the documents to the working group plate?

draft-schlyter-appkey-00.txt
draft-lewis-dnsext-key-genprot-00.txt

	Olafur



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Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 14:22:28 -0400
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_Gu=F0mundsson?=
  <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: Admitting Opcode discover draft?
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As discussed in the DNSEXT meeting in London, the author will change
copyright statement if and only if working group agrees to adopt
as a work item. An i-d of the same technical content as the ID
named above will be issued, the new document will fully conform to
RFC2026 with standard copyright without any changes or additions.

Is the working group willing to adopt this work (please be
civil and technical) ?

         Olafur

>To: IETF-Announce: ;
>From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
>Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
>Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt
>Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2001 10:31:34 -0400
>Sender: nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us
>X-UIDL: h\_"!e%4"!T;#"!J:G!!
>
>A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
>directories.
>
>
>         Title           : The DISCOVER opcode
>         Author(s)       : B. Manning, P. Vixie, E. Guttman
>         Filename        : draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt
>         Pages           :
>         Date            : 18-Jun-01
>
>The QUERY opcode in the DNS is designed for unicast. With the
>development of multicast capabilities in the DNS, it is desireable
>to have a more robust opcode for server interactions since a single
>request may result in replies from multiple responders. So DISCOVER
>is defined to deal with replies from multiple responders.
>As such, this document extend the core DNS specifications to allow
>clients to have a method for coping with replies from multiple
>responders. Use of this new opcode may facilitate DNS operations in
>modern networking topologies.
>
>A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt
>
>Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username
>"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
>type "cd internet-drafts" and then
>         "get draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt".
>
>A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
>http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
>or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt
>
>
>Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.
>
>Send a message to:
>         mailserv@ietf.org.
>In the body type:
>         "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt".
>
>NOTE:   The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
>         MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
>         feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
>         command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
>         a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail readers
>         exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
>         "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
>         up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
>         how to manipulate these messages.
>
>
>Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
>implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
>Internet-Draft.
>Content-Type: text/plain
>Content-ID:     <20010619102814.I-D@ietf.org>
>
>ENCODING mime
>FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt
>
><ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt>



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 16 15:20:47 2001
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Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 14:46:47 -0400
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_Gu=F0mundsson?=
  <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: DNSEXT WGLC: obsolete Iquery
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This is a last call for this document, it obsoletes a part of RFC1035 that
has been known to be of more harm than use.

WGLC will conclude 2001/10/31 at 23:59 UTC.

Silence on this document will be interpreted as support for this action.

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-obsolete-iquery-01.txt


	Olafur



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 16 17:01:57 2001
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To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Cc: dnssec@cafax.se
Subject: comments on delegation signer
From: David Blacka <davidb@research.netsol.com>
Date: 16 Oct 2001 16:28:35 -0400
Message-ID: <ko3d4jcoss.fsf@pinion.admin.cto.netsol.com>
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I have a few comments about the Delegation Signer draft
<draft-ietf-dnsext-delegation-signer-02.txt>.

First is a fairly minor issue: the DS draft states that in the textual
representation of a DS record, HEX should be used to display the SHA-1
hash.  However, this is inconsistent with the other DNSSEC RR types.
This forces implementors to create or have access to a base16
conversion library, in addition to a base64 library.  I can see no
particularly compelling reason to use hex here, especially considering
that base64 is sufficient for the other DNSSEC records.

My second comment centers around how resolvers determine the security
status of a child zone under this draft.

Section 2.2 states 

  "If a DS RR set accompanies the NS RR set, the intent is to state
  that the child zone is secured. If an NS RR set exists without a DS
  RR set the intent is to state that the child zone is unsecure."

This presents (I think) a security flaw.

If we posit the existence of a sophisticated "man in the middle"
attacker that can arbitrarily change DNS response packets, then this
attacker can convert a secure delegation to an unsecure, hijacked
destination by removing the DS records and signatures and altering the
unsigned NS records.

This vulnerability does not exist using RFC 2535 semantics.  This
attacker could only convert an unsecure delegation to a secure one (by
removing the NULL KEY), which does him no good.  He cannot convert a
secure delegation to an unsecure one, because that would require the
ability to sign a NULL KEY record.

Instead, a better approach might be to require DS enabled servers to
return either: 
   
   NS RR set + DS RR set + SIG{DS} set (for secure delegations)

   OR 

   NS RR set + NXT + SIG{NXT}.         (for insecure delegations)

The NXT record needs to show the non-existence of a DS (or KEY) RR
set.

Merely receiving NS RRs could either be an error (if we are aware that
the zone is using DS) or could be interpreted as a SIG@child
delegation.

This could eliminate the need for a SEC RR or bit in the KEY record to
indicate use of DS, as there would be no ambiguous cases:

delegation:     sec         unsec
            +---------+---------------+
  SIG@child | NS      | NS, NULL KEY, |
            | only    | SIG{KEY}      |
            +---------+---------------+
        DS  | NS,DS   | NS, NXT       |
            | SIG{DS} | SIG{NXT}      |
            +---------+---------------+

-- 
David Blacka         <davidb@research.netsol.com> 
Sr. Research Engineer   Verisign Applied Research


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 16 17:02:33 2001
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Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 13:33:17 -0700 (PDT)
Message-Id: <200110162033.NAA11933@gulag.araneus.fi>
To: "Jesper G. Hoy" <jhoy@jhsoft.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: RE: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-01.txt
In-Reply-To: <000a01c155d6$34929af0$6400a8c0@hp>
References: <200110152240.PAA11260@gulag.araneus.fi>
	<000a01c155d6$34929af0$6400a8c0@hp>
From: gson@isc.org (Andreas Gustafsson)
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Jesper G. Hoy writes:
> Wouldn't it be possible to set aside a certain range of RR type numbers
> that are "safe to cache as unknown" ?

One problem with this approach is that the NXT record deals poorly
with high-numbered types.

> Also, the document does not address compression of record labels.
> As far as I can tell this should never cause any problems.
> I would like to see an addition to section 4 like "record labels MAY be
> compressed for ALL record types"

This is already noted in RFC1123 section 6.1.3.5.  I will add a
reference to this section in the next revision of the draft.
-- 
Andreas Gustafsson, gson@isc.org


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 16 18:16:07 2001
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To: =?iso-8859-1?q?=D3lafur_Gu=F0mundsson?= <ogud@ogud.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011016143043.00afad90@localhost>
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20011016143043.00afad90@localhost>
 =?iso-8859-1?q?(=D3lafur_Gu=F0mundsson's?= message of "Tue, 16 Oct 2001
 14:35:31 -0400")
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 23:38:29 +0200
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=D3lafur Gu=F0mundsson <ogud@ogud.com> writes:

> These two documents take a different approach on how applications can
> store key information in DNS, one uses generic key protocol value, the
> other one proposes a new RR type.
> If admitted it is expected that at most one of these documents will advan=
ce.
> Is there any objection to adding the documents to the working group plate?
>=20
> draft-schlyter-appkey-00.txt
> draft-lewis-dnsext-key-genprot-00.txt

For the record I'd like to mention two alternative approaches:

    * Specifying new RR types for each application
    * Using CERT RR (RFC 2538) for this purpose

Both of the drafts above, and the two alternative approaches,
accomplish the same goal: Separating DNSSEC keying material from
non-DNS, application specific, keying material.  This is good, hence
one of the ideas should be recommended.  (Some people argue that
application keys should not be present in DNS at all, but I haven't
seen much in the area of technical arguments for that opinion.)

The first draft, APPKEY, introduces a new RR for this, which makes
things nice and clean.  I think the draft would require changes to DNS
software though, and neglects experience with the CERT RR (see below).

The second draft suggests using the DNSSEC KEY RR combined with owner
name guidelines.  It solves the problem of separating DNSSEC and
non-DNSSEC keying material, and the large RRset problem.  However,
IMHO it is a kludge, and draft-schlyter-appkey seem to agree (sorry if
I'm putting words in people's mouths):

        Although this would indeed solve the problem with large RR
   sets when querying for an application key, it could also make the
   protocol field lose its value in practice as new applications would
   not require a new protocol value.  The author believes that
   combining unique protocol values with SRV-like encode of protocol
   would be a better solution solving both the issue with large RR
   sets and a large number of possible applications.

Using a new RR for each application avoids sub-typing RR and solves
all problems.  However, this is probably only a academic idea since
new RRs seem to take ages to happen, and application designers will
probably not want to go through that effort.

The fourth idea, using the CERT record has the same advantages of the
proposed APPKEY but it is also implemented by DNS software, as well as
applications.  It also fulfills the requirements in the quotation
above.

As far as I have been able to understand, the only disadvantage of the
fourth idea is that some people feel that the CERT RR is intended to
only carry "certificates" according to some strict definition that
would only match X.509 or similar, and exclude "raw" keys such as
those used for e.g. SSH.  I think this is wrong, the CERT RR can be
regarded as a RR intended to support key material for applications.
If you step out of the box, a raw key (stored in a CERT RR) which has
a binding to a name which is guaranteed by DNSSEC _is_ a "certificate"
in the abstract definition, so it is fine to store it in the CERT RR.

If it hasn't been obvious, I'd like to see the CERT RR updated with
owner name guidelines as the solution to the problem of application
keying material in DNS.

PS. These ideas has been discussed on http://www.cafax.se/dnssec/
previously.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 16 20:37:27 2001
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Message-Id: <5.1.0.14.0.20011016170502.048642a8@jurassic.eng.sun.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 17:08:35 -0700
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, dnsop@cafax.se
From: Alain Durand <alain.durand@sun.com>
Subject: IPv6 DNS bridging system: lookup proxy
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FYI, NGtrans just started a 2 weeks last call on 
draft-ietf-ngtrans-dns-ops-req-02.txt
I guess this draft will also have to be discussed in DNS-ops.

One of the things that this requirement draft highlights is the need for a 
bridging
system. After many discussions with Johan Ihren and Akira Kato,
I'm convinced that something like a lookup proxy is needed to bridge
from IPv6 to IPv4.
I have published a draft that outline a _possible_ solution:
http://search.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-durand-dns-proxy-00.txt.

I would like to bring this draft to DNS-OPS and/or DNS-ext as a 
contribution for discussion.

	- Alain. 



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 17 00:59:46 2001
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To: David Blacka <davidb@research.netsol.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, dnssec@cafax.se
Subject: Re: comments on delegation signer
References: <ko3d4jcoss.fsf@pinion.admin.cto.netsol.com>
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: 16 Oct 2001 21:19:12 -0400
In-Reply-To: David Blacka's message of "16 Oct 2001 16:28:35 -0400"
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David Blacka <davidb@research.netsol.com> writes:

> First is a fairly minor issue: the DS draft states that in the textual
> representation of a DS record, HEX should be used to display the SHA-1
> hash.  However, this is inconsistent with the other DNSSEC RR types.
> This forces implementors to create or have access to a base16
> conversion library, in addition to a base64 library.  I can see no
> particularly compelling reason to use hex here, especially considering
> that base64 is sufficient for the other DNSSEC records.

Hex is used in the DS draft because pretty much every other security
protocol uses hex to represent hash values.  As for a base-16
"library", last I checked it was provided in LIBC.  Two particular
functions you should know about: "printf" and "scanf".  If that isn't
sufficient for your tastes, any programmer worth their grain in salt
can write a base16 parser in less that 10 lines of C.

> Instead, a better approach might be to require DS enabled servers to
> return either: 
>    
>    NS RR set + DS RR set + SIG{DS} set (for secure delegations)
> 
>    OR 
> 
>    NS RR set + NXT + SIG{NXT}.         (for insecure delegations)
> 
> The NXT record needs to show the non-existence of a DS (or KEY) RR
> set.

I was under the impression that this was implied by the fact that the
parent zone was secured in the first place.  The DS SIG on the DS
record is implied by the fact that the parent is secure.  So in the
case of a secure delegation the client should expect NS + DS +
SIG{DS}.  Alternatively is should expect expect NS + NXT + SIG{NXT} in
the case on an insecure delegation.  Again, this is implied by 2535.

> Merely receiving NS RRs could either be an error (if we are aware that
> the zone is using DS) or could be interpreted as a SIG@child
> delegation.

Merely receiving NS RRs would violate 2535, so the client would know
something was up.  OTOH, DNSSec does not protect against most DoS
attacks.

> -- 
> David Blacka         <davidb@research.netsol.com> 
> Sr. Research Engineer   Verisign Applied Research

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 17 01:00:03 2001
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To: Alain Durand <alain.durand@sun.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, dnsop@cafax.se
In-reply-to: alain.durand's message of Tue, 16 Oct 2001 17:08:35 MST.
      <5.1.0.14.0.20011016170502.048642a8@jurassic.eng.sun.com> 
Subject: Re: IPv6 DNS bridging system: lookup proxy 
From: itojun@iijlab.net
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 10:10:21 +0900
Message-ID: <16992.1003281021@itojun.org>
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>One of the things that this requirement draft highlights is the need for a 
>bridging
>system. After many discussions with Johan Ihren and Akira Kato,
>I'm convinced that something like a lookup proxy is needed to bridge
>from IPv6 to IPv4.
>I have published a draft that outline a _possible_ solution:
>http://search.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-durand-dns-proxy-00.txt.
>
>I would like to bring this draft to DNS-OPS and/or DNS-ext as a 
>contribution for discussion.

	section 6, "anycast issues" says that it is prohibited to use an
	anycast address source address (from RFC2460).  however,
	section 3.3 describes the use of TCP with the anycast prefix
	(P::a.b.c.d).  these sections are inconsistent at best (TCP cannot
	be established without using P::a.b.c.d as source).

itojun


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 17 08:44:05 2001
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Message-Id: <200110171057.f9HAvrP78099@quasar.kaynet.ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 19:57:53 +0900
From: Yuji Kamite <kamite@kaynet.ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Cc: kamite@kaynet.ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp, nakayama@nc.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Subject: TKEY secret renewal
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On Tue, 16 Oct 2001 14:31:55 -0400
_lafur Gu_mundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:

> This document has requested to be added to the working group
> work items. This document is within the working charter is there any
> objection to admitting it ?
> 
> draft-kamite-dnsext-tkey-secret-removal-00.txt


The title is wrong. Correct one is

draft-kamite-dnsext-tkey-secret-renewal-00.txt

Please be careful not to fail to read.


This document is about the management of secret keys used for TSIG,
which suggests smooth key renewal (rekeying) procedure making use
of TKEY.

Now we are reconsidering some definitions of secret key inception,
renewal timing, and expiration etc. (perhaps which we think are obscure)
in this draft.
In order to explain more clearly, we are going to submit
a revised version by the next meeting, if possible.

Thank you.

--
Yuji Kamite
Information Technology Center, Univ. of Tokyo
E-Mail: kamite@kaynet.ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp





> Abstract:
>     TKEY [RFC2930] provides methods of setting up shared secret keys for
>     TSIG [RFC2845] other than manual exchange. But TKEY itself cannot
>     control timing of key renewal very well though it can add or delete
>     shared keys.  Since continuing to sign messages with old keys
>     permanently is not safe, hosts which make use of TSIG should pay
>     attention to the time limit of secret usage.
> 
>     This document proposes a new Secret Key Renewal Mode in TKEY which
>     periodically changes secret shared between two hosts. Servers check
>     valid period of secret when they receive messages from clients, and
>     if they have already expired, the servers demand that clients should
>     send TKEY key renewal requests which are based on Diffie-Hellman
>     exchange. After secret establishment by exchange, new secret keys
>     become valid and the previous old keys are completely invalidated.
> 
> 
> 
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 17 11:58:26 2001
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References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011016143043.00afad90@localhost> ( =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?=
 =?iso-8859-1?Q?_?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?Gu=F0mundsson=27s?= message of 
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Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 11:28:25 -0400
To: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Cc: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?Gu=F0mundsson?=  <ogud@ogud.com>,
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At 5:38 PM -0400 10/16/01, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>PS. These ideas has been discussed on http://www.cafax.se/dnssec/
>previously.

...but no one has written drafts defining the alternate proposals.  That's
the second step (the first being the discussion on the list above).

I think the two drafts are admittable - we do need to define a generic way
in which DNS will handle application keys (at least a framework for the
support).

I'm not saying that the two drafts proposed are the solution - but they are
the only documented approaches available.

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

You fly too often when ... the airport taxi is on speed-dial.

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 17 13:11:06 2001
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Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 18:10:10 +0200 (CEST)
From: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
To: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
cc: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
In-Reply-To: <v0313034bb7f3532e63ca@[199.171.39.21]>
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On Wed, 17 Oct 2001, Edward Lewis wrote:

> At 5:38 PM -0400 10/16/01, Simon Josefsson wrote:
> >PS. These ideas has been discussed on http://www.cafax.se/dnssec/
> >previously.
>
> ...but no one has written drafts defining the alternate proposals.  That's
> the second step (the first being the discussion on the list above).

The first idea, using one RR for each application, cannot be written
generically so we have to wait for SSH, S/MIME, IPSEC, PGP etc to write
each spec.  I assume a brief document saying that DNSEXT would support the
approach could be written, but I haven't seen anyone seriously advocating
this idea so maybe noone will write it.

The second alternative, to use CERT with RR owner name guidelines, has
been written for S/MIME, SSL, IPSEC and CRL distribution in:

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-josefsson-pkix-dns-00.txt [1]

As such the draft has nothing to do with DNSEXT, but I guess I could
take on re-drafting this for a DNSEXT point of view (if someone wants to
help, please do :)) unless a resolution can't be reached by discussing the
alternatives only.

[1] It seems it expire tomorrow, how appropriate.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 17 16:31:01 2001
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Message-ID: <015501c15741$0f643240$b9370681@antd.nist.gov>
From: "Scott Rose" <scottr@antd.nist.gov>
To: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011016123744.025df4a0@localhost>
Subject: Re: Admitting Opcode discover draft?
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 15:22:28 -0400
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I guess you could call this an objection:

>From reading the DISCOVER query draft, I got the feeling that it would
almost become a lightweight resource discovery protocol.  Much like SLP,
only with fewer features.  Do we really want to mangle DNS to make it do
resouce discovery?  (the section of using QTYPE = SRV is what I'm talking
about).  Discovery of DNS servers would be the best use of this new query
type (and keep it limited to that).

If the rest of the working group want to adopt this draft, I can live with
it, but it my vote is it's re-inventing the wheel and forcing DNS to become
a service/resource discovery protocol (which should be avoided).

Scott
===============================================================
Scott Rose
Advanced Network Technologies Division
NIST

ph: 301-975-8439                       fax: 301-590-0932
http://www.nist.gov
===============================================================


----- Original Message -----
From: "Ólafur Guðmundsson" <ogud@ogud.com>
To: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Sent: Tuesday, October 16, 2001 2:22 PM
Subject: Admitting Opcode discover draft?


> As discussed in the DNSEXT meeting in London, the author will change
> copyright statement if and only if working group agrees to adopt
> as a work item. An i-d of the same technical content as the ID
> named above will be issued, the new document will fully conform to
> RFC2026 with standard copyright without any changes or additions.
>
> Is the working group willing to adopt this work (please be
> civil and technical) ?
>
>          Olafur
>
> >To: IETF-Announce: ;
> >From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
> >Reply-to: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
> >Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt
> >Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2001 10:31:34 -0400
> >Sender: nsyracus@cnri.reston.va.us
> >X-UIDL: h\_"!e%4"!T;#"!J:G!!
> >
> >A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> >directories.
> >
> >
> >         Title           : The DISCOVER opcode
> >         Author(s)       : B. Manning, P. Vixie, E. Guttman
> >         Filename        : draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt
> >         Pages           :
> >         Date            : 18-Jun-01
> >
> >The QUERY opcode in the DNS is designed for unicast. With the
> >development of multicast capabilities in the DNS, it is desireable
> >to have a more robust opcode for server interactions since a single
> >request may result in replies from multiple responders. So DISCOVER
> >is defined to deal with replies from multiple responders.
> >As such, this document extend the core DNS specifications to allow
> >clients to have a method for coping with replies from multiple
> >responders. Use of this new opcode may facilitate DNS operations in
> >modern networking topologies.
> >
> >A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> >http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt
> >
> >Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP. Login with the
username
> >"anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in,
> >type "cd internet-drafts" and then
> >         "get draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt".
> >
> >A list of Internet-Drafts directories can be found in
> >http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
> >or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt
> >
> >
> >Internet-Drafts can also be obtained by e-mail.
> >
> >Send a message to:
> >         mailserv@ietf.org.
> >In the body type:
> >         "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt".
> >
> >NOTE:   The mail server at ietf.org can return the document in
> >         MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility.  To use this
> >         feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE"
> >         command.  To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or
> >         a MIME-compliant mail reader.  Different MIME-compliant mail
readers
> >         exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with
> >         "multipart" MIME messages (i.e. documents which have been split
> >         up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on
> >         how to manipulate these messages.
> >
> >
> >Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
> >implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
> >Internet-Draft.
> >Content-Type: text/plain
> >Content-ID:     <20010619102814.I-D@ietf.org>
> >
> >ENCODING mime
> >FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt
> >
> ><ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt>
>
>
>
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 17 18:41:56 2001
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References: David Blacka's message of "16 Oct 2001 16:28:35 -0400"
 <ko3d4jcoss.fsf@pinion.admin.cto.netsol.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 16:40:10 -0400
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: comments on delegation signer
Cc: David Blacka <davidb@research.netsol.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org,
        dnssec@cafax.se
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At 9:19 PM -0400 10/16/01, Derek Atkins wrote:
>I was under the impression that this was implied by the fact that the

Either way, the document should make the inclusion of DS or NXT explicit.
Mr. Blacka's assessment that stripping data to go from secure to unsecure
is a concern.  I wonder if that was the thought (that removing data only
makes the source appeared to be more secured[1]) behind the NULL KEY RR set
way back in the day when DNSSEC was first hammered out.

[1] I.e., by removing an insecurity statement, the source appears to be
more secure - hence a signature is expected.  Since zonejackers can more
easily remove records than add seemingly valid signatures, the NULL KEY was
the way to go - up until operational considerations made us question the
workload needed for the approach.

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

You fly too often when ... the airport taxi is on speed-dial.

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 17 22:41:41 2001
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Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 14:46:38 -0400
To: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_Gu=F0mundsson?=
  <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Cc: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
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At 12:10 PM 10/17/2001, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>On Wed, 17 Oct 2001, Edward Lewis wrote:
>
> > At 5:38 PM -0400 10/16/01, Simon Josefsson wrote:
> > >PS. These ideas has been discussed on http://www.cafax.se/dnssec/
> > >previously.
> >
> > ...but no one has written drafts defining the alternate proposals.  That's
> > the second step (the first being the discussion on the list above).
>
>The first idea, using one RR for each application, cannot be written
>generically so we have to wait for SSH, S/MIME, IPSEC, PGP etc to write
>each spec.  I assume a brief document saying that DNSEXT would support the 
>approach could be written, but I haven't seen anyone seriously advocating
>this idea so maybe noone will write it.
>
>The second alternative, to use CERT with RR owner name guidelines, has
>been written for S/MIME, SSL, IPSEC and CRL distribution in:
>
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-josefsson-pkix-dns-00.txt [1]

You bring up a interesting point.
Some applications have CERT usage defined and should use CERT records.

The question is more for applications that do NOT have certificates
defined how can they advertise public keys ?

I do not think this is one shoe fits all situation.

>As such the draft has nothing to do with DNSEXT, but I guess I could
>take on re-drafting this for a DNSEXT point of view (if someone wants to
>help, please do :)) unless a resolution can't be reached by discussing the
>alternatives only.
>
>[1] It seems it expire tomorrow, how appropriate.

The only DNS issue in your draft is the selection of the names.
For SSL for example you say use the host name of the SSL server.
This is fine for dedicated servers, what about servers that service
multiple storefronts, do they use the same SSL cert for all?

         Olafur



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 18 09:28:43 2001
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Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 12:16:10 +0200 (MEST)
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
To: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Cc: =?iso-8859-1?q?=D3lafur_Gu=F0mundsson?= <ogud@ogud.com>,
        <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
In-Reply-To: <iluzo6rjmei.fsf@barbar.josefsson.org>
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On Tue, 16 Oct 2001, Simon Josefsson wrote:

> The first draft, APPKEY, introduces a new RR for this, which makes
> things nice and clean.  I think the draft would require changes to DNS
> software though, and neglects experience with the CERT RR (see below).

yes, the draft requires that DNS software adds support for APPKEY although
new server software should handle unknown RR-types transparently.

regarding the experience with the CERT the draft says:

  "The APPKEY RR is not intended for storage of certificates and a
   separate certificate RR, defined in RFC 2538, has been developed
   for that purpose."


> The fourth idea, using the CERT record has the same advantages of the
> proposed APPKEY but it is also implemented by DNS software, as well as
> applications.  It also fulfills the requirements in the quotation
> above.

whether a raw public key is a certificate or not has been discussed many
times and we have reached no consensus on this. because of this, I still
think that separating these two (i.e. having both CERT and APPKEY) are a
good thing.

currently installed base of applications is not an issue, except for
various experimental software. I do not think that I exaggerate if I say
that the total number of applications supporting KEY or CERT for non-DNS
use is less than ten.


> If you step out of the box, a raw key (stored in a CERT RR) which has
> a binding to a name which is guaranteed by DNSSEC _is_ a "certificate"
> in the abstract definition, so it is fine to store it in the CERT RR.

the primary issue here is that a CERT carries its own security,
independently of DNSSEC - APPKEY does not, but APPKEY+SIG(APPKEY) does.

	jakob



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 18 10:33:21 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: mjs@cisco.com, mellon@nominum.com, gson@nominum.com
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Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-03.txt to ps
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i have received comment that this draft does not make explicit that this RR
should only be defined for the IN class.

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 18 10:37:47 2001
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Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 10:22:43 -0400
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From: Mark Stapp <mjs@cisco.com>
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May I make that change and resubmit the -04 rev? Do you then submit that to 
the iesg, or do I need to do something to move it there?

Thanks,
Mark

At 07:11 AM 10/18/2001 -0700, Randy Bush wrote:
>i have received comment that this draft does not make explicit that this RR
>should only be defined for the IN class.
>
>randy



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 18 10:52:27 2001
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Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 09:47:19 -0400
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Cc: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>,
        =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?Gu=F0mundsson?=  <ogud@ogud.com>,
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At 6:16 AM -0400 10/18/01, Jakob Schlyter wrote:
>yes, the draft requires that DNS software adds support for APPKEY although
>new server software should handle unknown RR-types transparently.

BTW, there is an effort underway to do a prototype implementation of APPKEY
in BIND 9.2.0rc$i {$i in 0..7}.

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

You fly too often when ... the airport taxi is on speed-dial.

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 18 11:57:34 2001
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Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 17:49:37 +0200 (CEST)
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
To: Bill Manning <bmanning@ISI.EDU>
cc: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>,
        =?iso-8859-1?q?=D3lafur_Gu=F0mundsson?= <ogud@ogud.com>,
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Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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On Thu, 18 Oct 2001, Bill Manning wrote:

> % currently installed base of applications is not an issue, except for
> % various experimental software. I do not think that I exaggerate if I say
> % that the total number of applications supporting KEY or CERT for non-DNS
> % use is less than ten.
>
> 	Quick dump of stats on b.root-servers.net
>
> 	KEY: 2202
> 	CERT: 2
>
> I'd say ten is agressive. :)

FWIW there seem to be IPSEC implementations that uses TXT as well:

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic-02.txt



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 18 11:59:30 2001
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From: Bill Manning <bmanning@ISI.EDU>
Message-Id: <200110181526.f9IFQmx00502@zed.isi.edu>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
To: jakob@crt.se (Jakob Schlyter)
Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 08:26:48 -0700 (PDT)
Cc: jas@extundo.com (Simon Josefsson),
        ogud@ogud.com (=?iso-8859-1?q?=D3lafur_Gu=F0mundsson?=),
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% currently installed base of applications is not an issue, except for
% various experimental software. I do not think that I exaggerate if I say
% that the total number of applications supporting KEY or CERT for non-DNS
% use is less than ten.


	Quick dump of stats on b.root-servers.net

	KEY: 2202
	CERT: 2

I'd say ten is agressive. :)

--bill


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 18 12:40:55 2001
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Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 09:22:54 -0700
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From: Dave Crocker <dhc@dcrocker.net>
Subject: same protocol, different ports
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At 11:35 AM 10/16/2001, Ólafur Guðmundsson wrote:
>These two documents take a different approach on how applications can
>store key information in DNS,

The DNS has long been appealing, for discussion as a venue for a wide 
variety of lookup services.  Notably, few have actually gained much 
traction, though the appeal is serious and legitimate.

Recently, the email protocol folks separated initial posting from later 
relaying, by "copying" SMTP for use on a separate mail submission TCP port, 
and permitting divergent specification of the protocol, over time.

This approach could be very helpful for DNS.

The core DNS function is so massively integral to Internet infrastructure 
operations, it would be wise to pursue other uses of the protocol on a 
separate port, as a separate service.

At a minimum, this permits a) independent administration of core DNS data 
from value-added services, and b) separation of reliability concerns.

Thoughts?

d/


----------
Dave Crocker  <mailto:dcrocker@brandenburg.com>
Brandenburg InternetWorking  <http://www.brandenburg.com>
tel +1.408.246.8253;  fax +1.408.273.6464



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 18 12:53:33 2001
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Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 12:42:01 -0400
To: Dave Crocker <dhc@dcrocker.net>
From: John Schnizlein <jschnizl@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
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At 12:22 PM 10/18/2001, Dave Crocker wrote:

>The core DNS function is so massively integral to Internet infrastructure 
>operations, it would be wise to pursue other uses of the protocol on a 
>separate port, as a separate service.
>
>At a minimum, this permits a) independent administration of core DNS data 
>from value-added services, and b) separation of reliability concerns.
>
>Thoughts?

Good idea.

This would work well with the normal firewall treatment of port 53,
requiring changes to opt-in for the value-added services.

It would also provide a good environment to experiment with Randy's
encouragement to make better use (more values) of the class field of a RR.

John



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 18 13:36:22 2001
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Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 13:12:02 -0400
From: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
To: Dave Crocker <dhc@dcrocker.net>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
Message-ID: <20011018131202.K5336@bailey.dscga.com>
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On Thu, Oct 18, 2001 at 09:22:54AM -0700, Dave Crocker wrote:
> At 11:35 AM 10/16/2001, Ólafur Guðmundsson wrote:
> >These two documents take a different approach on how applications can
> >store key information in DNS,
> 
> The DNS has long been appealing, for discussion as a venue for a wide 
> variety of lookup services.  Notably, few have actually gained much 
> traction, though the appeal is serious and legitimate.
> 
> Recently, the email protocol folks separated initial posting from later 
> relaying, by "copying" SMTP for use on a separate mail submission TCP port, 
> and permitting divergent specification of the protocol, over time.
> 
> This approach could be very helpful for DNS.
> 
> The core DNS function is so massively integral to Internet infrastructure 
> operations, it would be wise to pursue other uses of the protocol on a 
> separate port, as a separate service.
> 
> At a minimum, this permits a) independent administration of core DNS data 
> from value-added services, and b) separation of reliability concerns.
> 
> Thoughts?

I've often thought of this and the conclusion I've come to is that
the reason people want to use the DNS often has more to do with
the APIs that are available to them and the fact that policies and
procedures ensure that its a somewhat stable namespace.

The problem I ran into when I thought about replicating the protocol
to another port was that just about none of the APIs support the
ability to ask DNS questions on another port. BIND derived APIs
allow it but these days that's become a small subset.

So, even if you were to run a special purpose nameserver on another port
the applications developer would have no pre-defined way of getting
at it (short of including their own DNS client software). The problem
with that is you then bypass the OS's policy and configuration options
for network directories...

IMHO, dns-ext could help the world if it would at least define a set of
requirements on DNS APIs. My minimum set would be:

1) any query must be able to define a port and server
2) all responses and queries must have a method for dealing with 
   unknown resource records (usually by passing the caller the raw packet)

So, yes, its an option, but if it could have been easily done it would have
been done already...

-MM

-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
michael@neonym.net      |                              | http://www.neonym.net


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 18 13:36:31 2001
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At 10:12 AM 10/18/2001, Michael Mealling wrote:
>I've often thought of this and the conclusion I've come to is that
>the reason people want to use the DNS often has more to do with
>the APIs that are available to them and the fact that policies and
>procedures ensure that its a somewhat stable namespace.

1.  Whether to diverge the namespace would be an open question.  My own 
(rather strong) opinion is that there should be only one namespace.  It is 
the RR's that could/should/would diverge.

2.  Whether to diverge any of the technology, including APIs, is another 
open question.  I don't see the need to diverge, but perhaps others do.

3.  Same for basic administration policies and procedures.

In other words, I agree with you, and therefore am only suggesting a 
separation of the databases of "values" being looked up.


>The problem I ran into when I thought about replicating the protocol
>to another port was that just about none of the APIs support the
>ability to ask DNS questions on another port.

given that it would be new applications (given that we are talking about 
new uses of the DNS) then having to make that small a change to an API 
seems... a small matter.


>IMHO, dns-ext could help the world if it would at least define a set of
>requirements on DNS APIs. My minimum set would be:

The IETF has always been reluctant to specify APIs.  They are platform 
dependent and the IETF does platform INdependent work.  And its 
transgressions into that space have not been met with spectacular success.

d/

----------
Dave Crocker  <mailto:dcrocker@brandenburg.com>
Brandenburg InternetWorking  <http://www.brandenburg.com>
tel +1.408.246.8253;  fax +1.408.273.6464



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 18 13:38:02 2001
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Message-Id: <200110181719.NAA16468@error-messages.mit.edu>
To: Dave Crocker <dhc@dcrocker.net>
cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 18 Oct 2001 09:22:54 PDT."
             <5.1.0.14.2.20011018091703.01eacf10@dcrocker.net> 
Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 13:19:49 -0400
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
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> The core DNS function is so massively integral to Internet
> infrastructure operations, it would be wise to pursue other uses of
> the protocol on a separate port, as a separate service.

> At a minimum, this permits a) independent administration of core DNS
> data from value-added services, and b) separation of reliability
> concerns.

I think this is a bad idea.  By changing the port number, you force
these other lookup services to recreate the entire DNS hierarchy
before they can achieve any kind of traction.  The benefits you cite
are easily achieved through zone delegation.  (Well, the delegated
value-added service will depend on the reliabiliy of the core service,
but that's okay.)  In essence, you're saying "let's not define any new
record types, and tell people who want to define them to go play in
this little ghetto where they are guaranteed never to get anywhere."

The designers of the MIT Hesiod service made the same mistake, except
they thought they wanted a separate query class instead of a separate
port.  They, too, thought a different mode of operation was necessary
in order to achieve independent administration and separation of
reliability concerns, but those benefits were already trivially
achieved because Hesiod data lived under ns.athena.mit.edu instead of
mit.edu.  So the benefit of the separate query class was illusory, but
the cost was great: a separate global root was required for the HS
tree, and every recursive resolver needed special configuration to
know about it.

In addition, BIND 8 lost the ability to act as a recursive resolver
for query classes other than IN.  Luckily, we had already made a
transition back to the IN class before that became an issue, but
otherwise we would have lost due to having marginalized ourselves by
using a slightly different mode of operation than the rest of the DNS.
Such marginalization is exactly what you're proposing value-added
services start doing.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 18 13:48:13 2001
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Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 13:30:42 -0400
From: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
To: Dave Crocker <dhc@dcrocker.net>
Cc: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
Message-ID: <20011018133042.L5336@bailey.dscga.com>
References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011018091703.01eacf10@dcrocker.net> <5.1.0.14.2.20011016143043.00afad90@localhost> <5.1.0.14.2.20011018091703.01eacf10@dcrocker.net> <5.1.0.14.2.20011018101713.03a83008@dcrocker.net>
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On Thu, Oct 18, 2001 at 10:22:37AM -0700, Dave Crocker wrote:
> At 10:12 AM 10/18/2001, Michael Mealling wrote:
> >I've often thought of this and the conclusion I've come to is that
> >the reason people want to use the DNS often has more to do with
> >the APIs that are available to them and the fact that policies and
> >procedures ensure that its a somewhat stable namespace.
> 
> 1.  Whether to diverge the namespace would be an open question.  My own 
> (rather strong) opinion is that there should be only one namespace.  It is 
> the RR's that could/should/would diverge.
> 
> 2.  Whether to diverge any of the technology, including APIs, is another 
> open question.  I don't see the need to diverge, but perhaps others do.
> 
> 3.  Same for basic administration policies and procedures.
> 
> In other words, I agree with you, and therefore am only suggesting a 
> separation of the databases of "values" being looked up.

Sure... just a slightly different take on John's "new class" approach...

> >The problem I ran into when I thought about replicating the protocol
> >to another port was that just about none of the APIs support the
> >ability to ask DNS questions on another port.
> 
> given that it would be new applications (given that we are talking about 
> new uses of the DNS) then having to make that small a change to an API 
> seems... a small matter.

It depends on how you deploy it. Do you setup a whole new set of root
nameservers on another port or do you use the existing port 53
delegation process and then only switch ports when you get to the
'last' nameserver? How much of the OS' native DNS implementation do you
use? If its none then you have to get all of the delegating nameservers
upgraded to run a listener on those other ports. If its some then
you have existing API issues.

I've looked at just about every single DNS client side implementation
and for about 80% of the machines on today's internet it would be 
a hard thing to deploy. I'm not saying its a show stopper, just that
if you do decide you want to do it you should make it clear to 
client developers how they should deal with it.

> >IMHO, dns-ext could help the world if it would at least define a set of
> >requirements on DNS APIs. My minimum set would be:
> 
> The IETF has always been reluctant to specify APIs.  They are platform 
> dependent and the IETF does platform INdependent work.  And its 
> transgressions into that space have not been met with spectacular success.

I wasn't suggesting that we specify the actual API. I'm suggesting
we create some guidance for API developers so they are aware that the 
DNS has moved beyond the old gethostbyname() and they should as well...
I.e. there's a disconnect between what we think of as 'DNS' and what 
developers think it is. Their view causes them to create APIs that make it
next to impossible to deploy DNS enhancements...

-MM

-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
michael@neonym.net      |                              | http://www.neonym.net


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 18 14:19:11 2001
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Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 10:56:32 -0700
To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
From: Dave Crocker <dhc@dcrocker.net>
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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At 10:30 AM 10/18/2001, Michael Mealling wrote:
> > given that it would be new applications (given that we are talking about
> > new uses of the DNS) then having to make that small a change to an API
> > seems... a small matter.
>
>It depends on how you deploy it. Do you setup a whole new set of root
>nameservers on another port or do you use the existing port 53
>delegation process and then only switch ports when you get to the
>'last' nameserver?

This is a really excellent point for discussion, as would be others about 
making the idea practical.

First reaction, to the specific point you raise:  Using the same namespace 
lookup sequence -- ie, only making the leaf query be on a different port -- 
ensures that the namespace administration -- and operation -- is consistent 
and shared.


>I've looked at just about every single DNS client side implementation
>and for about 80% of the machines on today's internet it would be
>a hard thing to deploy. I'm not saying its a show stopper, just that
>if you do decide you want to do it you should make it clear to
>client developers how they should deal with it.

My simplistic view is that having the DNS client module switch ports based 
on the RR being sought would be sufficient.  And there is nothing wrong 
with having the responding "value-add DNS" server continue the friendly 
pattern of including additional, related-but-unrequested RRs, including 
relevant ones from the core DNS.

d/

----------
Dave Crocker  <mailto:dcrocker@brandenburg.com>
Brandenburg InternetWorking  <http://www.brandenburg.com>
tel +1.408.246.8253;  fax +1.408.273.6464



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 18 17:27:34 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011018091703.01eacf10@dcrocker.net>
	<5.1.0.14.2.20011016143043.00afad90@localhost>
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> just a slightly different take on John's "new class" approach...

actually, i'll take the blame for that one sick part of idea.

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 19 02:32:16 2001
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From: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>
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Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 21:16:34 -0500
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From: "Dave Crocker" <dhc@dcrocker.net>

> First reaction, to the specific point you raise:  Using the same
> namespace  lookup sequence -- ie, only making the leaf query be on a
> different port --  ensures that the namespace administration -- and
> operation -- is consistent  and shared.

If the namespace is the same, why do you need another port?





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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 19 12:11:46 2001
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Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2001 08:58:32 -0400
From: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
To: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
Message-ID: <20011019085832.O5336@bailey.dscga.com>
References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011018101713.03a83008@dcrocker.net> <5.1.0.14.2.20011018091703.01eacf10@dcrocker.net> <5.1.0.14.2.20011016143043.00afad90@localhost> <5.1.0.14.2.20011018091703.01eacf10@dcrocker.net> <5.1.0.14.2.20011018101713.03a83008@dcrocker.net> <5.1.0.14.2.20011018105030.03be5e20@dcrocker.net> <001101c15844$1358c650$0a0aa8c0@labs.ntrg.com>
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On Thu, Oct 18, 2001 at 09:16:34PM -0500, Eric A. Hall wrote:
> From: "Dave Crocker" <dhc@dcrocker.net>
> 
> > First reaction, to the specific point you raise:  Using the same
> > namespace  lookup sequence -- ie, only making the leaf query be on a
> > different port --  ensures that the namespace administration -- and
> > operation -- is consistent  and shared.
> 
> If the namespace is the same, why do you need another port?

Think of the new port as a protocol version number on the entire DNS
system itself. By moving stuff to another port you can effectively say
that DNS as we know it right now is frozen.

In order to use the current delegation system on port 53 you'd need
some way to tell a client where along the path the break to the other
port is going to be. Sort of like an NS record but add a port number...

-MM

-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
michael@neonym.net      |                              | http://www.neonym.net


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 19 12:50:24 2001
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From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
To: "'Dave Crocker'" <dhc@dcrocker.net>, Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: RE: same protocol, different ports
Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2001 09:32:00 -0700
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I think folk are porbably unerestimating the extent to which corporate
firewalls have closed down the scope for establishing new ports. In most
organizations the security officer running the firewall has no incentive to
allow new protocols to be supported and a pretty big disincentive.

What people are trying to do by attaching their barnacles to DNS is to
bypass the problem of building critical mass by leveraging an exisiting
network. Such people will have no interest in any procedure that denies them
ready made critical mass.

Port numbers have the additional disadvantage that the IESG have to exercise
some prudence to avoid falling victim to port number exhaustion. There may
well have to be a cull of little used protocols on well known ports in any
case. But the IESG have been very negative to using duplicate ports for the
same protocol.

There are several types of barnacle being attached to DNS

1) Internationalization.
	Support for international character sets in the DNS system is an
obvious and useful improvement.

2) Attempts to provide security to DNS
	This should not be regarded as scope creep, it should be considered
to be correcting a serious flaw in the original DNS protocol. 

3) Attempts to add in additional information
	These should all be directed towards appropriate use of the existing
SRV record, including those that involve certificates. It is not a good idea
to attempt to merege application certificates with DNS. The administrative
responsibilities of DNS are different to those of any appication PKI.

	I can't see why 1 or 2 should justify a new port. Type 3 barnicles
are almost certain to involve changes to DNS that would be much better
managed using another protocol, either an existing one (LDAP, CNRP) or
something new that will probably end up running over port 80.

		Phill

Phillip Hallam-Baker FBCS C.Eng.
Principal Scientist
VeriSign Inc.
pbaker@verisign.com
781 245 6996 x227


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dave Crocker [mailto:dhc@dcrocker.net]
> Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2001 1:57 PM
> To: Michael Mealling
> Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
> Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
> 
> 
> At 10:30 AM 10/18/2001, Michael Mealling wrote:
> > > given that it would be new applications (given that we 
> are talking about
> > > new uses of the DNS) then having to make that small a 
> change to an API
> > > seems... a small matter.
> >
> >It depends on how you deploy it. Do you setup a whole new set of root
> >nameservers on another port or do you use the existing port 53
> >delegation process and then only switch ports when you get to the
> >'last' nameserver?
> 
> This is a really excellent point for discussion, as would be 
> others about 
> making the idea practical.
> 
> First reaction, to the specific point you raise:  Using the 
> same namespace 
> lookup sequence -- ie, only making the leaf query be on a 
> different port -- 
> ensures that the namespace administration -- and operation -- 
> is consistent 
> and shared.
> 
> 
> >I've looked at just about every single DNS client side implementation
> >and for about 80% of the machines on today's internet it would be
> >a hard thing to deploy. I'm not saying its a show stopper, just that
> >if you do decide you want to do it you should make it clear to
> >client developers how they should deal with it.
> 
> My simplistic view is that having the DNS client module 
> switch ports based 
> on the RR being sought would be sufficient.  And there is 
> nothing wrong 
> with having the responding "value-add DNS" server continue 
> the friendly 
> pattern of including additional, related-but-unrequested RRs, 
> including 
> relevant ones from the core DNS.
> 
> d/
> 
> ----------
> Dave Crocker  <mailto:dcrocker@brandenburg.com>
> Brandenburg InternetWorking  <http://www.brandenburg.com>
> tel +1.408.246.8253;  fax +1.408.273.6464

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 19 12:54:05 2001
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Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2001 12:42:39 -0400
From: Andrew Brown <namedroppers@lists.graffiti.com>
To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
Cc: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
Message-ID: <20011019124239.A2497@noc.untraceable.net>
References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011018101713.03a83008@dcrocker.net> <5.1.0.14.2.20011018091703.01eacf10@dcrocker.net> <5.1.0.14.2.20011016143043.00afad90@localhost> <5.1.0.14.2.20011018091703.01eacf10@dcrocker.net> <5.1.0.14.2.20011018101713.03a83008@dcrocker.net> <5.1.0.14.2.20011018105030.03be5e20@dcrocker.net> <001101c15844$1358c650$0a0aa8c0@labs.ntrg.com> <20011019085832.O5336@bailey.dscga.com>
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>> If the namespace is the same, why do you need another port?
>
>Think of the new port as a protocol version number on the entire DNS
>system itself. By moving stuff to another port you can effectively say
>that DNS as we know it right now is frozen.
>
>In order to use the current delegation system on port 53 you'd need
>some way to tell a client where along the path the break to the other
>port is going to be. Sort of like an NS record but add a port number...

sounds like an srv record to me.  :)

-- 
|-----< "CODE WARRIOR" >-----|
codewarrior@daemon.org             * "ah!  i see you have the internet
twofsonet@graffiti.com (Andrew Brown)                that goes *ping*!"
andrew@crossbar.com       * "information is power -- share the wealth."


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 19 13:00:20 2001
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Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2001 12:44:55 -0400
From: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
To: Andrew Brown <atatat@atatdot.net>
Cc: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>, "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>,
        namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
Message-ID: <20011019124455.G21201@bailey.dscga.com>
References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011018101713.03a83008@dcrocker.net> <5.1.0.14.2.20011018091703.01eacf10@dcrocker.net> <5.1.0.14.2.20011016143043.00afad90@localhost> <5.1.0.14.2.20011018091703.01eacf10@dcrocker.net> <5.1.0.14.2.20011018101713.03a83008@dcrocker.net> <5.1.0.14.2.20011018105030.03be5e20@dcrocker.net> <001101c15844$1358c650$0a0aa8c0@labs.ntrg.com> <20011019085832.O5336@bailey.dscga.com> <20011019124239.A2497@noc.untraceable.net>
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On Fri, Oct 19, 2001 at 12:42:39PM -0400, Andrew Brown wrote:
> >> If the namespace is the same, why do you need another port?
> >
> >Think of the new port as a protocol version number on the entire DNS
> >system itself. By moving stuff to another port you can effectively say
> >that DNS as we know it right now is frozen.
> >
> >In order to use the current delegation system on port 53 you'd need
> >some way to tell a client where along the path the break to the other
> >port is going to be. Sort of like an NS record but add a port number...
> 
> sounds like an srv record to me.  :)

Yea, but an SRV in the middle of the delegation path. I guess it
would be a cross between DNAME and SRV. And you really wouldn't want
the weight and preference part of the SRV here either....

-MM

-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
michael@neonym.net      |                              | http://www.neonym.net


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 19 16:41:42 2001
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 <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F405869810@vhqpostal.verisign.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2001 16:09:16 -0400
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: RE: same protocol, different ports
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At 12:32 PM -0400 10/19/01, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
>3) Attempts to add in additional information

I'm trying hard to understand the rationale behind the desire to limit the
scope of data held in DNS.  These are the following reasons I can come up
with:

1) New data types engender more lookups and hence heavier load on the root
servers.  Regardless of the lookup, in a situation without cached data, the
root will be asked first.  The use of the srv record to fend off some kinds
of data won't reduce the load on the root servers (or others on the way
down the tree) becuase whether I am looking for the data (eg FOO) or a
reference to the data (SRV), I still hit the root first.

2) New data types might require additional processing of the name server.
E.g., when I ask for data with the DNSSEC OK bit on, the new SIG records
are added to the answer (if available).  This is an example of special
processing.  (This issue is also germain to the handling of
unknown-to-the-server types.)  If a new type does not require any
additional processing, how is one of it more or less harmful than one of
the traditional types?

3) New data may expand the scope of DNS beyond what its core protocol was
defined to support.  After spending many hours blindly poking at the
elephant that is DNS, my take on DNS is that it is a simple lookup service.
Meaning that directory searching, fuzzy matches, etc. are beyond the scope.
So what is the damage of putting a FOO record at a domain name instead of
an A record?  The core of the protocol doesn't seem to care what the value
of the type is, nor the internal wire format of the RDATA.

4) New data types deplete the type number's 16-bit space.  This I can
understand, but how quickly are we chewing through this space?  Perhaps I
am underestimating the concern here.  (Wouldn't IPv6 solve this?  Just
kidding folks.)

What technical reason am I missing?  What of the above am I misinterpreting?
What would be the big problem if I wanted to suggest a BRAND RR, which
stored a base64 encoding of the UTF-8 version of the computer's retailer?
(Kinda like a screwed up version of HINFO.)

Signed, confounded in Glenwood...

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

You fly too often when ... the airport taxi is on speed-dial.

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 19 17:28:48 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: RE: same protocol, different ports
References: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F405869810@vhqpostal.verisign.com>
	<v03130301b7f635600711@[199.171.39.21]>
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> I'm trying hard to understand the rationale behind the desire to limit the
> scope of data held in DNS.


It's perfectly appropriate to be upset. I thought of it in a slightly
different way--like a space that we were exploring and, in the early days,
we figured out this consistent path through the space: IP, TCP, and so
on. What's been happening over the last few years is that the IETF is
filling the rest of the space with every alternative approach, not
necessarily any better. Every possible alternative is now being written
down. And it's not useful.  -- Jon Postel




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 19 17:36:36 2001
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To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports 
In-Reply-To: Message from "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com> 
   of "Fri, 19 Oct 2001 09:32:00 PDT." <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F405869810@vhqpostal.verisign.com> 
Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2001 14:24:10 -0700
From: Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
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> 3) Attempts to add in additional information
> 	These should all be directed towards appropriate use of the existing
> SRV record, including those that involve certificates. It is not a good idea
> to attempt to merege application certificates with DNS. The administrative
> responsibilities of DNS are different to those of any appication PKI.

i'm not in full agreement here.  dns as a carrier for certain forms of PKI
could work very well IF DNS WAS SECURE.  for example i'd be very happy if
i could put my uuencode/base64/whatever PGP public key into a TXT RR at
paul.vix.com (assuming a '@' -> '.' mapping similar to that in SOA ANAME or
in an RP RR).  imagine if PGP didn't have to make an http or ftp connection
to retrieve my key!  i guess what i mean is, there's more than one kind of
PKI and it would be unwise to characterize DNS as unsuitable for all PKI
when in fact at least one known kind of key would fit into DNS just fine.

on the more general topic of adding random gibberish to DNS, i seem to recall
a recommendation by mike schwartz maybe 10 years ago when he was doing harvest
which would "tag" TXT RR's.  assuming that RFC6565 were the document that
specified an encoding, i'd expect to see

	$ORIGIN vix.com.
	paul		IN TXT	RFC6565 PGP KEY 2.6.2 (
	  "mQCNAzAK1x4AAAEEANkrzStNGbzzqskxspacnGdfxmxbhxrXl+pnGte5wGM8l70m"
	  "jqSExbbgsqSEPDuXvv/ClYmQBleCgvI3XTLo1yAIgSzL9MVtGKuOICV90/JYlt2Z"
	  "vtSturqKzEqcCaMWZPqyOkfpXRv6hYUTh0YTTeZ2G+e5651dQ3cdkq6JcsfBAAUR"
	  "tBlQYXVsIFZpeGllIDxwYXVsQHZpeC5jb20+"
	  "=2A+R" )

note the disturbing but intentional absense of outer quote (") marks.  TXT
has a segmented RDATA, so if you don't surround the whole RDATA in quotes
in the master file, BIND (at least; one assumes that other implementations
also do it this way) will preserve the field boundaries in the wire format.

also note that the word PGP in this example would be reserved with IANA when
this particular TXT encoding was RFC'd, and such RFC would specify (in this
example) that the next word was the version number the key required, and the
rest of the words ("TXT RDATA segments") were the key itself, in ascii armor
format.

this wouldn't work well with large values.  even assuming that TCP was used,
there's a limit of ~64K per RDATA.  but it should have been used in lieu of
"rwhois" and maybe LDAP as well.  new transports need better justification
than "adding new RR types to the DNS is too difficult."

of course, i am not volunteering to write RFC6565 (the container protocol in
the above example.)  "let's you and him fight."


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 19 17:49:03 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Mark Stapp <mjs@cisco.com>
Cc: mellon@nominum.com, gson@nominum.com,
        namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-03.txt to ps
References: <E15mJrH-000Bmg-00@rip.psg.com>
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> May I make that change and resubmit the -04 rev? Do you then submit that
> to the iesg, or do I need to do something to move it there?

there seem to be folk too tired to speak for themselves on the mailing list,
so they send this stuff to me in email.  as 2026 does not specify that one
has the right to confront one's accusors, i will forward anonymously :-)

1. Canonical format redefined instead of being inherited.

2. Does not define that this type is only allowed in class IN

3. Does not explicitly state if this is a singleton type or multiple
   DHCID RR can be in a set.

4. Section 3.4 should be structured something like:
         "digest is calculated over <dhcpid> | <option> | <canonical FQDN>"
         followed by list of what <dhcpid> + <option> pairs are allowed
         followed by paragraph defining how to convert each option into
         "digestable" data.
   Right now it is really hard to comprehend, I'm sure the authors
   understand this but interoperabilty is going to be a problem.

5. Section 3.2 references to RFC2535 base 64 should be in the beginning not
   at the end.

6. Section 3.1 should state that the DHCID is fixed length 18 bytes RR.
   Most of second paragraph does not belong, all text until "the DHCID
   resource" should be moved or deleted.  The "n bytes" MUST be changed to
   "16 bytes".

7. Last paragraph of section 2 is bogus, it is not this documents role to
   make statements about SHA1 being significantly slower than MD5, only to
   make the statement that MD5 is strong enough for this purpose.

8. Section 3.5 and 3.6 do not fit in section 3 but should be in new section
   4 called something like "Use of DHCID record by DHC servers" Section 3.7
   should be new section 3.5.

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 19 18:45:36 2001
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To: Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
References: <200110192124.f9JLOAH54164@as.vix.com>
From: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <200110192124.f9JLOAH54164@as.vix.com> (Paul A Vixie's message
 of "Fri, 19 Oct 2001 14:24:10 -0700")
Date: Sat, 20 Oct 2001 00:34:33 +0200
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Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com> writes:

>> 3) Attempts to add in additional information
>> 	These should all be directed towards appropriate use of the existing
>> SRV record, including those that involve certificates. It is not a good idea
>> to attempt to merege application certificates with DNS. The administrative
>> responsibilities of DNS are different to those of any appication PKI.
> 
> i'm not in full agreement here.  dns as a carrier for certain forms
> of PKI could work very well IF DNS WAS SECURE. for example i'd be
> very happy if i could put my uuencode/base64/whatever PGP public key
> into a TXT RR at paul.vix.com (assuming a '@' -> '.' mapping similar
> to that in SOA ANAME or in an RP RR).  imagine if PGP didn't have to
> make an http or ftp connection to retrieve my key!

You can do that now.  It doesn't require secure DNS.  My mail client
locates S/MIME certificates this way.

(As for _trusting_ the PGP or S/MIME key located this way, you need a
separate trust chain.  Secure DNS and trust of a certain DNSSEC key
isn't a replacement for that and will never be, unless you're trying
to make DNSSEC a full-blown PKI which it wasn't designed for and is
far from able to support, at least as the standards are written
today.)

> i guess what i mean is, there's more than one kind of PKI and it
> would be unwise to characterize DNS as unsuitable for all PKI when
> in fact at least one known kind of key would fit into DNS just fine.

I couldn't agree more!



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 19 18:52:42 2001
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Date: Sat, 20 Oct 2001 00:39:55 +0200 (MEST)
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
To: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
Cc: Bill Manning <bmanning@ISI.EDU>,
        =?iso-8859-1?q?=D3lafur_Gu=F0mundsson?= <ogud@ogud.com>,
        <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.33.0110181745430.22991-100000@lie.extundo.com>
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On Thu, 18 Oct 2001, Simon Josefsson wrote:

> FWIW there seem to be IPSEC implementations that uses TXT as well:
>
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic-02.txt

as I understand, this is implemented in Linux FreeS/WAN and they use TXT
to combine a public key and the address of a security gateway.
surprisingly, I can not find any references to the key exchange delegation
record (RFC 2230) in this draft and they seem to accomplish almost the
same thing.

if APPKEY+KX is not enough for this need (which I believe it is), I'd like
to get more feedback so we can consider whether APPKEY is missing any
additional data or not.

	jakob



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 19 19:41:01 2001
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Message-ID: <003201c158f5$cfcff9f0$0a0aa8c0@labs.ntrg.com>
From: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>
To: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Cc: <lewis@tislabs.com>
References: <v03130301b7f635600711@[199.171.39.21]>
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2001 18:28:51 -0500
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> From: "Edward Lewis" <lewis@tislabs.com>

> I'm trying hard to understand the rationale behind the desire to limit
> the scope of data held in DNS.

I didn't see the comment as an effort at limiting DNS so much as I saw it as a
question about the suitability of DNS as an extensible platform in the first
place. There are many many well-known reasons supporting that position
(assuming that was the statement made).

Personally I'd like to hear more about the base effort. The subject says "same
protocol" but so far it seems to be a new protocol that reuses the DNS message
and namespace, which doesn't really make a lot of sense, so that is probably
wrong. If there really is a new protocol, there's no reason whatsoever to use
DNS for anything other than SRV pointers to the new protocol space. The
existing delegation tree is the most important (and the only
future-functional) architectural aspect of DNS.





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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 19 20:13:47 2001
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Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2001 16:57:47 -0700 (PDT)
Message-Id: <200110192357.QAA14114@gulag.araneus.fi>
To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Cc: Mark Stapp <mjs@cisco.com>, mellon@nominum.com, gson@nominum.com,
        namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: wg last call for draft-ietf-dnsext-dhcid-rr-03.txt to ps
In-Reply-To: <E15uhKK-000FQK-00@rip.psg.com>
References: <E15mJrH-000Bmg-00@rip.psg.com>
	<E15uhKK-000FQK-00@rip.psg.com>
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Randy Bush writes:
> 3. Does not explicitly state if this is a singleton type or multiple
>    DHCID RR can be in a set.

No other RR type definition does that.  In practice, all the RR types
that have not been singled out (no pun intended) as singleton types by
specific language in RFC 1035, 2136, or 2181 are assumed to allow
multiple RRs.

If this really needs to be stated explicitly, I suggest the following
text:

  The DHCID RR type is not restricted to a single RR per RRSet.
  Although the protocol for resolution of name conflicts by means
  of DHCID RRs may in fact employ only a single DHCID RR per
  RRSet, any such limitation is a property of that protocol,
  not of the DHCID RR itself, and is to to be enforced by that
  protocol, not by the DNS implementation.

-- 
Andreas Gustafsson, gson@isc.org


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 22 11:14:39 2001
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To: Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
References: <200110192124.f9JLOAH54164@as.vix.com>
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: 22 Oct 2001 10:28:46 -0400
In-Reply-To: Paul A Vixie's message of "Fri, 19 Oct 2001 14:24:10 -0700"
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Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com> writes:

> i'm not in full agreement here.  dns as a carrier for certain forms of PKI
> could work very well IF DNS WAS SECURE.  for example i'd be very happy if
> i could put my uuencode/base64/whatever PGP public key into a TXT RR at
> paul.vix.com (assuming a '@' -> '.' mapping similar to that in SOA ANAME or
> in an RP RR).  imagine if PGP didn't have to make an http or ftp connection
> to retrieve my key!  i guess what i mean is, there's more than one kind of
> PKI and it would be unwise to characterize DNS as unsuitable for all PKI
> when in fact at least one known kind of key would fit into DNS just fine.

Actually, Paul, you don't need a secure DNS to be able to store PGP
(or X.509) Keys (Certs).  The reason: PGP certs are self-verifying.
The PGP client obtains the key from an "untrusted" source and then
verifies the key against other known keys.  You don't necessarily need
DNS Security for this operation.

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 22 11:14:50 2001
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To: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
References: <v03130301b7f635600711@[199.171.39.21]>
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: 22 Oct 2001 10:25:00 -0400
In-Reply-To: Edward Lewis's message of "Fri, 19 Oct 2001 16:09:16 -0400"
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Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com> writes:

> 1) New data types engender more lookups and hence heavier load on the root
> servers.  Regardless of the lookup, in a situation without cached data, the
> root will be asked first.  The use of the srv record to fend off some kinds
> of data won't reduce the load on the root servers (or others on the way
> down the tree) becuase whether I am looking for the data (eg FOO) or a
> reference to the data (SRV), I still hit the root first.

The key point here is "without cached data".  You are right that most
likely the FIRST lookup will not be cached, but subsequent lookups
will.  So for example the SRV request may require going through the
root servers, but then you'll already have the NS/A records cached for
that zone.  Then the A record lookups for the servers in question, and
subsequent CERT/APPKEY lookups, will NOT need to hose the root server
at all.

> 2) New data types might require additional processing of the name server.
> E.g., when I ask for data with the DNSSEC OK bit on, the new SIG records
> are added to the answer (if available).  This is an example of special
> processing.  (This issue is also germain to the handling of
> unknown-to-the-server types.)  If a new type does not require any
> additional processing, how is one of it more or less harmful than one of
> the traditional types?

This is perhaps "special processing", but from a security point of
view this is negligible.  Adding TSIG is certainly going to be more
cpu intensive than just returning a SIG record.  And performing
on-the-fly SIG-generation would be even more cpu intensive.

In my mind, a branch to decide whether to include an extra RRset is
truly negligible.

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 22 23:31:57 2001
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Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2001 18:22:23 +0200 (MEST)
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com>, <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
In-Reply-To: <sjm1yjviw9t.fsf@rcn.ihtfp.org>
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On 22 Oct 2001, Derek Atkins wrote:

> Actually, Paul, you don't need a secure DNS to be able to store PGP
> (or X.509) Keys (Certs).  The reason: PGP certs are self-verifying.
> The PGP client obtains the key from an "untrusted" source and then
> verifies the key against other known keys.  You don't necessarily need
> DNS Security for this operation.

you might however do want to put more trust in a PKIX certificate
retrieved from dns if it was verified using dnssec. Leif Johansson and I
have described this in an upcoming draft that will be submitted later this
week, preliminary abstract below:

    A major problem facing PKIX deployment and implementation is the
    problem of constructing certificate paths for input to the path
    validation algorithm. This draft describes the use of the DNS and
    DNSSEC as a certificate store and it's implication for path
    validation in PKIX.


	jakob



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 22 23:31:57 2001
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To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
Cc: Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com>, <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110221812460.17673-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: 22 Oct 2001 12:40:56 -0400
In-Reply-To: Jakob Schlyter's message of "Mon, 22 Oct 2001 18:22:23 +0200 (MEST)"
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Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se> writes:

> you might however do want to put more trust in a PKIX certificate
> retrieved from dns if it was verified using dnssec. Leif Johansson and I
> have described this in an upcoming draft that will be submitted later this
> week, preliminary abstract below:

This is true of PGP and other certificates as well.  The more lines of
validation, the better.  If you have the PGP Web of Trust (or X.509
Cert Chain) as well as a DNSSec SIG over the object, there is a higher
level of trust possible.

OTOH, do _you_ trust your DNS administrator to put your key up for
you?  How about if you're a CableModem/DSL subscriber?  What about if
you have a dynamic address?  There are LOTS of issues with putting
user/application keys into the DNS.  Not that I'm saying it should
be done -- I think there are a lot of GOOD reasons for putting app
keys into DNS.  I just think that we as a group should be aware of
the ramifications.

> 	jakob

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 22 23:31:59 2001
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Message-Id: <5.1.0.14.2.20011022090132.041e6968@dcrocker.net>
Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2001 10:09:34 -0700
To: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
From: Dave Crocker <dhc@dcrocker.net>
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
In-Reply-To: <003201c158f5$cfcff9f0$0a0aa8c0@labs.ntrg.com>
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At 04:28 PM 10/19/2001, Eric A. Hall wrote:
>Personally I'd like to hear more about the base effort. The subject says "same
>protocol" but so far it seems to be a new protocol that reuses the DNS message
>and namespace

same protocol = the packet formats are the same and the rules for 
exchanging them are the same.

The suggested differences were:

1.  Permit long-term divergence of the protocol, IFF necessary.  At the 
moment, I do not see the need for making any changes to the base protocol, 
but it is important to permit the divergence if a requirement later emerges.

2.  Permit support of additional RRs, for uses outside of core Internet 
name/address mapping.  Adding RRs does not change the protocol.

3.  A different port, for the additional RRs, so that administration and 
lookup traffic are independent of the core Internet name/address mapping.

Hence, the primary focus is on administrative independence, rather than 
technical independence.  As stated in the original note, messing with 
infrastructure services is dangerous.  All of these value-added uses of the 
DNS protocol are serious, interesting, and probably useful.

However there is nothing about them that requires them to share the 
Internet's core mapping service.  Quite the opposite.  Separating the 
administration and operation of these additional services is likely to make 
their adoption much easier.

d/

d/


----------
Dave Crocker  <mailto:dcrocker@brandenburg.com>
Brandenburg InternetWorking  <http://www.brandenburg.com>
tel +1.408.246.8253;  fax +1.408.273.6464



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 22 23:43:53 2001
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To: lafur Guðmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
Cc: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>, <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <v0313034bb7f3532e63ca@[199.171.39.21]> <5.1.0.14.2.20011017140806.02a3ccf0@localhost>
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: 22 Oct 2001 14:39:28 -0400
In-Reply-To: Ólafur  Guðmundsson's message of "Wed, 17 Oct 2001 14:46:38 -0400"
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=?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_Gu=F0mundsson?= <ogud@ogud.com> writes:

> You bring up a interesting point.
> Some applications have CERT usage defined and should use CERT records.
> 
> The question is more for applications that do NOT have certificates
> defined how can they advertise public keys ?
> 
> I do not think this is one shoe fits all situation.

Ignore the similarities between the word "Certificate" and the RR type
"CERT".  What we have/need is a generic means for applications to store
public keying, authenticating, and authorizing information within the DNS.
>From a DNS point of view, this key/auth data can be an opaque blob that
is handed to the relevant application.

There is absolutely no reason that a 'CERT' record cannot be used
for generic (non-self-verifying) public keys.  All that needs to
happen is the application needs to know the DNSSec validity of the
record.

Here are some examples:

1) PGP Keys are self-verifying.  A PGP Application can obtain a key
   from an untrusted source and verify the key using signatures that
   are stored with the key (Note: I am *NOT* calling this a
   certificate!).  If a PGP key is stored in a CERT record, the PGP
   Application can look up the key, ignore DNSSec, and validate the
   key by itself.  In this case, DNSSec is an added benefit, but not
   necessary for the application.

2) SSH Keys are currently not self-verifying.  They are raw keys.
   Currently an SSH application only verifies the linkability of keys.
   In other words, is the key I got from the host this time the same
   key that was presented the last time?  This key list is maintained
   by the client application (a way of "self-signing" certificates).
   Obviously, there is a potential for an attacker the first time you
   connect to a host.

   The question is how would SSH interact with DNS for keys?  If DNS
   is going to be used in lieu of the private key-cache, then it is
   absolutely vital for the client to authenticate the keys.  This
   means that an SSH applicatin would necessarily want to see the
   DNSSec validation of the key material.  However, note that this can
   STILL be done as a CERT record.

The only difference between how PGP and SSH would use keys in DNS is
whether the application needs to verify the DNSSec signature on the
key.  All that requires is that the lookup API provide that
information back to the application.  PGP can ignore it; SSH can use
it.

Nothing in these two examples say that PGP and SSH necessarily need
different record types.  CERT would work for both of them.  APPKEY
would work for both of them.

One thing to keep in mind if we have multiple key types: What if some
day SSH does provide optional X.509 or PGP support?  Would you require
SSH to use both key types, and maintainers to store keys in multiple
locations?

As a security person, I maintain that all (public) keys should be
treated equal, regardless of how they are encoded or what additional
information is contained alongside in the encoding.

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 23 09:52:17 2001
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 =?iso-8859-1?Q?Gu=F0mundsson=27s?= message of 
 "Wed, 17 Oct 2001 14:46:38 -0400" <v0313034bb7f3532e63ca@[199.171.39.21]> <5.1.0.14.2.20011017140806.02a3ccf0@localhost>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2001 00:06:52 -0400
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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At 2:39 PM -0400 10/22/01, Derek Atkins wrote:
>There is absolutely no reason that a 'CERT' record cannot be used
>for generic (non-self-verifying) public keys.

I can think of one reason - no one has submitted a draft defining how this
could be done. (;))


-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

You fly too often when ... the airport taxi is on speed-dial.

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC
	Author(s)	: D. Conrad
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-okbit-03.txt
	Pages		: 5
	Date		: 22-Oct-01
	
In order to deploy DNSSEC operationally, DNSSEC aware servers should
only perform automatic inclusion of DNSSEC RRs when there is an
explicit indication that the resolver can understand those RRs. This
document proposes the use of a bit in the EDNS0 header to provide
that explicit indication and the necessary protocol changes to
implement that notification.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 24 11:52:05 2001
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Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2001 10:27:57 -0400 (EDT)
From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
To: DNSEXT mailing list <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: DNSEXT WGLC  Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-okbit-03.txt
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On Tue, 23 Oct 2001 Internet-Drafts@ietf.org wrote:

> 	Title		: Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC
> 	Author(s)	: D. Conrad
> 	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-okbit-03.txt
> 	Pages		: 5
> 	Date		: 22-Oct-01

This document has been sitting in the RFC editors queue for some time
while we finished creating a registry for the DNS header bits. 

There are two changes from the prior version
1. Minor edits for clarity. 

2. The document now specifies that OK bit MUST be copied from the 
EDNS query header to the ENDS answer header.
The prior version was silent on this issue.
This change was prompted by an implementor clarification request to the
author. 

Does any member of the working group object to the changes? 
(see diff of all text changes below)

The WGLC will finish on October 31 at 23:00 UTC. 

	Olafur 

--- ok-02.txt	Tue Oct 23 10:21:05 2001
+++ ok-03.txt	Tue Oct 23 10:21:11 2001
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@
    only perform automatic inclusion of DNSSEC RRs when there is an
    explicit indication that the resolver can understand those RRs. This
    document proposes the use of a bit in the EDNS0 header to provide
-   that explicit indication and the necessary protocol changes to
-   implement that notification.
+   that explicit indication and describes the necessary protocol changes
+   to implement that notification.
 
 1. Introduction
 
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
    from classic headers as queries are passed on to authoritative
    servers, the use of a bit from the EDNS0 header is proposed.
 
-   An alternative approach would be to use the existance of an EDNS0
+   An alternative approach would be to use the existence of an EDNS0
    header as an implicit indication of client-side support of DNSSEC.
    This approach was not chosen as there may be applications in which
    EDNS0 is supported but in which the use of DNSSEC is inappropriate.
@@ -125,8 +125,8 @@
    the most significant bit of the Z field on the EDNS0 OPT header in
    the query.  This bit is referred to as the "DNSSEC OK" (DO) bit.  In
    the context of the EDNS0 OPT meta-RR, the DO bit is the first bit of
-   the the third and fourth bytes of the "extended RCODE and flags"
-   portion of the EDNS0 OPT meta-RR, structured as follows:
+   the third and fourth bytes of the "extended RCODE and flags" portion
+   of the EDNS0 OPT meta-RR, structured as follows:
 
                 +0 (MSB)                +1 (LSB)
          +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
@@ -139,7 +139,8 @@
    resolver is able to accept DNSSEC security RRs.  The DO bit cleared
    (set to zero) indicates the resolver is unprepared to handle DNSSEC
    security RRs and those RRs MUST NOT be returned in the response
-   (unless DNSSEC security RRs are explicitly queried for).
+   (unless DNSSEC security RRs are explicitly queried for).  The DO bit
+   of the query MUST be copied in the response.
 
    More explicitly, DNSSEC-aware nameservers MUST NOT insert SIG, KEY,
    or NXT RRs to authenticate a response as specified in [RFC2535]
@@ -156,14 +157,14 @@
    data MUST NOT be modified.
 
    In the event a server returns a NOTIMP, FORMERR or SERVFAIL response
-   to a query that has the DO bit set, the resolver SHOULD NOT expect
 
 
 
 
 
 
-   DNSSEC security RRs and SHOULD retry the query without the EDNS0 in
+   to a query that has the DO bit set, the resolver SHOULD NOT expect
+   DNSSEC security RRs and SHOULD retry the query without EDNS0 in
    accordance with section 5.3 of [RFC2671].
 
 Security Considerations
@@ -175,8 +176,8 @@
 
 IANA considerations:
 
-   EDNS0[RFC2761] defines 16 bits as extened flags in the OPT record,
-   these bits are encoded into the TTL field of the OPT record (RFC2761
+   EDNS0[RFC2671] defines 16 bits as extended flags in the OPT record,
+   these bits are encoded into the TTL field of the OPT record (RFC2671
    section 4.6).
 
    This document reserves one of these bits as the OK bit. It is
@@ -227,7 +228,7 @@
    Redwood City, CA 94063
    USA
 
-   Phone: +1 650 779 6003
+   Phone: +1 650 381 6003
 
    Email: david.conrad@nominum.com
 
 
 
 



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 24 11:52:10 2001
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Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2001 11:39:55 -0400
To: David Blacka <davidb@research.netsol.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_Gu=F0mundsson?=
  <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: Re: comments on delegation signer
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At 04:28 PM 10/16/2001, David Blacka wrote:
>I have a few comments about the Delegation Signer draft
><draft-ietf-dnsext-delegation-signer-02.txt>.
>
>First is a fairly minor issue: the DS draft states that in the textual
>representation of a DS record, HEX should be used to display the SHA-1
>hash.  However, this is inconsistent with the other DNSSEC RR types.
>This forces implementors to create or have access to a base16
>conversion library, in addition to a base64 library.  I can see no
>particularly compelling reason to use hex here, especially considering
>that base64 is sufficient for the other DNSSEC records.


I do not like this change
Reasons:
    As pointed out by Derek all key foot prints use HEX.
    It is simpler to check HEX than base64 (case sensitive) and read it over
         the phone.
    Base64 was opposed by implementors for SIG and KEY records but won
         because of the savings for large records both is size and processing
         time. Contents of KEY and SIG records are not designed for human
         consumption, DS is designed to be human readable.
    Unknown RR also specifies HEX.


>My second comment centers around how resolvers determine the security
>status of a child zone under this draft.
>
>Section 2.2 states
>
>   "If a DS RR set accompanies the NS RR set, the intent is to state
>   that the child zone is secured. If an NS RR set exists without a DS
>   RR set the intent is to state that the child zone is unsecure."
>
>This presents (I think) a security flaw.
>
>If we posit the existence of a sophisticated "man in the middle"
>attacker that can arbitrarily change DNS response packets, then this
>attacker can convert a secure delegation to an unsecure, hijacked
>destination by removing the DS records and signatures and altering the
>unsigned NS records.

You are right DS as specified has a flaw, in that Secure RFC2535
answer is identical to Unsecure DS answer. This is exploitable as
you say and confuses resolvers.


>This vulnerability does not exist using RFC 2535 semantics.  This
>attacker could only convert an unsecure delegation to a secure one (by
>removing the NULL KEY), which does him no good.  He cannot convert a
>secure delegation to an unsecure one, because that would require the
>ability to sign a NULL KEY record.


A sophisticated attack by a entity that sees all queries from a particular
resolver can convince that resolver that there is NO DNSSEC in use in the
world, thus defeating RFC2535 as well as DS.
DNSSEC protection against "man in the middle" attacks is transaction 
signatures (SIG(0) and TSIG). Any interaction without them is vulnerable
to this attack.


>Instead, a better approach might be to require DS enabled servers to
>return either:
>
>    NS RR set + DS RR set + SIG{DS} set (for secure delegations)
>
>    OR
>
>    NS RR set + NXT + SIG{NXT}.         (for insecure delegations)
>
>The NXT record needs to show the non-existence of a DS (or KEY) RR
>set.
>
>Merely receiving NS RRs could either be an error (if we are aware that
>the zone is using DS) or could be interpreted as a SIG@child
>delegation.

I do not like writing an additional section processing rules that
are dependant if a particular RR set has been added to the additional
section before it. How about changing the current NS set additional section
rule from
         NS + A*
to
         NS  + A* + DS + NXT

In the chase where DS is present the NXT is redundant but harmless.



>This could eliminate the need for a SEC RR or bit in the KEY record to
>indicate use of DS, as there would be no ambiguous cases:
>
>delegation:     sec         unsec
>             +---------+---------------+
>   SIG@child | NS      | NS, NULL KEY, |
>             | only    | SIG{KEY}      |
>             +---------+---------------+
>         DS  | NS,DS   | NS, NXT       |
>             | SIG{DS} | SIG{NXT}      |
>             +---------+---------------+

The problem is still that the NXT in the states "sec SIG@child" and
"unsec DS" is identical. A third approach to the two you mention above
is to reserve a bit in the NXT to signal "NO DS at this delegation".
This consumes one type code from DNS but we are only up to 42 so far,
or we can reuse one of the unused type codes that have been allocated but
never used, say SINK (40).

I plan on reissuing the DS draft on Friday with NO-DS bit in NXT,
unless the working group thinks that KEY flag or depend on the
unspecified SEC RR is the way to go.

         Olafur


         Olafur



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Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 02:06:57 +0200
From: Martin Fredriksson <m@crt.se>
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>,
        Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>,
        namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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--On m=E5ndag 22 oktober 2001 14.39 -0400 Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>=20
wrote:

> The only difference between how PGP and SSH would use keys in DNS is
> whether the application needs to verify the DNSSec signature on the
> key.  All that requires is that the lookup API provide that
> information back to the application.  PGP can ignore it; SSH can use
> it.

This is a BIG difference.  I have seen a lot of cases where "public keys"=20
are being confused with "certificates".   They are different entities, and=20
I support all means for keeping that difference clear and obvious.  I think =

Jakob expressed it very well in a previous mail in this thread:

>> the primary issue here is that a CERT carries its own security,
>> independently of DNSSEC - APPKEY does not, but APPKEY+SIG(APPKEY) does.

I think it is a distinct advantage in making it clear where DNSSEC provides =

the basic security infrastructure (APPKEY) and where it does not (CERT).

/m

--
--------------------------------------------------------------
Martin Fredriksson                     Email: m@crt.se
Carlstedt Research & Technology AB     Phone:  +46 31 7014200
Stora Badhusgatan 18-20                Direct: +46 31 7014237
SE-41121  GOTEBORG                     Mobile: +46 70 5208339
SWEDEN                                 W3: http://www.crt.se/
 


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 24 12:47:27 2001
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From: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>
To: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
References: <v03130301b7f635600711@[199.171.39.21]> <5.1.0.14.2.20011022090132.041e6968@dcrocker.net>
Subject: Re: same protocol, different ports
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From: "Dave Crocker" <dhc@dcrocker.net>
To: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Sent: Monday, October 22, 2001 12:09 PM


> At 04:28 PM 10/19/2001, Eric A. Hall wrote:
> >Personally I'd like to hear more about the base effort. The subject
> >says "same protocol" but so far it seems to be a new protocol that
> >reuses the DNS message and namespace

I still don't understand what you're trying to achieve with this but I will
give some generic responses. I've been working on a personal draft that
discusses some of these issues which you may or may not find useful (see
http://www.ehsco.com/misc/draft-hall-dns-data-00.txt, completion pending the
acquisition of performance related data).

> same protocol = the packet formats are the same and the rules for
> exchanging them are the same.
>
> The suggested differences were:
>
> 1.  Permit long-term divergence of the protocol, IFF necessary.  At the >
moment, I do not see the need for making any changes to the base
> protocol,  but it is important to permit the divergence if a
> requirement later emerges.


DNS is a message, a protocol, and a namespace. The unarguably crippled
component is the message (no version field, fixed length predefined fields,
maximum message-sizing constraints with UDP and TCP, etc.). Reusing the
message for anything is suicidal. By the time you fixed the problems with the
message (at the least adding a version field so that you CAN make changes
later), you would not have anything like what you started with. You would be
better off starting from scratch.

The protocol has lots of minor problems (fixed timers for example), but no
major limitations apart from those inherited by message restrictions (EG lack
of per-user authentication due to issues with the message structure), unless
you also consider some of DNS' features as problems (transparent caching =
lack of cache management). Mimicing the protocol makes sense if you're
interested in replicating the lookup-centric, cache-laden, unauthenticated
functionality. These are compelling features for a lot of uses, but they are
also preventative for a lot of uses (storing and reading logged-in users, for
example). Introducing features like authenticated cache management controls
are not simple modifications to the DNS protocol as it exists today.

The namespace only has one fundamental problem apart from the message, which
is that delegation and authority are represented by a common NS RR (if they
had used separate RRs, cache pollution would not have been as much of a
problem). But if you're designing a spanking-new protocol, then defining a
separate namespace would also make sense, at least so that you could define a
robust delegation mechanism from the beginning (to the extent that your
protocol may or may not provide service-specific delegation). Also, having to
manage data from an external service is not a new dimension to zone operation
that's particularly desirable. EG, how would this (potentially weird-looking)
data affect zone transfers?

>From your note, you are talking about a new message and namespace, and
probably a new protocol. If you're doing all this work, why not start from
scratch and do it cleanly?

--
Eric A. Hall                                        http://www.ehsco.com/
Internet Core Protocols          http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 24 13:17:21 2001
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Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2001 22:57:06 -0400
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= Gudmundsson/DNSEXT co-chair <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: DNSEXT WG last call GSS-tsig-03
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The TSIG protocol provides transaction level authentication for DNS.
TSIG is extensible through the definition of new algorithms.  This
document specifies an algorithm based on the Generic Security Service
Application Program Interface (GSS-API) (RFC2743).

This WG last call ends November 8'th 2001.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-gss-tsig-03.txt

This draft is on standards track, if you disagree with that please state why
in your response.

The chair has been informed that there are at least two inter operable
implementations deployed.

	Olafur



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 24 13:17:23 2001
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To: Martin Fredriksson <m@crt.se>
Cc: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>,
        Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>,
        namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <4711141.1003889217@localhost>
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: 24 Oct 2001 09:49:06 -0400
In-Reply-To: Martin Fredriksson's message of "Wed, 24 Oct 2001 02:06:57 +0200"
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Martin Fredriksson <m@crt.se> writes:

> This is a BIG difference.  I have seen a lot of cases where "public keys"=20
> are being confused with "certificates".   They are different entities, and=20
> I support all means for keeping that difference clear and obvious.  I think =

No, it's a small difference, and that difference is ONLY a difference
to the application.  As far as DNS itself is concerned, there is no
difference.

The application needs to know whether to check DNSSec.  It can tell
that based upon the data it received from the response.  Keep in mind
that a security application SHOULD NOT depend upon DNSSec verification
outside the local resolver.  This means that the application itself
should get a "DNSSec verified" flag (and potentially even access to
the KEY/SIG records).

As far as DNS is concerned, there is no difference.  If you're trying
to save yourself trouble by only partially signing a zone (so you can
avoid signing CERT records), I believe you are doing yourself a
disservice.

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 24 13:38:37 2001
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Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 16:52:16 +0200
From: Martin Fredriksson <m@crt.se>
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>,
        Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>,
        namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <7451205.1003942336@[10.0.0.1]>
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--On onsdag 24 oktober 2001 09.49 -0400 Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU> 
wrote:

> Martin Fredriksson <m@crt.se> writes:
>
>> This is a BIG difference.  I have seen a lot of cases where "public
>> keys"=20 are being confused with "certificates".   They are different
>> entities, and=20 I support all means for keeping that difference clear
>> and obvious.  I think =
>
> No, it's a small difference, and that difference is ONLY a difference
> to the application.  As far as DNS itself is concerned, there is no
> difference.

I agree about the latter.  I strongly disagree about the former.  There is 
no ONLY about this difference, at least not in my experience.

> The application needs to know whether to check DNSSec.  It can tell
> that based upon the data it received from the response.  Keep in mind
> that a security application SHOULD NOT depend upon DNSSec verification
> outside the local resolver.  This means that the application itself
> should get a "DNSSec verified" flag (and potentially even access to
> the KEY/SIG records).
>
> As far as DNS is concerned, there is no difference.  If you're trying
> to save yourself trouble by only partially signing a zone (so you can
> avoid signing CERT records), I believe you are doing yourself a
> disservice.

I agree.

/m



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 24 13:39:23 2001
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Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 16:52:06 +0200
From: Martin Fredriksson <m@crt.se>
To: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
Cc: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>,
        namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <7450556.1003942325@[10.0.0.1]>
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--On onsdag 24 oktober 2001 12.10 +0200 Simon Josefsson=20
<sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com> wrote:

> Martin Fredriksson <m@crt.se> writes:
>
>> --On m=E5ndag 22 oktober 2001 14.39 -0400 Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> The only difference between how PGP and SSH would use keys in DNS is
>>> whether the application needs to verify the DNSSec signature on the
>>> key.  All that requires is that the lookup API provide that
>>> information back to the application.  PGP can ignore it; SSH can use
>>> it.
>>
>> This is a BIG difference.  I have seen a lot of cases where "public
>> keys" are being confused with "certificates".   They are different
>> entities, and I support all means for keeping that difference clear
>> and obvious.
>
> From a DNS point of view: Why?  How would DNS software handle "public
> keys" and "certificates" differently?

It would not.  I was talking from an application/user perspective.

> If DNS software does not have to treat CERT and APPKEY differently,
> why should DNS software (and DNS administrators) need to be aware of
> the difference?
>
> The purpose of APPKEY/CERT is to provide applications with some kind
> of security related data, maybe the distinction between public keys,
> certificates and whatnot should be in the application instead of DNS.

It should.  My argument for APPKEY is that it helps to keep the distinction =

more obvious.

> Also, we have only talked about "certificates" and "public keys" so
> far but there will likely be other information that applications may
> wish to store in DNS, such as:
>
> * Pointer to CA roots for use within a domain
> * Kerberos Realm (this is already being stored in DNS but is a good
>   example of this kind of data)
> * Realm for SASL mechanisms
> * ... other realmlike information, or CA root like information
>
> Having a application-independent RR for each of these purposes,
> APPREALM and APPCAROOT etc, seems complex and unnecessary to me.
>
> The two extremes are one RR per application, or one RR for all
> application security related information.  I vote for the latter since
> it is probably easier to deploy within DNS.

I believe we should solve one problem at a time.  I do not think a generic=20
"security related information" RR is the solution.  We will never be able=20
to cover all cases anyway.  At least that is my gut feeling.

> The middle way of having several RRs to hold application security data
> is not perfect, I think.  Consder SSH.  Maybe SSH starts to support
> certificate-like public containers (X.509, PGP, SPKI etc) as well as
> raw keys, then the SSH client need to query for both APPKEY and CERT
> to find what the server uses.  Maybe SSH adds support for Kerberos,
> then it need to query for yet another RR to find the realm.  Maybe SSH
> adds support for SASL and some SASL mechanism need realm information.
> Maybe SSH adds support for other security stuff that needs some kind
> of data, then we're up to querying for 5 different RRs each time the
> client make a connection.  I don't think this scales well.

Hmm, this all depends on _when_ you do the lookup.  You of course need to=20
know what to ask for, and you won't know that until you have started=20
talking to the server.  I don't see the problem.

/m



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 24 13:58:09 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
Cc: DNSEXT mailing list <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: DNSEXT WGLC  Re: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-okbit-03.txt
References: <200110231102.HAA25428@ietf.org>
	<Pine.BSF.4.21.0110231011300.86724-100000@hlid.dc.ogud.com>
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> 2. The document now specifies that OK bit MUST be copied from the 
> EDNS query header to the ENDS answer header.
> The prior version was silent on this issue.
> This change was prompted by an implementor clarification request to the
> author. 

i think this was a good change

randy, with chair hat off


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 25 10:58:29 2001
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To: Martin Fredriksson <m@crt.se>
Cc: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>,
        namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <4711141.1003889217@localhost>
	<m3vgh5pcw1.fsf@sjosefsson-pc.d.dynas.se>
	<7450556.1003942325@[10.0.0.1]>
From: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <7450556.1003942325@[10.0.0.1]> (Martin Fredriksson's message
 of "Wed, 24 Oct 2001 16:52:06 +0200")
Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2001 12:09:29 +0200
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Martin Fredriksson <m@crt.se> writes:

>> Also, we have only talked about "certificates" and "public keys" so
>> far but there will likely be other information that applications may
>> wish to store in DNS, such as:
>>
>> * Pointer to CA roots for use within a domain
>> * Kerberos Realm (this is already being stored in DNS but is a good
>>   example of this kind of data)
>> * Realm for SASL mechanisms
>> * ... other realmlike information, or CA root like information
>>
>> Having a application-independent RR for each of these purposes,
>> APPREALM and APPCAROOT etc, seems complex and unnecessary to me.
>>
>> The two extremes are one RR per application, or one RR for all
>> application security related information.  I vote for the latter since
>> it is probably easier to deploy within DNS.
> 
> I believe we should solve one problem at a time.  I do not think a generic
> "security related information" RR is the solution.  We will never be able
> to cover all cases anyway.  At least that is my gut feeling.

If the RR does not say anything about how it must be used by, I think
it would cover all cases because the interpretation of the RR would be
left to the application, so it can be used to store certificates,
keys, realms, ca root pointers and whatnot.

(If it is a good thing to store all that junk in DNS is a different
discussion, though.)

>> The middle way of having several RRs to hold application security data
>> is not perfect, I think.  Consder SSH.  Maybe SSH starts to support
>> certificate-like public containers (X.509, PGP, SPKI etc) as well as
>> raw keys, then the SSH client need to query for both APPKEY and CERT
>> to find what the server uses.  Maybe SSH adds support for Kerberos,
>> then it need to query for yet another RR to find the realm.  Maybe SSH
>> adds support for SASL and some SASL mechanism need realm information.
>> Maybe SSH adds support for other security stuff that needs some kind
>> of data, then we're up to querying for 5 different RRs each time the
>> client make a connection.  I don't think this scales well.
> 
> Hmm, this all depends on _when_ you do the lookup.  You of course need to
> know what to ask for, and you won't know that until you have started
> talking to the server.

I don't think that is generic, there may well be protocols that
require you to know the public key of the recipient before you talk to
him (since, for example, the stuff you send should be encrypted to the
recipient).

Sending PKCS#7/CMS blobs via mail is an example of such protocol.

Hey, even IPSEC with oppurtunistic encryption is a example if I
understand draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic-02.txt correctly.

I don't know the SSH protocol so I couldn't say if this applies there
as well, but generically I wouldn't place much trust in what a
not-yet-authenticated server would tell me about where I should get
his public key.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 25 10:58:31 2001
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To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <v0313034bb7f3532e63ca@[199.171.39.21]>
	<5.1.0.14.2.20011017140806.02a3ccf0@localhost>
	<v03130303b7fa9c6e46b9@[65.174.249.227]>
From: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <v03130303b7fa9c6e46b9@[65.174.249.227]> (Edward Lewis's
 message of "Tue, 23 Oct 2001 00:06:52 -0400")
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2001 18:08:21 +0200
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(Resent to the list only, because of subscription address problems)

Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com> writes:

> At 2:39 PM -0400 10/22/01, Derek Atkins wrote:
>>There is absolutely no reason that a 'CERT' record cannot be used
>>for generic (non-self-verifying) public keys.
> 
> I can think of one reason - no one has submitted a draft defining how this
> could be done. (;))

I promised to work on such a draft, but I find very little to write
about.  RFC 2538 contains most of it already.

In reviewing RFC 2538, I find that the only thing lacking are:

- A high-level description of the big picture as far as generic,
non-certificate based, application security goes.

- The removal of two sections that are probably better of in separate
documents. Namely section 3.1 (X.509 owner name guidelines, which are
poor) and section 3.2 (PGP owner name guidelines, which are good).

- The title should probably be changed to say "application specific
security material" (or similar) instead of "certificate" as well.

If people do not find RFC 2538 clear enough, and that there are no
real technical details that would fit into a separate draft, maybe a
Son-of-RFC2538 is the solution.  How do you all feel about that?  In
particular, perhaps, the authors of RFC 2538.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 25 10:58:32 2001
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To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <4711141.1003889217@localhost>
From: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <4711141.1003889217@localhost> (Martin Fredriksson's message of
 "Wed, 24 Oct 2001 02:06:57 +0200")
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 12:10:06 +0200
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(Resent to the list only, because of subscription address problems)

Martin Fredriksson <m@crt.se> writes:

> --On m=E5ndag 22 oktober 2001 14.39 -0400 Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
> wrote:
>
>> The only difference between how PGP and SSH would use keys in DNS is
>> whether the application needs to verify the DNSSec signature on the
>> key.  All that requires is that the lookup API provide that
>> information back to the application.  PGP can ignore it; SSH can use
>> it.
>
> This is a BIG difference.  I have seen a lot of cases where "public
> keys" are being confused with "certificates".   They are different
> entities, and I support all means for keeping that difference clear
> and obvious.

From a DNS point of view: Why?  How would DNS software handle "public
keys" and "certificates" differently?

If DNS software does not have to treat CERT and APPKEY differently,
why should DNS software (and DNS administrators) need to be aware of
the difference?

The purpose of APPKEY/CERT is to provide applications with some kind
of security related data, maybe the distinction between public keys,
certificates and whatnot should be in the application instead of DNS.

Also, we have only talked about "certificates" and "public keys" so
far but there will likely be other information that applications may
wish to store in DNS, such as:

* Pointer to CA roots for use within a domain
* Kerberos Realm (this is already being stored in DNS but is a good
  example of this kind of data)
* Realm for SASL mechanisms
* ... other realmlike information, or CA root like information

Having a application-independent RR for each of these purposes,
APPREALM and APPCAROOT etc, seems complex and unnecessary to me.

The two extremes are one RR per application, or one RR for all
application security related information.  I vote for the latter since
it is probably easier to deploy within DNS.

The middle way of having several RRs to hold application security data
is not perfect, I think.  Consder SSH.  Maybe SSH starts to support
certificate-like public containers (X.509, PGP, SPKI etc) as well as
raw keys, then the SSH client need to query for both APPKEY and CERT
to find what the server uses.  Maybe SSH adds support for Kerberos,
then it need to query for yet another RR to find the realm.  Maybe SSH
adds support for SASL and some SASL mechanism need realm information.
Maybe SSH adds support for other security stuff that needs some kind
of data, then we're up to querying for 5 different RRs each time the
client make a connection.  I don't think this scales well.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 25 12:18:42 2001
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Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2001 08:46:31 -0700
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Bob Fink <fink@es.net>
Subject: ipv6-smtp-requirement comments?
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DNSEXT WG,

The following NGTRANS ipv6-smtp-requirement I-D has just finished WG last 
call for forwarding as an Informational RFC. Randy Bush (our AD) suggested 
that we also circulate it to various groups that might have comments 
otherwise uncovered in ngtrans as it also covers practice.

<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ngtrans-ipv6-smtp-requirement-03.txt>

So, please let the ngtrans list now if you have any problems with 
forwarding this draft, preferably by 1 November.


Thanks,


Bob Fink
ngtrans co-chair



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 25 12:20:00 2001
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References: <7450556.1003942325@[10.0.0.1]> (Martin Fredriksson's message
 of "Wed, 24 Oct 2001 16:52:06 +0200") <4711141.1003889217@localhost>
 <m3vgh5pcw1.fsf@sjosefsson-pc.d.dynas.se>	<7450556.1003942325@[10.0.0.1]>
Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2001 11:52:21 -0400
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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I think we are going in circles again.

We are talking about storing two kinds of information in DNS.

1) Certificates, which I understand to be structures that include a public
key and associate it with identity information and are usually, if not
always, signed by some agency.  (Personally I discount self-signed
certificates as I can't figure out what they prove.)

2) Public Keys, which I understand are numbers that interact with a Private
Key to do some magic.

A public key is an ingredient in a certificate (at least within the realm
of what I think it the discussion).

We are talking about a number of ways of storing these two things in DNS.

1) RFC 2538 (CERT) defines a structure to hold certificates.  The document
does go so far as to state that certificates are signed, etc., as described
in the first category above.  Some folks have gone on to state that this is
over restrictive and that the RFC doesn't mean what it states.

2) The KEY RR in RFC 2535 defines a means for holding public keys.

3) The APPKEY RR internet draft defines another mechanism for holding
public keys that is more ameanable to application use.  E.g., the KEY RR
does not have the ability to convey application version information that is
needed by, SSH when considering v1 and v2 public keys.

The "camps" of dicsussion fall into one group wanting to define a new key
record, the APPKEY, and keep the CERT record for its textually described
use.  Another camp wants to avoid the use of the APPKEY and reuse the CERT
record.

So much for the objective part of my message.

As far as reusing the CERT RR, a new document is needed.  The new document
must define a new certificate type (see 2.1 of RFC 2538), and a format for
the certificate/crl portion of the RDATA.  The new document may not have a
lot of text, but it must at least be a request that IANA allocate the
certificate type value.  (Both the APPKEY and CERT approaches require
standards action - neither is a lighter load on the WG process.)  The new
document should also attempt to restate the intended purpose of the CERT
RR, fixing whatever is perceived to be broken about the text in RFC2538's
security considerations.

Essentially the above approach is defining a *data structure* for a DNS
public key certificate - perhaps without defining a certificate handling
process.  Doing this could be taken as a step towards turning DNS into a
PKI.

I am in favor of the APPKEY.  The reason is because of the DNSSEC ramp-up
proposals (opt-in or no sig).  I can see the reason for avoiding the CERT
RR's but including APPKEY RR's.  The obvious reason is that certificates as
defined above have their own validation chain and don't need DNS to provice
the same.  The less obvious reason is that CERT RR's may have owner domain
names that reveal personnel employed in a company (for email certificates).
By omitting CERT RR's, the names aren't as exposed via an NXT walk.

In conclusion - if we are to continue to debate this, we do need a document
supporting the use of the CERT RR as a holder for a public key...

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

You fly too often when ... the airport taxi is on speed-dial.

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 25 13:55:45 2001
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Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2001 13:21:24 -0400
From: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
To: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <20011025132124.E2873@bailey.dscga.com>
Reply-To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
References: <7450556.1003942325@[10.0.0.1]> <4711141.1003889217@localhost> <m3vgh5pcw1.fsf@sjosefsson-pc.d.dynas.se> <7450556.1003942325@[10.0.0.1]> <v0313030eb7fddfd2c503@[199.171.39.21]>
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On Thu, Oct 25, 2001 at 11:52:21AM -0400, Edward Lewis wrote:
> I think we are going in circles again.
> 
> We are talking about storing two kinds of information in DNS.
> 
> 1) Certificates, 
> 2) Public Keys, 

The rule of thumb I've been using when I designed the NAPTR stuff was this:

The DNS is used to point to network level resources that actually have
the information you are after. You never put the actual information
itself in the DNS. With respect to URIs that means you use the DNS
to find the host that can answer questions about the URI. You never
put the the document or complete information about the URI (including
the path) in the DNS.

In other words, there should never be a 1:1 mapping between the number of 
DNS Resource Records and the number of entities being discussed. With
respect to the Web you would never have a single DNS RR for each and 
every URI. With respect to PKI you should never have an RR for every
certificate/key. With respect to IDN you should never have an RR for
every possible normalization method/character set. 

Its the _Domain_ Name System. The identifiers in it point to _domains_
of data, not the individual items in those domains...

Just my experience with doing this same "can I come up with a new RR that
doesn't completely break DNS" process...

-MM

-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
michael@neonym.net      |                              | http://www.neonym.net


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 25 15:18:59 2001
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To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
Cc: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <7450556.1003942325@[10.0.0.1]> <4711141.1003889217@localhost> <m3vgh5pcw1.fsf@sjosefsson-pc.d.dynas.se> <7450556.1003942325@[10.0.0.1]> <v0313030eb7fddfd2c503@[199.171.39.21]> <20011025132124.E2873@bailey.dscga.com>
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: 25 Oct 2001 14:51:45 -0400
In-Reply-To: Michael Mealling's message of "Thu, 25 Oct 2001 13:21:24 -0400"
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Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net> writes:

> Its the _Domain_ Name System. The identifiers in it point to _domains_
> of data, not the individual items in those domains...

Um, 'A' records?  'CNAME' records?  Sorry, I don't buy this argument.
While I agree that URIs are a good thing, at some level you need to
point to something.  It _IS_ possible to have too many levels of
indirection.

> Just my experience with doing this same "can I come up with a new RR that
> doesn't completely break DNS" process...

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Oct 25 15:19:51 2001
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To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 25 Oct 2001 13:21:24 EDT."
             <20011025132124.E2873@bailey.dscga.com> 
Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2001 14:57:04 -0400
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> In other words, there should never be a 1:1 mapping between the
> number of DNS Resource Records and the number of entities being
> discussed.

Whyever not?  If the data in question are a good match for the
properties of the DNS, what's wrong with putting the data there?
Maybe application keys aren't a good fit; if so, people need to make
specific arguments to that effect, not vague general arguments about
all kinds of new data.

If currently DNS server implementations aren't good at entering new
kinds of data, then let's create new (or enhanced) implementations,
not new protocols.

If we're worried about impacting the existing DNS infrastructure, then
let's make sure that the domain names for the new data live in their
own little space like SRV records do, so that zone delegation can take
care of the necessary separation.

> Its the _Domain_ Name System. The identifiers in it point to
> _domains_ of data, not the individual items in those domains...

I'm not sure I've ever heard that interpretation of the name before.
And I'm not sure why that argument applies any less to hostname -> IP
address translations than it does to other kinds of data.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 00:47:58 2001
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RFC 1034 specs opcode 2 as "status" but doesn't define it. I've been
thinking about some ways to use it for a couple of years, but recent
events have made me look at this more closely. On the one hand, I recently
did some DNS clean-up work for a large installation that was horribly
broken, and this would have really helped. Second, I'm thinking that
misconfigs from typos will become more frequent if a particular encoding
mechanisms ends up getting deployed.

So, I'd like to propose that this WG pick up as a work item some way of
standardizing "status" as a way to analyze zone data. EG, see what other
servers are being replicated with, the current version of the zone on the
queried server, the status of the NS entries for that zone, or just in
general, how misconfigured is that zone on that server.

To get this started, I've put together a draft of some POSSIBLE mechanisms
at http://www.ehsco.com/misc/draft-hall-status-opcode-00-1.txt  Many of
these mechanisms SHOULD NOT be included in any final version, and are only
presented to incite thought. Other mechanisms which SHOULD be there cannot
be installed without a new RR (replication servers, for example, which may
be configured by name OR address).

Anyway, is there any interest in this?

Thanks

-- 
Eric A. Hall                                        http://www.ehsco.com/
Internet Core Protocols          http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 01:46:34 2001
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From: "James Seng/Personal" <jseng@pobox.org.sg>
To: "Michael Mealling" <michael@neonym.net>,
        "Edward Lewis" <lewis@tislabs.com>
Cc: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
References: <7450556.1003942325@[10.0.0.1]> <4711141.1003889217@localhost> <m3vgh5pcw1.fsf@sjosefsson-pc.d.dynas.se> <7450556.1003942325@[10.0.0.1]> <v0313030eb7fddfd2c503@[199.171.39.21]> <20011025132124.E2873@bailey.dscga.com>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 13:20:43 +0800
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I agree with Michael here.

While it is possible to engineer DNS to put all sort of data into it by
having multiples RR, we need to ask ourselves if the intention is to
build a mini-database. Heck, I could engineer DNS to serve HTML page by
define RR records for that and we can do away with HTTP.

Therefore, putting a digital cert or public key into DNS does sound
excess to me. Putting a reference to a digital cert on the other hand
seem reasonable. And that can be done somewhat using the existing NAPTR
RR.

-James Seng

----- Original Message -----
From: "Michael Mealling" <michael@neonym.net>
To: "Edward Lewis" <lewis@tislabs.com>
Cc: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Sent: Friday, October 26, 2001 1:21 AM
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS


> On Thu, Oct 25, 2001 at 11:52:21AM -0400, Edward Lewis wrote:
> > I think we are going in circles again.
> >
> > We are talking about storing two kinds of information in DNS.
> >
> > 1) Certificates,
> > 2) Public Keys,
>
> The rule of thumb I've been using when I designed the NAPTR stuff was
this:
>
> The DNS is used to point to network level resources that actually have
> the information you are after. You never put the actual information
> itself in the DNS. With respect to URIs that means you use the DNS
> to find the host that can answer questions about the URI. You never
> put the the document or complete information about the URI (including
> the path) in the DNS.
>
> In other words, there should never be a 1:1 mapping between the number
of
> DNS Resource Records and the number of entities being discussed. With
> respect to the Web you would never have a single DNS RR for each and
> every URI. With respect to PKI you should never have an RR for every
> certificate/key. With respect to IDN you should never have an RR for
> every possible normalization method/character set.
>
> Its the _Domain_ Name System. The identifiers in it point to _domains_
> of data, not the individual items in those domains...
>
> Just my experience with doing this same "can I come up with a new RR
that
> doesn't completely break DNS" process...
>
> -MM
>
> --
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
> Michael Mealling |      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
> michael@neonym.net      |                              |
http://www.neonym.net
>
>
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org
with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 09:47:14 2001
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Message-ID: <013301c15dfb$feea31a0$dd00a8c0@jamessonyvaio>
From: "James Seng/Personal" <jseng@pobox.org.sg>
To: "Jakob Schlyter" <ops@openbsd.org>
Cc: "Michael Mealling" <michael@neonym.net>,
        "Edward Lewis" <lewis@tislabs.com>, <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110260837530.19718-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 16:55:43 +0800
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> On Fri, 26 Oct 2001, James Seng/Personal wrote:
> > Therefore, putting a digital cert or public key into DNS does sound
> > excess to me. Putting a reference to a digital cert on the other
hand
> > seem reasonable. And that can be done somewhat using the existing
NAPTR
> > RR.
>
> storing the data outside dns would give you a large bootstrap problem.
> how do you securly fetch the data referenced?

In the same way some other transport can securely fetch the data, over
IPsec, SSL etc. the reference could be LDAP, SHTTP, SCP or some other
secure transport protocol but should not be a concern for the DNS.

> I believe this is one of the most important reasons for storing public
> keys and certificates in dns and secured by dnssec.

dnssec would ensure the network resource returned is accurate. That,
IMHO, is suffice.

We do not ask how the smtp servers going to send the mail after they got
the MX, nor do we ask how the browser how to obtain the html after they
got the IP. lets not ask how the apps going to retrieve the cert after
they got the reference from NAPTR too.

-James Seng



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 09:48:15 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 12:42:25 +0200 (MEST)
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
To: James Seng/Personal <jseng@pobox.org.sg>
Cc: Jakob Schlyter <ops@openbsd.org>, Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>,
        Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>, <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
In-Reply-To: <01f801c15e07$0cf74c00$dd00a8c0@jamessonyvaio>
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On Fri, 26 Oct 2001, James Seng/Personal wrote:

> By bootstrap, do you mean the root key to start the whole chain of
> trust?

that is implemented in the policy of the resolver verifying the dns
answer.

> In the same way as what we are doing right now. The apps itself have
> the root key. Different apps have different root keys. Chaotic? Yes,
> but neither is one single authoritive root going to work in digital
> cert anyway given the different security practices and policy etc.

this will not scale. dns does scale.

> This question shouldnt even be ask in DNSEXT. AFAICS, so long the DNS
> is able to provide a accurate network reference, then its mission is
> accomplish. How you going to retrieve data securely after that is
> really none of the DNS business.

then we obviously have a large disagreement on the purpose of dns.

> Lets not make DNS more than what it is. It is *not* a database.

dns is a distributed database optimized for lookup operation.

> Please dont get me wrong. I support using DNS mechanism to lookup cert
> and its status etc. That is a good idea. But I do not support putting
> cert into DNS directly.

we're getting nowhere on this discussion. if we do not continue to provide
support for storing CERT and APP(KEY) in dns, people will do this anyway
using txt-records and I do not think we should go down that road.

	jakob



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 09:48:30 2001
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From: "James Seng/Personal" <jseng@pobox.org.sg>
To: "Jakob Schlyter" <jakob@crt.se>
Cc: "Jakob Schlyter" <ops@openbsd.org>,
        "Michael Mealling" <michael@neonym.net>,
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References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261144340.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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By bootstrap, do you mean the root key to start the whole chain of
trust?

In the same way as what we are doing right now. The apps itself have the
root key. Different apps have different root keys. Chaotic? Yes, but
neither is one single authoritive root going to work in digital cert
anyway given the different security practices and policy etc.

This question shouldnt even be ask in DNSEXT. AFAICS, so long the DNS is
able to provide a accurate network reference, then its mission is
accomplish. How you going to retrieve data securely after that is really
none of the DNS business.

Lets not make DNS more than what it is. It is *not* a database.

Please dont get me wrong. I support using DNS mechanism to lookup cert
and its status etc. That is a good idea. But I do not support putting
cert into DNS directly.

-James Seng

> On Fri, 26 Oct 2001, James Seng/Personal wrote:
>
> > > storing the data outside dns would give you a large bootstrap
problem.
> > > how do you securly fetch the data referenced?
> >
> > In the same way some other transport can securely fetch the data,
over
> > IPsec, SSL etc. the reference could be LDAP, SHTTP, SCP or some
other
> > secure transport protocol but should not be a concern for the DNS.
>
> and how do we bootstrap these protocols?
>
>  - by using certificates in static files on disk? probably not.
>  - by using certificates and/or public keys published using dns and
>    verifiable using dnssec? yes.
>
> dns and dnssec enables us to bootstrap these protocols with security,
> performance and redundancy. we're not talking about storing the all
the
> information in the world in dns, only the data needed to bootstrap
> communication between machines and/or people.
>
>
> jakob
>



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 09:50:23 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 11:58:00 +0200 (MEST)
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
To: James Seng/Personal <jseng@pobox.org.sg>
Cc: Jakob Schlyter <ops@openbsd.org>, Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>,
        Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>, <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
In-Reply-To: <013301c15dfb$feea31a0$dd00a8c0@jamessonyvaio>
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On Fri, 26 Oct 2001, James Seng/Personal wrote:

> > storing the data outside dns would give you a large bootstrap problem.
> > how do you securly fetch the data referenced?
>
> In the same way some other transport can securely fetch the data, over
> IPsec, SSL etc. the reference could be LDAP, SHTTP, SCP or some other
> secure transport protocol but should not be a concern for the DNS.

and how do we bootstrap these protocols?

 - by using certificates in static files on disk? probably not.
 - by using certificates and/or public keys published using dns and
   verifiable using dnssec? yes.

dns and dnssec enables us to bootstrap these protocols with security,
performance and redundancy. we're not talking about storing the all the
information in the world in dns, only the data needed to bootstrap
communication between machines and/or people.


	jakob



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 09:57:17 2001
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From: "James Seng/Personal" <jseng@pobox.org.sg>
To: "Jakob Schlyter" <jakob@crt.se>
Cc: "Jakob Schlyter" <ops@openbsd.org>,
        "Michael Mealling" <michael@neonym.net>,
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Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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This has been the number one argument/threat we see on justification for
a new RR. ;-)

I am not sure this old trick still work or not.

-James Seng

> we're getting nowhere on this discussion. if we do not continue to
provide
> support for storing CERT and APP(KEY) in dns, people will do this
anyway
> using txt-records and I do not think we should go down that road.
>
> jakob
>



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 10:01:34 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 09:03:40 -0400
From: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
Cc: James Seng/Personal <jseng@pobox.org.sg>, Jakob Schlyter <ops@openbsd.org>,
        Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>,
        Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <20011026090339.V2873@bailey.dscga.com>
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On Fri, Oct 26, 2001 at 12:42:25PM +0200, Jakob Schlyter wrote:
> we're getting nowhere on this discussion. if we do not continue to provide
> support for storing CERT and APP(KEY) in dns, people will do this anyway
> using txt-records and I do not think we should go down that road.

They won't if we give them an alternative that works. But the question
is: even if we had one, would you implement it? I.e. are you willing
to investigate scalable/secure alternatives?

-MM

-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
michael@neonym.net      |                              | http://www.neonym.net


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 10:01:58 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 15:14:48 +0200 (MEST)
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
To: James Seng/Personal <jseng@pobox.org.sg>
Cc: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>, Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>,
        DNSEXT <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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On Fri, 26 Oct 2001, James Seng/Personal wrote:

> Therefore, putting a digital cert or public key into DNS does sound
> excess to me. Putting a reference to a digital cert on the other hand
> seem reasonable. And that can be done somewhat using the existing
> NAPTR RR.

storing the data outside dns would give you a large bootstrap problem. how
do you securly fetch the data referenced?

I believe this is one of the most important reasons for storing public
keys and certificates in dns and secured by dnssec.

	jakob



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 10:04:23 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 09:01:28 -0400
From: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
Cc: James Seng/Personal <jseng@pobox.org.sg>, Jakob Schlyter <ops@openbsd.org>,
        Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>,
        Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <20011026090127.U2873@bailey.dscga.com>
References: <013301c15dfb$feea31a0$dd00a8c0@jamessonyvaio> <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261144340.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
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On Fri, Oct 26, 2001 at 11:58:00AM +0200, Jakob Schlyter wrote:
> On Fri, 26 Oct 2001, James Seng/Personal wrote:
> > > storing the data outside dns would give you a large bootstrap problem.
> > > how do you securly fetch the data referenced?
> >
> > In the same way some other transport can securely fetch the data, over
> > IPsec, SSL etc. the reference could be LDAP, SHTTP, SCP or some other
> > secure transport protocol but should not be a concern for the DNS.
> 
> and how do we bootstrap these protocols?
> 
>  - by using certificates in static files on disk? probably not.

No. You write an application that publishes them. My personal
preference would be the work the RESCAP group is doing....

>  - by using certificates and/or public keys published using dns and
>    verifiable using dnssec? yes.

No.

> dns and dnssec enables us to bootstrap these protocols with security,
> performance and redundancy. we're not talking about storing the all the
> information in the world in dns, only the data needed to bootstrap
> communication between machines and/or people.

You know as well as I do that whatever you use to bootstrap something
is exactly what ends up being used regardless of whether a much better
solution comes along. I'm sure Microsoft thought the 8.3 filename
limit was a fine bootstrap method but even in 2001 its the root of
many problems (viruses just being one of them).

IMHO, when you know something is wrong but you do it anyway just to
get a semi-solution out the door in the next week, that's bad engineering...

-MM

-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
michael@neonym.net      |                              | http://www.neonym.net


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 10:07:08 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 09:16:23 -0400
From: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
Cc: James Seng/Personal <jseng@pobox.org.sg>,
        Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>,
        Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>, DNSEXT <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <20011026091623.X2873@bailey.dscga.com>
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
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On Fri, Oct 26, 2001 at 03:14:48PM +0200, Jakob Schlyter wrote:
> On Fri, 26 Oct 2001, James Seng/Personal wrote:
> > Therefore, putting a digital cert or public key into DNS does sound
> > excess to me. Putting a reference to a digital cert on the other hand
> > seem reasonable. And that can be done somewhat using the existing
> > NAPTR RR.
> 
> storing the data outside dns would give you a large bootstrap problem. how
> do you securly fetch the data referenced?

Currently any modern operating system plus nearly all embedded ones have
support for one and probably two application layer protocols (http and 
possibly LDAP). I don't know of any OS or device that simply has _only_
DNS and no other available protocols. I don't understand the bootstrapping
issue here. You use DNS to get a NAPTR and/or SRV record to find out where
the server is that has the CERT/KEY and then you use one of those 
other protocols to contact it. I have yet to run across a platform that
can't do that just about out of the box with existing APIs.

-MM

-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
michael@neonym.net      |                              | http://www.neonym.net


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 10:21:39 2001
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Message-Id: <200110261400.KAA32361@egyptian-gods.MIT.EDU>
To: "James Seng/Personal" <jseng@pobox.org.sg>
cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Fri, 26 Oct 2001 16:55:43 +0800."
             <013301c15dfb$feea31a0$dd00a8c0@jamessonyvaio> 
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 10:00:45 -0400
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>> storing the data outside dns would give you a large bootstrap
>> problem.  how do you securly fetch the data referenced?

> In the same way some other transport can securely fetch the data,
> over IPsec, SSL etc. the reference could be LDAP, SHTTP, SCP or some
> other secure transport protocol but should not be a concern for the
> DNS.

Although lots of protocols have security facilities, that doesn't mean
it is currently easy to establish trust between two parties who are
not within a single administrative domain.

Let's consider the application of an email-like service, where I want
to be able to verify that you are really jseng@pobox.org.sg and not
someone else.  Trusting the DNS is no problem since it is a DNS-based
identity which I am trying to verify.  Using an APPKEY approach, I can
securely (assuming this is a future day when we have DNSSEC) fetch a
key for pobox.org.sg and use it to verify a certificate used to sign
your messages.

Using your approach, the DNS can only tell me what server to contact
to get the key for pobox.org.sg.  When I contact that server, I have
to establish trust with it somehow, but because of your constraints,
pobox.org.sg's DNSSEC key can't be used to sign any application keys.
So I will have to use something else, probably an X.509 certificate,
to establish trust.  Two trust hierarchies more points of failure and
greater expense for pobox.org.sg.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 10:36:09 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <01f801c15e07$0cf74c00$dd00a8c0@jamessonyvaio>
	<Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261233510.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
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> we're getting nowhere on this discussion. if we do not continue to provide
> support for storing CERT and APP(KEY) in dns, people will do this anyway
> using txt-records and I do not think we should go down that road.

don't forget

   and if we don't standardize it in the ietf, the mpls forum will

:-)/2

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 10:39:17 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 10:20:03 -0400
To: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>, namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= Gudmundsson/DNSEXT co-chair <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: Re: status opcode
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At 12:14 AM 10/26/2001, Eric A. Hall wrote:
>RFC 1034 specs opcode 2 as "status" but doesn't define it. I've been
>thinking about some ways to use it for a couple of years, but recent
>events have made me look at this more closely. On the one hand, I recently
>did some DNS clean-up work for a large installation that was horribly
>broken, and this would have really helped. Second, I'm thinking that
>misconfigs from typos will become more frequent if a particular encoding
>mechanisms ends up getting deployed.
>
>So, I'd like to propose that this WG pick up as a work item some way of
>standardizing "status" as a way to analyze zone data. EG, see what other
>servers are being replicated with, the current version of the zone on the
>queried server, the status of the NS entries for that zone, or just in
>general, how misconfigured is that zone on that server.
>
>To get this started, I've put together a draft of some POSSIBLE mechanisms
>at http://www.ehsco.com/misc/draft-hall-status-opcode-00-1.txt  Many of
>these mechanisms SHOULD NOT be included in any final version, and are only
>presented to incite thought. Other mechanisms which SHOULD be there cannot
>be installed without a new RR (replication servers, for example, which may
>be configured by name OR address).
>
>Anyway, is there any interest in this?

Procedure :
1 Write a draft,
2 Submit the draft as individual submission,
3 start a thread on namedroppers,
4 ask chair to admit document.

you have completed steps 1, 3 and 4.  you skipped step 2.

Temporary Answer to 4:
WG will decide after next IETF if this work is of interest to be
adopted.

On first read this my impression is that this is a interesting idea,
is one of few possible ways to monitor DNS servers and this should be
looked at in that context.
Security considerations section contains many MAY and MUST all these
should be in a separate section called "status message access control"

Old timers: Why was status never defined ?

         Olafur

>Thanks
>
>--
>Eric A. Hall                                        http://www.ehsco.com/
>Internet Core Protocols          http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/
>
>
>to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
>the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 10:49:22 2001
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To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= Gudmundsson/DNSEXT co-chair <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: Result admitting more documents: Application key storage
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There has been lively discussion on this topic that has demonstrated that
this issue needs to be addressed and thus the working will take this on.
As there is no clear consensus on the path forward, the chairs invite
submissions of ideas of how to store the keys in DNS,
and welcome position papers that argue for or against this, papers
that explain how to USE DNS to FIND application keys are also welcome.

NOTE: At MOST ONE document on this issue will be the output of the
working group. The group may kill them all.

Any author that wants to submit a document on this issue, send me a copy
before ID submission for relevance check and document name assignment.

	Olafur for both chairs. 



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 10:50:11 2001
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The Working group invites the authors of draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt
to submit that document as working group document with the copyright #1.
Please contact me for working group document assignment.

	Olafur



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 10:50:13 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 10:32:23 -0400
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= Gudmundsson/DNSEXT co-chair <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: TKEY secret removal 
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At 02:31 PM 10/16/2001, =D3lafur Gu=F0mundsson wrote:
>This document has requested to be added to the working group
>work items. This document is within the working charter is there any
>objection to admitting it ?


As no one objected the document is admitted. Authors please contact
me for working group document name assignment.

         Olafur



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 10:52:26 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
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what is really being asked is how much are we willing to stuff in the
dns to make up for the apps folk's inability to field usable directory
services and the security folk's inability to field a usable pki?

as the dns is not ideally structured for either, is bending dns to
compensate for apps's and security's shortcomings.  not good
architecture and hence likely to result in unpleasant surprises.

so what lessons have we learned in dns-land that might help apps and
security do their job?

randy


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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 16:33:12 +0200 (MEST)
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
Cc: DNSEXT <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
In-Reply-To: <20011026090339.V2873@bailey.dscga.com>
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On Fri, 26 Oct 2001, Michael Mealling wrote:

> On Fri, Oct 26, 2001 at 12:42:25PM +0200, Jakob Schlyter wrote:
> > we're getting nowhere on this discussion. if we do not continue to provide
> > support for storing CERT and APP(KEY) in dns, people will do this anyway
> > using txt-records and I do not think we should go down that road.
>
> They won't if we give them an alternative that works. But the question
> is: even if we had one, would you implement it? I.e. are you willing
> to investigate scalable/secure alternatives?

there are currently no scalable nor secure alternatives to dnssec for
doing large scale distribution of certificates and public keys.

	jakob



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 10:54:41 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 16:29:15 +0200 (CEST)
From: Roy Arends <Roy.Arends@nominum.com>
To: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: status opcode
In-Reply-To: <3BD8E330.6D2F3208@ehsco.com>
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On Thu, 25 Oct 2001, Eric A. Hall wrote:

> RFC 1034 specs opcode 2 as "status" but doesn't define it. I've been
> thinking about some ways to use it for a couple of years, but recent
> events have made me look at this more closely. On the one hand, I recently
> did some DNS clean-up work for a large installation that was horribly
> broken, and this would have really helped. Second, I'm thinking that
> misconfigs from typos will become more frequent if a particular encoding
> mechanisms ends up getting deployed.
>
> So, I'd like to propose that this WG pick up as a work item some way of
> standardizing "status" as a way to analyze zone data. EG, see what other
> servers are being replicated with, the current version of the zone on the
> queried server, the status of the NS entries for that zone, or just in
> general, how misconfigured is that zone on that server.
>
> To get this started, I've put together a draft of some POSSIBLE mechanisms
> at http://www.ehsco.com/misc/draft-hall-status-opcode-00-1.txt  Many of
> these mechanisms SHOULD NOT be included in any final version, and are only
> presented to incite thought. Other mechanisms which SHOULD be there cannot
> be installed without a new RR (replication servers, for example, which may
> be configured by name OR address).
>
> Anyway, is there any interest in this?

The config of a specific server for a specific zone is brand-dependant. To
specify optional configuration data in a status-response has some
inter-operable issues.

The server config should be of interest to the operator, who already has
some way of administering the server and zones.

Next to that, the status of specific zones on their respective servers can
currently be retrieved by analysing the aa, ra and ad bits together with
the RCODE and the sections data.

Also, how do the different server brands right now treat an incoming
status opcode.  I did a small survey recently, and it seems that some
server brands completely ignore the status OPCODE field (treating it as
though it was a QUERY opcode), others blackhole it, and some return a
FORMERR/SERVFAIL/NOTIMP RCODE. (I guess the proper way to respond to a
status opcode currently is with a NOTIMP rcode).

My .02 Euro

Roy Arends
Nominum





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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 10:54:53 2001
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References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
 <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 10:32:06 -0400
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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It seems to be that we are arguing over points to which we won't be able to
come to an agreement on.

On the one one hand, DNS is a very important piece of the infrastructure so
it should be as simple and fast as possible.  We don't want software
meltdowns and we don't want it to be a bottleneck.  Any additional services
should be shunted off to other processes - essentially compartmentalizing
and simplifying the code, etc.

On the other hand, extending the types held by DNS does not alter the
software (outside of the text-to-binary conversions) and doesn't exactly
add much to the server load - as any lookup for data in another service
requires the use of DNS to locate the service.  In addition, there is no
other scaleable alternative to DNS for the distribution of information.

Personally, I side with adding new types to DNS (so long as there is no
extra processing needed).  I can't see how this is a technical problem for
DNS.  However, I can't see anyway of "proving" that the addition of new
types is superior to the alternative approach.

While it is fine to have protracted threads arguing this again and again
(;)), it might be time if the WG sought an opinion from a higher power
(IESG/IAB) on what the criteria for new types are.  Perhaps the answer is
to just propose the new types and see what progresses through the standards
process.  Perhaps the answer is to develop a statement on the future
directions of name service.  I don't know - but I do know that we waste a
lot of bandwith on this topic.

I would like to hear from folks who want to limit the growth of type
definitions on this question.  While I realize there is an alternative to
adding a new type (say APPKEY), what technical problems are created by it?
Do you object to 1) exhaustion of the type space, 2) an increased load on
servers (queries, data), 3) more documents to process?

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

You fly too often when ... the airport taxi is on speed-dial.

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 10:58:11 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 10:37:21 -0400
From: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
Cc: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>, DNSEXT <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <20011026103720.C2873@bailey.dscga.com>
References: <20011026090339.V2873@bailey.dscga.com> <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261629340.19718-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
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On Fri, Oct 26, 2001 at 04:33:12PM +0200, Jakob Schlyter wrote:
> On Fri, 26 Oct 2001, Michael Mealling wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 26, 2001 at 12:42:25PM +0200, Jakob Schlyter wrote:
> > > we're getting nowhere on this discussion. if we do not continue to provide
> > > support for storing CERT and APP(KEY) in dns, people will do this anyway
> > > using txt-records and I do not think we should go down that road.
> >
> > They won't if we give them an alternative that works. But the question
> > is: even if we had one, would you implement it? I.e. are you willing
> > to investigate scalable/secure alternatives?
> 
> there are currently no scalable nor secure alternatives to dnssec for
> doing large scale distribution of certificates and public keys.

I've got one pretty much done:

Using DNSSEC you secure a NAPTR record that iteratively gets you to the
record that tells you what server has the information and then you contact
it via the given protocol and ask for the keys/certs. If you have to have
it working next week then you'd use HTTP as the final leg of the trip.
HTTP's security features are as good (or better) than DNSSEC if you use
the right authentication methods (which I would hope you would want).

I could probably have it done by the end of next week if you want to try
it out...

Now, why can't you use a solution like this? It doesn't even require
BIND to be upgraded to support a new RR type.... NAPTR support has
been in BIND since 4.9.5 so I'm willing to bet all DNSSEC capable nameservers
already have NAPTR support...

-MM


-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
michael@neonym.net      |                              | http://www.neonym.net


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:05:02 2001
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Message-Id: <4.3.2.7.2.20011026103821.0325f118@diablo.cisco.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 10:47:22 -0400
To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
From: John Schnizlein <jschnizl@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <20011026090127.U2873@bailey.dscga.com>
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261144340.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
 <013301c15dfb$feea31a0$dd00a8c0@jamessonyvaio>
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Historical reality check:
When Microsoft chose limited file names at 8.3 characters, many
universities were teaching the error of such arbitrary limits
using an operating system that deliberately included only the
known best practices (no new ideas on purpose) of Operating
Systems (OSs). This OS was available at low distribution costs
as the result of research at Bell Labs. Its source code and
commentary from the University of South Wales facilitated
instruction, and its wide spread later facilitated the inclusion
of network protocols in an operating system (a new idea then) at
the Univeristy of California at Berkeley.

I am sure most people on this list know the facts, but I have 
learned the hard way that uncorrected historical references are
interpreted as true before very long.

John

At 09:01 AM 10/26/2001, Michael Mealling wrote:
>...
>You know as well as I do that whatever you use to bootstrap something
>is exactly what ends up being used regardless of whether a much better
>solution comes along. I'm sure Microsoft thought the 8.3 filename
>limit was a fine bootstrap method but even in 2001 its the root of
>many problems (viruses just being one of them).
>
>IMHO, when you know something is wrong but you do it anyway just to
>get a semi-solution out the door in the next week, that's bad engineering...



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:06:05 2001
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Message-ID: <3BD978CD.93E4D7F0@ehsco.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 09:53:01 -0500
From: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>
To: Roy Arends <Roy.Arends@nominum.com>
CC: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: status opcode
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Roy Arends wrote:

> The config of a specific server for a specific zone is brand-dependant.

Yes, very much so, which is why I used Text in the sketch.

>From the perspective of retrieving the status of a zone, there are lots of
important details which may be affecting operation. The most obvious ones
are the replication and/or forwarding servers for a zone, although there
isn't a good RR for that data at the moment (data can be FQDN, RDN, or IP
address). And really, there are a bunch of vendor-specific buttons and
knobs which can affect the processing of a query, such as permissions.

The only way to grab all of that data is to stuff it into TXT as a blob.

Personally, I don't think that all of the data is needed. TXT is used as a
way to grab it all, but I don't believe that is the way to go. I would
rather limit it to specific data using specific RRs, but which RRs those
should be is unclear at the moment. Nominations welcome.

> To specify optional configuration data in a status-response has some
> inter-operable issues.

Interoperability of TXT RR data wasn't an objective. It's just for human
consumption of ~all relevant config data for that zone.

> Next to that, the status of specific zones on their respective servers
> can currently be retrieved by analysing the aa, ra and ad bits together
> with the RCODE and the sections data.

Yeah, among other bits.

The problem is that isn't always easy. EG, the one server on the other
side of the empire that isn't picking up changes, and which you need to
find somebody at the remote office with a login in order to determine that
the list of replicating servers is misconfigured.

> I did a small survey recently, and it seems that some server brands
> completely ignore the status OPCODE field (treating it as though it
> was a QUERY opcode), others blackhole it, and some return a
> FORMERR/SERVFAIL/NOTIMP RCODE. (I guess the proper way to respond to a
> status opcode currently is with a NOTIMP rcode).

I had also assumed that NOTIMP would be the proper response. Perhaps some
of the other responses indicate private extensions.

-- 
Eric A. Hall                                        http://www.ehsco.com/
Internet Core Protocols          http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:11:30 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 16:58:07 +0200 (MEST)
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
Cc: DNSEXT <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
In-Reply-To: <20011026103720.C2873@bailey.dscga.com>
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On Fri, 26 Oct 2001, Michael Mealling wrote:

> Using DNSSEC you secure a NAPTR record that iteratively gets you to
> the record that tells you what server has the information and then you
> contact it via the given protocol and ask for the keys/certs. If you
> have to have it working next week then you'd use HTTP as the final leg
> of the trip.

in addition to just adding another level indirection, you still have the
problem of bootstrapping that other protocol.


> HTTP's security features are as good (or better) than DNSSEC if you use
> the right authentication methods (which I would hope you would want).

the mechanisms needed for distribution are already in dns & dnssec -
caching, replication, data integrity. why try create a parallel
infrastructure using http, ldap or what have you?


> Now, why can't you use a solution like this? It doesn't even require
> BIND to be upgraded to support a new RR type.... NAPTR support has
> been in BIND since 4.9.5 so I'm willing to bet all DNSSEC capable
> nameservers already have NAPTR support...

moving the problem over to other protocols doesn't improve the situation,
neither securitywise nor performancewise.


	jakob



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:15:34 2001
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To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Fri, 26 Oct 2001 07:33:38 PDT."
             <E15x83G-0005CA-00@rip.psg.com> 
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 10:59:10 -0400
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> what is really being asked is how much are we willing to stuff in
> the dns to make up for the apps folk's inability to field usable
> directory services and the security folk's inability to field a
> usable pki?

Uh, when did directory services come up?  I haven't seen the APPKEY
people asking for anything more than simple lookup.

> as the dns is not ideally structured for either

A few people often say that as if it's true by inspection (as applied
to pki).  I think DNS makes a fine online PKI, with many nicer
properties than the offline X.509 infrastructure currently used for
the web.  For instance, the certificate revocation problem can be
sidestepped by providing keys which expire after a relatively short
people of time (an hour, or a day, depending on how well you can
handle the load), and having people re-query for them whenever they
expire.  With sufficient application support, you can also accomplish
smooth key rollover by providing multiple APPKEY RRs at the same
domain.

If you see problems with the use of APPKEY, make specific arguments,
not vague generalities.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:20:43 2001
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Message-ID: <3BD97DEA.633587BA@unixpeople.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 08:14:50 -0700
From: "Andy W. Barclay" <abarclay@unixpeople.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <200110261400.KAA32361@egyptian-gods.MIT.EDU>
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Greg Hudson wrote:
> 
> >> storing the data outside dns would give you a large bootstrap
> >> problem.  how do you securly fetch the data referenced?
> 
> > In the same way some other transport can securely fetch the data,
> > over IPsec, SSL etc. the reference could be LDAP, SHTTP, SCP or some
> > other secure transport protocol but should not be a concern for the
> > DNS.
> 
> Although lots of protocols have security facilities, that doesn't mean
> it is currently easy to establish trust between two parties who are
> not within a single administrative domain.
> 
> Let's consider the application of an email-like service, where I want
> to be able to verify that you are really jseng@pobox.org.sg and not
> someone else.  Trusting the DNS is no problem since it is a DNS-based
> identity which I am trying to verify.  Using an APPKEY approach, I can
> securely (assuming this is a future day when we have DNSSEC) fetch a
> key for pobox.org.sg and use it to verify a certificate used to sign
> your messages.
> 
> Using your approach, the DNS can only tell me what server to contact
> to get the key for pobox.org.sg.  When I contact that server, I have
> to establish trust with it somehow, but because of your constraints,
> pobox.org.sg's DNSSEC key can't be used to sign any application keys.
> So I will have to use something else, probably an X.509 certificate,
> to establish trust.  Two trust hierarchies more points of failure and
> greater expense for pobox.org.sg.

I am concerned that the person responsible for the DNS won't do
due-dilligence in validating the keys that are put in the DNS before
signing the zone.

Using your example, assume jseng sent an e-mail to his DNS administrator
asking him/her to add this APPKEY to the zone.... The admin will need
to go through all the validation that a certificate authority would -
like ask the person to fax or send a copy of a government issued ID,
or passport, or something before adding the APPKEY. I would assume
most DNS admins would not be interested in doing this, and as such,
we would end up with a bunch of APPKEYs which are signed and valid
by DNSSEC, but which cannot be trusted.

I may be in the minority here, but I feel that this type of
duty is best left to a certificate authority.

--
Regards,
Andy W. Barclay.        abarclay@unixpeople.com
fax  (781) 823-8276
Always a UNIX Evangelist (and sometimes a system and network architect)

Ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be
so.
   --John Stuart Mill


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:21:43 2001
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From: Bill Manning <bmanning@ISI.EDU>
Message-Id: <200110261505.f9QF5nE08068@zed.isi.edu>
Subject: Re: Discover invited :-)
To: ogud@ogud.com (=?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= Gudmundsson/DNSEXT co-chair)
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 08:05:49 -0700 (PDT)
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20011026102718.027aa500@localhost> from "=?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= Gudmundsson/DNSEXT co-chair" at Oct 26, 2001 10:30:40 AM
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% The Working group invites the authors of draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-02.txt
% to submit that document as working group document with the copyright #1.
% Please contact me for working group document assignment.
% 
% 	Olafur

	There have been two similar solicitations.
	The first, right after the London IETF, generated zero input
	from the WG.  The second, issued about two weeks ago, generated
	one response in the negative.  Apathy with a slight negative 
	spin.

	So how can you state that the WG is making such an invitation?
	Perhaps you might better phrase this as; "One of the WG chairs..."
	instead of "The Working Group..."
	
	At this point, the documents work is already done. Its complete.
	Of what value will there be to treat this as WG fodder?  I'm not
	going to debate or change what was done two years ago.  Its 
	a matter of historical fact.  It would be a waste of WG, AD, and
	IESG members valuable time to reopen debate on what should or 
	should not have been done.

	If there really is interest in fixing DISCOVER, then it should
	recognize and build on prior work. The WG was completely uninterested
	when the work was occuring. If there is future interest, then it
	would be worthwhile allowing this draft to proceed as an 
	indivdual submission and then revisit the concepts as WG fodder
	when/if there is interest by others.

	
--bill


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:22:40 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 11:01:07 -0400
From: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
Cc: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>, DNSEXT <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <20011026110107.E2873@bailey.dscga.com>
References: <20011026103720.C2873@bailey.dscga.com> <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261645040.27013-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
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On Fri, Oct 26, 2001 at 04:58:07PM +0200, Jakob Schlyter wrote:
> On Fri, 26 Oct 2001, Michael Mealling wrote:
> > Using DNSSEC you secure a NAPTR record that iteratively gets you to
> > the record that tells you what server has the information and then you
> > contact it via the given protocol and ask for the keys/certs. If you
> > have to have it working next week then you'd use HTTP as the final leg
> > of the trip.
> 
> in addition to just adding another level indirection, you still have the
> problem of bootstrapping that other protocol.

You do? How?

> > HTTP's security features are as good (or better) than DNSSEC if you use
> > the right authentication methods (which I would hope you would want).
> 
> the mechanisms needed for distribution are already in dns & dnssec -
> caching, replication, data integrity. why try create a parallel
> infrastructure using http, ldap or what have you?

DNS's 'caching, replication, data integrity' etc are probably at the
lower end of the scale when it comes to those terms. I would assert
that methods for doing that over and for HTTP are much more robust these days.

> > Now, why can't you use a solution like this? It doesn't even require
> > BIND to be upgraded to support a new RR type.... NAPTR support has
> > been in BIND since 4.9.5 so I'm willing to bet all DNSSEC capable
> > nameservers already have NAPTR support...
> 
> moving the problem over to other protocols doesn't improve the situation,
> neither securitywise nor performancewise.

It does when those protocols are engineered to do functions exactly like 
this. If your assertion were true then it would make sense to put 
web pages, mailbox capabilities, LDAP records, etc in DNS.

-MM

-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
michael@neonym.net      |                              | http://www.neonym.net


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:27:36 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <E15x83G-0005CA-00@rip.psg.com>
	<200110261459.KAA00405@egyptian-gods.MIT.EDU>
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> A few people often say that as if it's true by inspection (as applied
> to pki).  I think DNS makes a fine online PKI, with many nicer
> properties than the offline X.509 infrastructure currently used for
> the web.

the pki i use today, the public pgp keyring, is not a hierarchic name space.

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:28:47 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <20011026090339.V2873@bailey.dscga.com>
	<Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261629340.19718-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
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> there are currently no scalable nor secure alternatives to dnssec for
> doing large scale distribution of certificates and public keys.

a - dnssec s not yet real/deployable.  dnssec itself has keying problems.

b - because you have not designed a better container for your goods does
    not justify turning dns into a public dump.

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:41:55 2001
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From: Bill Manning <bmanning@ISI.EDU>
Message-Id: <200110261524.f9QFOpA08104@zed.isi.edu>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
To: randy@psg.com (Randy Bush)
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 08:24:51 -0700 (PDT)
Cc: jakob@crt.se (Jakob Schlyter), namedroppers@ops.ietf.org (namedroppers)
In-Reply-To: <E15x8hu-0006Pu-00@rip.psg.com> from "Randy Bush" at Oct 26, 2001 08:15:38 AM
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% > there are currently no scalable nor secure alternatives to dnssec for
% > doing large scale distribution of certificates and public keys.
% 
% a - dnssec s not yet real/deployable.  dnssec itself has keying problems.
	    ^ as a distribution method for certificates & pulbic keys i

There are components of DNSSEC that are eminently real and have been 
deployed. 


--bill


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:44:50 2001
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To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
Cc: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>, DNSEXT <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <20011026090339.V2873@bailey.dscga.com> <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261629340.19718-100000@fonbella.crt.se> <20011026103720.C2873@bailey.dscga.com>
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: 26 Oct 2001 11:28:31 -0400
In-Reply-To: Michael Mealling's message of "Fri, 26 Oct 2001 10:37:21 -0400"
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Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net> writes:

> I've got one pretty much done:
> 
> Using DNSSEC you secure a NAPTR record that iteratively gets you to the
> record that tells you what server has the information and then you contact
> it via the given protocol and ask for the keys/certs. If you have to have
> it working next week then you'd use HTTP as the final leg of the trip.
> HTTP's security features are as good (or better) than DNSSEC if you use
> the right authentication methods (which I would hope you would want).

Great, I'll be sure to intercept all of the HTTP requests for your
ssh public key and insert my own....

Seriously, all you've done is push the security off of DNS and onto HTTP.
We're no better off than we were before (except you can now rub your
hands and say "not my problem".  It's been everybody wiping their
hands this way that got us where we are today:  without security.

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:44:51 2001
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To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Cc: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>, namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
	<E15x83G-0005CA-00@rip.psg.com>
From: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <E15x83G-0005CA-00@rip.psg.com> (Randy Bush's message of "Fri,
 26 Oct 2001 07:33:38 -0700")
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 17:32:56 +0200
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Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> writes:

> what is really being asked is how much are we willing to stuff in the
> dns to make up for the apps folk's inability to field usable directory
> services and the security folk's inability to field a usable pki?
> 
> as the dns is not ideally structured for either, is bending dns to
> compensate for apps's and security's shortcomings.  not good
> architecture and hence likely to result in unpleasant surprises.

I'm not sure this is entirely the whole truth -- I think what we are
seeing is that a fundamental requirement to achieve a secure Internet
is that the same entity that provides "name" to "address" mapping
(DNS, that is) provides the "name" to "security material" mapping.

In the old times, all you need to talk with someone was the address of
that someone.  Today you need the address and some keying material so
that you can talk to the someone securely.  I don't believe decoupling
the name->address mapping (DNS) and name->key mapping (e.g. LDAP,
possibly via DNS referrals) cannot work reliably in a scalable way.
(Of course, please prove me wrong, I'd even like to work on proving
this wrong.)

I believe solving this problem outside of DNS would require replacing
DNS with something else that can map names to addresses.  Which might
be a good thing in itself, but I guess that would be less trivial.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:51:37 2001
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To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Cc: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>, namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <E15x83G-0005CA-00@rip.psg.com> 	<200110261459.KAA00405@egyptian-gods.MIT.EDU> <E15x8fd-0006Lm-00@rip.psg.com>
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@mit.edu>
Date: 26 Oct 2001 11:35:01 -0400
In-Reply-To: Randy Bush's message of "Fri, 26 Oct 2001 08:13:17 -0700"
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Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> writes:

> the pki i use today, the public pgp keyring, is not a hierarchic name space.

The signatures certainly don't follow a hierachy, but the lookup
mechanism, the userID, most certainly does (for any real-world usable
key).  When you look up my PGP key, you look it up via
"warlord@MIT.EDU".  I look up yours via "randy@psg.com".  Those
lookups are EXTREMELY hierarchical, in the same way my mailer has to
lookup the MX/A record for psg.com and yours needs to lookup the MX/A
records for MIT.EDU.

> randy

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:52:30 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@research.att.com>
To: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
	<E15x83G-0005CA-00@rip.psg.com>
	<m34rom76xj.fsf@sjosefsson-pc.d.dynas.se>
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> I think what we are seeing is that a fundamental requirement to
> achieve a secure Internet is that the same entity that provides
> "name" to "address" mapping (DNS, that is) provides the "name" to
> "security material" mapping.

a hidden and suspect assumption, the name space of security material is
the same as the dns name space.  i suspect that, as time passes, a
smaller and smaller proportion of interesting security material will be
about domains and hosts.

> In the old times, all you need to talk with someone was the address of
> that someone.  Today you need the address and some keying material so
> that you can talk to the someone securely.

where in the dns space does my pgp key fit so naturally and elegantly?
(note the From: and that my key is Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>)

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:53:53 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 11:32:10 -0400
From: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>, Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>,
        DNSEXT <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <20011026113210.J2873@bailey.dscga.com>
References: <20011026090339.V2873@bailey.dscga.com> <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261629340.19718-100000@fonbella.crt.se> <20011026103720.C2873@bailey.dscga.com> <sjm1yjqbeu8.fsf@rcn.ihtfp.org>
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On Fri, Oct 26, 2001 at 11:28:31AM -0400, Derek Atkins wrote:
> Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net> writes:
> > I've got one pretty much done:
> > Using DNSSEC you secure a NAPTR record that iteratively gets you to the
> > record that tells you what server has the information and then you contact
> > it via the given protocol and ask for the keys/certs. If you have to have
> > it working next week then you'd use HTTP as the final leg of the trip.
> > HTTP's security features are as good (or better) than DNSSEC if you use
> > the right authentication methods (which I would hope you would want).
> 
> Great, I'll be sure to intercept all of the HTTP requests for your
> ssh public key and insert my own....

You can try but I'll be doing it over authenticated SSL and if you can
snoop that then DNSSEC is just as useless...

> Seriously, all you've done is push the security off of DNS and onto HTTP.
> We're no better off than we were before (except you can now rub your
> hands and say "not my problem".  It's been everybody wiping their
> hands this way that got us where we are today:  without security.

I'm not saying "wipe your hands of it". I'm suggesting you do it in
a protocol that was designed to be able to support it. If that protocol
isn't currently sufficient I suggest it would be easier to fix that
than turn the DNS inside out to make it work there...

-MM

-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
michael@neonym.net      |                              | http://www.neonym.net


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:54:46 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 11:30:07 -0400
From: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
To: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <20011026113007.I2873@bailey.dscga.com>
Reply-To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se> <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se> <v0313030db7ff2138fb89@[199.171.39.21]>
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On Fri, Oct 26, 2001 at 10:32:06AM -0400, Edward Lewis wrote:
> On the one one hand, DNS is a very important piece of the infrastructure so
> it should be as simple and fast as possible.  We don't want software
> meltdowns and we don't want it to be a bottleneck.  Any additional services
> should be shunted off to other processes - essentially compartmentalizing
> and simplifying the code, etc.
> 
> On the other hand, extending the types held by DNS does not alter the
> software (outside of the text-to-binary conversions) and doesn't exactly
> add much to the server load - as any lookup for data in another service
> requires the use of DNS to locate the service.  In addition, there is no
> other scaleable alternative to DNS for the distribution of information.

I'm not arguing that we should limit the number of RR types in the DNS.... 

> Personally, I side with adding new types to DNS (so long as there is no
> extra processing needed).  I can't see how this is a technical problem for
> DNS.  However, I can't see anyway of "proving" that the addition of new
> types is superior to the alternative approach.
> 
> I would like to hear from folks who want to limit the growth of type
> definitions on this question.  While I realize there is an alternative to
> adding a new type (say APPKEY), what technical problems are created by it?
> Do you object to 1) exhaustion of the type space, 2) an increased load on
> servers (queries, data), 3) more documents to process?

My objection isn't that a new RR is added, but that the usage profile
of new functionality that requires that RR is inconsistent with previous ones. 
By putting keys/certs in the DNS you've turned the DNS into a data store
for end point information, not a pointer to that information. It changes
the ratio of the amount/number of queries in/to a nameserver to 
the members of an administrative domain from 1:<very many> to 1:1.

I.e. its no the RR that's the problem. Its the increase in the usage profile
that's the problem....

-MM

-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
michael@neonym.net      |                              | http://www.neonym.net


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 11:59:35 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 11:44:17 -0400
From: Mike Schiraldi <raldi@research.netsol.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <20011026114417.D15892@research.netsol.com>
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261144340.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se> <013301c15dfb$feea31a0$dd00a8c0@jamessonyvaio> <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261144340.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se> <4.3.2.7.2.20011026103821.0325f118@diablo.cisco.com>
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> I am sure most people on this list know the facts, but I have=20
> learned the hard way that uncorrected historical references are
> interpreted as true before very long.

I'm not sure i understand your argument. Michael was citing an example of
how imperfect solutions meant to bootstrap a new technology often stick
around far longer than their implementors intended them to, and can continue
to cause headaches for decades.


--=20
Mike Schiraldi
Verisign Applied Research

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 12:00:50 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <E15x83G-0005CA-00@rip.psg.com>
	<200110261459.KAA00405@egyptian-gods.MIT.EDU>
	<E15x8fd-0006Lm-00@rip.psg.com>
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>> the pki i use today, the public pgp keyring, is not a hierarchic name
>> space. 
> The signatures certainly don't follow a hierachy, but the lookup
> mechanism, the userID, most certainly does (for any real-world usable
> key).

useful pgp is not restricted to email addresses as ids.

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 12:12:22 2001
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To: "Andy W. Barclay" <abarclay@unixpeople.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <200110261400.KAA32361@egyptian-gods.MIT.EDU>
	<3BD97DEA.633587BA@unixpeople.com>
From: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <3BD97DEA.633587BA@unixpeople.com> ("Andy W. Barclay"'s message
 of "Fri, 26 Oct 2001 08:14:50 -0700")
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 17:54:03 +0200
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"Andy W. Barclay" <abarclay@unixpeople.com> writes:

>> Let's consider the application of an email-like service, where I want
>> to be able to verify that you are really jseng@pobox.org.sg and not
>> someone else.  Trusting the DNS is no problem since it is a DNS-based
>> identity which I am trying to verify.  Using an APPKEY approach, I can
>> securely (assuming this is a future day when we have DNSSEC) fetch a
>> key for pobox.org.sg and use it to verify a certificate used to sign
>> your messages.
>> 
>> Using your approach, the DNS can only tell me what server to contact
>> to get the key for pobox.org.sg.  When I contact that server, I have
>> to establish trust with it somehow, but because of your constraints,
>> pobox.org.sg's DNSSEC key can't be used to sign any application keys.
>> So I will have to use something else, probably an X.509 certificate,
>> to establish trust.  Two trust hierarchies more points of failure and
>> greater expense for pobox.org.sg.
> 
> I am concerned that the person responsible for the DNS won't do
> due-dilligence in validating the keys that are put in the DNS before
> signing the zone.

This is a social issue, it cannot be solved technically alone.

> Using your example, assume jseng sent an e-mail to his DNS administrator
> asking him/her to add this APPKEY to the zone.... The admin will need
> to go through all the validation that a certificate authority would -
> like ask the person to fax or send a copy of a government issued ID,
> or passport, or something before adding the APPKEY. I would assume
> most DNS admins would not be interested in doing this, and as such,
> we would end up with a bunch of APPKEYs which are signed and valid
> by DNSSEC, but which cannot be trusted.
> 
> I may be in the minority here, but I feel that this type of
> duty is best left to a certificate authority.

I agree, and I hope and think we are in majority -- I have not seen
anyone advocating using the DNSSEC PKI for trusting that keys belong
to a certain person.

Using the DNS to store a certificate issued by a CA via e.g. the CERT
record is different though.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 12:35:05 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 17:55:52 +0200
From: bert hubert <ahu@ds9a.nl>
To: Bill Manning <bmanning@ISI.EDU>
Cc: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>, Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>,
        namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <20011026175552.A15873@outpost.ds9a.nl>
References: <E15x8hu-0006Pu-00@rip.psg.com> <200110261524.f9QFOpA08104@zed.isi.edu>
In-Reply-To: <200110261524.f9QFOpA08104@zed.isi.edu>; from bmanning@ISI.EDU on Fri, Oct 26, 2001 at 08:24:51AM -0700
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On Fri, Oct 26, 2001 at 08:24:51AM -0700, Bill Manning wrote:
> % > there are currently no scalable nor secure alternatives to dnssec for
> % > doing large scale distribution of certificates and public keys.
> % 
> % a - dnssec s not yet real/deployable.  dnssec itself has keying problems.
> 	    ^ as a distribution method for certificates & pulbic keys i
> 
> There are components of DNSSEC that are eminently real and have been 
> deployed. 

PKI may yet make dnnsec a reality - suddenly dnssec has a use beyond being a
'probably more secure but lots more complicated mousetrap'.

And DNSSEC needs all the help it can get to gain real world acceptance.

Regards,

bert

-- 
http://www.PowerDNS.com          Versatile DNS Software & Services
Trilab                                 The Technology People
Netherlabs BV / Rent-a-Nerd.nl           - Nerd Available -
'SYN! .. SYN|ACK! .. ACK!' - the mating call of the internet


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 12:38:18 2001
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To: Randy Bush <randy@research.att.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
	<E15x83G-0005CA-00@rip.psg.com>
	<m34rom76xj.fsf@sjosefsson-pc.d.dynas.se>
	<E15x93y-000754-00@rip.psg.com>
From: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <E15x93y-000754-00@rip.psg.com> (Randy Bush's message of "Fri,
 26 Oct 2001 08:38:26 -0700")
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 18:07:36 +0200
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Randy Bush <randy@research.att.com> writes:

>> I think what we are seeing is that a fundamental requirement to
>> achieve a secure Internet is that the same entity that provides
>> "name" to "address" mapping (DNS, that is) provides the "name" to
>> "security material" mapping.
> 
> a hidden and suspect assumption, the name space of security material is
> the same as the dns name space.  i suspect that, as time passes, a
> smaller and smaller proportion of interesting security material will be
> about domains and hosts.

I don't believe so, people will continue to use tools to communicate,
and they need to trust those the machines.  (What would the larger
proportion of interesting security material be about?  Persons?)

>> In the old times, all you need to talk with someone was the address of
>> that someone.  Today you need the address and some keying material so
>> that you can talk to the someone securely.
> 
> where in the dns space does my pgp key fit so naturally and elegantly?
> (note the From: and that my key is Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>)

It belongs in the same domain as the MX record used to find your mail
server, which is found via the address you give to someone in order
for that someone to be able to contact you.  E.g., if your business
card contains X@Y the security data should be at X._mail.Y.  I fail to
see how the From: line has anything to do with anything (you don't
need to send mail from the same address you receive it to).

(This is probably of little technical value, I'm sorry I started this
part of thread.)



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 12:43:22 2001
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Message-ID: <00bf01c15e38$522a7be0$dd00a8c0@jamessonyvaio>
From: "James Seng/Personal" <jseng@pobox.org.sg>
To: "Greg Hudson" <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
Cc: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
References: <200110261400.KAA32361@egyptian-gods.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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Lets see the trust model.

I am saying "I trust DNSSEC to give me an accurate reference of A". Then
I trust "ROOT KEY of R to give me accurate data of A".

You are saying, lets make ROOT KEY of R = DNSSEC, ie "I trust DNSSEC to
give me accurate data of A".

In terms of simplicity, I agree that yours is better, thus less proned
to technical risk.

OTOH, while I can trust D to give me some information, I may not trust D
to give me all the information. There are different security use &
practice and insurance and liabilities consideration. A lookup to verify
jseng@pobox.org.sg have a very different consideration compared to a
money-transfer transcation. Putting them all under a single trust model
is an engineer dream but a nightmare in reality.

The failure to build a single trust root for PKI is a testimont to the
fact that people wants different trust relationship for different
purposes. For an example, I would trust my bank with my money and I
would trust my lawyer with my will. I trust both my bank and lawyer but
they are not inexchangable nor chainable. If they do, it is based on my
choice, not some X party choice.

But these are obviously abstract thoughts, maybe not even worth
pondering on...

-James Seng

> Let's consider the application of an email-like service, where I want
> to be able to verify that you are really jseng@pobox.org.sg and not
> someone else.  Trusting the DNS is no problem since it is a DNS-based
> identity which I am trying to verify.  Using an APPKEY approach, I can
> securely (assuming this is a future day when we have DNSSEC) fetch a
> key for pobox.org.sg and use it to verify a certificate used to sign
> your messages.
>
> Using your approach, the DNS can only tell me what server to contact
> to get the key for pobox.org.sg.  When I contact that server, I have
> to establish trust with it somehow, but because of your constraints,
> pobox.org.sg's DNSSEC key can't be used to sign any application keys.
> So I will have to use something else, probably an X.509 certificate,
> to establish trust.  Two trust hierarchies more points of failure and
> greater expense for pobox.org.sg.
>
>
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org
with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 12:43:45 2001
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Message-ID: <005d01c15e39$54dcae20$0a0aa8c0@labs.ntrg.com>
From: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>
To: "Greg Hudson" <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
Cc: "namedroppers" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
References: <200110261459.KAA00405@egyptian-gods.MIT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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"Greg Hudson" <ghudson@MIT.EDU> wrote:

> If you see problems with the use of APPKEY, make specific arguments,
> not vague generalities.

Looking at it in the context of my list of considerations for DNS data, the
two concerns that immediately jump out are message size and cache integrity.
It seems that overflow will likely be common. Controlling the expiration of
cached keys is a bit trickier. TTLs would have to be very tightly managed in
order to ensure the veracity of the RRs in caches, which would likely be
required if the original key was changed for some reason. I'm not sure how
much of a problem either of those really are, they just jump out as probable
concerns.

I'm completely ambivalent on the RR or usage, other than I have a general
belief that this kind of stuff does not fit well within a lookup service like
DNS anymore than it would fit well within ARP.

--
Eric A. Hall                                        http://www.ehsco.com/
Internet Core Protocols          http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 12:51:20 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
	<E15x83G-0005CA-00@rip.psg.com>
	<m34rom76xj.fsf@sjosefsson-pc.d.dynas.se>
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>> where in the dns space does my pgp key fit so naturally and elegantly?
>> (note the From: and that my key is Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>)
> It belongs in the same domain as the MX record used to find your mail
> server

no problem.  dear dns admin of att.com, please insert my pgp key for
randy@psg.com (and 100,000 others and shrinking) in the dns for att.com.
and pigs will fly.

and email addresses have an lhs.  you can twist and turn all day, but this
is not a clear mapping.

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 12:59:31 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 18:43:07 +0200 (MEST)
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
In-Reply-To: <E15x8hu-0006Pu-00@rip.psg.com>
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On Fri, 26 Oct 2001, Randy Bush wrote:

> a - dnssec s not yet real/deployable.  dnssec itself has keying problems.

what problems are you refering to? the problems that initiated the work on
delegation signer or the general parent-child key transfer problem?

	jakob



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 13:00:35 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 18:46:46 +0200 (MEST)
From: Jakob Schlyter <jakob@crt.se>
To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
Cc: DNSEXT <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
In-Reply-To: <20011026110107.E2873@bailey.dscga.com>
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On Fri, 26 Oct 2001, Michael Mealling wrote:

> > in addition to just adding another level indirection, you still have the
> > problem of bootstrapping that other protocol.
>
> You do? How?

how to you trust the tls/ssl peer that you are talking https or ldaps
with?


> DNS's 'caching, replication, data integrity' etc are probably at the
> lower end of the scale when it comes to those terms. I would assert
> that methods for doing that over and for HTTP are much more robust
> these days.

distributed http caching mechanism? large scale http replication between
sites? signed content in dns? we must living in separate worlds.


	jakob




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 13:00:52 2001
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To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
	<E15x83G-0005CA-00@rip.psg.com>
	<m34rom76xj.fsf@sjosefsson-pc.d.dynas.se>
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	<E15x9nj-0008Qt-00@rip.psg.com>
From: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <E15x9nj-0008Qt-00@rip.psg.com> (Randy Bush's message of "Fri,
 26 Oct 2001 09:25:43 -0700")
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 18:46:41 +0200
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Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> writes:

>>> where in the dns space does my pgp key fit so naturally and elegantly?
>>> (note the From: and that my key is Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>)
>> It belongs in the same domain as the MX record used to find your mail
>> server
> 
> no problem.  dear dns admin of att.com, please insert my pgp key for
> randy@psg.com (and 100,000 others and shrinking) in the dns for att.com.
> and pigs will fly.

If the DNS administrator do not publish their users' certificates it
is not going to work.

But I don't see how it would be easier to get the LDAP admins of
att.com to enter the PGP key for randy@psg.com in the directory AND
the DNS admins to insert SRV glue in DNS to point at this server?  The
latter is even less secure (where do I get the keys used to talk with
the LDAP server securely?).

> and email addresses have an lhs. you can twist and turn all day, but
> this is not a clear mapping.

What about the SOA mapping?  It is supposedly used by some registries
to contact hostmaster in a automated fashion.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 13:04:08 2001
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References: <v0313030db7ff2138fb89@[199.171.39.21]>
 <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
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 <v0313030db7ff2138fb89@[199.171.39.21]>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 12:04:21 -0400
To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Cc: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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At 11:30 AM -0400 10/26/01, Michael Mealling wrote:
>My objection isn't that a new RR is added, but that the usage profile
>of new functionality that requires that RR is inconsistent with previous
>ones.
>By putting keys/certs in the DNS you've turned the DNS into a data store
>for end point information, not a pointer to that information. It changes
>the ratio of the amount/number of queries in/to a nameserver to
>the members of an administrative domain from 1:<very many> to 1:1.
>
>I.e. its no the RR that's the problem. Its the increase in the usage profile
>that's the problem....

I would like a little more specific information on this.  How does the
usage profile differ between an MX record and the proposed APPKEY record?
In both cases I know where I want to send mail/where I want to get a key
and I ask for the information.  In the MX case, I use the result for the
email MTA application, in the other I use the result for validating an SSH
key offerering.

I applogize for seeming to be argumentative, but perhaps I am
misinterpreting the phrase "usage profile."

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

You fly too often when ... the airport taxi is on speed-dial.

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 13:08:37 2001
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Message-ID: <004d01c15e3e$ea071300$dd00a8c0@jamessonyvaio>
From: "James Seng/Personal" <jseng@pobox.org.sg>
To: "Greg Hudson" <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
Cc: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
References: <200110261400.KAA32361@egyptian-gods.MIT.EDU> <00bf01c15e38$522a7be0$dd00a8c0@jamessonyvaio>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Date: Sat, 27 Oct 2001 00:54:44 +0800
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I love following up my own mail.

But I like to post just one question (one which may not have an answer):

When an application retrieve the publickey, say using the mechanism
stated in draft-schlyter-appkey, does the application needs to validate
the publickey?

If yes, then ...(see how it relates below)...
If no, then ...(see how it relates below)...

:-)

-James Seng

----- Original Message -----
From: "James Seng/Personal" <jseng@pobox.org.sg>
To: "Greg Hudson" <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
Cc: <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Sent: Saturday, October 27, 2001 12:07 AM
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS


> Lets see the trust model.
>
> I am saying "I trust DNSSEC to give me an accurate reference of A".
Then
> I trust "ROOT KEY of R to give me accurate data of A".
>
> You are saying, lets make ROOT KEY of R = DNSSEC, ie "I trust DNSSEC
to
> give me accurate data of A".
>
> In terms of simplicity, I agree that yours is better, thus less proned
> to technical risk.
>
> OTOH, while I can trust D to give me some information, I may not trust
D
> to give me all the information. There are different security use &
> practice and insurance and liabilities consideration. A lookup to
verify
> jseng@pobox.org.sg have a very different consideration compared to a
> money-transfer transcation. Putting them all under a single trust
model
> is an engineer dream but a nightmare in reality.
>
> The failure to build a single trust root for PKI is a testimont to the
> fact that people wants different trust relationship for different
> purposes. For an example, I would trust my bank with my money and I
> would trust my lawyer with my will. I trust both my bank and lawyer
but
> they are not inexchangable nor chainable. If they do, it is based on
my
> choice, not some X party choice.
>
> But these are obviously abstract thoughts, maybe not even worth
> pondering on...
>
> -James Seng
>
> > Let's consider the application of an email-like service, where I
want
> > to be able to verify that you are really jseng@pobox.org.sg and not
> > someone else.  Trusting the DNS is no problem since it is a
DNS-based
> > identity which I am trying to verify.  Using an APPKEY approach, I
can
> > securely (assuming this is a future day when we have DNSSEC) fetch a
> > key for pobox.org.sg and use it to verify a certificate used to sign
> > your messages.
> >
> > Using your approach, the DNS can only tell me what server to contact
> > to get the key for pobox.org.sg.  When I contact that server, I have
> > to establish trust with it somehow, but because of your constraints,
> > pobox.org.sg's DNSSEC key can't be used to sign any application
keys.
> > So I will have to use something else, probably an X.509 certificate,
> > to establish trust.  Two trust hierarchies more points of failure
and
> > greater expense for pobox.org.sg.
> >
> >
> > to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org
> with
> > the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
>
>
>
> to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org
with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 13:25:25 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 19:11:30 +0200 (CEST)
From: Simon Josefsson <jas@extundo.com>
To: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>
cc: Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU>, namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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On Fri, 26 Oct 2001, Eric A. Hall wrote:

> "Greg Hudson" <ghudson@MIT.EDU> wrote:
> 
> > If you see problems with the use of APPKEY, make specific arguments,
> > not vague generalities.
> 
> Looking at it in the context of my list of considerations for DNS data, 
> the two concerns that immediately jump out are message size and cache 
> integrity.

Thank you for providing technical arguments against the approach.

> It seems that overflow will likely be common.

When I investigated it, I came to the conclusion that overflow will almost 
always happen -- X.509 certificates used for email purposes seem to be 
around 600-1200 bytes (of course exceptions exists), larger than the IPv4 
UDP limit.

I believe draft-ietf-dnsext-message-size-04.txt addresses this concern 
though.

> Controlling the expiration of cached keys is a bit trickier. TTLs
> would have to be very tightly managed in order to ensure the veracity
> of the RRs in caches, which would likely be required if the original
> key was changed for some reason.

For certificates: Revocation is not handled by DNS at all.  I believe the 
TTL can in fact be _much_ longer than usual, since it is known at time 
when you enter the certificate into DNS how long it will be valid 
(expirytime).

For raw application keys: This is a problem.  However, if this is a real 
problem for the application, it can use certificate based key distribution 
instead.  It isn't necessarily a problem for all applications.

> I'm not sure how much of a problem either of those really are, they
> just jump out as probable concerns.

IMHO it would be good to have the set of concerns people have written 
down so it is possible to address them, your list is a good start.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 13:48:46 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 10:31:20 -0700
From: Mark Gritter <mgritter@CS.Stanford.EDU>
To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <20011026103120.A11737@Xenon.Stanford.EDU>
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se> <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se> <v0313030db7ff2138fb89@[199.171.39.21]> <20011026113007.I2873@bailey.dscga.com>
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I'm afraid I don't follow the reasoning here.  You seem to be making the
assumption that one lookup of NAPTR (or whatever other pointer-to-where-
you-should-go-to-get-keys exists) is shared among many key lookups.

Is this a realistic assumption?  What sort of mapping from key ID -->
domain name are you imagining?  If different keys map to different domain
names, then there is no reduction in queries other than that provided
by caching.  For example, if we want to store SSH keys, then it is
not possible to assume that a key pointer at "dsg.stanford.edu"
is the right place to look for keys for "erdos.dsg.stanford.edu".
So there are at least some circumstances in which the extra level of
indirection provides _no_ savings.

Further, I think that the increased usage profile is only a problem if
you look at just DNS.  _Something_ is going to have to handle the load
of key lookups, so I can't imagine there will be much benefit in handing
the server side off to another process--- in many sites it would just be
the same machine.  The load on recursive name servers is an issue, and
I agree that any proposal would have to examine it, but I don't believe
it to be a show-stopper--- particularly if the "real" key-distribution
protocol uses any intermediate agents (like HTTP caches...)

Mark Gritter

On Fri, Oct 26, 2001 at 11:30:07AM -0400, Michael Mealling wrote:
> My objection isn't that a new RR is added, but that the usage profile
> of new functionality that requires that RR is inconsistent with previous ones. 
> By putting keys/certs in the DNS you've turned the DNS into a data store
> for end point information, not a pointer to that information. It changes
> the ratio of the amount/number of queries in/to a nameserver to 
> the members of an administrative domain from 1:<very many> to 1:1.
> 
> I.e. its no the RR that's the problem. Its the increase in the usage profile
> that's the problem....
> 
> -MM
> 

-- 
Mark Gritter <mgritter@cs.stanford.edu>
http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~mgritter/


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 13:50:24 2001
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Message-ID: <3BD99E56.70249B11@ehsco.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 12:33:11 -0500
From: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>
To: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
CC: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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Simon Josefsson wrote:

> But I don't see how it would be easier to get the LDAP admins of
> att.com to enter the PGP key for randy@psg.com in the directory AND
> the DNS admins to insert SRV glue in DNS to point at this server?

The "easier" part is that LDAP has a notion of ACLs, meaning that the
users can be given permission to enter their own keys, rather than
requiring administrators do it for them. An equivalent in DNS would be to
define ACL RRs and pass them as mandatory data in all queries.

-- 
Eric A. Hall                                        http://www.ehsco.com/
Internet Core Protocols          http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 14:05:05 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 13:40:57 -0400
From: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
To: Mark Gritter <mgritter@CS.Stanford.EDU>
Cc: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <20011026134057.P2873@bailey.dscga.com>
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se> <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se> <v0313030db7ff2138fb89@[199.171.39.21]> <20011026113007.I2873@bailey.dscga.com> <20011026103120.A11737@Xenon.Stanford.EDU>
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On Fri, Oct 26, 2001 at 10:31:20AM -0700, Mark Gritter wrote:
> I'm afraid I don't follow the reasoning here.  You seem to be making the
> assumption that one lookup of NAPTR (or whatever other pointer-to-where-
> you-should-go-to-get-keys exists) is shared among many key lookups.

Yes it is. This is what the NAPTR based DDDS algorithm was designed to do.

> Is this a realistic assumption?  What sort of mapping from key ID -->
> domain name are you imagining?  If different keys map to different domain
> names, then there is no reduction in queries other than that provided
> by caching.  For example, if we want to store SSH keys, then it is
> not possible to assume that a key pointer at "dsg.stanford.edu"
> is the right place to look for keys for "erdos.dsg.stanford.edu".
> So there are at least some circumstances in which the extra level of
> indirection provides _no_ savings.

The NAPTR record handles this by providing a rewrite function set that
allows you to say that "erdos.dsg.stanford.edu" has behavior 'x' and
'dsg.stanford.edu' has behavior 'y' without having to have records for
foo.stanford.edu. Its a much more robust delegation model than DNS since 
it can take into account more than just DNS labels.

> Further, I think that the increased usage profile is only a problem if
> you look at just DNS.  _Something_ is going to have to handle the load
> of key lookups, so I can't imagine there will be much benefit in handing
> the server side off to another process--- in many sites it would just be
> the same machine.  The load on recursive name servers is an issue, and
> I agree that any proposal would have to examine it, but I don't believe
> it to be a show-stopper--- particularly if the "real" key-distribution
> protocol uses any intermediate agents (like HTTP caches...)

Yes and no. Some protocols are better at handling mirros than others.
Just from our experience (I'm with VeriSign's research group) adding
to much to DNS nameservers causes huge issues with the roots...

To me it makes much more sense to leave the DNS at its current loading
and moving new, possibly very busy services to other protocols so that
you don't have to deal with more than one usage profile for the service.

-MM

-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
michael@neonym.net      |                              | http://www.neonym.net


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To: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
	<E15x83G-0005CA-00@rip.psg.com>
	<m34rom76xj.fsf@sjosefsson-pc.d.dynas.se>
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From: Simon Josefsson <sjosefsson@rsasecurity.com>
In-Reply-To: <3BD99E56.70249B11@ehsco.com> ("Eric A. Hall"'s message of
 "Fri, 26 Oct 2001 12:33:11 -0500")
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 19:54:40 +0200
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"Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com> writes:

> Simon Josefsson wrote:
> 
>> But I don't see how it would be easier to get the LDAP admins of
>> att.com to enter the PGP key for randy@psg.com in the directory AND
>> the DNS admins to insert SRV glue in DNS to point at this server?
> 
> The "easier" part is that LDAP has a notion of ACLs, meaning that the
> users can be given permission to enter their own keys, rather than
> requiring administrators do it for them. 

Do users commonly want (and know how to) update their own keys in LDAP
servers?  (I don't know the answer, but my limited experience is that
administrators generally manage this.)

> An equivalent in DNS would be to define ACL RRs and pass them as
> mandatory data in all queries.

Or simply allowing users to update their own DNS data via mail, HTTP,
LDAP or similar.

Being able to do it via the DNS protocol is not necessary, I think,
and even if Dynamic DNS was used you don't need to have the ACL data
available in DNS.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 14:06:07 2001
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To: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
Cc: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se> <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se> <v0313030db7ff2138fb89@[199.171.39.21]> <20011026113007.I2873@bailey.dscga.com>
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: 26 Oct 2001 13:52:15 -0400
In-Reply-To: Michael Mealling's message of "Fri, 26 Oct 2001 11:30:07 -0400"
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Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net> writes:

> My objection isn't that a new RR is added, but that the usage
> profile of new functionality that requires that RR is inconsistent
> with previous ones.  By putting keys/certs in the DNS you've turned
> the DNS into a data store for end point information, not a pointer
> to that information. It changes the ratio of the amount/number of
> queries in/to a nameserver to the members of an administrative
> domain from 1:<very many> to 1:1.

As many have already pointed out, the DNS is already a data store for
end-point information, at least as far as hosts are concerned.

Perhaps we should limit this discussion to host-based keying material
as opposed to user-based keying material.  Not that this changes the
discussion -- we were already talking about IPsec and SSH -- but
perhaps that can scope us into a point where your arguments are
invalid.

We already have A record information for how to contact a host.  Why
not CERT/APPKEY information for how to contact that host securely?

> I.e. its no the RR that's the problem. Its the increase in the usage profile
> that's the problem....

I think this is a red herring.  All of this extra information is out
on the fringes; it's not in the core.

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 14:09:09 2001
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To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <E15x83G-0005CA-00@rip.psg.com> 	<200110261459.KAA00405@egyptian-gods.MIT.EDU> 	<E15x8fd-0006Lm-00@rip.psg.com> 	<sjmzo6e9zyy.fsf@rcn.ihtfp.org> <E15x9EA-0007O8-00@rip.psg.com>
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Date: 26 Oct 2001 13:55:11 -0400
In-Reply-To: Randy Bush's message of "Fri, 26 Oct 2001 08:48:58 -0700"
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Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> writes:

> >> the pki i use today, the public pgp keyring, is not a hierarchic name
> >> space. 
> > The signatures certainly don't follow a hierachy, but the lookup
> > mechanism, the userID, most certainly does (for any real-world usable
> > key).
> 
> useful pgp is not restricted to email addresses as ids.

Sure it is.  Go send a message to Abdullah Oblongata.  Go ahead.  Go
find his key and send him an email?  Doesn't work very well, does it?
Whereas if I said, "send a message to president@whitehouse.gov", you
could do that.

I still maintain that useful pgp is restricted to email addresses.
Perhaps I should qualify that as "useful PGP for random
communication."  PGP in a closed environment can work without email
addresses, but in that case you're not going to use a directory to
lookup keys.

> randy

-derek

PS: I maintain that the current PGP Keyserver design is broken, and
has always been broken.  But back when there _were_ only 1000 keys in
the database, it made sense to do it that way.  But we've ALWAYS said
we need a DNS-like key distribution mechanism.

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 14:11:59 2001
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To: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>
Cc: "Greg Hudson" <ghudson@mit.edu>,
        "namedroppers" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
References: <200110261459.KAA00405@egyptian-gods.MIT.EDU> <005d01c15e39$54dcae20$0a0aa8c0@labs.ntrg.com>
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@mit.edu>
Date: 26 Oct 2001 13:59:46 -0400
In-Reply-To: "Eric A. Hall"'s message of "Fri, 26 Oct 2001 11:14:45 -0500"
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"Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com> writes:

> "Greg Hudson" <ghudson@MIT.EDU> wrote:
> 
> > If you see problems with the use of APPKEY, make specific arguments,
> > not vague generalities.
> 
> Looking at it in the context of my list of considerations for DNS data, the
> two concerns that immediately jump out are message size and cache integrity.
> It seems that overflow will likely be common. Controlling the expiration of
> cached keys is a bit trickier. TTLs would have to be very tightly managed in
> order to ensure the veracity of the RRs in caches, which would likely be
> required if the original key was changed for some reason. I'm not sure how
> much of a problem either of those really are, they just jump out as probable
> concerns.

Nothing in the DNS Spec says that you MUST cache data, and nothing
says that you MUST keep it as long as the TTL.  The TTL is a MAXIMUM
length, not an exact length.  If your cache gets too big, flush
entries.

As for message size, you do realize that this is all end-node data,
not in the core?  The core/root servers aren't storing the foo.com
keys -- those are in the foo.com DNS servers.

Also, CERT/APPKEY messages wont be any bigger than 2535 SIG/KEY
records.  Are you saying that we should just scrap all of DNSsec
because it's too big?  If not, then why are SIG/KEY record sizes ok
but CERT/APPKEY message sizes too big?  If anything, I'd expect
SIG/KEY records to be LARGER than CERT/APPKEY records.

> I'm completely ambivalent on the RR or usage, other than I have a general
> belief that this kind of stuff does not fit well within a lookup service like
> DNS anymore than it would fit well within ARP.

I think we are going to have to agree to disagree on this one.
If SSH is already looking up the A record to connect to a host,
why not lookup the CERT/APPKEY record to connect securely to
that host?

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 14:18:09 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 14:00:26 -0400
From: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
Cc: Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net>, Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>,
        namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Message-ID: <20011026140025.Q2873@bailey.dscga.com>
References: <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se> <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261511270.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se> <v0313030db7ff2138fb89@[199.171.39.21]> <20011026113007.I2873@bailey.dscga.com> <sjmn12e9tm8.fsf@rcn.ihtfp.org>
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On Fri, Oct 26, 2001 at 01:52:15PM -0400, Derek Atkins wrote:
> Michael Mealling <michael@neonym.net> writes:
> > My objection isn't that a new RR is added, but that the usage
> > profile of new functionality that requires that RR is inconsistent
> > with previous ones.  By putting keys/certs in the DNS you've turned
> > the DNS into a data store for end point information, not a pointer
> > to that information. It changes the ratio of the amount/number of
> > queries in/to a nameserver to the members of an administrative
> > domain from 1:<very many> to 1:1.
> 
> As many have already pointed out, the DNS is already a data store for
> end-point information, at least as far as hosts are concerned.
> 
> Perhaps we should limit this discussion to host-based keying material
> as opposed to user-based keying material.  Not that this changes the
> discussion -- we were already talking about IPsec and SSH -- but
> perhaps that can scope us into a point where your arguments are
> invalid.
> 
> We already have A record information for how to contact a host.  Why
> not CERT/APPKEY information for how to contact that host securely?

That I don't have a problem with. After thinking about this I would 
do something like this:

Take the existing KEY RR and deprecate the use of anything other than
a zone. The NAPTR record is signed with that key. That NAPTR record points
to a server that runs various protocols that can answer various questions
about the thing the client is trying to do. Contact with that host via 
those protocols is authenticated via TLS using the same key that signed
the NAPTR record.

If its bad juju to use the zone key in the TLS session then I guess I
could be ok with both a host key and a zone key. 

I just have objections to keys for individual users/entities/documents, etc.

> > I.e. its no the RR that's the problem. Its the increase in the usage profile
> > that's the problem....
> 
> I think this is a red herring.  All of this extra information is out
> on the fringes; it's not in the core.

But the number of total queries goes up because you don't agregate things at
the host level anymore...

-MM


-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | urn:pin:1
michael@neonym.net      |                              | http://www.neonym.net


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 14:22:34 2001
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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 14:09:29 EDT
From: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@columbia.edu>
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@mit.edu>
Cc: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>, "Greg Hudson" <ghudson@mit.edu>,
        "namedroppers" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
In-Reply-To: Your message of 26 Oct 2001 13:59:46 -0400
Message-ID: <CMM.0.90.4.1004119769.jaltman@watsun.cc.columbia.edu>
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> > I'm completely ambivalent on the RR or usage, other than I have a general
> > belief that this kind of stuff does not fit well within a lookup service like
> > DNS anymore than it would fit well within ARP.
> 
> I think we are going to have to agree to disagree on this one.
> If SSH is already looking up the A record to connect to a host,
> why not lookup the CERT/APPKEY record to connect securely to
> that host?
> 
> -derek

I can think of one reason.  If you do not have a copy of the SSH key
in your possession from some trusted source, the copy of a key that
you receive from untrusted DNS is of no more value than the copy of
the key you will receive from the server you are attempting to connect
to.  If you trust the DNS entry to say that the host is the one you
want to connect to, you might as well get the host key from the SSH
server.

All that putting the SSH key in untrusted DNS does is increase the
amount of administration that must be performed when a host key must
be changed for legitimate reasons.

- Jeff



 Jeffrey Altman * Sr.Software Designer      C-Kermit 8.0 Beta available
 The Kermit Project @ Columbia University   includes Secure Telnet and FTP
 http://www.kermit-project.org/             using Kerberos, SRP, and 
 kermit-support@kermit-project.org          OpenSSL.  SSH soon to follow.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 15:40:13 2001
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Message-Id: <4.3.2.7.2.20011026150458.0324dc20@diablo.cisco.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 15:15:18 -0400
To: Mike Schiraldi <raldi@research.netsol.com>
From: John Schnizlein <jschnizl@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <20011026114417.D15892@research.netsol.com>
References: <4.3.2.7.2.20011026103821.0325f118@diablo.cisco.com>
 <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261144340.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
 <013301c15dfb$feea31a0$dd00a8c0@jamessonyvaio>
 <Pine.BSO.4.40.0110261144340.19486-100000@fonbella.crt.se>
 <4.3.2.7.2.20011026103821.0325f118@diablo.cisco.com>
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Microsoft's choice of 8.3 filenames is not an example of trying
to use the established (best practice) technology for purposes 
not anticipated at the time of invention.
The problem in this case was well known when MS-DOS was first
licensed to IBM. The implication that 8.3 filenames were
best practice at that time is historically false.

This attempted metaphor does not apply to the issue at hand:
using the (best practice) DNS to carry host-access security
information in addition to host-access address information.

John

At 11:44 AM 10/26/2001, Mike Schiraldi wrote:
>> I am sure most people on this list know the facts, but I have 
>> learned the hard way that uncorrected historical references are
>> interpreted as true before very long.
>
>I'm not sure i understand your argument. Michael was citing an example of
>how imperfect solutions meant to bootstrap a new technology often stick
>around far longer than their implementors intended them to, and can continue
>to cause headaches for decades.



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Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 15:16:08 -0500
From: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>
Organization: EHS Company
To: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
CC: Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU>, namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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Derek Atkins wrote:

> Nothing in the DNS Spec says that you MUST cache data, and nothing
> says that you MUST keep it as long as the TTL.  The TTL is a MAXIMUM
> length, not an exact length.  If your cache gets too big, flush
> entries.

Nothing to do with size of the cache, and everything to do with old keys
hanging around in somebody's cache. Until the cache expires, the key you
have hoses your app. There are two options around this: don't cache it, or
let clients demand authoritative answers. Both suck for the cache-heavy,
lookup-centric DNS model.

> As for message size, you do realize that this is all end-node data,
> not in the core?  The core/root servers aren't storing the foo.com
> keys -- those are in the foo.com DNS servers.

If it will always overflow, then you will always need to fallback to TCP.
For infrequent operations that's not a big deal but for frequent uses it
adds up pretty quickly, especially on busy servers where TCP puts a much
larger burden on the system.

I'm not claiming that these issues are worthy of preventing the use of the
RR, but they are certainly valid considerations.

> If SSH is already looking up the A record to connect to a host,
> why not lookup the CERT/APPKEY record to connect securely to
> that host?

Equally, why would you want to do so? I mean, at that point, why not just
store SSH profiles in DNS as well?

-- 
Eric A. Hall                                        http://www.ehsco.com/
Internet Core Protocols          http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 17:26:58 2001
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Message-ID: <3BD9CA5C.3FD432C8@unixpeople.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 13:41:00 -0700
From: "Andy W. Barclay" <abarclay@unixpeople.com>
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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I agree with Jeff with one possible change: "s/untrusted//g"

If I get an ssh key from DNS, even if that key has been signed
by DNSSec, then I still can't trust it. Why? Because I can be pretty
sure that the user generated his/her own key pair, then forwarded
the public key to the admin for inclusion to the DNS.
The admin has just included the key in the zone and signed it.

All I can be sure of is that the key has not been changed in transit.
Without a CERT, I can't be sure of the identity of the user. 

Jeffrey Altman wrote:
> 
> > > I'm completely ambivalent on the RR or usage, other than I have a general
> > > belief that this kind of stuff does not fit well within a lookup service like
> > > DNS anymore than it would fit well within ARP.
> >
> > I think we are going to have to agree to disagree on this one.
> > If SSH is already looking up the A record to connect to a host,
> > why not lookup the CERT/APPKEY record to connect securely to
> > that host?
> >
> > -derek
> 
> I can think of one reason.  If you do not have a copy of the SSH key
> in your possession from some trusted source, the copy of a key that
> you receive from untrusted DNS is of no more value than the copy of
> the key you will receive from the server you are attempting to connect
> to.  If you trust the DNS entry to say that the host is the one you
> want to connect to, you might as well get the host key from the SSH
> server.
> 
> All that putting the SSH key in untrusted DNS does is increase the
> amount of administration that must be performed when a host key must
> be changed for legitimate reasons.

--
Regards,
Andy W. Barclay.        abarclay@unixpeople.com
fax  (781) 823-8276
Always a UNIX Evangelist (and sometimes a system and network architect)

"So she went into the garden to cut a cabbage leaf to make an
apple pie; and at the same time a great she-bear, coming up 
the street pops its head into the shop. 'What! no soap?'
So he died, and she very imprudently married the barber; and 
they all fell to playing the game of catch as catch can; til
the gunpowder ran out at the heels of their boots.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 18:24:15 2001
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To: "Andy W. Barclay" <abarclay@unixpeople.com>
cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 18:01:41 -0400
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
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> If I get an ssh key from DNS, even if that key has been signed by
> DNSSec, then I still can't trust it. Why? Because I can be pretty
> sure that the user generated his/her own key pair, then forwarded
> the public key to the admin for inclusion to the DNS.
[...]
> Without a CERT, I can't be sure of the identity of the user. 

So, let me get this straight:

  A DNS APPKEY record retrieved via secure DNS is a key signed by the
  next level up in the DNS hierarchy.  An APPKEY record must have been
  signed by an irresponsible DNS administrator who got the public key
  from some other person by an unauthenticated path.

  A certificate is a key signed by the next level up in the
  certification hierarchy.  A certificate key must have been signed
  by a responsible CA who generated the key pair and transmitted the
  private key to some other person by a secret path.

That's a pretty impressive level of prejudice, given that the
technical mechanisms are identical.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Oct 26 23:32:47 2001
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In-Reply-To: Message from Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> 
   of "Sat, 27 Oct 2001 03:31:18 BST." <14028.1004149878@gromit.rfc1035.com> 
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: SOA MNAME usage and restrictions 
Date: Fri, 26 Oct 2001 20:01:13 -0700
From: Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
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>     Paul> NOTIFY is the only protocol-defined use for SOA MNAME.
> 
> I thought it gets used in DDNS too, no?

oops.  embarrassing, since i wrote that section:

   4.3. If the requestor has reasonable cause to believe that all of a
   zone's servers will be equally reachable, then it should arrange to try
   the primary master server (as given by the SOA MNAME field if matched by
   some NS NSDNAME) first to avoid unnecessary forwarding inside the slave
   servers.  (Note that the primary master will in some cases not be
   reachable by all requestors, due to firewalls or network partitioning.)


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Sun Oct 28 18:57:57 2001
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Date: Sun, 28 Oct 2001 12:36:40 -0800
From: "Andy W. Barclay" <abarclay@unixpeople.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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Sorry, let me clarify.

Greg Hudson wrote:
> 
> > If I get an ssh key from DNS, even if that key has been signed by
> > DNSSec, then I still can't trust it. Why? Because I can be pretty
> > sure that the user generated his/her own key pair, then forwarded
> > the public key to the admin for inclusion to the DNS.
> [...]
> > Without a CERT, I can't be sure of the identity of the user.
> 
> So, let me get this straight:
> 
>   A DNS APPKEY record retrieved via secure DNS is a key signed by the
>   next level up in the DNS hierarchy.  An APPKEY record must have been
>   signed by an irresponsible DNS administrator who got the public key
>   from some other person by an unauthenticated path.
> 
>   A certificate is a key signed by the next level up in the
>   certification hierarchy.  A certificate key must have been signed
>   by a responsible CA who generated the key pair and transmitted the
>   private key to some other person by a secret path.
> 
> That's a pretty impressive level of prejudice, given that the
> technical mechanisms are identical.

As an individual, I can contact a certificate authority (like verisign),
and
provide that CA with a copy of my passport and a signed letter, and
whatever else they require, and they will issue me a certificate. I am
pretty sure that a CERT is simply a public key, signed by a CA.

I have just started a new job this week. If I generate an ssh key pair
and
ask the local admin to stick the public key into DNS, then the zone gets
signed.

I do assert, in this case, that the former case offers MUCH more
reliability than the latter. DNSSec does a good job of authenticating
data that is DNS related, but authentication at the application level
should be left to a CA.

--
Regards,
Andy W. Barclay.        abarclay@unixpeople.com
fax  (781) 823-8276
Always a UNIX Evangelist (and sometimes a system and network architect)

Real Programmers don't write specs -- users should
consider themselves lucky to get any programs at all
and take what they get...


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 29 00:51:16 2001
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             <3BDC6C58.D9DE1E5A@unixpeople.com> 
To: "Andy W. Barclay" <abarclay@unixpeople.com>
cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2001 00:20:17 -0500
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
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> As an individual, I can contact a certificate authority (like
> verisign), and provide that CA with a copy of my passport and a
> signed letter, and whatever else they require, and they will issue
> me a certificate. I am pretty sure that a CERT is simply a public
> key, signed by a CA.

They also have to give you the private key, or you can't do anything
with the certificate.  I don't know how CAs usually transport private
keys to customers without exposing them to packet-sniffing or
interception by intermediaries.

How is Verisign supposed to know that I am authorized to change the
host key of error-messages.mit.edu (my laptop) but not www.mit.edu?

How can you justify the expense of performing a business transaction
with a third party for every host key created within an organization?
(This is more of a technology decision than a policy decision,
although the X.509 usage I know about has typically followed your
model where everyone transacts directly with the CA.)

> I have just started a new job this week. If I generate an ssh key
> pair and ask the local admin to stick the public key into DNS, then
> the zone gets signed.

First, this is an implementation issue.  No one says the ssh key pair
can't be generated by the DNS admin.

Second, this scenario seems perfectly secure in many circumstances,
e.g. at a small company where you just walked over to the DNS
administrator's desk and told him you were sending him your public
key.  That's much better authentication than anything you can give to
Verisign, and of course a DNS administrator can actually know who is
authorized to do what in the company.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 29 10:46:49 2001
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In-Reply-To: Greg Hudson's message of "Mon, 29 Oct 2001 00:20:17 -0500"
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To: Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
Cc: "Andy W. Barclay" <abarclay@unixpeople.com>,
        namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
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Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU> writes:

> They also have to give you the private key, or you can't do anything
> with the certificate.  I don't know how CAs usually transport private
> keys to customers without exposing them to packet-sniffing or
> interception by intermediaries.

Generally you generate the key pair yourself and send a "certificate
request" to the CA.  The CertReq contains your public key, your name
as _you_ think it should be, and some other information and self-signs
it (potentially along with a nonce or challenge value).  The CA then
somehow out-of-band verifies this CertReq against the meatspace
customer and then signs and returns the Certificate signed by the CA.

> How is Verisign supposed to know that I am authorized to change the
> host key of error-messages.mit.edu (my laptop) but not www.mit.edu?

This is indeed the problem -- c.f. Verisign signing a fake M$ Cert!

> > I have just started a new job this week. If I generate an ssh key
> > pair and ask the local admin to stick the public key into DNS, then
> > the zone gets signed.

Andy, I don't understand what's wrong with this?  When I started my
last job I had to wait to get my new host into the DNS; I had to wait
to get my account into NIS; I had to wait to get my mail aliases into
sendmail's db.

I think you are blowing the onus of sending an SSH key to the DNS
admin out of proportion.  I think most enterprises already have
delegated administration to handle these things.  Certainly the last
three places I've worked (from 18 to 10,000 employees) would all have
been able to handle this without a problem.

And note that you do NOT need to resign a complete zone when you make
one change; you only seen to sign the subset of the zone that actually
changed!  If you already have an A record and you add a CERT record,
then all you have to do is sign the CERT and re-issue the NXT.  That's
only two signatures you need to make to perform that change.

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord@MIT.EDU                        PGP key available


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From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-delegation-signer-03.txt
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Delegation Signer record in parent
	Author(s)	: O. Gudmundsson
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-delegation-signer-03.txt
	Pages		: 12
	Date		: 26-Oct-01
	
The Delegation Signer (DS) RR set is stored in a delegating (parent)
zone at each delegation point, and indicates the keys used in the
delegated (child) zone. The main design goal of the DS RR simplify the
operation of secure delegations by eliminating the need to store the
same RR in parent and child, as is done with the NS RR set and the KEY
set in RFC2535.
Secure resolvers need to take an additional step with DS to verify a
child's KEY RR set. Operationally this schema is much simpler as
operation of the two zones at delegation is now decoupled to great
extent.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 29 19:45:56 2001
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References: Greg Hudson's message of "Mon, 29 Oct 2001 00:20:17 -0500"
 <200110290520.AAA04635@error-messages.mit.edu>
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Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2001 12:59:16 -0500
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Cc: lewis@tislabs.com
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It seems to me that the the important debate in this thread is whether or
not DNS is an appropriate mechanism for distributing security data
(specifically public keys).  Although there are no technical barriers to
the addition of data and data types to DNS (within constraints), there is a
division over whether the distribution of security data is within DNS
bounds or is an overextension of the original protocol.

I suspect the resistance to the development of new records for keys (APPKEY
for one) comes under the heading of "since key management is too difficult
for DNS operatrors, let's not give them a record (rope) to hang
themselves."  I can understand this attitude, even if the pro-new records
camp insists that the distribution of PKI output does not make DNS a PKI.

My suspicion is that issuing genuine PKI certificates (PGP, X.509) in DNS
is acceptable to even those who fear turning DNS into a PKI.  The trouble
is in trusting whether operators can be trusted to handle keys well enough
for other protocols.  (We assume they can be trained to at least secure
DNS.)

Whether or not an application can place its trust in DNS to handle raw
public keys is really an application-by-application issue.  The DNS issue
is whether or not to support applications that can live by DNS key
management rules.

As far as SSH is concerned - and perhaps this should really be discussed in
an SSH forum and not DNS - we need to determine the relationship between
the person responsible for deriving the hosts public key and registering it
(and the address record) in the DNS.  Cutting a long analysis short, I
think in the majority of instances, the relationship is close as the nature
of the data (host based) is close.  (Who would be the CA that would vouch
for the host public key?)

Perhaps in another application, one which is user based, the relationship
between the generator of the public key and the DNS administrator is
further apart.  In this case, DNS management of the public key is less wise
- and where the CERT record should hold the certificate that should be in
place.

Where do I expect to see go to next?  Deciding if we want to supply the
rope for applications, should they choose to hang themselves is the first
step.  It might be beneficial for SSH-interested folk to determine if
having the keys in DNS is a good thing, or it SSH would benefit more from a
true certificate system.  Perhaps others might want to suggest and study
this issue for other applications.

If DNS isn't the place to distribute public keys, perhaps the key
distribution people have to run off and work on a key distribution
mechanism.  This could be a schema in LDAP and NAPTR records, or it might
not.

If it comes down to adding more to DNS or keeping DNS simple and
complicating the lives of applications (say adding NAPTR and LDAP), what
choice should be made?  Is the (relative) simplicity of DNS important
enough to force more work on the applications?

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

You fly too often when ... the airport taxi is on speed-dial.

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 29 19:46:02 2001
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From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
To: "'Greg Hudson'" <ghudson@MIT.EDU>,
        "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2001 10:41:30 -0800
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> > I am disturbed by the apparent proposals to start adding additional
> > demands to DNSSEC before the system is deployed in a form that can
> > secure DNS.
> 
> No additional demands are being made on DNSSEC.  No additional
> security would be required at DNS ops centers simply because the
> APPKEY record exists.

On the contrary, every DNS ops center existing would become a potential
target of a key introduction or substitution attack.

Capture of a DNS server would allow the attacker to compromise all
the applications that rely on it to distribute keys. Since the 
main application you appear to be promoting is SSH that is a very
considerable concern since one of the primary uses of SSH is to 
perform secure admin of UNIX systems.

The vulnerability would be created even for sites that did not
deploy the APPKEY record since SSH clients would be written to
look for the record.


> > I am also somewhat disturbed that a significant proportion of the
> > messages posted in support of the proposal contain statements that
> > appear to indicate limited experience with PKI infrastructure.
> 
> I believe it was just me, on the question of who generates private
> keys in a transaction with a CA (and Andy on the other side of the
> debate, but you don't seem to be bothered that people *against* the
> new infrastructure were also ignorant of aspects of PKI procedures).
> Regardless, this is an ad hominem attack.  If you have something
> substantial to say, say it; don't merely inject FUD into the debate.

I don't think it is unreasonable to expect that people who make
a technical proposal demonstrate knowledge of the subject matter
they are addressing, or at the very least not demonstrate ignorance.

Since the form of your argument is ad-hominem 'trust me we know
what we are doing' you should not get into a tizzy when provided
with a counter-factual.


In the security field the people who oppose a change always get 
favored treatment in the argument over those wanting to make the
change. If you don't like that fact try finding another field. 
'If it works don't break it is' the mantra that every Sysop who 
you repeat your scheme to will reply with.

A half baked security solution is much worse than no security
solution. This half baked solution would introduce a new type
of compromise to an existing security specification that has to
date been reasonably robust.


Before you make a security proposal you need to be able to specify
the assets it is intended to protect, the risks to those assets
it is intended to control, the treats that realise those risks,
the controls that mitigate those risks and convince them that the 
residual risk has substantially decreased.

		Phill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 29 19:46:14 2001
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From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
To: "'Greg Hudson'" <ghudson@MIT.EDU>,
        "Andy W. Barclay" <abarclay@unixpeople.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2001 09:16:23 -0800
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Both sets of statements appear to be confused.

As a CA the last thing I ever want to see is someone's private key. The
liabililty issues involved in that type of process are just horrendous.

It is of course essential that the CA know that the person registering the
public key be the actual holder of the private key. Otherwise there are a
bunch of nasty certificate substitution attacks possible. Fortunately with
public key crypto it is not necessary to reveal the private key to prove
that I know it, hence the proof of possession mechanisms.


I am disturbed by the apparent proposals to start adding additional demands
to DNSSEC before the system is deployed in a form that can secure DNS. We
are not going to be able to deploy DNSSEC if Price Waterhouse and the rest
go round telling the F500 companies that they require Tier 5 security for
their DNS ops centers if they turn it on.

I am also somewhat disturbed that a significant proportion of the messages
posted in support of the proposal contain statements that appear to indicate
limited experience with PKI infrastructure. It is the same feeling I get
when talking to X.500 biggots who rant on about how the world has to move to
the one true name system while showing a complete lack of knowledge of what
DNS does and how it works.


The trust provided by a PKI is not determined by the technical mechanisms
employed, they merely set the lower bound for the trust provided. It is the
administrative procedures that provide the trust. 

Trust is the ability to accurately asses risk. An established system that
has a proven track record will always have a significant advantage over a
newly proposed one.

While any administrative procedure must inevitably have some failure rate,
some are more error prone than others. There are 250,000 SSL certs current.
The reported reliability of the admin proceedures is 99.999%.


PKI is not easy. The DNS is now a critical infrastructure. Do not
underestimate the difficulty of deploying a security infrastructre, a change
to a critical infrastructure, a security infrastructure that requires a
change to a critical infrastructure.

It may well prove to be the case that to deploy DNSSEC it is necessary to
make changes to it. By deploy I mean "cause to be used by at least 10% of
the DNS user base" and not "implement in some copy of BIND". 

		Phill


Phillip Hallam-Baker FBCS C.Eng.
Principal Scientist
VeriSign Inc.
pbaker@verisign.com
781 245 6996 x227


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Greg Hudson [mailto:ghudson@MIT.EDU]
> Sent: Friday, October 26, 2001 6:02 PM
> To: Andy W. Barclay
> Cc: namedroppers
> Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
> 
> 
> > If I get an ssh key from DNS, even if that key has been signed by
> > DNSSec, then I still can't trust it. Why? Because I can be pretty
> > sure that the user generated his/her own key pair, then forwarded
> > the public key to the admin for inclusion to the DNS.
> [...]
> > Without a CERT, I can't be sure of the identity of the user. 
> 
> So, let me get this straight:
> 
>   A DNS APPKEY record retrieved via secure DNS is a key signed by the
>   next level up in the DNS hierarchy.  An APPKEY record must have been
>   signed by an irresponsible DNS administrator who got the public key
>   from some other person by an unauthenticated path.
> 
>   A certificate is a key signed by the next level up in the
>   certification hierarchy.  A certificate key must have been signed
>   by a responsible CA who generated the key pair and transmitted the
>   private key to some other person by a secret path.
> 
> That's a pretty impressive level of prejudice, given that the
> technical mechanisms are identical.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 29 19:47:24 2001
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             <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F40586984A@vhqpostal.verisign.com> 
To: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2001 12:54:13 -0500
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
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> I am disturbed by the apparent proposals to start adding additional
> demands to DNSSEC before the system is deployed in a form that can
> secure DNS.

No additional demands are being made on DNSSEC.  No additional
security would be required at DNS ops centers simply because the
APPKEY record exists.

> I am also somewhat disturbed that a significant proportion of the
> messages posted in support of the proposal contain statements that
> appear to indicate limited experience with PKI infrastructure.

I believe it was just me, on the question of who generates private
keys in a transaction with a CA (and Andy on the other side of the
debate, but you don't seem to be bothered that people *against* the
new infrastructure were also ignorant of aspects of PKI procedures).
Regardless, this is an ad hominem attack.  If you have something
substantial to say, say it; don't merely inject FUD into the debate.

> The trust provided by a PKI is not determined by the technical
> mechanisms employed, they merely set the lower bound for the trust
> provided. It is the administrative procedures that provide the
> trust.

(I believe you mean an upper bound.)

Yes, administrative procedures provide the trust.  But the IETF
specifies technical mechanisms, not administrative procedures.  And
the APPKEY RR specification has nothing to do with how these keys are
entered into the DNS.  If you believe that the APPKEY mechanism sets
an unacceptable upper bound on trust, make a concrete argument.

> An established system that has a proven track record will always
> have a significant advantage over a newly proposed one.
[...]
> There are 250,000 SSL certs current.  The reported reliability of
> the admin proceedures is 99.999%.

In my observation, these procedures have really only been proven for
the operation commercial web sites--one certificate per organization.
250,000 is meaninglessly small compared to the number of certificates
which would need to be out there to handle the full range of
interactions which ought to be cryptographically protected.

I agree that APPKEY has a pretty big hill to climb to create a
globally scalable and reasonably secure cryptographic infrastructure.
This working group might kill it (for reasons I still can't quite
understand).  Even if APPKEY goes forward, DNSSEC might never be
deployed at the root.  Even if that happens, new APPKEY-using
protocols might never be designed or accepted which could rival TLS.
And even if they are, a good set of administrative procedures might
never grow up around them.

On the other hand, even if DNSSEC is never deployed at the root, and
no TLS-like protocol arises using DNSSEC-protected keys, organizations
could still use APPKEY records and preconfigured DNSSEC keys to secure
SSH keys internally, without having to mess around with X.509
certificates.  I think that's useful enough just by itself to justify
APPKEY going forward.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 29 19:48:02 2001
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References: <200110290520.AAA04635@error-messages.mit.edu> <sjmu1wi7ekb.fsf@rcn.ihtfp.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2001 10:13:58 -0800
From: "Andy W. Barclay" <abarclay@unixpeople.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
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Let me see if I can bring this back on track a little.

Derek Atkins wrote:
> 
> Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU> writes:
> 
.... snip derek's info on certs - its correct .....
> 
> > How is Verisign supposed to know that I am authorized to change the
> > host key of error-messages.mit.edu (my laptop) but not www.mit.edu?
> 
> This is indeed the problem -- c.f. Verisign signing a fake M$ Cert!

Right, but I don't think this is a DNS issue.

..... snip stuff on waiting to get info into various name services....

> 
> I think you are blowing the onus of sending an SSH key to the DNS
> admin out of proportion.  I think most enterprises already have
> delegated administration to handle these things.  Certainly the last
> three places I've worked (from 18 to 10,000 employees) would all have
> been able to handle this without a problem.

Thats not my point at all. Please see the note at the bottom.

> 
> And note that you do NOT need to resign a complete zone when you make
> one change; you only seen to sign the subset of the zone that actually
> changed!  If you already have an A record and you add a CERT record,
> then all you have to do is sign the CERT and re-issue the NXT.  That's
> only two signatures you need to make to perform that change.

Right, but it doesn't affect what my argument is.

Its obvious that I didn't make my point clear. A while back, Jeffrey
Altman wrote:

> > If SSH is already looking up the A record to connect to a host,
> > why not lookup the CERT/APPKEY record to connect securely to
> > that host?

I think this is completely do-able and its JUST as secure as what
happens
today (first time you connect, there is a key transfer). BUT, a pki
requires a strict process to be followed and its only as strong as its
weakest link. If you allow people to submit via an insecure channel,
then
you can sign that data to your hearts content, and you will get no more
security.

In summary, if I was an application developer, I would USE the key data
in DNS, and I would probably rely on it for privacy assurance, but not
for authentication.



--
Regards,
Andy W. Barclay.        abarclay@unixpeople.com
fax  (781) 823-8276
Always a UNIX Evangelist (and sometimes a system and network architect)

Don't order a drink for the road, because the road is
already laid out.
   --Flip Wilson


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Oct 29 22:47:45 2001
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             <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F40586984C@vhqpostal.verisign.com> 
To: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2001 22:10:18 -0500
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> On the contrary, every DNS ops center existing would become a
> potential target of a key introduction or substitution attack.

Okay, this is a good point.  If code starts looking for more stuff in
DNS, more damage can be done by subverting DNS, even for a domain
which doesn't use the new record types.  I don't think it's a
compelling argument against APPKEY all by itself, but it deserves
careful consideration.

> Since the form of your argument is ad-hominem 'trust me we know what
> we are doing' you should not get into a tizzy when provided with a
> counter-factual.

I don't believe I ever made that argument.  Perhaps someone else made
that argument, or perhaps I unintentionally said something which
sounded like that.  What I was trying to say is:

  * APPKEY is only about fetching keys out of DNS, not putting them
    in.  There is lots of room to do either a good job or a bad job at
    getting keys into the DNS; people should limit themselves to
    imagine one particular procedure.

    At no point did I mean to imply that I was eminently qualified to
    develop procedures to put keys into the DNS, or that the IETF
    should try to standardize those procedures.

  * For many applications, the organization (as reflected by the DNS
    hierarchy) can do a much better job of verifying identities and
    authorizations than a third party can.  Organizations may not
    always do a good job, but they still have the potential to do
    better.

    (For some applications, the reverse would be true.  A CA-issued
    certificate probably makes more sense than a DNS-signed key for
    authenticating a bank, for instance.  Or at least, it would if
    people looked at who certificates were issued to.)


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Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2001 19:31:02 -0800 (PST)
From: Bernard Aboba <aboba@internaut.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
cc: erik.guttman@sun.com
Subject: Proposed modification to mDNS-06 draft
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Proposer: Erik Guttman 
Date: 10/28/01
Section affected: 3
Rationale: 

The proposed change allows us to completely avoid use of ".local.arpa",
aliasing, etc. Note that this suggestion *does* change the search order
behavior, by  adding a new rule to just try the name.  But section 3 of
mdns-06 also changes the rules, by requiring the adding of local.arpa
suffixes to the search order.
    
Proposal: 

Replace section 3 text:

"
    Multicast DNS usage is determined by special treatment of the
    ".local.arpa."  namespace. The sender treats queries for ".local.arpa."
    as a special case.  A sender MUST NOT send a unicast query for names
    ending with the ".local.arpa." suffix except when:
 
      a. A sender repeats a query after it received a response
         to the previous multicast query with the TC bit set, or
 
      b. The sender's cache contains an NS resource record that enables
         the sender to send a query directly to the hosts
         authoritative for the name in the query.
  
    It is not expected that a host named "host.example.com." will be
    manually configured to have the additional name
    "host.example.com.local.arpa." when it is configured to use multicast
    DNS. Instead, a responder with a name "host.example.com." configured
    with ".local.arpa." suffix in its domain search configuration is
    authoritative for the name "host.example.com.local.arpa.". For example,
    when a responder with the name "host.example.com." receives an A type
    query for the name "host.example.com.local.arpa." it authoritatively
    responds to the query.
 
    The same host MAY use multicast DNS queries for the resolution of names
    ending with ".local.arpa.", and unicast DNS queries for resolution of
    all other names. When a user or application requests a DNS client to
    resolve a dot-terminated name that contains a ".local.arpa" suffix, the
    query for such a name MUST be multicast and the name SHOULD NOT be
    concatenated with any suffix."
 
with the following text:
 
   A mDNS "sender" MAY multicast requests for any name.  If that name
   is not qualified and does not end in a trailing dot, for the purposes
   of mDNS, the implicit search order is as follows:
 
      A. Request the name with the current domain appended. 
      B. Request just the name.
 
   This is the behavior suggested by [21].  mDNS uses this technique 
   resolve unqualified host names.  
 
 
[21] Kumar, A., et. al. "DNS Implementation Errors and Suggested
      Fixes", RFC 1536, October 1993.
 
Recommendation: Discuss

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 30 10:56:11 2001
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From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
To: "'Greg Hudson'" <ghudson@MIT.EDU>,
        "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 07:23:10 -0800
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> I don't believe I ever made that argument.  Perhaps someone else made
> that argument, or perhaps I unintentionally said something which
> sounded like that.  What I was trying to say is:
> 
>   * APPKEY is only about fetching keys out of DNS, not putting them
>     in.  There is lots of room to do either a good job or a bad job at
>     getting keys into the DNS; people should limit themselves to
>     imagine one particular procedure.
> 
>     At no point did I mean to imply that I was eminently qualified to
>     develop procedures to put keys into the DNS, or that the IETF
>     should try to standardize those procedures.

Excuse me? If you don't know what you are talking about why are you
taking our time arguing?

Your proposal introduces a whole new assumption into the security
architecture, that DNS is a secure key distribution center.

I don't think it is unreasonable to expect an explanation of how that
administrative state of affairs can be achieved.


		Phill 

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 30 11:27:57 2001
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From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
To: "'Andy W. Barclay'" <abarclay@unixpeople.com>
Cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 07:49:02 -0800
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> In summary, if I was an application developer, I would USE 
> the key data
> in DNS, and I would probably rely on it for privacy assurance, but not
> for authentication.

The problem with this approach is that privacy assurance has proved
in practice to be an easier problem to solve than authentication.

While I accept the argument that permiscuous encryption can be a good
idea and that a good argument can be made that it is better to encrypt
against a key you do not have absolute trust in than to send in the clear,
distribution of low assurance keys is not a difficult problem, it can be
achieved in band in almost all protocols, there is no need to involve
DNS and no particular advantage in doing so.

If there is key data in DNS it will be used for authentication purposes.
That would be a very bad thing.


What we need to do is to separate the discussion of assured key 
distribution from that of non-assured.

* The idea that we can turn the DNS system into a key distribution 
	center is a very, very very bad one. 

* The idea that we can use DNS to help locate key distribution
	centers is a good one.

* In particular DNS may have some utility in addressing the problem
	of downgrade attacks.

For example it would be a good thing (TM) if SMTP over SSL was the 
default for mail services even if the mail servers used self signed 
certificates.

If you have a MS Exchange mail server talking to another MS Exchange
server and both have SSL certificates installed the session will
automatically upgrade to use SSL (pity they don't mention this in the
documentation eh?).

If you are using self signed certificates the connection is vulnerable
to a man-in-the-middle attack. 

Because the default for email is to not support encryption the scheme
is also vulnerable to a downgrade attack. A Man in the middle can 
respond to the query 'should we upgrade' with 'no' and the connection
will default to being in the clear.

There is a utility in being able to specify in DNS the fact that the 
mail service supports encryption.


As a security specialist I would much prefer to obtain from the DNS
service a referral to a Key Exchange service rather than a key itself.

That would allow for the keying to be performed by either public 
key, or if it was an intranet communication via a Kerberos style
exchange.


It might even be the case that the machine hosting the DNS would turn
out in some cases to be the machine hosting the key exchange service.

But I don't want to merge my security code with BIND any more than I 
want to merge BIND with Sendmail, Apache or any other unrelated service.


Finally, the claim that inventing a new protocol is a worse option
than overextending an existing protocol is a complete crock. Repeating
the claim ad-nauseam does not make it any more true.

We are not re-inventing the wheel, we are pointing out the difference
between a bicycle and a truck.

		Phill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 30 11:29:11 2001
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             <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F405869851@vhqpostal.verisign.com> 
To: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
cc: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 10:42:27 -0500
From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
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> Excuse me? If you don't know what you are talking about why are you
> taking our time arguing?

This is getting downright abusive.  You've had some good points; you
should stick to them.

> Your proposal introduces a whole new assumption into the security
> architecture, that DNS is a secure key distribution center.

It's not my proposal.  (But perhaps you meant that term loosely.)

It's not a whole new assumption.  RFC 2535 states:

   The KEY resource record (RR) is used to store a public key that is
   associated with a Domain Name System (DNS) name.  This can be the  
   public key of a zone, a user, or a host or other end entity.

Other parts of RFC 2535 state that they definitely have applications
in mind beyond DNSSEC.  APPKEY merely extends the KEY RR to use 24
bits for the protocol (16 bits for the protocol name and 8 bits for a
version) instead of 8.

> I don't think it is unreasonable to expect an explanation of how
> that administrative state of affairs can be achieved.

I think it is sufficient to show that there is no technical obstacle
to developing good procedures.  Are you seriously arguing that there
can be no good way to get key information from individuals within an
organization to the organization's DNS server?

I can certainly give an example.  At MIT, we have a
Kerberos-authenticated database which is used to generate the zone
files for the DNS servers.  Users already have access to edit data
about hosts they control; they could have the privilege of editing the
(just for example) ssh public key of hosts they control.  Since
Kerberos and this database are both mission-critical, any compromise
of their security can already do more damage than compromising any
number of host keys.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 30 12:23:11 2001
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Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 11:48:51 -0500
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_Gu=F0mundsson?= <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: DNSEXT open WGLC (2001/10/30)
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The last for iquery will conclude on Wednesday night.
	default action: is to advance if there are no further comments.

The last call for OK bit revision ends at the same time.
	default action: send back to RFC editor if no objections.

The last call for GSSAPI-TSIG will conclude on Wednesday next week,
send in comments.
	Default action: Chair has no sense at this time if this document
	is ready to be advanced, if there are no comments I think this
	document will be send up to IESG as "Experimental"  or "Informational".

	Olafur



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 30 12:26:25 2001
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Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 11:55:41 -0500
To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: RE: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Cc: lewis@tislabs.com
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At 10:49 AM -0500 10/30/01, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
>* The idea that we can turn the DNS system into a key distribution
>	center is a very, very very bad one.

I understand your sentiment, but I think this is overstated.

>* The idea that we can use DNS to help locate key distribution
>	centers is a good one.

For example, take SSH (as has been done repeatedly).

Assuming we use APPKEY, the risk is that the admin of the host incorrectly
interfaces with the admin of the zone.  The result is that at sometime, the
wrong key may be entered into DNS.

Assuming SSH derives a key distribution mechanism (other than the server
just sending the key), the first question SSH will have to answer is "how
will a server host key be validated?"  Once that is answered, the same
issue arrives - will the practice of this be compromised?  The second
question is how will SSH tell the client where to get the key?  If DNS is
used, the referral is as suspect as the key above.

SSH also has some other properties that make this issue interesting.  One
is that SSH is generally a closed-set protocol - the client and server have
preexisting relationships (accounts).  It doesn't seem worthwhile to set up
a large scale key management mechanism when given the option of DNS.
(Everytime I've discussed this locally, we keep arriving at the conclusion
that such a system would just be enriching to CA interests - each
organization would need to certificate-signing certificate, and those are
quite expensive.)

Looking at email and web security is a different matter.  In these cases,
the open-community nature is more ameanable to the higher overhead (because
of scaling problems).  In those instances, certificates make much more
sense.

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

You fly too often when ... the airport taxi is on speed-dial.

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 30 12:48:50 2001
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From: "A. Gregory Rabil" <grabil@lucent.com>
To: "=?us-ascii?Q?'Olafur_Gu=3Fmundsson'?=" <ogud@ogud.com>,
        <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: RE: DNSEXT open WGLC (2001/10/30)
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Olafur,
Can you please explain why the GSSAPI-TSIG draft should not be advanced as a
standard?  What sort of comments do you require?

Regards,
Greg

> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
> [mailto:owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org]On Behalf Of Olafur
> Gu?mundsson
> Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2001 11:49 AM
> To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
> Subject: DNSEXT open WGLC (2001/10/30)
>
>
> The last for iquery will conclude on Wednesday night.
> 	default action: is to advance if there are no further comments.
>
> The last call for OK bit revision ends at the same time.
> 	default action: send back to RFC editor if no objections.
>
> The last call for GSSAPI-TSIG will conclude on Wednesday next week,
> send in comments.
> 	Default action: Chair has no sense at this time if this document
> 	is ready to be advanced, if there are no comments I think this
> 	document will be send up to IESG as "Experimental"  or
> "Informational".
>
> 	Olafur
>
>
>
> to unsubscribe send a message to
> namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
>



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 30 14:03:52 2001
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References: <5.1.0.14.2.20011030113826.02d2f730@localhost>
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 13:25:45 -0500
To: "A. Gregory Rabil" <grabil@lucent.com>,
        "=?us-ascii?Q?'Olafur_Gu=3Fmundsson'?=" <ogud@ogud.com>,
        <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?=D3lafur?= =?iso-8859-1?Q?_Gu=F0mundsson?= <ogud@ogud.com>
Subject: RE: DNSEXT open WGLC (2001/10/30)
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At 12:28 PM 10/30/2001, A. Gregory Rabil wrote:
>Olafur,
>Can you please explain why the GSSAPI-TSIG draft should not be advanced as a
>standard?  What sort of comments do you require?
>
>Regards,
>Greg

People saying this is important and it MUST be standardized, if noone
says so my read is that none cares thus we will publish as "informational"
and not bother with further standardization.

         Olafur




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 30 14:22:30 2001
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From: "A. Gregory Rabil" <grabil@lucent.com>
To: "=?us-ascii?Q?'Olafur_Gu=3Fmundsson'?=" <ogud@ogud.com>,
        <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: RE: DNSEXT open WGLC (2001/10/30)
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> People saying this is important and it MUST be standardized, if noone
> says so my read is that none cares thus we will publish as
> "informational"
> and not bother with further standardization.
>
>          Olafur

Okay, well I'd like to say that I believe it is important and should be
moved towards proposed standard.  I know of two implementations, Microsoft
and Lucent.  Also, I believe that the latest cut of ISC Bind 9 has a bit of
code dedicated to supporting GSSAPI-TSIG.  Therefore, I believe it is
important that these implementations adhere to a standard in order to
interoperate.

Greg



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 30 14:59:36 2001
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Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 11:44:50 -0800
To: "A. Gregory Rabil" <grabil@lucent.com>,
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From: "David R. Conrad" <david.conrad@nominum.com>
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Greg,

At 02:10 PM 10/30/2001 -0500, A. Gregory Rabil wrote:
>Okay, well I'd like to say that I believe it is important and should be
>moved towards proposed standard.  I know of two implementations, Microsoft
>and Lucent.

An honest question:  how independent are those implementations?  I mean, is 
it necessary to use Microsoft DLLs or use a Microsoft KDC or whatever?

>Also, I believe that the latest cut of ISC Bind 9 has a bit of
>code dedicated to supporting GSSAPI-TSIG.

Well, yes, but there is no GSS-TSIG implementation in BINDv9.  There is a 
bit of code representing an early attempt but it is decidely non-functional.

Rgds,
-drc



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 30 15:01:26 2001
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   of "Tue, 30 Oct 2001 13:25:45 EST." <5.1.0.14.2.20011030132426.00acb0a0@localhost> 
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNSEXT open WGLC (2001/10/30) 
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 11:43:06 -0800
From: Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
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> >standard?  What sort of comments do you require?
> 
> People saying this is important and it MUST be standardized, if noone
> says so my read is that none cares thus we will publish as "informational"
> and not bother with further standardization.

i do not believe that gss-tsig is subject to standardization.  even a small
change at this point would upset a very large installed base, which would 
lead to an irrelevant standard.  let's just call this informational rather
than rubber-stamping a non-ietf-originated protocol with the ietf seal of
approval.

(an actual gss-based tsig standard would be implementable using other open
standards, so an argument along these lines would run very much like the
original rsa/dsa arguments in DNSSEC-land.)


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 30 15:39:15 2001
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Paul A Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNSEXT open WGLC (2001/10/30) 
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[ i have yet to do sufficient homework to have a technical opinion, but
  think the process needs to be a bit more honest ]

> i do not believe that gss-tsig is subject to standardization.  even a

s/subject to standardization/advisable to modify/

> small change at this point would upset a very large installed base, which
> would lead to an irrelevant standard.  let's just call this informational
> rather than rubber-stamping a non-ietf-originated protocol with the ietf
> seal of approval.

what you seem to mean is that the ietf should rubber stamp it as an rfc and
not review the actual technology.

randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 30 16:16:01 2001
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In-Reply-To: Message from Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> 
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To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNSEXT open WGLC (2001/10/30) 
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 12:56:30 -0800
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> > i do not believe that gss-tsig is subject to standardization.  even a
> 
> s/subject to standardization/advisable to modify/

standardize != publish.

> what you seem to mean is that the ietf should rubber stamp it as an rfc and
> not review the actual technology.

same as with early imap, yes.  the rfc would be informational because it
would accurately describe a protocol developed outside of the ietf.  
editorial concerns such as "will interoperability be likely based on the
quality of the document" are relevant.  protocol standards concerns such
as "is this really the right way to do this?" are not (because it wasn't,
but arguing about it at this late date would be pointless.)


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 30 17:16:47 2001
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Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 16:14:39 -0500
From: rhall@quadritek.com (Randy Hall)
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNSEXT open WGLC (2001/10/30)
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"David R. Conrad" wrote:
> 
> Greg,
> 
> At 02:10 PM 10/30/2001 -0500, A. Gregory Rabil wrote:
> >Okay, well I'd like to say that I believe it is important and 
> >should be moved towards proposed standard.  I know of two 
> >implementations, Microsoft
> >and Lucent.
> 
> An honest question:  how independent are those implementations?  I 
> mean, is it necessary to use Microsoft DLLs or use a Microsoft KDC 
> or whatever?

It is possible to implement the protocol without using Microsoft
DLLs, operating systems, or KDC.  Such an implementation
has been also been demonstrated to work using a Microsoft KDC
as well.

I believe it is possible for someone else to implement the 
protocol using open standards.  I believe such an implementation 
would interoperate with Lucent's implementation.  (I have not
actually verified that all of the open source components I
use are based on open standards, but I am fairly certain that 
they are).  

Cheers
Randy


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Oct 30 18:15:50 2001
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Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 14:51:22 -0800
To: rhall@quadritek.com (Randy Hall), namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: "David R. Conrad" <david.conrad@nominum.com>
Subject: Re: DNSEXT open WGLC (2001/10/30)
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At 04:14 PM 10/30/2001 -0500, Randy Hall wrote:
>It is possible to implement the protocol without using Microsoft
>DLLs, operating systems, or KDC.  Such an implementation
>has been also been demonstrated to work using a Microsoft KDC
>as well.

If such is the case, then I would argue that it should be pushed forward as 
a standard as an alternative (optional) way to do TSIG.

Rgds,
-drc



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 31 00:12:27 2001
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Subject: RE: DNSEXT open WGLC (2001/10/30)
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2001 18:17:53 -0800
From: "Levon Esibov" <levone@windows.microsoft.com>
To: "David R. Conrad" <david.conrad@nominum.com>,
        "Randy Hall" <rhall@quadritek.com>, <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
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I join David Conrad, Randy Hall and Greg Rabil, and raise my voice to
push GSS-TSIG as a Proposed Standard.

Cheers,
Levon.

> If such is the case, then I would argue that it should be pushed forward
> as a standard as an alternative (optional) way to do TSIG.
>
> Rgds,
> -drc



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Oct 31 12:27:50 2001
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Message-ID: <2F3EC696EAEED311BB2D009027C3F4F405869856@vhqpostal.verisign.com>
From: "Hallam-Baker, Phillip" <pbaker@verisign.com>
To: "'Edward Lewis'" <lewis@tislabs.com>,
        namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: RE: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2001 08:44:26 -0800
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As you say, SSH is solving a closed loop problem.

Why involve DNS at all? Why not extend the yellow pages system? Why not use
the SRV or NAPTR mechanism to connect to a protocol designed to deliver
authenticated keys?

Any facility that is put into DNS will be assumed to be for general use.

	Phill

Phillip Hallam-Baker FBCS C.Eng.
Principal Scientist
VeriSign Inc.
pbaker@verisign.com
781 245 6996 x227


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Edward Lewis [mailto:lewis@tislabs.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2001 11:56 AM
> To: namedroppers
> Cc: lewis@tislabs.com
> Subject: RE: Admitting more documents: application keys in DNS
> 
> 
> At 10:49 AM -0500 10/30/01, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
> >* The idea that we can turn the DNS system into a key distribution
> >	center is a very, very very bad one.
> 
> I understand your sentiment, but I think this is overstated.
> 
> >* The idea that we can use DNS to help locate key distribution
> >	centers is a good one.
> 
> For example, take SSH (as has been done repeatedly).
> 
> Assuming we use APPKEY, the risk is that the admin of the 
> host incorrectly
> interfaces with the admin of the zone.  The result is that at 
> sometime, the
> wrong key may be entered into DNS.
> 
> Assuming SSH derives a key distribution mechanism (other than 
> the server
> just sending the key), the first question SSH will have to 
> answer is "how
> will a server host key be validated?"  Once that is answered, the same
> issue arrives - will the practice of this be compromised?  The second
> question is how will SSH tell the client where to get the 
> key?  If DNS is
> used, the referral is as suspect as the key above.
> 
> SSH also has some other properties that make this issue 
> interesting.  One
> is that SSH is generally a closed-set protocol - the client 
> and server have
> preexisting relationships (accounts).  It doesn't seem 
> worthwhile to set up
> a large scale key management mechanism when given the option of DNS.
> (Everytime I've discussed this locally, we keep arriving at 
> the conclusion
> that such a system would just be enriching to CA interests - each
> organization would need to certificate-signing certificate, 
> and those are
> quite expensive.)
> 
> Looking at email and web security is a different matter.  In 
> these cases,
> the open-community nature is more ameanable to the higher 
> overhead (because
> of scaling problems).  In those instances, certificates make much more
> sense.
> 
> -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
> Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
> Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com
> 
> You fly too often when ... the airport taxi is on speed-dial.
> 
> Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> to unsubscribe send a message to 
> namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
> the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
> 


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