Subject: A halfway solution to the multiple-ksk verification problem.

From: Ted Lemon <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2003 15:02:32 -0800

You suggested two degrees of paranoia that a resolver might use for 
validating the root key - allow one of five keys, and require three of 
five.   The first is not so good because if a key is compromised, you 
can be spoofed.   The second is not good because it requires three 
signatures for every response to an apex query.   A possible 
intermediate solution would be to have resolvers that maintain stable 
state to try a different key with each apex query.   If the resolver is 
unable to get the root to use all five ksk's in sequence, it means that 
thing that answered your apex query is probably an attacker that has 
one key but not all.   So at *that* point you switch into the mode of 
requiring three keys.   The resolver then periodically tries to 
re-validate its apex keys, using the stronger degree of validation.   
It stays in this mode until it has been able to successfully get a list 
of valid keys from the apex server signed with three known keys.

--
to unsubscribe send a message to [email-masked] with
the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
archive: <http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/>

---

From: Ted Lemon <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2003 10:02:20 -0800

> they way that you talk about root servers responding, sounds like you 
> think
> that the signatures are done online.

Err, oops.   I should stick to things I have in cache.   :'}