Subject: [dnsext] Publication request for draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-14.txt

From: Andrew Sullivan <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2009 17:29:13 -0400

Esteemed Area Directors,

This note requests publication of the following draft:

Title           : Use of SHA-2 algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG
                  Resource Records for DNSSEC
Author(s)       : J. Jansen
Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-14.txt
Date            : 2009-07-30
Document shepherd: Andrew Sullivan <[email-masked]>

The publication request includes a note for IANA, in section 1.d below.

 (1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the
        Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the 
        document and, in particular, does he or she believe this 
        version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication? 

Andrew Sullivan; yes; yes.

  (1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members 
        and from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have 
        any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that 
        have been performed?  

Yes; no.

  (1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document 
        needs more review from a particular or broader perspective, 
        e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with 
        AAA, internationalization or XML? 

The document editor sent the document to the security directorate
requesting review.  A response was received from one member of the
security directorate.  It might be good if someone else also from the
security directorate reviewed the document, because the person
responding is also active in the DNSEXT working group.  In particular,
there was a question about the utility of the SHA-512 definition in
here, and particularly whether that definition is acceptable given the
limit on key size.

  (1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or 
        issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
        and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he 
        or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or 
        has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any 
        event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated 
        that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those 
        concerns here. Has an IPR disclosure related to this document 
        been filed? If so, please include a reference to the 
        disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on 
        this issue. 

There are two items to note.

First, in making a final-pass check, I note that the examples in
section 6 have (by mistake) actual algorithm numbers in them instead
of {TBD1} and {TBD2}.  Because these are just examples, I judge that
they may be fixed as an editorial matter, so I didn't want to issue
another version of the draft.  As a matter for IANA, we would in fact
like TBD1 to be 8 and TBD2 to be 10.  This is because an early
implementation used those two typecodes already.

Secondly there is the question about SHA-512 in 1.c.  Despite useful
and considered feedback received from one commentator, we decided to
go ahead leaving that section in because we believed that it does no
real harm and because it has taken a surprisingly long time to build
consensus around the document in the WG.

I found no IPR disclosure in the database.

  (1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it 
        represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with 
        others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and 
        agree with it?   

I judge the consensus to be strong and broad.

A previous version of this document used algorithm aliases for NSEC
and NSEC3 application, but several participants strongly objected
to that strategy.  This version of the document uses one algorithm
identifier for both NSEC and NSEC3.  The effect of this is that
implementations that do not support NSEC3 will not be able to use
SHA-2 either.  The WG consensus is that, because of announced
deployment of NSEC3 in large zones near the root of the DNS, it
will be infeasible for a modern DNSSEC implementation not to
support NSEC3.

  (1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme 
        discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in 
        separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It 
        should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is 
        entered into the ID Tracker.) 

No.

  (1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the 
        document satisfies all ID nits? (See the Internet-Drafts Checklist 
        and http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are 
        not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document 
        met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB 
        Doctor, media type and URI type reviews? 

The Shepherd has checked the nits.  There are no other reviews to
perform for this document as far as I understand.

  (1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and 
        informative? Are there normative references to documents that 
        are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear 
        state? If such normative references exist, what is the 
        strategy for their completion? Are there normative references 
        that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If 
        so, list these downward references to support the Area 
        Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967]. 

Yes; No; Not a downref, but a reference to a non-RFC standard:    

[FIPS.180-3.2008]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
              Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-3, October 2008.

As near as the Document Shepherd can tell, there is no RFC that
outlines FIPS PUB 180-3, but that's what defines SHA-2, so we need the
normative reference.

  (1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA 
        consideration section exists and is consistent with the body 
        of the document? If the document specifies protocol 
        extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA 
        registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If 
        the document creates a new registry, does it define the 
        proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation 
        procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a 
        reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC5226]. If the 
        document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd 
        conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG 
        can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation? 

The IANA consideration does exist.  There are reservatiions in a
registry requested.  The requested algorithm identifiers are marked as
{TBD1} and {TBD 2}.  See the remarks under item (1.d) above for a
request for the actual numbers to be assigned.

  (1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the 
        document that are written in a formal language, such as XML 
        code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in 
        an automated checker? 

No such formal language sections are in this document.

  (1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document 
        Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document 
        Announcement Write-Up? 

          Technical Summary 

   This document describes how to produce RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512
   DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records for use in the Domain Name System
   Security Extensions (DNSSEC, RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035).

          Working Group Summary 
   
   The DNS Extensions Working Group had consensus to publish the
   document.  A strong objection to an aliasing strategy for algorithm
   identifiers was lodged at one point, and that has been addressed in
   this version.  Nobody has objected to this change. 

          Document Quality 

   The document received thorough review, and it is expected that
   vendors supporting DNSSEC will implement SHA-2 once the document is
   published.  The document went through a large number of revisions
   before submission, reflecting the extensive feedback and detailed
   comments received.

Best regards,

Andrew Sullivan
DNS Extensions WG Co-Chair

--
Andrew Sullivan
[email-masked]
Shinkuro, Inc.

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