Subject: [dnsext] [Errata Verified] RFC5155 (4622)

From: RFC Errata System <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2016 08:48:37 -0800 (PST)

The following errata report has been verified for RFC5155,
"DNS Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence". 

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You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=5155&eid=4622

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Status: Verified
Type: Technical

Reported by: Robert Edmonds <[email-masked]>
Date Reported: 2016-02-18
Verified by: Brian Haberman (IESG)

Section: 7.2.8

Original Text
-------------
7.2.8.  Responding to Queries for NSEC3 Owner Names

   The owner names of NSEC3 RRs are not represented in the NSEC3 RR
   chain like other owner names.  As a result, each NSEC3 owner name is
   covered by another NSEC3 RR, effectively negating the existence of
   the NSEC3 RR.  This is a paradox, since the existence of an NSEC3 RR
   can be proven by its RRSIG RRSet.

   If the following conditions are all true:

   o  the QNAME equals the owner name of an existing NSEC3 RR, and

   o  no RR types exist at the QNAME, nor at any descendant of QNAME,

   then the response MUST be constructed as a Name Error response
   (Section 7.2.2).  Or, in other words, the authoritative name server
   will act as if the owner name of the NSEC3 RR did not exist.

Corrected Text
--------------
7.2.8.  Responding to Queries for NSEC3 Owner Names

   The owner names of NSEC3 RRs are not represented in the NSEC3 RR
   chain like other owner names.  As a result, each NSEC3 owner name is
   covered by another NSEC3 RR, effectively negating the existence of
   the NSEC3 RR.  This is a paradox, since the existence of an NSEC3 RR
   can be proven by its RRSIG RRSet.

   If the following conditions are all true:

   o  the QNAME equals the owner name of an existing NSEC3 RR, and

   o  no RR types exist at the QNAME besides NSEC3, nor at any
      descendant of QNAME,

   then the response MUST be constructed as a Name Error response
   (Section 7.2.2).  Or, in other words, the authoritative name server
   will act as if the owner name of the NSEC3 RR did not exist.

Notes
-----
If the QNAME is equal to the owner name of an existing NSEC3 RR, then the NSEC3 RR type itself will exist at the QNAME, and the second condition will always be false.

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RFC5155 (draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec3-13)
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Title               : DNS Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence
Publication Date    : March 2008
Author(s)           : B. Laurie, G. Sisson, R. Arends, D. Blacka
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : DNS Extensions
Area                : Internet
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG