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Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-tkey-01.txt
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR)
	Author(s)	: D. Eastlake 3rd
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-tkey-01.txt
	Pages		: 17
	Date		: 01-Mar-00
	
[draft-ietf-{dnsind|dnsext}-tsig-*.txt] provides a means of
authenticating Domain Name System (DNS) queries and responses using
shared secret keys via the TSIG resource record (RR).  However, it
provides no mechanism for setting up such keys other than manual
exchange. This document describes a TKEY RR that can be used in a
number of different modes to establish shared secret keys between a
DNS resolver and server.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Mar  2 13:28:49 2000
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Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-sig-zero-00.txt
Date: Thu, 02 Mar 2000 10:32:37 -0500
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: DNS Request and Transaction Signatures ( SIG(0)s )
	Author(s)	: D. Eastlake
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-sig-zero-00.txt
	Pages		: 9
	Date		: 01-Mar-00
	
Extensions to the Domain Name System (DNS) are described in [RFC
2535] that can provide data origin and transaction integrity and
authentication to security aware resolvers and applications through
the use of cryptographic digital signatures.
Implementation experience has indicated the need for minor but non-
interoperable changes in Request and Transaction signature resource
records ( SIG(0)s ).  These changes are documented herein.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Mar  2 17:20:10 2000
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Message-ID: <726A4C58DBA56E409F3D3563A8BF953C09ECE8@airstream-corp.platinum.corp.microsoft.com>
From: Peter Ford <peterf@Exchange.Microsoft.com>
To: "'Al Costanzo'" <al@akc.com>,
        "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>,
        "Namedroppers@Internic.Net" <namedroppers@internic.net>
Subject: RE: "local" names
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2000 10:44:04 -0800 
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how about ".notglobal", or simply ".not".   The critical attribute is that
the name is NOT part of the guaranteed to unique global namespace.

I also think it might be useful to have another name: ".linklocal".

fwiw,
peterf

-----Original Message-----
From: Al Costanzo [mailto:al@akc.com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 28, 1999 1:24 PM
To: Donald E. Eastlake 3rd; Namedroppers@Internic.Net
Subject: RE: "local" names


IMHO, I think this is a good idea.  I can remember 10 years ago when Prime
computer setup a private network that wrapped around the world with
thousands upon thousands of nodes within it. Would have been marvelous then
as well as now.

As far as the suffix is concerned, my own opinion would be to use: '.intra'.

Everyone is familiar with the word Intranet vs. Internet so it makes sense
to me to base the phrase-oligy on something familiar.

     | -----Original Message-----
     | From: owner-namedroppers@internic.net
     | [mailto:owner-namedroppers@internic.net]On Behalf Of Donald
     | E. Eastlake
     | 3rd
     | Sent: luned=EC 27 dicembre 1999 8.53
     | To: namedroppers@internic.net
     | Subject: "local" names
     |
     |
     | I have received a request to change "local" in
     | draft-ietf-dnsind-local-names-07.txt.  In particular, the
     | correspondent
     | said:
     |
     |
     | ... I do prefer another name though. Something like .intra or
     | .internal. These names associate better with the meaning of an
     | internal network. Moreover, internal networks of big
     | companies tend to
     | have a global coverage rather then a local one.  .Intra or .internal
     | nicely fit into:
     |     www.mycompany.com is for our international customers,
     |     www.mycompany.nl aims at customers in The Netherlands,
     |     etc.
     |     www.mycompany.intra aims at the employee's of the company.
     |
     |
     | Does anyone on namedroppers have an opinon on this?
     |
     | Thanks,
     | Donald
     | =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
     |  Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   +1 914-276-2668   dee3@torque.pothole.com
     |  65 Shindegan Hill Rd, RR#1  +1 914-784-7913(w)     dee3@us.ibm.com
     |  Carmel, NY 10512 USA
     |


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Mar  3 09:18:25 2000
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Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-apl-rr-00.txt
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: A DNS RR Type for Lists of Address Prefixes (APL RR)
	Author(s)	: P. Koch
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-apl-rr-00.txt
	Pages		: 7
	Date		: 02-Mar-00
	
The Domain Name System is primarily used to translate domain names
into IPv4 addresses using A RRs. Several approaches exist to describe
networks or address ranges. This document specifies a new DNS RR type
'APL' for address prefix lists.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Mar  3 09:18:26 2000
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Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-dnsext-tsig-00.txt
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)
	Author(s)	: P. Vixie, O.Gudmundsson, D. Eastlake, B. Wellington
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-tsig-00.txt
	Pages		: 15
	Date		: 02-Mar-00
	
This protocol allows for transaction level authentication using
shared secrets and one way hashing.  It can be used to authenticate
dynamic updates as coming from an approved client, or to authenticate
responses as coming from an approved recursive name server.
No provision has been made here for distributing the shared secrets;
it is expected that a network administrator will statically configure
name servers and clients using some out of band mechanism such as
sneaker-net until a secure automated mechanism for key distribution
is available.

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Sat Mar  4 01:26:21 2000
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Date: Fri, 03 Mar 2000 13:33:36 -0500
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
Subject: DNSEXT WG Last Call: SIG(0) 
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This is a last call on this document, SIG(0) updates RFC2535 in 
the definition of transaction signatures. The changes are mostly 
to make SIG(0) more like TSIG in implementation and result of 
implementation experience. 
SIG(0) is required for TKEY exchange when no existing shared secret
between two DNS entities exist. 

This is a WG last call ending March 20'th 2000. 

A URL for this Internet-Draft is: 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-sig-zero-00.txt

This draft is on standards track, if you disagree with that please state why
in your response. 

        Olafur



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Date: Fri, 03 Mar 2000 13:51:32 -0500
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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This is a second last call on this draft, authors have addressed all the
issues raised in the first round. This document has provides general
guidance to IANA for DNS related reservations. 

This is a WG last call ending March 14'th 2000. 

A URL for this Internet-Draft is: 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-iana-dns-00.txt

This document is to published as a BCP, if you disagree with that please
state your reasons.

        Olafur



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To: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
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Subject: Re: TKEY 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Mon, 07 Feb 2000 09:10:30 EST."
             <v03130306b4c47dbea4f8@[207.172.150.18]> 
Date: Fri, 03 Mar 2000 14:20:00 -0500
From: "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>
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From:  Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
X-Sender:  lewis@pop.gw.tislabs.com
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References:  Your message of "Tue, 04 Jan 2000 09:50:00 EST."            
	     <v03130300b497b4f47765@[10.33.10.14]>
Content-Type:  text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Date:  Mon, 7 Feb 2000 09:10:30 -0500
To:  "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>
Cc:  Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>,
            "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>,
            namedroppers@internic.net
>At 11:26 PM -0500 2/6/00, Donald E. Eastlake 3rd wrote:
>>However, I must say that the process of reviewing and re-organization
>>this material was a lot more work than I thought it would be and has
>>lead, in my opinion, to a lot more improvement than I though it would.
>>In fact, I found cases that said "SHOULD" which have to say "MUST" to
>>actually achieve security.
>
>This is what I thought would happen.  By following a stricter discipline
>(e.g., no requirements in intro, discussions), I have found that the result
>is much better.  Not only do the aesthetics improve, the reorganization
>effort often finds other places where one can tighten the work.  I think
>the reason is that the author sees the requirements from another angle,
>performing another round of requirements analysis.
>
>>Based on all this it seems best to not use the DNS header RCODE field,
>>so the current -dnsind-tkey-03.txt draft on page 7 where the error
>>codes are listed says the following which I essentially plan to retain
>>in the next draft:
>>
>>   When an extended RCODE appears in the TKEY in a response, the DNS
>>   header RCODE field indicates no error.
>
>I think it is wise to report an error just once, lest you start seeing
>messages with multiple error codes, leading to confusion by the reader.
>Writing a "good" client that understands the error codes is very hard once
>we start indicating multiple failures.
>
>OTOH, reporting "no error" in the header field is probably misleading, is
>there a "error inside" value?  That being said, I think having "no error"
>in the header field is better than having some other specific error code
>there.

Deciding to minimize changes, I left it as "no error" in the updated
version of the draft just announced today.

>---
>
>There is a paper by Ferguson & Schneier called "A Cryptographic Evaluation
>of IPsec," unfortunately I have a copy for which I cannot give a published
>reference[1] (it was handed to me).  In this, they[2] criticize IPsec from
>a security/cryptographic point of view.  I think that some of the
>interesting points are the claims that the documentation of IPsec prevents
>good security analysis, as well as the protocol's complexity making it hard
>to ensure that security is "attained."  The reason I am riding the DNS
>security documents hard is to try and avoid the same criticisms if DNS
>security.

It's at <http://www.counterpane.com/ipsec.html>.  The
IPSEC/ISAKMP/IKE/...  melange is an order of magnitude more complex
than all proposals for DNS security put together.

>[1] There is a URL: www.counterpane.com under the title.
>[2] Assuming the paper did not forge their typed names...;)
>
>-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
>Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
>Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com
>
>"Trying is the first step to failure." - Homer Simpson
>"No! Try not. Do... or do not. There is no try." - Yoda
>"It takes years of training to know when to do nothing" - Dogbert 1/21/00
>
>Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.

Thanks,
Donald
===================================================================
 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd                    dee3@torque.pothole.com
 65 Shindegan Hill Rd, RR#1                 lde008@dma.isg.mot.com
 Carmel, NY 10512 USA     +1 914-276-2668(h)    +1 508-261-5434(w)




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Sat Mar  4 01:38:36 2000
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Date: Fri, 03 Mar 2000 13:33:28 -0500
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This is a last call on this document, TKEY defines a DNS protocol
mechanism to allow two DNS entities to create a shared secret to be
used by TSIG for message authentication. 

The document defines two mandatory modes to implement and few optional 
ones. 

This is a WG last call ending March 20'th 2000. 

A URL for this Internet-Draft is: 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-tkey-01.txt

This draft is on standards track, if you disagree with that please state why
in your response. 

        Olafur




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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: DNS Zone Transfer Protocol Clarifications
	Author(s)	: A. Gustafsson
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-axfr-clarify-00.txt
	Pages		: 5
	Date		: 03-Mar-00
	
In the Domain Name System, zone data is replicated among
authoritative DNS servers by means of the

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Mar  7 20:00:28 2000
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Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2000 15:39:27 -0500 (EST)
From: Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>
To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNSEXT WG Last Call: SIG(0) 
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On Fri, 3 Mar 2000, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:

> This is a last call on this document, SIG(0) updates RFC2535 in 
> the definition of transaction signatures. The changes are mostly 
> to make SIG(0) more like TSIG in implementation and result of 
> implementation experience. 
> SIG(0) is required for TKEY exchange when no existing shared secret
> between two DNS entities exist. 

Once again, I suggest that the number of SIG(0) signatures per message be
restricted to 1.  Allowing more than one introduces unnecessary
complexity.  The only benefit would be to allow TKEY-generated TSIGs to
have multiple authorizations (derived from each signing SIG(0)), but the
necessity of this feature is unconvincing.  Also, multiple authorizations
can lead to conflicts whose resolution is not specified in any document.

Brian



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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS
	Author(s)	: M. Ohta
	Filename	: draft-ietf-dnsext-ixfr-00.txt
	Pages		: 10
	Date		: 06-Mar-00
	
This document proposes extensions to the DNS protocols to provide an
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Mar  7 20:00:46 2000
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We now have 5 documents in Last call, without any comments. 
Here is a list of the documents in last call and the deadline
for comments on each one. 
Remember it is Randy and my job to judge the consensus of the group but
to do so we need some feedback on each one of these documents. 

I would like to finish as many of these important documents before or at
Adelaide meeting.

Due March 8'th 2000:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-signing-auth-00.txt
and 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-simple-secure-update-
00.txt


Due March 14'th 2000. 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-iana-dns-00.txt


Due March 20'th 2000. 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-sig-zero-00.txt
and
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-tkey-01.txt


        Olafur



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Mar  7 20:01:54 2000
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Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2000 13:23:38 -0500
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From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
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There have been a number of changes requested by the IESG and IETF
Last call commentators. Current draft addresses all the concerns and
issues.

TSIG draft now distinguishes between Transaction Signatures (SIG(0))
and message authentication code (MAC). Change insisted upon by Steve Kent. 

New algorithms MUST be registered with IANA. 
Algorithm name is now domain name encoding of a character string and 
there is no requirement that it is a resolvable name. 

Old version did not capitalize all MUST/SHOULD/MAY/REQUIRED statements, fixed. 
Wording on truncation case made clearer, processing of Incoming messages 
(section 3.2) contains more explicit MUST and SHOULD statements.

Section 4.2 now explicitly outlaws servers from adding a TSIG to a unsigned
query. 

Section 4.5.2 has added text about replay prevention and allows servers
to discard TSIG messages if one with more recent time has been received. 


Section 7 IANA considerations has been rewritten to reflect the requirements 
that algorithm names are unique and not a valid domain names. 
The name "HMAC-MD5.SIG-ALG.REG.INT" is grandfathered in as a name to
allow exisiting implementations to function.
New paragraph has been added to cover assignment of new TSIG error codes. 


    Olafur



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Mar  7 20:23:03 2000
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Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2000 15:26:18 -0500 (EST)
From: Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>
To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNSEXT WG Last Call: TKEY-01
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On Fri, 3 Mar 2000, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:

> This is a last call on this document, TKEY defines a DNS protocol
> mechanism to allow two DNS entities to create a shared secret to be
> used by TSIG for message authentication. 

I have no objections, but one question.  Transaction security MUST be
applied to many of the TKEY transactions, but there is no specified error
to return if there is no transaction security.  I'd vote for rcode
NOTAUTH, but anything else would be ok too.

Brian



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 02:10:43 2000
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To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: Last call reminder: 
In-reply-to: <4.1.20000306100528.009f0340@mail.gw.tislabs.com> 
Date: Tue, 07 Mar 2000 20:31:05 -0800
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> We now have 5 documents in Last call, without any comments. 
> Here is a list of the documents in last call and the deadline
> for comments on each one. 
> Remember it is Randy and my job to judge the consensus of the group but
> to do so we need some feedback on each one of these documents. 

I think the WG has successfully worn out just about everyone who cares,
by constant rewriting of standards that we haven't ever field-tested.
I certainly can't dedicate the time to keep up with all these paper
standards.

Please allow me to recommend that all of them be discarded or delayed
indefinitely, until we have some operational experience with the draft
standards that preceded them.

Now you have one comment for your last call.

	John


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 02:10:51 2000
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To: Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>
cc: Olafur Gudmundsson    <ogud@tislabs.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNSEXT WG Last Call: SIG(0) 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Tue, 07 Mar 2000 15:39:27 EST."
             <Pine.LNX.4.10.10003071532480.10169-100000@spiral.gw.tislabs.com> 
Date: Tue, 07 Mar 2000 22:49:21 -0500
From: "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>
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Actually, although multiple different authorization was the only
reason I mentioned when we last talked about this, there is another.

With TSIG, you have (or at least believe you have) a shared (secret)
key and algorithm.  With SIG(0), you typically don't have or need that
since the public key to verify the signature can be obtained from the
DNS.  However, that also means you don't know what algorithm(s) the
server understands.  So you might want to have, for example, two
signatures giving exactly the same authorization but with diffeent
algorithms and the understanding would be that if any SIG(0) for that
specific authorization verified, you have the authority indicated
(assuming it conforms to server policy, etc.).  I suppose it could
also be possible that during some key rollover situation with some
clock jitter, you might want two signatures with the same authority
and algorithm but different keys, although usually you would arrange
for the key validities to overlap enough that it wouldn't be a
problem.

Donald

From:  Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>
Date:  Tue, 7 Mar 2000 15:39:27 -0500 (EST)
To:  Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
cc:  namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To:  <4.1.20000303131708.00a33a30@mail.gw.tislabs.com>
Message-ID:  <Pine.LNX.4.10.10003071532480.10169-100000@spiral.gw.tislabs.com>

>On Fri, 3 Mar 2000, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:
>
>> This is a last call on this document, SIG(0) updates RFC2535 in 
>> the definition of transaction signatures. The changes are mostly 
>> to make SIG(0) more like TSIG in implementation and result of 
>> implementation experience. 
>> SIG(0) is required for TKEY exchange when no existing shared secret
>> between two DNS entities exist. 
>
>Once again, I suggest that the number of SIG(0) signatures per message be
>restricted to 1.  Allowing more than one introduces unnecessary
>complexity.  The only benefit would be to allow TKEY-generated TSIGs to
>have multiple authorizations (derived from each signing SIG(0)), but the
>necessity of this feature is unconvincing.  Also, multiple authorizations
>can lead to conflicts whose resolution is not specified in any document.
>
>Brian
>
>
>
>to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
>the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 02:21:41 2000
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cc: Olafur Gudmundsson    <ogud@tislabs.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNSEXT WG Last Call: TKEY-01 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Tue, 07 Mar 2000 15:26:18 EST."
             <Pine.LNX.4.10.10003071522240.10169-100000@spiral.gw.tislabs.com> 
Date: Tue, 07 Mar 2000 22:50:19 -0500
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That would be fine with me.

Donald

From:  Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>
Date:  Tue, 7 Mar 2000 15:26:18 -0500 (EST)
To:  Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
cc:  namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To:  <4.1.20000303131618.00a36e90@mail.gw.tislabs.com>
Message-ID:  <Pine.LNX.4.10.10003071522240.10169-100000@spiral.gw.tislabs.com>

>On Fri, 3 Mar 2000, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:
>
>> This is a last call on this document, TKEY defines a DNS protocol
>> mechanism to allow two DNS entities to create a shared secret to be
>> used by TSIG for message authentication. 
>
>I have no objections, but one question.  Transaction security MUST be
>applied to many of the TKEY transactions, but there is no specified error
>to return if there is no transaction security.  I'd vote for rcode
>NOTAUTH, but anything else would be ok too.
>
>Brian


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 10:37:57 2000
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References: Your message of "Tue, 07 Mar 2000 15:39:27 EST."            
 <Pine.LNX.4.10.10003071532480.10169-100000@spiral.gw.tislabs.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2000 09:01:13 -0500
To: "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: DNSEXT WG Last Call: SIG(0)
Cc: Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>,
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I agree with Brian.  If we start with one signature and, given operational
experience demanding multiple signatures, later expand the protocol to
allow multiple we will be better off that with the alternative.

If we start with multiple but decide single is the way to go, then we will
have deployed resolvers that won't interoperate with new servers.

Given the choice between a restrictive system (one sig) and a more flexible
system (multi sigs), the more restrictive will be more secure in an
operational setting.  I don't care if "theoretically" multi sigs are as
safe as single sigs, once we get into operations, if a critical assumptions
supporting the proof is voided, the proof is useless.[1]

At 10:49 PM -0500 3/7/00, Donald E. Eastlake 3rd wrote:
>Actually, although multiple different authorization was the only
>reason I mentioned when we last talked about this, there is another.
>
...
>
>From:  Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>
>Date:  Tue, 7 Mar 2000 15:39:27 -0500 (EST)
>To:  Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
>cc:  namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
>>
>>Once again, I suggest that the number of SIG(0) signatures per message be
>>restricted to 1.  Allowing more than one introduces unnecessary

[1] Gratuitous analogy - there was once a race between a Porsche and a
Chevy.  Although standing still the Prosche was a faster vehicle and the
course was thought to favor it, the Chevy won.  The reason turned out to be
Chevy's lack of aerodynamic styling.  The (paved) road course was somewhat
uneven (few potholes, other depressions), leaving small pockets of vaccuum
as the Porsche rushed by.  The Chevy didn't have the vaccuum problems since
it didn't hug the road.  The moral is - the Porsche assumed a flat surface,
but in the real world, the road settles.

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

"Trying is the first step to failure." - Homer Simpson
"No! Try not. Do... or do not. There is no try." - Yoda
"It takes years of training to know when to do nothing" - Dogbert 1/21/00

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 10:38:13 2000
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Subject: Re: Last call reminder: 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Tue, 07 Mar 2000 20:31:05 PST."
             <200003080431.UAA20066@toad.com> 
Date: Wed, 08 Mar 2000 08:44:05 -0500
From: "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>
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While there certainly is a problem with lack of energy and
participation in the WG, and with lack of deployment, I don't see
throwing away the current drafts or delaying going to RFC as a
solution.

In many cases the drafts are simplifications or clarification that
have been derived from implementation or attempted implementation.  To
just throw them out would leave the previous complex and/or unclear
RFCs as the only reference.  And going to RFC gives wider notice and
is considered by some as an important factor in favor of
implementation and deployment.

I'm not sure what the answer is.  Maybe we need some really
controversial drafts so as to get people's interest and energy levels
up higher and cause more comment... the most recent large spurt of
comments was on my .local draft.  Guess it's time to integrate those
comments and re-issue it :-)

Actaully, I don't think the lack of comments is quite as bad as it
seems.  In many cases the drafts have been commented on before and
those comments integrated or at least some comments were passed around
when the draft first came out, before the last call.

Thanks,
Donald

From:  John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>
Message-Id:  <200003080431.UAA20066@toad.com>
To:  Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
cc:  namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, gnu@toad.com
In-reply-to:  <4.1.20000306100528.009f0340@mail.gw.tislabs.com> 
Date:  Tue, 07 Mar 2000 20:31:05 -0800

>> We now have 5 documents in Last call, without any comments. 
>> Here is a list of the documents in last call and the deadline
>> for comments on each one. 
>> Remember it is Randy and my job to judge the consensus of the group but
>> to do so we need some feedback on each one of these documents. 
>
>I think the WG has successfully worn out just about everyone who cares,
>by constant rewriting of standards that we haven't ever field-tested.
>I certainly can't dedicate the time to keep up with all these paper
>standards.
>
>Please allow me to recommend that all of them be discarded or delayed
>indefinitely, until we have some operational experience with the draft
>standards that preceded them.
>
>Now you have one comment for your last call.
>
>	John


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 10:41:34 2000
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Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2000 08:29:53 -0500
To: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: Last call reminder:
Cc: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org,
        gnu@toad.com
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At 11:31 PM -0500 3/7/00, John Gilmore wrote:
>I think the WG has successfully worn out just about everyone who cares,
>by constant rewriting of standards that we haven't ever field-tested.
>I certainly can't dedicate the time to keep up with all these paper
>standards.

I half agree and half disagree with your message...

The last calls are not that effective.  Most of these documents have been
getting little review and little discussion on the list.  I think the
deadlines are too tight given that the start of the last call comes out of
the blue.

On the other hand, these are not just 'paper standards.'  Most, if not
all[1], are being implemented in BIND 9.  (I am unsure about what Microsoft
has implemented regarding GSSAPI TKEY.)  What is happening is the
pre-documentation of the protocols as they are being implemented.  Not just
in in the DNS[A-Z0-9]* WG, but throughout the IETF there is a effort to put
the paper before the code.  (IMHO, this is the ISO-ization process.)

The WG problem isn't the lack of implementation, but the lack of competing
implementations that foster in-depth discussions leading to improved words
on paper.

You are right that we do need operational experience.  I have been doing
all I can to make this come about, but I don't have resources.  Who does?
I'd like to know.

[1] I know TSIG is, I think SIG(0) and TKEY is, what are the other two docs
in last call?

-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

"Trying is the first step to failure." - Homer Simpson
"No! Try not. Do... or do not. There is no try." - Yoda
"It takes years of training to know when to do nothing" - Dogbert 1/21/00

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 11:05:49 2000
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Subject: re: draft-ietf-dnsext-simple-secure-update-00.txt
Date: Wed, 08 Mar 2000 10:15:05 -0500
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draft-ietf-dnsext-simple-secure-update-00.txt

On section 3 on Policy, I think there is a bit of an over reaction
here.  True, RFC 2137 was way to complex and hard to implement.  But
just saying that ALL update policy is outside of the standard doesn't
strike me as the best design either.  You say it avoids
non-interoperability problems but that is only by ruling it all
outside the area of the standard so that possibly you will always have
non-interoperability and a burden on anyone who has an updatable zone
and wants to move their primary.

Assume that 99% of all KEY based updates could be handled by name
scoped authority to update user RRs only.  In particular I think that
would be adequate to handle the DHCP cases.  Consider the following
straw man proposal: three of the formerly designated "signatory" bits
are zero/ignored but the fourth has the following meaning: if zero,
the KEY can not be used to authorize updates; if one, the default
meaning is that the KEY can authorize DNS name scoped update of user
RRs only, however, this authority can be arbitrarily expanded or
reduced by policy setting at the primary server.  If my assumption was
correct, you would then handle 99% of the update authorization
requirements in this one bit in the KEY RR and such zones could be
freely moved between primary servers that supported the secure dynamic
update standard.  Only in the rare cases where a KEY needs to be
authorized to add/change NS's or be restricted to only doing updates
on alternate shrove tuesdays or it's really important to limit its
authority to TXT RRs or something would the primary server arbitrary
policy configuration mechanism be needed.

I'd also like to suggest a minor rewording of section 1.3 as follows:

1.3 - Comparison of data authentication and message authentication

	Message based authentication, using TSIG or SIG(0), provides
	protection for the entire message with a single signing and single
	verification which, in the case of TSIG, is a relatively
	inexpensive MAC creation and check.  For update requests, this
	signature can establish, based on policy or key negotation, the
	authority to make the request.
	
	DNSSEC SIG records can be used to protect the integrity of
	individual RRs or RRsets in a DNS message with the authority of
	the zone owner. However, this cannot sufficiently protect the
	dynamic update request.

	Using SIG records to secure RRsets in an update request is
	incompatible with the design of update, as described below, and
	would in any case require multiple expensive public key signatures
	and verifcations.

	SIG records do not cover the message header, which includes record
	counts.  Therefore, it is possibly to maliciously insert or remove
	RRsets in an update request without causing a verification
	failure.

	If SIG records were used to protect the prerequisite section, it
	would be impossible to determine whether the SIGs themselves were
	a prerequisite or simply used for validation.

	In the update section of an update request, signing requests to
	add an RRset is straightforward, and this signature could be
	permanently used to protect the data, as specified in [RFC2535]. 
	However, if an RRset is deleted, there is no data for a SIG to
	cover.


Thanks,
Donald
=====================================================================
 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd                      dee3@torque.pothole.com
 65 Shindegan Hill Road, RR#1                     +1 914-276-2668(h)
 Carmel, NY 10512 USA                             +1 508-261-5434(w)


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 11:13:32 2000
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Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2000 10:23:09 -0500 (EST)
From: Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>
To: "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>
cc: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNSEXT WG Last Call: SIG(0) 
In-Reply-To: <200003080349.WAA11445@torque.pothole.com>
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On Tue, 7 Mar 2000, Donald E. Eastlake 3rd wrote:

> Actually, although multiple different authorization was the only
> reason I mentioned when we last talked about this, there is another.

OK.  My primary concern is that situations involving multiple
authorizations don't arise.  Restricting it in SIG(0) seesed like the
logical choice, but maybe not.

> With TSIG, you have (or at least believe you have) a shared (secret)
> key and algorithm.  With SIG(0), you typically don't have or need that
> since the public key to verify the signature can be obtained from the
> DNS.  However, that also means you don't know what algorithm(s) the
> server understands.

I'm not sure about this.  The server is expected to understand the
mandatory to implement algorithms,  I think a better solution is to allow
the server to notify the client that a SIG(0) could not be verified, and
then the client would never try it again.

The client can also query the server and determine what keys it uses for
SIG(0) (or at least an approximation - all dnssec protocol host keys at
the server's name), and determine what algorithms it understands from
that.

> So you might want to have, for example, two
> signatures giving exactly the same authorization but with diffeent
> algorithms and the understanding would be that if any SIG(0) for that
> specific authorization verified, you have the authority indicated
> (assuming it conforms to server policy, etc.).

But if the client sends 2 SIG(0)'s with one message, and the server
verifies one of them, the client doesn't know which one was verified.  So,
any further SIG(0) signed messages will also need to be signed with both.

I'd recommend something the following:
	- client sends RSA SIG(0) signed TKEY mesage
	- server doesn't do RSA, sends back NOTAUTH
	- client sends DSA SIG(0) signed TKEY mesage
	- server sends back signed TKEY response, all is good.

Of course, the client should probably send DSA first, since it's
mandatory, but that wouldn't illustrate the point.

> I suppose it could
> also be possible that during some key rollover situation with some
> clock jitter, you might want two signatures with the same authority
> and algorithm but different keys, although usually you would arrange
> for the key validities to overlap enough that it wouldn't be a
> problem.

This could be a problem, but I think that it should be up to the user to
properly configure keys.

Brian



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 11:40:49 2000
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My experience of the URN working group is that no RFCs is usually better
than bad RFCs. Anyone trying to do any work on URNs will find the
detritus from the failed URN working group in the way. Every bad
design decision of the group is now fixed by authority of an RFC.

I believe that we have to deploy a security infrastructure for the 
internet name system system in a very short timescale. I am somewhat
disturbed by the fact that there are RFCs at proposed standard that
do not appear to have been reviewed by the commercial providers of
name infrastructure or PKI infrastructure.

Furthermore there does not appear to be any commitment to deploy the
specifications from the principal operating systems vendors - with the
exception of SRV.

Before deployment the easiest thing to change is the specifications.


		Phill

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 11:52:45 2000
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To: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
cc: Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>,
        Olafur Gudmundsson    <ogud@tislabs.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNSEXT WG Last Call: SIG(0) 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Wed, 08 Mar 2000 09:01:13 EST."
             <v0313030eb4ec0b4ec66f@[10.33.10.14]> 
Date: Wed, 08 Mar 2000 11:05:49 -0500
From: "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>
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I don't see how permitting multiple signatures for the same authority
but different algorithms, such that the request is considered valid if
any of them verify, reduces security, since you can just send N
requests, each with one of the multiple signatures.  However, since
you can do that, it is also not particularly important to allow
multiple signatures for this reason.

Donald


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 12:13:36 2000
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Subject: Re: Last call reminder: 
In-reply-to: Your message of Wed, 08 Mar 2000 08:29:53 -0500.
             <v0313030ab4ec03a6f89a@[207.172.150.61]> 
Date: Wed, 08 Mar 2000 17:29:47 +0100
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    You are right that we do need operational experience.  I have been doing
    all I can to make this come about, but I don't have resources.  Who does?
    I'd like to know.

We, the domein-registry in .nl, de-nic (.de) have some resources
allocated for doing some large scale dns-sec implementation testing
(based on bind9), together with nlnetlabs.nl and other parties. We
are actively setting op an workgroup etc. As soon as the details
are sorted out, we can give some more details.

	jaap


    [1] I know TSIG is, I think SIG(0) and TKEY is, what are the
    other two docs in last call?

    -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
    Edward Lewis
    NAI Labs Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email:
    lewis@tislabs.com

    "Trying is the first step to failure." - Homer Simpson "No!
    Try not. Do... or do not. There is no try." - Yoda "It takes
    years of training to know when to do nothing" - Dogbert 1/21/00

    Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 12:26:25 2000
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From: Michael Mealling <michael@bailey.dscga.com>
To: Philip Hallam-Baker <pbaker@verisign.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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Message-ID: <20000308113630.G24105@bailey.dscga.com>
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On Wed, Mar 08, 2000 at 07:56:55AM -0800, Philip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> My experience of the URN working group is that no RFCs is usually better
> than bad RFCs. Anyone trying to do any work on URNs will find the
> detritus from the failed URN working group in the way. Every bad
> design decision of the group is now fixed by authority of an RFC.

Huh? Failed? The group is just about finished and implementations
are under way. One of the two larger uses can be found in 
the upcoming XML URN and the work being done in ENUM.

-MM


-- 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Mealling	|      Vote Libertarian!       | www.rwhois.net/michael
Sr. Research Engineer   |   www.ga.lp.org/gwinnett     | ICQ#:         14198821
Network Solutions	|          www.lp.org          |  michaelm@netsol.com


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 13:46:55 2000
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Message-ID: <38C68E71.C94A1A90@whistle.com>
Date: Wed, 08 Mar 2000 09:31:29 -0800
From: Terry Lambert <terry@whistle.com>
To: Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>
CC: "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>,
        Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNSEXT WG Last Call: SIG(0)
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Brian Wellington wrote:
> On Tue, 7 Mar 2000, Donald E. Eastlake 3rd wrote:
> 
> > Actually, although multiple different authorization was the only
> > reason I mentioned when we last talked about this, there is another.
> 
> OK.  My primary concern is that situations involving multiple
> authorizations don't arise.  Restricting it in SIG(0) seesed like the
> logical choice, but maybe not.


I think the key jitter argument is specious; I personally
use SecurID, from Security Dynamics, to get behind an IBM
firewall.  This works by generating pseudo-random numbers,
and providing a window for "jitter" to deal with the clock
synchronization issue for the pseudo-random number (e.g.,
the number is valid for ~3x the window, and the back end is
synchronized ("recentered") on the middle of the window for
a valid number.

This argument is specious for automatic systems, since
there are no automatic systems that implement this (the
SecurID system is to permit people with keychain fobs
and an account and PIN to login from outside, not one
machine with magic client hardware to talk to another
with magic server hardware; I also think that permitting
the implementation of a "standards conforming" system
that is nevertheless non-interoperable with other
instances of "standards conforming" systems is an extreme
error, and points up an obvious flaw in the standards
document, if it is even theoretically possible to create
such an implementation).

It seems to me that the "jitter" argument is an attempt to
dodge the key distribution problem, which I believe has
already been adequately resolved elsewhere (e.g. "Racoon"
for IPv6), and we can look elsewhere for a model.


For the non-"jitter" argument of multiple algorithms, I
think that if a client has an unsupported algorithm, then
it should attempt it, and if the server does not accept
it, then the client MUST fall back to a supported (e.g. a
"mandatory to implement") algorithm.

I use the word "MUST" intentionally, in its RFC sense.



Right now, we are beset with attempts to control the
client, the server, or both sides of the implementation
of supposedly standard security protocols, sometimes in
the face of white papers by the authors of the standards
specifically stating the intended use of "optional" fields,
such as we are  talking about in this specific case.

What is to stop a vendor from implementing a signature
security algorithm that is proprietary and/or patented,
and then setting up their servers to require the use of
their signatures, thus leveraging a near monopoly in
clients to force the use of their servers?

Or vice-versa, what is to stop someone from implementing
a server which understands such an algorithm, and treats
clients which only implement the "mandatory to implement"
algorithms as second class citizens in "their" network?


It is not strong enough to permit optional algorithms,
we MUST ensure that the "mandatory to implement" ones
are universal, and that implementations which _only_
support these CAN NOT be treated as second class network
citizens as a result of a vendor whim.


The RFC SHOULD NOT be issued until interoperability
guarantees have been addressed in the protocol definition.


-- Terry Lambert
-- Whistle Communications, Inc., an I.B.M. Company
-- terry@whistle.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------
This is formal notice under California Assembly Bill 1629, enacted
9/26/98 that any UCE sent to my email address will be billed $50
per incident to the legally allowed maximum of $25,000.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 15:48:35 2000
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From: Peter Deutsch <pdeutsch@cisco.com>
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[ enough.  can we take this one elsewhere please?  -- rb ]

Guys,

Michael Mealling wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Mar 08, 2000 at 07:56:55AM -0800, Philip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> > My experience of the URN working group is that no RFCs is usually better
> > than bad RFCs. Anyone trying to do any work on URNs will find the
> > detritus from the failed URN working group in the way. Every bad
> > design decision of the group is now fixed by authority of an RFC.
> 
> Huh? Failed? The group is just about finished and implementations
> are under way. One of the two larger uses can be found in
> the upcoming XML URN and the work being done in ENUM.


       And so it came to pass that the Pope in Avignon sent out
       his forces to do battle with the forces of the Pope in Rome.
       And there was misery and woe upon the land...


In other words, some people don't believe in URNs as defined by that
working group. So don't use them.

We used to welcome diversity. Yeesh...

				- peterd


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 19:28:32 2000
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To: Philip Hallam-Baker <pbaker@verisign.com>
cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, gnu@toad.com
Subject: Re: Last call reminder: (DNSSEC)
In-reply-to: <C713C1768C55D3119D200090277AEECAB52D14@postal.verisign.com> 
Date: Wed, 08 Mar 2000 15:38:39 -0800
From: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>
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> I believe that we have to deploy a security infrastructure for the 
> internet name system system in a very short timescale.

Why do you believe this, particularly the timescale?

>							   I am somewhat
> disturbed by the fact that there are RFCs at proposed standard that
> do not appear to have been reviewed by the commercial providers of
> name infrastructure or PKI infrastructure.

ISC and NSI and CORE and IANA all reviewed it.  I think ICANN has had
its hands full with politics, legalism and bureacracy, and is only
starting to be able to deal with technology issues.

As for PKI infrastructure, DNSSEC *competes* with PKI infrastructure.
Isn't that why Verisign bought NSI?  PKI has been heavily based on
deliberate anti-privacy information collection ("voluntary" disclosure
to Dun&Bradstreet, which then sells your info, is required to get a
cert for secure web serving), cumbersome ISO encoding, and centralized
providers protected by patent monopolies who are maneuvering to
collect tolls from everyone on the Internet.  We should expect
companies invested in X.509 and PKI certificate models -- such as your
own, Philip -- to want to kill or cripple DNSSEC.  It is only to the
extent that they didn't notice DNSSEC, or didn't believe that it was
viable, that it has survived.  Though perhaps with NSI firmly in hand,
Verisign can arrange to collect tolls from DNSSEC users too, so now
wants to see it deployed.

> Furthermore there does not appear to be any commitment to deploy the
> specifications from the principal operating systems vendors.

A collection of Unix companies is funding BIND v9 development and
support, with the intent of incorporating it into their products.

As for Microsoft, they have been tracking the standards, but who would
believe them if they said they'd implement it as written?  When it
serves their interest to do something else, they do something else.

	John


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar  8 21:38:37 2000
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Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2000 20:50:16 -0500
From: Mark Kosters <markk@netsol.com>
To: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>
Cc: Philip Hallam-Baker <pbaker@verisign.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Last call reminder: (DNSSEC)
Message-ID: <20000308205016.C7110@slam.internic.net>
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On Wed, Mar 08, 2000 at 03:38:39PM -0800, John Gilmore wrote:
> ISC and NSI and CORE and IANA all reviewed it.  I think ICANN has had
> its hands full with politics, legalism and bureacracy, and is only
> starting to be able to deal with technology issues.

You are more confident than I that ICANN is past the non-technical issues 
and has extra cycles to think about signing the root.  Nevertheless, there 
are a couple of things that need to happen to make this a reality from
my prospective (and this list may not be complete):

 1) EDNS0 needs to be deployed for dnssec to happen at the roots. Running
    TCP retries due to udp packet overflows will be bad if we were to deploy
    this now.
 2) Software needs to work. The dnssec workshops that I've participated
    in have had less than stellar results over the past year.
 3) More thought has to go into key rollovers for delegations. The idea
    of the millions of .coms having to deal resigning their keys with
    the parent is suboptimal at this point.*  That reminds me - what
    happened to the draft that Donald and Mark wrote almost a year ago?

Regards,
Mark

*I've written a keyserver to authenticate the child using the 
registrar/registry model. This is cool but am unsure if every admin really
wants to do this on a frequent basis outside of DNS.

-- 

Mark Kosters             markk@netsol.com       Network Solutions, Inc.
PGP Key fingerprint =  1A 2A 92 F8 8E D3 47 F9  15 65 80 87 68 13 F6 48


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Mar  9 00:52:05 2000
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Message-Id: <200003090328.OAA09823@bsdi.dv.isc.org>
To: Mark Kosters <markk@netsol.com>
Cc: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>, Philip Hallam-Baker <pbaker@verisign.com>,
        namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Mark.Andrews@nominum.com
Subject: Re: Last call reminder: (DNSSEC) 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Wed, 08 Mar 2000 20:50:16 CDT."
             <20000308205016.C7110@slam.internic.net> 
Date: Thu, 09 Mar 2000 14:28:23 +1100
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>  3) More thought has to go into key rollovers for delegations. The idea
>     of the millions of .coms having to deal resigning their keys with
>     the parent is suboptimal at this point.*  That reminds me - what
>     happened to the draft that Donald and Mark wrote almost a year ago?
> 

	We are still working on it.  We want to use SRV records to be able
	to seperate the server from the signer if wanted.
	
	Mark

> Regards,
> Mark
> 
> *I've written a keyserver to authenticate the child using the 
> registrar/registry model. This is cool but am unsure if every admin really
> wants to do this on a frequent basis outside of DNS.
--
Mark Andrews, Nominum Inc. / Internet Software Consortium
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark.Andrews@nominum.com


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Mar  9 00:53:19 2000
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Date: Wed, 08 Mar 2000 21:33:38 -0500
To: dnsop@cafax.se, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Marc Blanchet <Marc.Blanchet@viagenie.qc.ca>
Subject: Fwd: [idn] next ietf idn agenda proposal
Cc: jseng@pobox.org.sg
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FYI.  IDN wg meeting will be monday, March 27, 2000 13h00-15h00

You are more than welcome to participate.

Marc. (idn wg co-chair)

>Date: Wed, 08 Mar 2000 09:16:01 -0500
>To: idn@ops.ietf.org
>From: Marc Blanchet <Marc.Blanchet@viagenie.qc.ca>
>Subject: [idn] next ietf idn agenda proposal
>
>
>Hi,
>         based on requests, here is a first agenda proposal for the next 
> ietf idn wg meeting.  Hope I didn't forget someone.
>         if you want to make a presentation, please send request to me and 
> james (Marc.Blanchet@viagenie.qc.ca and jseng@pobox.org.sg).
>         Recall that our focus for now is on requirements. So priority #1 
> on presentations is for the requirements. If we have time, we will begin 
> discussing the implementations document.
>         I'll wait for a few days for comments on the agenda and then send 
> it to the IETF secretariat.
>
>Marc.
>=====================
>IETF 47th, Adelaide, March 2000
>
>Internationalized domain names (idn)
>working group meeting agenda
>
>- Agenda bashing, blue sheet, setup, 5 minutes
>
>- Requirements document, James Seng, 50 minutes
>  http://www.normos.org/ietf/draft/draft-ietf-idn-requirment-00.txt
>
>- Requirements from Japan, Yoshiro YONEYA, 15 minutes
>
>- Internationalization of URLs: history, Larry Masinter, 15 minutes
>  http://www.normos.org/ietf/draft/draft-masinter-url-i18n-04.txt
>
>- Report on APTLD meetings, TBA, 5 minutes
>
>- Implementations document structure and plan, TBA, 30 minutes


Marc Blanchet
Viagénie inc.
tel: 418-656-9254
http://www.viagenie.qc.ca

----------------------------------------------------------
Normos (http://www.normos.org): Internet standards portal:
IETF RFC, drafts, IANA, W3C, ATMForum, ISO, ... all in one place.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Mar  9 00:58:24 2000
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From: Bill Manning <bmanning@ISI.EDU>
Message-Id: <200003090226.SAA19759@zephyr.isi.edu>
Subject: Re: Last call reminder: (DNSSEC)
To: markk@netsol.com (Mark Kosters)
Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2000 18:26:18 -0800 (PST)
Cc: gnu@toad.com (John Gilmore), pbaker@verisign.com (Philip Hallam-Baker),
        namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <20000308205016.C7110@slam.internic.net> from "Mark Kosters" at Mar 08, 2000 08:50:16 PM
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% On Wed, Mar 08, 2000 at 03:38:39PM -0800, John Gilmore wrote:
% > ISC and NSI and CORE and IANA all reviewed it.  I think ICANN has had
% > its hands full with politics, legalism and bureacracy, and is only
% > starting to be able to deal with technology issues.
% 
% You are more confident than I that ICANN is past the non-technical issues 
% and has extra cycles to think about signing the root.  Nevertheless, there 
% are a couple of things that need to happen to make this a reality from
% my prospective (and this list may not be complete):

	Echo Marks concerns.
	I believe that ICANN has a couple of technical steps ahead 
	of itself before it could begin to be prepared to think of how
	to deploy DNSSEC.

%  1) EDNS0 needs to be deployed for dnssec to happen at the roots. Running
%     TCP retries due to udp packet overflows will be bad if we were to deploy
%     this now.

	The problem would not be a root issue once the g & cc TLDs are 
	migrated off the roots to their own servers. It would still be
	an issue.

%  2) Software needs to work. The dnssec workshops that I've participated
%     in have had less than stellar results over the past year.

	Well, it does work, but with significant manual intervention.
	I am concerned that there is a lack of compatability between
	versions.  Still too fluid for a production system for my tastes.

%  3) More thought has to go into key rollovers for delegations. The idea
%     of the millions of .coms having to deal resigning their keys with
%     the parent is suboptimal at this point.*  That reminds me - what
%     happened to the draft that Donald and Mark wrote almost a year ago?
% 
% Regards,
% Mark
% 
% *I've written a keyserver to authenticate the child using the 
% registrar/registry model. This is cool but am unsure if every admin really
% wants to do this on a frequent basis outside of DNS.

	Nifty!  
% 
% -- 
% 
% Mark Kosters             markk@netsol.com       Network Solutions, Inc.
% PGP Key fingerprint =  1A 2A 92 F8 8E D3 47 F9  15 65 80 87 68 13 F6 48
% 
% 
% to unsubscribe send a message to namedroppers-request@ops.ietf.org with
% the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.
% 


-- 
--bill


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Mar  9 14:19:51 2000
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Date: Thu, 09 Mar 2000 10:15:37 -0800
From: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: opcode 2: server status request
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RFC 1035 doesn't provide any purpose or usage notes on opcode 2: server
status request. Various searches have also proven futile. Anybody got
any background info on this they can share?

-- 
Eric A. Hall                                            ehall@ehsco.com
+1-650-685-0557                                    http://www.ehsco.com


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Thu Mar  9 15:49:02 2000
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Date: Thu, 09 Mar 2000 15:08:25 -0500
To: "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>,
        namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
Subject: re: draft-ietf-dnsext-simple-secure-update-00.txt
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At 10:15 AM 3/8/00 , Donald E. Eastlake 3rd wrote:
>draft-ietf-dnsext-simple-secure-update-00.txt
>
>On section 3 on Policy, I think there is a bit of an over reaction
>here.  True, RFC 2137 was way to complex and hard to implement.  But
>just saying that ALL update policy is outside of the standard doesn't
>strike me as the best design either.  You say it avoids
>non-interoperability problems but that is only by ruling it all
>outside the area of the standard so that possibly you will always have
>non-interoperability and a burden on anyone who has an updatable zone
>and wants to move their primary.

The main problem with RFC 2137 it is not trivial for resolver to determine 
if the key is allowed to update the data it signed.
The language might be toned down a little bit. 


>
>Assume that 99% of all KEY based updates could be handled by name
>scoped authority to update user RRs only.  In particular I think that
>would be adequate to handle the DHCP cases.  Consider the following
>straw man proposal: three of the formerly designated "signatory" bits
>are zero/ignored but the fourth has the following meaning: if zero,
>the KEY can not be used to authorize updates; if one, the default
>meaning is that the KEY can authorize DNS name scoped update of user
>RRs only, however, this authority can be arbitrarily expanded or
>reduced by policy setting at the primary server.  If my assumption was
>correct, you would then handle 99% of the update authorization
>requirements in this one bit in the KEY RR and such zones could be
>freely moved between primary servers that supported the secure dynamic
>update standard.  Only in the rare cases where a KEY needs to be
>authorized to add/change NS's or be restricted to only doing updates
>on alternate shrove tuesdays or it's really important to limit its
>authority to TXT RRs or something would the primary server arbitrary
>policy configuration mechanism be needed.

I think it is premature to anticipate what policies sites will use,
and making any assumptions about X% of updates is counterproductive.
Policy at a site can be much more fine grained than
just name; hosts could be allowed to only update address records but 
not text records etc. 

I think that keeping the policy outside the specification until
this area is better understood is the right thing to do NOW. 
(KISS principle).


	Olafur



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Sat Mar 11 17:28:51 2000
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Message-ID: <38CABAAA.2E0E772A@ehsco.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2000 13:29:14 -0800
From: "Eric A. Hall" <ehall@ehsco.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: opcode 2: server status request
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Just a thought, but if this opcode is neither used nor understood, then
perhaps it should be made obsolete.


"Eric A. Hall" wrote:
> 
> RFC 1035 doesn't provide any purpose or usage notes on opcode 2: server
> status request. Various searches have also proven futile. Anybody got
> any background info on this they can share?

-- 
Eric A. Hall                                            ehall@ehsco.com
+1-650-685-0557                                    http://www.ehsco.com


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Mar 13 14:13:23 2000
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Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2000 12:55:06 -0500
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
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The last call period on this document has concluded.
No substantial comments where received during the last call. 

Minor edit's where suggested in private emails to author and WG-chair.
Author will update document for clarity.

It is the sense of the WG that the document is ready for advancement
and will be forwarded to IESG after update. 

There will be an oppertunity to address the WG last call of this
document in Working Group meeting. 

        Olafur

>
> This document was spun off from the Simple Secure Update document after 
> WGLC. 
> This document specifies that for DNSSEC purposes only zone key signatures 
> are material. This restriction simplifies signature validation, and 
> allows flexible dynamic update policies. The changes result from
> implementation 
> experience. 
> This is a WG last call ending March 8'th 2000. 
> The draft is: 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-signing-auth-00.txt
> There are no known defects in this version of the document. 
> Please send comments to the list.
> This document is to be published as an standards track RFC, updating RFC2565.
> Olafur 





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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Mar 13 14:16:51 2000
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Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2000 12:55:13 -0500
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
Subject: DNSEXT WG Last Call Summary: Simple Secure Update-00
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The last call period on this document has concluded.
No substantial comments where received

Minor comments where for improved wording of certain sections 
and clarification.  Some discussion on the merits of update policies 
expressed in KEY records versus configured in servers was conducted.

The consensus is that author should address the minor edits requested
and post a new version of the document which is ready to forwarded
to the IESG. 

There will be an opportunity to address the WG last call of this
document in Working Group meeting. 

        Olafur
        

>
> This is a second last call on this document, in the first round some 
> changes where suggested mainly spilt the document in two as the original 
> document was updating RFC2535 and obsoleting RFC2137 this document 
> reflects all comments received. 
> This document specifies how to update zones securely using only message 
> authentication. This document does not specify update policy, but extends 
> dynamic update RFC2136 to DNSSEC types and their restrictions. 
> This is a WG last call ending March 8'th 2000. 
> The draft is: 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-simple-secure-update-0 
> 0.txt




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Mar 14 12:06:18 2000
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Message-Id: <200003141430.JAA14566@noah.dma.isg.mot.com>
To: skwan@microsoft.com
From: Donald Eastlake 3rd <dee3@torque.pothole.com>
cc: dee3@torque.pothole.com, lde008@dma.isg.mot.com, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org,
        jamesg@microsoft.com, praeritg@microsoft.com
Subject: draft-skwan-gss-tsig-05.txt
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2000 09:30:36 -0500
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Hi Stuart,

Reviewing the latest version of your draft, I note that you seem to
use spontaneous server inclusion of TKEY RR only for key deletion, not
for coveying GSS-API info.  So there would never be a GSS-API mode
TKEY RR spontaneously included by a server.  Would you mind if I
removed that possibility from the TKEY draft to simplify it?

Thanks,
Donald

PS: The TSIG and TEKY info in your References section is a bit
out of date...

==================================================================
 Donald Eastlake 3rd  +1 914-276-2668(h)  dee3@torque.pothole.com
 65 Shindegan Hill Rd. +1 508-261-5434(w)  lde008@dma.isg.mot.com
 Carmel, NY 10512 USA






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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Mar 17 11:30:49 2000
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Message-ID: <19398D273324D3118A2B0008C7E9A56905F55154@SIT.platinum.corp.microsoft.com>
From: Stuart Kwan <skwan@Exchange.Microsoft.com>
To: "'Donald Eastlake 3rd'" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>
Cc: lde008@dma.isg.mot.com, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org,
        James Gilroy <jamesg@Exchange.Microsoft.com>,
        Praerit Garg <praeritg@Exchange.Microsoft.com>
Subject: RE: draft-skwan-gss-tsig-05.txt
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Hi Donald,

I don't mind if you remove that section (5.2) from the TKEY draft.

I'll fix up the references before I resubmit the draft as a DNSEXT I-D.

Cheers,
- Stuart

-----Original Message-----
From: Donald Eastlake 3rd [mailto:dee3@torque.pothole.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 14, 2000 6:31 AM
To: Stuart Kwan
Cc: dee3@torque.pothole.com; lde008@dma.isg.mot.com;
namedroppers@ops.ietf.org; James Gilroy; Praerit Garg
Subject: draft-skwan-gss-tsig-05.txt


Hi Stuart,

Reviewing the latest version of your draft, I note that you seem to
use spontaneous server inclusion of TKEY RR only for key deletion, not
for coveying GSS-API info.  So there would never be a GSS-API mode
TKEY RR spontaneously included by a server.  Would you mind if I
removed that possibility from the TKEY draft to simplify it?

Thanks,
Donald

PS: The TSIG and TEKY info in your References section is a bit
out of date...

==================================================================
 Donald Eastlake 3rd  +1 914-276-2668(h)  dee3@torque.pothole.com
 65 Shindegan Hill Rd. +1 508-261-5434(w)  lde008@dma.isg.mot.com
 Carmel, NY 10512 USA






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the word 'unsubscribe' in a single line as the message text body.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Mar 17 20:12:41 2000
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Subject: DNSEXT WG agenda at 45'th IETF
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Here is the draft DNSEXT agenda
bashing 5 minutes (Randy) 

charter review 10 minutes (Olafur)

working group last call summary  10  minutes (Olafur) 
	TSIG  		draft-ietf-dnsext-tsig-00.txt
	zone signing key draft-ietf-dnsext-signing-auth-00.txt
	secure update	draft-ietf-dnsext-simple-secure-update-00.txt
	TKEY    	draft-ietf-dnsext-tkey-01.txt
	SIG(0) 		draft-ietf-dnsext-sig-zero-00.txt
	IANA    	draft-ietf-dnsext-iana-dns-00.txt
	
RFC status 10 minutes (Olafur)
	RFC 2782 
	<status of other RFCS> 

current drafts 40 minutes (Authors or chair)
	axfr 5  	draft-ietf-dnsext-axfr-clarify-00.txt
	IXFR 5   	draft-ietf-dnsext-ixfr-00.txt
	eds0.5 10	draft-ietf-dnsext-edns0dot5-00.txt
	Zone secure status 5  draft-ietf-dnsext-zone-status-00.txt
	DHCID 5 	draft-ietf-dnsind-dhcp-rr-00.txt
	<open>

related drafts 40  (Author or chair) 
	TSIG-GSSAPI 5   draft-skwan-gss-tsig-05.txt
	Multicast DNS 20 draft-aboba-dnsext-mdns-00.txt
	<open> 

related WG's 10 (WG chairs)
	DNSOPS 
	IDNS

other agenda items 




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Mar 17 21:56:06 2000
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Message-ID: <19398D273324D3118A2B0008C7E9A56905F55176@SIT.platinum.corp.microsoft.com>
From: Stuart Kwan <skwan@Exchange.Microsoft.com>
To: "'Olafur Gudmundsson'" <ogud@tislabs.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: RE: DNSEXT WG agenda at 45'th IETF
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Hello all,

I will not be attending Adelaide.  Olafur, can you please drive the
discussion on GSS-TSIG?

I intend to resubmit GSS-TSIG as a working group draft when the I-D window
reopens.  I am not planning any significant changes to the draft.

Cheers,
- Stuart

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Sat Mar 18 18:00:53 2000
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        "'Olafur Gudmundsson'" <ogud@tislabs.com>, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
Subject: RE: DNSEXT WG agenda at 45'th IETF
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At 08:50 PM 3/17/00 , Stuart Kwan wrote:
>Hello all,
>
>I will not be attending Adelaide.  Olafur, can you please drive the
>discussion on GSS-TSIG?

No problem, I will bring up the issue that the draft is applying to become
a working group draft, and I see no reason for that not to happen. 

>I intend to resubmit GSS-TSIG as a working group draft when the I-D window
>reopens.  I am not planning any significant changes to the draft.

I will read the draft before the meeting and send you any suggestions
I may have. 

	Olafur



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Mar 20 11:29:51 2000
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From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
Subject: Protocol Action: Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
	 (TSIG) to Proposed Standard
Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2000 09:22:06 -0500
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The IESG has approved the Internet-Draft 'Secret Key Transaction
Authentication for DNS' <draft-ietf-dnsext-tsig-00.txt> as a
Proposed Standard.  This document is the product of the DNS Extensions 
Working Group.  The IESG contact persons are Erik Nordmark and Thomas Narten.

 
Technical Summary
 
This document, orginally available as draft-ietf-dnsind-tsig-nn, specifies
an extension to DNS that allows for transaction level authentication 
using shared secrets and one way hashing.  It can be used to authenticate 
dynamic updates as coming from an approved client, or to authenticate 
responses as coming from an approved recursive name server.


Working Group Summary

There was consensus is the WG to advance the document.

Protocol Quality

This document has been reviewed for the IESG by Erik Nordmark.



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Mar 20 14:47:47 2000
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Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2000 10:55:28 -0800 (PST)
From: Erik Nordmark <Erik.Nordmark@eng.sun.com>
Subject: SRV records for SIP?
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Cc: nordmark@jurassic.Eng.Sun.COM, gnair@cs.columbia.edu,
        shulzrinne@cs.columbia.edu
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draft-ietf-sip-dhcp-00.txt defines some new DHCP options.
One of them carry the FQDN to use when asking for SRV records
(which seems a little bit odd - I'd expect a fixed prefix like
_sip._tcp.<something> ??).

The other DHCP option tries to capture all of the content of 
the reply to a query for an SRV record.
The DHCP option doesn't contain anything like a DNS TTL for this info.
Thus I'd appreciate if somebody could give this document a careful read
from the DNS perspective.

   Erik



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Mar 20 16:09:29 2000
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Message-ID: <38D68306.6FB790C3@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2000 14:59:02 -0500
From: Gautam Nair <gnair@cs.columbia.edu>
To: Erik Nordmark <Erik.Nordmark@eng.sun.com>
CC: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, nordmark@jurassic.Eng.Sun.COM,
        hgs@cs.columbia.edu
Subject: Re: SRV records for SIP?
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In the first option we defined, we send a DNS string to the client. This
DNS string could either be an SRV name such as sip.udp.cs.columbia.edu *or*
it could be an A record string such as marta.cs.columbia.edu. It is
obviously more desireable to use the SRV record. The local DHCP
administrator can configure the DHCP server to send either the SRV or the A
record string according to the DNS capabilities of the DNS server and the
SIP client. The client should however first attempt to use the string in an
SRV query if it is SRV cognizant. I do not think there is any harm in
sending an A record string in an SRV query other than the fact that it will
fail and a second attempt (making the A record query) will have to be made.

The second option that we defined is an attempt to replicate the reply to
an SRV query. This is done with some embedded systems, that do not
implement DNS, in mind. Since all the IP addresses and priority/weightage
information is available, a DNS query is not required.
For the DNS TTL type of info: In this case, it is expected that the DHCP
administrator would make sure that the IP addresses are up to date, so TTL
is not too important here.

Regards,
Gautam.


Erik Nordmark wrote:

> draft-ietf-sip-dhcp-00.txt defines some new DHCP options.
> One of them carry the FQDN to use when asking for SRV records
> (which seems a little bit odd - I'd expect a fixed prefix like
> _sip._tcp.<something> ??).
>
> The other DHCP option tries to capture all of the content of
> the reply to a query for an SRV record.
> The DHCP option doesn't contain anything like a DNS TTL for this info.
> Thus I'd appreciate if somebody could give this document a careful read
> from the DNS perspective.
>
>    Erik



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Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2000 12:28:03 -0800 (PST)
From: Erik Nordmark <Erik.Nordmark@eng.sun.com>
Subject: SRV records for SIP?
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Cc: nordmark@jurassic.Eng.Sun.COM, narten@raleigh.ibm.com,
        gnair@cs.columbia.edu, schulzrinne@cs.columbia.edu
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[Resent with correct address.]

draft-ietf-sip-dhcp-00.txt defines some new DHCP options.
One of them carry the FQDN to use when asking for SRV records
(which seems a little bit odd - I'd expect a fixed prefix like
_sip._tcp.<something> ??).

The other DHCP option tries to capture all of the content of 
the reply to a query for an SRV record.
The DHCP option doesn't contain anything like a DNS TTL for this info.
Thus I'd appreciate if somebody could give this document a careful read
from the DNS perspective.

   Erik



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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Mar 21 00:55:56 2000
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From: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
To: gnair@cs.columbia.edu, schulzrinne@cs.columbia.edu
Cc: Erik Nordmark <Erik.Nordmark@eng.sun.com>, narten@raleigh.ibm.com,
        namedroppers@internic.net
Subject: Re: SRV records for SIP? 
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Mon, 20 Mar 2000 12:28:03 -0800."
             <Roam.SIMC.2.0.6.953584083.22389.nordmark@jurassic> 
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2000 12:55:36 +1100
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    Date:        Mon, 20 Mar 2000 12:28:03 -0800 (PST)
    From:        Erik Nordmark <Erik.Nordmark@eng.sun.com>
    Message-ID:  <Roam.SIMC.2.0.6.953584083.22389.nordmark@jurassic>

  | One of them carry the FQDN to use when asking for SRV records
  | (which seems a little bit odd - I'd expect a fixed prefix like
  | _sip._tcp.<something> ??).

I don't mind that .. if anything building the magic knowledge into
less places is probably an advantage, the extra few octets that appear
in the DHCP reply (even given that DHCP packets are, like the DNS, one
of those places where space is at a premium) shouldn't matter.

However, just like every new place where DNS names are embedded in
binary protocols, I don't believe that using the ascii form of the
DNS name benefits anyone - embed the thing using DNS binary form.
If that's done, then it is certain that a max length of 255 octets
is sufficient (so the one byte length code works) - in textual form
that is no longer going to cover all the cases, some sequences need
extra bytes to act as escapes.   With the (possible) forthcoming use of
more international domain names, this is likely to become much
more important (as perhaps will names that come closer to needing
the full 255 octets than those we typically see today).

For the kind of application that is being suggested here, one which
may not even have a DNS client, this is likely to be an even bigger
win, as it allows DNS support to be added without the need to have
a hostname parser - the string returned from the DHCP option could
be copied literally into the question section of a DNS packet, making
the DNS support that much cheaper to add.

  | The other DHCP option tries to capture all of the content of 
  | the reply to a query for an SRV record.

That part is totally brain dead.   Anything that can cope with DHCP
ought to be able to cope with DNS as well, the two are very similar
in their requirements - both use UDP, so both need internal retransmit
timers and backoffs, both use a binary packet format, ...

  | The DHCP option doesn't contain anything like a DNS TTL for this info.

While that would be trivial to add, and absolutely must be added anywhere
that addresses are being passed around.  With DHCP the server could
perhaps mitigate this to some extent by arranging for the lease on the
client's IP address to be no longer than the minimum TTL of all the
addresses in the reply - most other addresses in DHCP replies have no
TTLs either - but this ought to be stated somewhere, and further, someone
needs to work out how all of this functions with DHCPINFORM requests,
where no leasing info is supplied.

But just assuming that an address is valid when it is returned, and
that that obviates the need for a TTL totally misses the point of the
TTL, which is as a guarantee (promise) of how long into the future the
address will remain valid.   If no TTL were to be included, then the
doc would need to say "for immediate consumption, another DHCP query
must be performed if the address is to be reused more than a second later
than when the first DHCP reply is received".

However, I don't believe this is a good match to the DHCP protocol, or
DHCP servers - where DNS servers expect to be asked the same questions
over and over, DHCP servers typiclaly don't - the protocol generally
expects the clients to go away for hours after a query has been answered.
This manifests itself in many ways - not the least being the habbit of
DHCP servers to log every query received, and every answer sent.

However, perhaps even worse than that is that this option is so IPv4
centric.  I know that DHCPv6 is a different protocol, but it seems to
me that defining new options now, that can't simply be used in both,
is a grave mistake - anything new ought be compatible with both the v4
and v6 versions of DHCP.    Here, as for some obscure reason the address
(uniquely I belive amongst all DHCP options) is being returned as a
dotted quad (ie: in ascii instead of binary), supporting IPv6 would
be fairly easy - just allow it's ascii form to be returned as well.
However the doc explicitly states that the address is a dotted quad.
That means IPv4 only.

More trivially...

        wt: This field is used by the load balancing mechanism.  When
             selecting a target host among those that have the same
             priority, the chance of trying this one first SHOULD be
             proportional to its weight. The range of this number is 1-
             65535. Domain administrators are urged to use Weight 0 when
             there isn't any load balancing to do, to make the option
             easier to read for humans (less noisy).

which just duplicates the language from an old SRV draft - language
which was one of the overhauls before the doc was finished,
not least because it is hard to see how to specify "Weight 0" (as
directed) in a field which has a range of 1-65535.

I would simply drop this option - require use of the DNS, and don't
attempt to pervert the DHCP protocol into becoming an el-cheapo DNS
protocol in disguise.   DHCP will already tell the client the address
of the DNS server to use, sending an extra DNS query cannot realistically
be enough overhead (in code size, or in execution time) to really
matter (and as far as time goes, especially once it is realised that
the DHCP server is often going to have to do the DNS query to get the
information anyway - ie: you cannot assume that the delay won't exist).

Just return the name to be used in the DNS SRV request, and return that
in DNS encoded binary form (ie: an overall length - 1..255 followed
by a series of one or more <length><label> pairs, where each length is
1-63 except the last, which is length 0, with no following label).

It probably wouodn't hurt to include explicit advice as to whether or
not a SRV query is to be attempted, rather than expecting the client
to just do the SRV, and if that fails, do an A (or any address type) query.
Otherise I'd expect that clients will be tempte dto try the A query
first, on the assumption that that is what most users will actually
use, and so avoid the RTT that the SRV query would add.

Of course, the other option would be to mandate the SRV query, and
prohibit doing an address query on the results of this option - actually
require people to use SRV records for this purpose.

kre


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Mar 21 01:07:20 2000
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Message-ID: <38D6E3C1.DFBA7BEE@cs.columbia.edu>
Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2000 21:51:45 -0500
From: Henning Schulzrinne <schulzrinne@cs.columbia.edu>
To: Robert Elz <kre@munnari.OZ.AU>
CC: gnair@ober.cs.columbia.edu, Erik Nordmark <Erik.Nordmark@eng.sun.com>,
        narten@raleigh.ibm.com, namedroppers@internic.net
Subject: Re: SRV records for SIP?
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Thanks for your valuable comments.

Robert Elz wrote:
> 
>     Date:        Mon, 20 Mar 2000 12:28:03 -0800 (PST)
>     From:        Erik Nordmark <Erik.Nordmark@eng.sun.com>
>     Message-ID:  <Roam.SIMC.2.0.6.953584083.22389.nordmark@jurassic>
> 
>   | One of them carry the FQDN to use when asking for SRV records
>   | (which seems a little bit odd - I'd expect a fixed prefix like
>   | _sip._tcp.<something> ??).
> 
> I don't mind that .. if anything building the magic knowledge into
> less places is probably an advantage, the extra few octets that appear
> in the DHCP reply (even given that DHCP packets are, like the DNS, one
> of those places where space is at a premium) shouldn't matter.

Besides the space, there's one reason not to include the protocol
(tcp/udp), in that clients may only speak one, but servers generally
speak both TCP and UDP. This would mean that all advertisements have to
include two strings, but the client really knows which one it needs.
This is probably a minor advantage, so I don't much care one way or the
other.


> 
> However, just like every new place where DNS names are embedded in
> binary protocols, I don't believe that using the ascii form of the
> DNS name benefits anyone - embed the thing using DNS binary form.
> If that's done, then it is certain that a max length of 255 octets
> is sufficient (so the one byte length code works) - in textual form
> that is no longer going to cover all the cases, some sequences need
> extra bytes to act as escapes.   With the (possible) forthcoming use of
> more international domain names, this is likely to become much
> more important (as perhaps will names that come closer to needing
> the full 255 octets than those we typically see today).

I have one concern with the DNS format, namely that it won't allow use
of existing DHCP servers, which only allow strings (or list of IPv4
addresses) as values. We'd have to wait until all the servers support
this format.

My current inclination is to keep things simple by only having something
like

A some.host.domain or 
SRV some.host.domain

(or the equivalent binary version) and drop the SRV replication.
Comments?
-- 
Henning Schulzrinne   http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~hgs


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar 22 16:42:00 2000
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Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 09:39:10 +0200
From: Alexander Krotov <ank@namesurfer.com>
To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: DNSEXT WG agenda at 45'th IETF
Message-ID: <20000322093910.A34425@namesurfer.com>
References: <4.1.20000317160535.06aec8b0@localhost>
In-Reply-To: <4.1.20000317160535.06aec8b0@localhost>; from ogud@tislabs.com on Fri, Mar 17, 2000 at 04:18:40PM -0500
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On Fri, Mar 17, 2000 at 04:18:40PM -0500, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:
> Here is the draft DNSEXT agenda
...

Any ideas about ineroperability testing ?

-- 
Alexander Krotov	gsm: +358 40-725 7216
Product Developer	fax: +358  9-478 1030
NameSurfer Ltd.		http://www.namesurfer.com


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar 22 16:47:37 2000
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Message-Id: <4.1.20000322095037.06aab310@sentry.gw.tislabs.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 10:35:26 -0500
To: DNSEXT WG Mailing list <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
Subject: DNSEXT WGLC Summary: SIG(0)
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The last call period on this document has concluded. 

Only one issue was raised during the WGLC period. Currently the draft 
allows multiple SIG(0)'s to be attached to a message. There where calls
to restrict this to one SIG(0) per message. The consensus of the 
Working group is that SIG(0) MUST be restricted to one. 
The arguments against this restriction where:
1. The client does not know what algorithm the server supports
2. Allow Multiple Inheritance of capabilities to a key generated in    a
TKEY exchange. 

The working group rejects the first one as the client can query the server
for its appropriate key set and use that to select one of clients key to 
sign message. 
About the second argument there was some discussion on if this is a good
idea but because the rules governing how inheritance of capabilities is 
NOT defined yet, the working group consensus is that this is better 
to not address at this time but this issue can be revisited later in
a separate document. 

No other substantial comments where received during the last call. 

Donald please update document to reflect the WG consensus.

It is the sense of the WG that the document is ready for advancement 
and will be forwarded to IESG after update. 

There will be an opportunity to address the WG last call of this 
document in Working Group meeting in Adelaide. 

Olafur



>This is a last call on this document, SIG(0) updates RFC2535 in 
>the definition of transaction signatures. The changes are mostly 
>to make SIG(0) more like TSIG in implementation and result of 
>implementation experience. 
>SIG(0) is required for TKEY exchange when no existing shared secret
>between two DNS entities exist. 

The 


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar 22 16:53:36 2000
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Message-Id: <4.1.20000322102746.00acda30@localhost>
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 10:34:11 -0500
To: DNSEXT WG Mailing list <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
Subject: DNSEXT WGLC Summary: DNS-IANA-00
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The WGLC period has concluded.

No issues where raised during the last call. 
It is the consensus of the working group that the document is ready to be
advanced as BCP. 

There will be opportunity to address this last call in the meeting in Adelaide
and the document will be advanced to the IESG after that. 

        Olafur


>
> This is a second last call on this draft, authors have addressed all the 
> issues raised in the first round. This document has provides general 
> guidance to IANA for DNS related reservations. 
> This is a WG last call ending March 14'th 2000. 
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is: 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-iana-dns-00.txt
> This document is to published as a BCP, if you disagree with that please 
> state your reasons.




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Mar 22 16:56:28 2000
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Message-Id: <4.1.20000322100521.00a68b70@sentry.gw.tislabs.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 10:25:58 -0500
To: DNSEXT WG Mailing list <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@tislabs.com>
Subject: DNSEXT WGLC Summary: TKEY-01
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The WGLC period has concluded: 
Two issues where raised in the last call:
1. Unspecified error case, 
2. The Sporadic Server assignment can be restricted to Delete only. 

The Sporadic Server inclusion of new key was included for GSS-API key 
exchange but the implementors of that algorithm stated that there is no
need for this.

Donald please update document to reflect the WG consensuses.

It is the sense of the WG that the document is ready for advancement 
and will be forwarded to IESG after update as a standards track document.

There will be an opportunity to address the WG last call of this 
document in Working Group meeting in Adelaide.


>
> This is a last call on this document, TKEY defines a DNS protocol 
> mechanism to allow two DNS entities to create a shared secret to be 
> used by TSIG for message authentication. 
> The document defines two mandatory modes to implement and few optional 
> ones. 
> This is a WG last call ending March 20'th 2000. 
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is: 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-tkey-01.txt




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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Mar 27 18:20:02 2000
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Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2000 13:39:40 -0500
To: "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>
From: Edward Lewis <lewis@tislabs.com>
Subject: Re: comments on draft-ietf-dnsext-zone-status-00.txt
Cc: Domain Names WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>, ogud@tislabs.com,
        lewis@tislabs.com
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At 7:39 AM -0500 3/27/00, Donald E. Eastlake 3rd wrote:

First - regarding the importance of a resolver's configuration in the
judgement of whether a zone is perceived to be secure or not:  This
discussion is explicitly off-limits with regard to this document.  See the
penultimate paragraph of the Introduction.

>RFC 2535 specifically provides that being a zone KEY overrides the
>protocol field and thus there is no need to check the protocol field
>for a zone KEY (section 3.1.3) so this should be flagged as a change
>although I don't actually see any reason for this change.  The purpose
>of zone KEYs is to sign DNS data.  The protocol field is intended for
>use in connection with end-entity and user KEYs.

This section will then be marked as updating 2535.

>Seems like you need to make an exception for root.

As there is neither documentation on, nor a BCP de jure for, the method for
securing the root, hence I can't state the exception.  I will defer
addressing this until later.

>I would number the two sentences or put "Or" between them...

I will consider doing that.

>	In RFC 2535, a parent is required to hold a NULL key for an unsigned
>	child (a bone of contention here is how this works in light of
...
>
>As I have said several times before, the first sentence above is
>WRONG, was WRONG, and continues to be WRONG.  There is absolutely no
>problem under RFC 2535 in an insecure child and only that insecure
>child holding the NULL key signed by its parent.

RFC 2535, section 2.3.4, second paragraph, second sentence reads:
# But, in the case of an unsecured subzone which can not or will not be
# modified to add any security RRs, a KEY declaring the subzone to be
# unsecured MUST appear with the superzone signature in the superzone,
# if the superzone is secure.

What does the second sentence or your comment mean?

>	3.2.d. The parent MUST allow the child, through some trusted, probably
>	non-DNS mechanism, to request that the indication of the KEY set in
>	the NXT be turned off.  This allows a child to revert to an unsigned
>	state.
...
>not want to permit the child to become insecure.  Mandating the
>CAPABILITY, however, is quite reasonable.  Should say something like
>"The parent MUST have the capability of allowing the child....".

I'll make a change here.

>	The next issue is the means in which a validation action is reported
>	to the active zone.  On the surface, dynamically updating the NXT
>	would seem to make sense, but updating the NXT in this manner can lead
>	to a race condition in the server, this is unstable.  The issue here
...
>
>Could you say a bit more about the particular race condition you see?

I have labels x,y,z.  x has an A record and wants to add a TXT record.  x
begins with a "NXT y A NXT" entry.  I want this to become "NXT y A TXT
NXT."  While I request this change, it is possible that y is being
eliminated, so the NXT of x should point to z, not y.  The race condition
is what happens to the NXT of x.

>	7 Security Considerations
...
>If the resolver is "misbehaving", aren't all bets off?  With a well
>behaving resolver staticly configured with a good root key, there
>should be no way to dupe it into believing bad data...

Ergo, a misbehaving resolver is a security concern, which is why this is
mentioned here.


-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis                                                NAI Labs
Phone: +1 443-259-2352                      Email: lewis@tislabs.com

"Trying is the first step to failure." - Homer Simpson
"No! Try not. Do... or do not. There is no try." - Yoda
"It takes years of training to know when to do nothing" - Dogbert 1/21/00

Opinions expressed are property of my evil twin, not my employer.




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cc: ogud@tislabs.com, lewis@tislabs.com
Subject: comments on draft-ietf-dnsext-zone-status-00.txt
Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2000 07:39:57 -0500
From: "Donald E. Eastlake 3rd" <dee3@torque.pothole.com>
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A few comments...

	DNSEXT WG                                           Edward Lewis
	INTERNET DRAFT                                      NAI Labs
	Category:I-D                                        Feburary 1, 2000

	           DNS Security Extension Clarification on Zone Status
	                <draft-ietf-dnsext-zone-status-00.txt>

	Status of this Memo

	...

	Abstract

	The definition of a secured zone is presented, updating RFC 2535.  The
	new definition has consequences which alter the interpretation of the
	NXT record, obsolete NULL keys, and the designation of "experimentally
	secure."

	1 Introduction

	Whether a DNS zone is "secured" or not is a question asked in at least
	four contexts.  A zone administrator asks the question when
	configuring a zone to use DNSSEC.  A dynamic update server asks the
	question when an update request arrives, which may require DNSSEC
	processing.  A delegating zone asks the question of a child zone when
	the parent enters data indicating the status the child.  A resolver
	asks the question upon receipt of data belonging to the zone.

This distinction of four points of view is useful and I comment more
on each below.  But I think the last one, whether a particular
resolver in a particular case cares about whether it gets a SIG on
some data, is the most important.

	A zone administrator needs to be able to determine what steps are
	needed to make the zone as secure as it can be.  Realizing that due to
	the distributed nature of DNS and its administration, any single zone
	is at the mercy of other zones when it comes to the appearance of
	security.  This document will define what makes a zone qualify as
	secure (absent interaction with other zones).

Well, zones are always at the mercy of their ancestors (parent,
grandparent, etc.) for those retrieving data from the zone by working
their way down the DNS tree.  Whether a zone appears to be secure to a
particular resolver may also depend on the static key configuration of
and algorithms implemented at that resolver.

	A name server performing dynamic updates needs to know whether a zone
	being updated is to have signatures added to the updated data, NXT
	records applied, and other required processing.  In this case, it is
	conceivable that the name server is configured with the knowledge, but
	being able to determine the status of a zone by examining the data is
	a desirable alternative to configuration parameters.

Given that under "simple dynamic update", which I expect to be
adopted, everything about update has to be explicitly configured in a
proprietary fashion at the primary server, having to configure whether
it needs to do SIG and NXT updates seems pretty trivial.  You have to
staticly configure on line private key(s) for the update in any case
and just doing the SIG and NXT update if there are any private keys
present and not if there aren't (since you can't in that case anyway)
seems adequate.  But I suppose you could look into the zone and see if
the SOA and/or apex KEY RRSET or whatever are signed if you want...

	A delegating zone is required to indicate whether a child zone is
	secured.  The reason for this requirement lies in the way in which a
	resolver makes its own determination about a zone (next paragraph). To
	shorten a long story, a parent needs to know whether a child should be
	considered secured.  This is a two part question, what does a parent
	consider a secure child to be, and how does a parent know if the child
	conforms?

There may be little operational connections between a parent and a
child.  I don't think the standard should impose any obligation on the
parent to actually know what child operations "conform" to.  A secure
parent can only depend on information it has authoritatively received
from the child's management, i.e., KEY(s) to sign, or the like.  Just
how this authoritative communicaiton occures is an interesting
question outside the scope of this document, but parents already have
to authoritatively receive NS information from children.  See further
discussion below.

	A resolver needs to know if a zone is secured when the resolver is
	processing data from the zone.  Ultimately, a resolver needs to know
	whether or not to expect a usable signature covering the data.  How
	this determination is done is out of the scope of this document,
	except that, in some cases, the resolver will need to contact the
	parent of the zone to see if the parent states that the child is
	secured.

	This document updates several sections of RFC 2535.  The definition of
	a secured zone is an update to section 3.4 of the RFC.  The document
	updates section 2.3.4, by specifying a replacement for the NULL zone
	keys.  The document also updates section 3.4 to eliminate the
	definition of experimental keys and illustrate a way to still achieve
	the functionality they were designed to provide.

	2 Status of a Zone

	In this section, rules governing a zone's DNSSEC status are presented.
	There are three levels of security defined; full, private, and
	unsecured.  A zone is fully secure when it complies with the strictest
	set of DNSSEC processing rules.  A zone is privately secured when it
	is configured in such a way that only resolvers that are appropriately
	configured see the zone as secured.  All other zones are unsecured.

It is always true that only resolvers that are appropriately
configured see a zone as secure.  For example, a resolver not staticly
configured with any key must consider all of DNS "inscure" and do resolution
the way it is currently done by security ignorant resolvers.  A resolver
configured only with a static key or keys for, say, co.jp. should look for
signatures there and can determine, from its point of view, whether
data below co.jp. is cryptographically verifiable but all the rest of
the DNS is "insecure" as above (unless, for some bizarre reason, parts
of the rest of DNS are signed by a co.jp key the resolver knows and
the resolvers policies allow such "cross certification").

	Note: there currently is no other document completely defining DNSSEC
	processing rules.  For the purposes of this document, the strictest
	rules are assumed to state that the verification chain of zone keys
	parallels the delegation tree up to the root zone.  This is not
	intended to disallow alternate verification paths, just to establish a
	baseline definition.

	To avoid repetition in the rules below, the following term is defined.

	2.a. Zone signing KEY RR - A KEY RR whose flag field has the value 01
	for name type (indicating a zone key) and either value 00 or value 01
	for key type (indicating a key permitted to authenticate data).  (See
	RFC 2535, section 3.1.2).  The KEY RR also has a protocol octet value
	of DNSSEC (3) or All (255).

RFC 2535 specifically provides that being a zone KEY overrides the
protocol field and thus there is no need to check the protocol field
for a zone KEY (section 3.1.3) so this should be flagged as a change
although I don't actually see any reason for this change.  The purpose
of zone KEYs is to sign DNS data.  The protocol field is intended for
use in connection with end-entity and user KEYs.

	2.1 Fully Secured

I don't like the term "Fully" here.  Sure, zones that use only
mandatory to implement algorithms and are lucky enough to have a
secure parent that will sign their keys are more likely to have
signatures be expected and be checked by a resolver in the general
case.  But it seems odd to call them "fully secure" when it is
possible that, due to static key configuration problems, there are
zero resolves that will end up applying cryptographic checks to their
content.  Similarly, it seems odd to refuse to call a zone "fully
secure" when every resolver that will ever retrieve from it will
expect signatures and try to verify them.  (Example of the later case
would be a zone internal to some company where the algorithm(s) used
in the zone and its zone KEY are staticly configures into all the
resolvers that will ever send queries to that zone.)

	A fully secured zone, in a nutshell, is a zone that uses only
	mandatory to implement algorithms (RFC 2535, section 3.2) and relies
	on a key certification chain that parallels the delegation tree. Fully
	secured zones are defined by the following rules.

	2.1.a. The zone's apex MUST have a KEY RR set.  There MUST be at least
	one zone signing KEY RR (2.a) of a mandatory to implement algorithm in
	the set.

	2.1.b. The zone's apex KEY RR set MUST be signed by a private key
	belonging to the parent zone.  The private key's public companion MUST
	be a zone signing KEY RR (2.a) of a mandatory to implement algorithm
	and owned by the parent's apex.

Seems like you need to make an exception for root.

	If a zone cannot get a conforming signature from the parent zone, the
	child zone cannot be considered fully secured.

	2.1.c. NXT records MUST be deployed throughout the zone. (Updates RFC
	2535, section 2.3.2.)  Note: there is some operational discomfort with
	the current NXT record.  This requirement is open to modification when
	two things happen.  First, an alternate mechanism to the NXT is
	defined and second, a means by which a zone can indicate that it is
	using an alternate method.

That there are problems with NXT has been known for quite a while.
But whenever I bring up the possibility of change there is great
wailing that any changes will "delay deployment"...

	2.1.d. Each RR set that qualifies for zone membership MUST be signed
	by a key that is in the apex's KEY RR set and is a zone signing KEY RR
	(2.a) of a mandatory to implement algorithm.  (Updates 2535, section
	2.3.1.)

	2.2 Privately Secured

	A privately secured zone is a zone that complies with rules like those
	for fully secured, with the following exceptions.  The signing keys
	may be of an algorithm that is not mandatory to implement and/or the
	verification of the zone keys in use may rely on a verification chain
	that is not parallel to the delegation tree.

	2.2.a. The zone's apex MUST have a KEY RR set.  There MUST be at least
	one zone signing KEY RR (2.a) in the set.

	2.2.b. The zone's apex KEY RR set MUST be signed by a private key and
	one of the following two sentences MUST hold true.  The private key's
	public companion MUST be preconfigured in all the resolvers of
	interest.  The private key's public component MUST be a zone signing
	KEY RR (2.a) authorized to provide validation of the zone's apex KEY
	RR set, as recognized by resolvers of interest.

I would number the two sentences or put "Or" between them...

	The previous sentence is trying to convey the notion of using a
	trusted third party to provide validation of keys.  If the domain name
	owning the validating key is not the parent zone, the domain name must
	represent someone the resolver trusts to provide validation.

In general, I would think that the mechanism of such trust would be
via the static configuration of the public key.  That's why section
6.3 of RFC 2535 has optional Rule 3 to allow such limited cross
certification.

	2.2.c. NXT records MUST be deployed throughout the zone. (Updates RFC
	2535, section 2.3.2.) Note: see the discussion following 2.1.c.

	2.2.d. Each RR set that qualifies for zone membership MUST be signed
	by a key that is in the apex's KEY RR set and is a zone signing KEY RR
	(2.a).  (Updates 2535, section 2.3.1.)

	2.3 Unsecured

	All other zones qualify as unsecured.  This includes zones that are
	designed to be experimentally secure, as defined in a later section on
	that topic.

	2.4 Wrap up

	The designation of fully secured, privately secured, and unsecured are
	merely labels to apply to zones, based on their contents.  Resolvers,
	when determining whether a signature is expected or not, will only see
	a zone as secured or unsecured.

I think better terms would be "generally signed" and "specially
signed".  If .com is signed with a mandatory to implement algorithm
but root isn't signed at all and the public key for .com is widely
distributed and staticly configured in zillions of browsers, does it
make sense to say that .com is only "privately" secure?

	Resolvers that follow the most restrictive DNSSEC verification rules
	will only see fully secured zones as secured, and all others as
	unsecured, including zones which are privately secured.  Resolvers
	which are not as restrictive, such as those that implement algorithms
	in addition to the mandatory to implement algorithms, will see some
	privately secured zones as secured.

I hope few browsers follow the first sentence in the paragraph above.
For them, and assuming a change so that root can be "fully secured"
without having a parent, it would require everything from root down to
a zone for a resolver as you describe to consider that zone as secure.
But I believe that resolvers should consider any zone for which they
have staticly configured zone KEY(s) to be secure and to expect
signatures from them and check those signatures, even if the zone is,
say, dma.isg.mot.com and none of its ancesotrs are signed.

	The intent of the labels "fully" and "privately" is to identify the
	specific attributes of a zone.  The words are chosen to assist in the
	writing of a document recommending the actions a zone administrator
	take in making use of the DNS security extensions.  The words are
	explicitly not intended to convey a state of compliance with DNS
	security standards.

I think the terms "generally signed" and "specially signed" would be
better to describe these two types of zones.

	3 Parental Notification

	For a resolver to come to a definitive answer concerning a zone's
	security status, there is a requirement that the parent of a zone
	signify whether the child zone is signed or not.  The justification of
	this requirement requires a discussion of the resolver's activity,
	which is described in RFC 2535.

Note exception for root.  I think the better way to look at it is that
any zone for which a resolver has one or more zone KEY RR(s) staticly
configures is secure from the point of view of that resolver.  In
determining whether the descendents of such a zone are secure, the
resolver, naturally, would only want to depend on data which it had
cryptographically verified.

	In RFC 2535, a parent is required to hold a NULL key for an unsigned
	child (a bone of contention here is how this works in light of
	multiple algorithms).  The parent has the option to hold the keys of
	the child if the child is signed. The parent may also hold nothing
	cryptographic if the child is signed.  This, of course, assumes the
	parent is a signed zone.

As I have said several times before, the first sentence above is
WRONG, was WRONG, and continues to be WRONG.  There is absolutely no
problem under RFC 2535 in an insecure child and only that insecure
child holding the NULL key signed by its parent.

There is some special language in RFC 2535 about this because of the
following problem: I expect that initially only a small subset of
zones will be signed.  And the administrators of unsigned zones will
not all be with it enough to get and insert a parent signed NULL key
in their zone.  If there isn't an indication of their security
somewhere, a resolver who is treating their parent as secure must, in
effect, deny access to this child (unless a request specifies that
checking is disabled).  If it knew the child was secure, via one or
more parent signed non-NULL zone keys for the child, it would be
expecting and checking for signatures in the child zone.  If it knew
that the child was insecure, due to a parent signed NULL key under RFC
2535, no matter where it found that parent signed NULL key, it would
know to just do traditional DNS resolution and not look for or try to
validate signatures in the zone.  If it can't find either indication,
it's stuck.  Note, in particular, that an adversary could have blocked
the transmission to the resolver of a parent signed non-NULL key so it
is unsafe to assume the child is insecure.

If DNS was being started from scratch with security, you could
reasonably expcect children to know they should be serving up security
status information about themselves.  But even assuming a much
stronger effort to deploy DNSSEC than I have seen, it will be years
before it would be reasonable to assume the cooperation of all
children.

In order to avoid denial of service to clueless children, RFC 2535
says parents MUST SUPPORT a NULL for an insecure child to be served
from them but it does NOT REQUIRE such a NULL to be served by the
parent if the child is willing to do it.  Let me repeat, RFC 2535 says
parents MUST SUPPORT a NULL for an insecure child to be served from
then but it does NOT REQUIRE that such a NULL be so server.  I am not
sue why I have been having such extraordinary difficulty getting this
point through.

	There is a strong case for discouraging a parent from holding keys of
	a signed child.  These include concrete concerns about performance and
	more abstract concerns about the liability of the parent.

Sure, it generally works better for the keys with parent signature to
be served from the child.  In the case of bloatzones like .com, it may
be impractical to serve them all from the parent.  But there isn't any
significant liability problem with the parent serving signed child
keys.  There are plenty of potential liability problems with being a
parent.  These probably increase when the parent signs the keys.
Before signing, the liability was just for the data being dynamically
served which can be corrected very quickly and in centralized.  At
least the primary is the most important, secondaries are also quite
important, but they the time you get to various caches floating around
out there, you usually don't have any clear way to prove the data came
from the authentic server. The more layers the data has gone through,
the fuzzier responsibilty is.  Signed data is very different.  No
matter whether retrieved directly from the primary or from a secondary
or from a child or from a random cache or even if found printed out on
a scrap of paper in the gutter somewhere, the server signature imposes
much clearer and more directly traceable responsibilty back to that
server which does not become fuzzier no matter how many times the data
is copied or passed around.  It is not significant whether the parent
serves the KEY and SIG itself.  Its repsonsibility and traceability
comes from the signature, not from serving the data to the world.
There is no significant liability effect from the parents decision as
to whether it will server up signed child keys.

	DNS [RFC 1034 and 1035] requires a parent to hold NS records for a
	child zone, this signifies the delegation.  RFC 2535 requires a
	secured parent to also have signed NXT records for the child, and
	possibly a signed KEY RR set (required for NULL key situations).

Being able to authenticatably deny the existence of a name using NXT
requires an NXT for every name in the zone, including the names of
children.  RFC 2535 does NOT require that the parent hold a signed
NULL key for insecure children.  It does require that a parent by able
to hold such a key in the case of cluelessly administered children to
avoid denial of DNS service to such clueless children by secure DNS
resolvers.  See remarks above concerning this.

	By redefining the security status of a zone to be per zone and not per
	algorithm, there is an opportunity to completely remove the need for a
	KEY RR set in the parent.  Because the question of whether the zone is
	secure or not is a yes-or-no question, the notification needs just one
	bit to be expressed.

As I said in previous mail, I think the change from per algorithm to
per zone security status is a good thing.  Of course "secure" depends
on your point of view.  A parent considering a zone "secure" if it has
signed keys for it is reasonable.  But a security aware resolver that
does not implement any of the algorithm(s) with which the zone is
signed should consider it insecure and do traditional non-secure
resolution in it.

	Keep in mind that the following sections speak to the contents of a
	zone, not a name server.  In the case of a name server speaking
	authoritatively for both the parent and child, or if a server caches
	the information for the other half of the delegation, then a server
	will have more types of data at a delegation point than a parent is
	supposed to hold.  (E.g., if a parent zone's name server caches the
	SOA for the child, the SOA is not in the parent zone, but is in the
	server's cache.)

	3.1 Child Is Secured Bit

	This section is written assuming the current definition of NXT holds. 
	There is some controversy surrounding the NXT record which may result
	in a complete replacement of it for proof of non-existence.  The
	current NXT definition provides an extension bit in the types present
	bit map, whose use is remains incompletely defined.  The following
	text largely ignores these uncertainties, and should be rewritten to
	accommodate these uncertainties in revisions.

Here is exaclty what RFC 2535 says about the first bit in the type
bit map in its RDATA:
*  "The first bit represents RR type zero (an illegal type which
*  can not be present) and so will be zero in this format.  This format
*  is not used if there exists an RR with a type number greater than
*  127.  If the zero bit of the type bit map is a one, it indicates that
*  a different format is being used which will always be the case if a
*  type number greater than 127 is present."
However, no other format has actually been specified.

	In the parent's half of the delegation point, there will be an NXT
	record.  According to the rules for a delegation point, only the NS,
	NXT, and SIG bits will be turned on in the types present field,
	assuming we drop the KEY set altogether.

	The KEY bit in the parent's NXT types present bit map is hereby
	redefined to have the following meaning.

	If the bit corresponding to the KEY RR set in a parent NXT is set, the
	parent has signed a KEY RR set for the child that includes a zone
	signing KEY RR (2.a).  Furthermore, the validity period on the SIG
	(KEY) RR covers the current time and the public component of the key
	used to generate the SIG (KEY) RR is validly available from the
	parent.

This is a very interesting idea.  Even though the only case where a
child zone KEY RR really needed to be in the parent was the insecure
AND cluelessly administered child case, using a bit in the parent NXT
makes things even more compact for the parent.  And I don't see
anything wrong with the part about the parent SIG public key being
available.

	E.g., Assume the zone "test." signs a key for "zone1.test.," with the
	signature valid from May 1st to June 1st and a public key from "test."
	available from April 1st until July 1st.  The NXT record for
	"zone1.test." will have the KEY RR bit set from May 1st to June 1st.
	This constraint may be enforced in the SIG (NXT) RR validity period,
	timely editing of the master file, or whatever other mechanism "test."
	chooses to implement.

	Conversely, if the bit is 0, then the child is not secured.  Note that
	for a fully secured zone (section 2.1), the bit is on (1).  For all
	unsecured zones (section 2.3) the bit is off (0).  For privately
	secured zones (section 2.2), the setting of the bit is determined by
	whether the parent signs the child's keys or not.  Hence, for
	privately secured zones, the parent may have no responsibility.  A
	child wishing to have the parent set the bit must contact the parent.

I suppose it doesn't really have much effect here but I think it is
important to retain the ability to set up local versions of root or
lower zones and the like.

	3.2 Rules Governing the Bit

	In this section, the words of the previous are turned into definitive
	MUST and SHOULDs.  Note that this section does not refer to the bit in
	the NXT.  This is in anticipation of a change in the way NXT indicates
	types present (e.g., if bit 0 of the field is defined) or a successor
	to the NXT is defined.

	3.2.a. At a delegation point, a parent zone MUST have a mechanism in
	place to indicate which RR sets are present.  The mechanism MUST
	indicate that the NS, SIG, and the type(s) corresponding to the
	mechanism itself are present (of course, with these types actually
	being present).  With the exception of the KEY RR type, all other
	types MUST be indicated as not present, and, in accordance with
	delegation rules, actually be absent from the zone.  If, in the
	future, other data is permitted to be present at a delegation point,
	this requirement MUST be amended.

"Actually absent form the zone" seems exessive. It shouldn't hurt if
miscellaneous other RR types happen to be at the server due to caching
or serving up the child so I don't see how having them in the zone
would cause any problem, at least with security.

	Assuming the NXT record, the above requirement reads as follows.  At a
	delegation point, a parent zone must have a secured NXT record.  This
	NXT record must indicate that the NS, SIG, and NXT types are present.
	With the exception of KEY, all other types must be indicated as not
	present.  The lower casing of the word "must" is intentional,
	conveying that this is an explanation of the rule above.

	3.2.b. The KEY set MUST be indicated as present during the time when
	the parent has issued a signature for the child's KEY set. Conversely,
	during periods of time in which the parent knows it has not generated
	a signature for the KEY RR set, the KEY set MUST be indicated to be
	absent.

	If the parent has issued signatures with discontinuous validity spans,
	then the presence of the KEY set will flip from present to not present
	and back as time progresses.

This seems like a pain but I can't think of any alternative right now.

	If the parent is aware that the child's keys are becoming valid or
	will be becoming invalid at a certain point in time, it is recommended
	that this be reflected in the NXT's signature validity period.

	3.2.c. When signing a child's KEY RR set, a parent SHOULD carefully
	consider the algorithm of the key used to generate the signature.  The
	parent SHOULD make clear to child zones what steps are to be taken to
	get the parent to indicate that the child is signed.  This document
	will go no further in specifying operational considerations.

	(Let's say the parent signs the child's key set with an algorithm the
	child can't process.  The child could elect not to advertise this
	signature as it cannot verify that the signature covers the real key
	set.  If this happens, is the parent justified in claiming that the
	child is secured?)

It's not worth worrying much about this.  In protocol terms, the
parent is in charge.  If the parent indicates a child is signed and
the signed zone KEY of the child is not available from the DNS, then
for secure resovlers descending through that parent, there is no
service for that child.  That is, they know its signed but they can
never get the public key to veryify any SIGs they might get form it.
So they know verified SIGs are required but, if they get SIGs, they
can never verify them, so they can not provide data in response to any
request that does not have Checking Disabled inicated.

If the parent thinks the child should be avertising some parent signed
child zone key, either because the child requested the parent to sign
it or the parent directed the child to do so, the parent should
indicate the child as secured.  There will be all sorts of
relationships between parent and child, from children being branches
of a parent company and subject to its orders to arms length
commercial relationships where the child has purchased DNS service
from the parent.

	3.2.d. The parent MUST allow the child, through some trusted, probably
	non-DNS mechanism, to request that the indication of the KEY set in
	the NXT be turned off.  This allows a child to revert to an unsigned
	state.

If the child is a branch of company X and the parent is the home
office, there is no need to mandate this behaviour.  If the parent has
real world authority over the child (like the child is a branch of a
company and the parent is the company headquarters), the parent may
not want to permit the child to become insecure.  Mandating the
CAPABILITY, however, is quite reasonable.  Should say something like
"The parent MUST have the capability of allowing the child....".

	3.2.e. The parent SHOULD NOT allow the child to request that the KEY
	set be indicated in the absence of a key signing request.

Reasonable.

	3.3 Operational Considerations

	Retrieving the NXT for a delegated name from the parent zone (the
	upper NXT) is not a trivial operation.  The complication arises due to
	having an NXT in the delegatee (the lower NXT) that matches the owner
	name of the upper NXT.  (The case in which both the parent and child
	zones are secured is the only case mentioned here.  If both are not
	secured, then there will be at most one NXT, which is easily
	retrieved.)

	There are two complications to describe.  One involves the multiple
	NXT sets matching the same owner.  The other is the pragmatic issue of
	knowing where to get the answer.

	With multiple NXT sets at the same owner, caches may become a problem.
	If a (for example) recursive server has cached the lower NXT, any
	query for the upper NXT may be confused for a lower NXT query.  This
	is akin to the issue of the ANY query, where a server with some cached
	data will answer with just that and not seek the rest of the data.

This topic has been brought up before.  I thought implementors had
indicated that it was "trivial" to tell the lower and upper NXTs
apart, based on either the type bit map, or on the relationship
between the owner name and the next name field.  The cleanest solution
to this would be to add a new RR type, perhaps called APEX, exactly
the same as NXT except for RR type number.  Then you use APEX at zone
apexes and NXT everywhere else and these difficulties are
substantially reduced.  But, of course, that is a change.  On the
other hand, if there were a consensus to change NXT for other reasons,
perhaps this could be rolled into that change.

	A resolver may know the child's server's addresses and the parent zone
	may not be sharing servers with the child.  In this case the resolver
	will need to be able to locate the parent zones (possibly having to go
	to the root servers and descend) in order to obtain the upper NXT
	record.

	A potential solution to this is to define an NXT meta-query which will
	force a recursive server to find all available NXT RR sets for a given
	name.  Details of this have not been examined.

	3.4 Interaction with Dynamic Update

	Dynamic update [RFC 2136, draft-ietf-dnsext-simple-secure-update-
	xy.txt] defines a means by which a zone can change without undergoing
	a full reload.  This combination of dynamic update and the proposed
	use of the NXT record to signify a child's status raises some
	concerns.

	First a few elements need to be labeled.  There is an off-line signer,
	which is the process that signs zone data files away from the name
	server.  There is an on-line signer, part of a name server, that the
	dynamic update mechanism uses to sign the updated data.  Finally,
	there is an on-line key validator, perhaps a misnomer, which accepts
	requests for parent signatures over each child zone's keys.

If you have on line signing capability, then doing the main zone
signing off line doesn't add much security and you could really do it
all on line.

	The proposal depicted in this draft relies upon the on-line key
	validator informing the on-line and off-line signers of the status of
	a child, recall that the status of a child has a temporal element. 
	E.g., a signature may be generated for just the month of July, so the
	child is secured for the month of July, but not August.

	The first issues pertain to the way in which a validation is encoded
	in an NXT record by the off-line signer.  There is a need for the
	status information to flow from the on-line validator to the off-line
	signer and then be used as input to the signing process.  The way that
	this information makes the transition is an issue.  The second issue
	is through what mechanism is this information ingested into the NXT
	generating process.  Recall that all other information can be derived
	by the zone data, the status of the child isn't stored anywhere else
	in the parent zone.

	The next issue is the means in which a validation action is reported
	to the active zone.  On the surface, dynamically updating the NXT
	would seem to make sense, but updating the NXT in this manner can lead
	to a race condition in the server, this is unstable.  The issue here
	is deriving a mechanism by which a name server knows to signify that
	the child status has changed.  Note that this applies to newly
	validated keys as well as the granting of a child's request to cancel
	a validation.

Given the loosly synchronized nature of DNS and such possibilities as
a multi-level zone splitting off children or a child and parent
combining, I feel virtually certain that there are plenty of race
conditions out there.  But how much of a problem are they in reality?
Could you say a bit more about the particular race condition you see?

	The final issue is the operation of the off-line signer.  When an NXT
	is being regenerated, the old NXT is needed to see what the previous
	setting of the child's status had been.  The old NXT signature is also
	needed to know that, had the child been known to be secured, for what
	interval was is it thought to be secured so that the new NXT signature
	is appropriately set.  Of course, if the reason for updating the NXT
	is a change as described in the previous paragraph, the old NXT is of
	lesser value.

Well, the information is needed, but that doesn't need to be back
derived from an actual NXT RR.  Seems to me that all this calls for an
auxiliary table.

	The issue raised in the last paragraph leads to a questioning of the
	sanity of using signature validity periods to signify the temporal
	status of data in a server.  What does a server return if the NXT
	needed is not currently covered by a valid signature?

Due to data caching, etc., seems like you have to encode the validity
interval in the RR data.  There are all kinds of ways that the data
could be screwed up.  The part of the server actually answering
queries should just do the best it can with the data available to it.
If NXTs or SIGs or whatever are missing from the on line zone, it is a
problem with the software that should be generating those RRs or
perhaps an operational problem...

	4 NULL keys

	Through the use of the types present to indicate the existence of a
	signature validating the KEY set of a child, the need for NULL keys
	effectively disappears.  NULL keys are left as a defined entity, but
	are rendered meaningless in DNSSEC.

	5 Experimental Status

	Without NULL keys, an experimentally secured zone cannot be defined as
	it is in RFC 2535.  The purpose of an experimentally secured zone was
	to facilitate the migration from an unsecured zone to a secured zone.

	The objective of facilitating the migration can be achieved without a
	special designation of an experimentally secure status. Experimentally
	secured is a special case of privately secured.  A zone administrator
	can achieve this by publishing a zone with signatures and configuring
	a set of test resolvers with the corresponding public keys.  Even if
	the public key is published in a KEY RR, as long as there is no parent
	signature, the resolvers will need some preconfiguration to know to
	process the signatures.  This allows a zone to be secured with in the
	sphere of the experiment, yet still be registered as unsecured in the
	general Internet.

Well, this doesn't quite do what "Experimental" does.  The current
Experimental is such that you can set up everything for a zone exactly
as if it were secure and then add a NULL KEY (per algorithm according
to RFC 2535 but per zone is better).  That means that you have to seek
SIGs and check them if you get them but if the server you are querying
is claiming there aren't any SIGs, that's OK.

	6 IANA/ICANN Considerations

	This document does not request any action from an assigned number
	authority nor recommends any actions.

	7 Security Considerations

	Without a means to enforce compliance with specified protocols or
	recommended actions, declaring a DNS zone to be "completely" secured
	is impossible.  Even if, assuming an omnipotent view of DNS, one can
	declare a zone to be properly configured for security, and all of the
	zones up to the root too, a misbehaving resolver could be duped into
	believing bad data.

If the resolver is "misbehaving", aren't all bets off?  With a well
behaving resolver staticly configured with a good root key, there
should be no way to dupe it into believing bad data...

	                     If a zone and resolver comply, a non-compliant or
	subverted parent could interrupt operations.  The best that can be
	hoped for is that all parties are prepared to be judged secure and
	that security incidents can be traced to the cause in short order.

	8 Acknowledgements

	The need to refine the definition of a secured zone has become
	apparent through the efforts of the participants at two DNSSEC
	workshops, sponsored by the NIC-SE (.se registrar) and CAIRN (a
	DARPA-funded research network).  Further discussions leading to the
	document include Olafur Gudmundsson, Russ Mundy, Robert Watson, and
	Brian Wellington.

	9 References

	...

	10 Author Information

	Edward Lewis NAI Labs 3060 Washington Road Glenwood, MD 21738 +1 443
	259 2352 <lewis@tislabs.com>

	11 Full Copyright Statement

	...

Hope these comments are helpful,
Donald

=====================================================================
 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd                      dee3@torque.pothole.com
 65 Shindegan Hill Road, RR#1                     +1 914-276-2668(h)
 Carmel, NY 10512 USA                             +1 508-261-5434(w)


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To: DNSEXT WG Mailing list <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
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Anyone that has or is implementing EDNS0 please contact me with your
experience and/or status of implementation/deployment

	Olafur

PS: this is in order to evaluate the pain of revising the specification 


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