Subject: [eap] Proposed Resolution to Issue 316: Counter Length

From: "Bernard Aboba" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 08 Jan 2006 10:32:59 -0800

The text of Issue 316 is available here:
http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/EAP/eapissues3.html#Issue%20316

The Proposed Resolution is as follows:

The proposed resolution is as follows:

In Section 5.8, change:

"Lower Layer
    The lower layer Secure Association Protocol MUST generate a fresh
    session key for each session, even if the keying material and
    parameters provided by EAP methods are cached, or the peer or
    authenticator lacks a high entropy random number generator.  A
    RECOMMENDED method is for the peer and authenticator to each
    provide a nonce or counter of at least 128 bits, used in session
    key derivation. "

To:

"Lower Layer
The lower layer Secure Association Protocol MUST generate a fresh
session key for each session, even if the keying material and
parameters provided by EAP methods are cached, or the peer or
authenticator lack a high entropy random number generator. A
RECOMMENDED method is for the peer and authenticator to each
provide a nonce or counter used in session key derivation.
If a nonce is used, it is RECOMMENDED that it be at least 128 bits."

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From: Jari Arkko <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2006 12:24:01 +0200

Ok.