Subject: [Ecrit] Re: [Geopriv] RE: Strawman Proposal

From: Haberler Michael <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2007 07:24:40 +0100

Am 14.03.2007 um 00:29 schrieb Dawson, Martin:
>
> Secondly, one of the things that emergency services don't concern
> themselves with in responding to callers is whether you really are the
> individual they claim to be. Anonymous emergency calling via public
> payphones, SIMless mobiles, and any other point a caller can lay their
> hands on a device is an accepted feature of the service.

just noting SIMless 911 seems to be not universally accepted -

Switzerland explicitely denies SIMless emergency calls

in Austria recommended procedure for mountaineers is to remove the  
SIM before the hike to get better coverage for 140 (mountain rescue)

downside of this is - Vienna police gets a surge of SIMless 112 calls  
every saturday as stolen mobiles are tested for functionality on the  
flea markets by calling 112

more relevant (possibly to ECRIT towards PSAP contact publishing  
requirements) is - Switzerland publishes *routing numbers* as PSAP  
destinations which are meaningful only in a national interconnect  
scenario

-Michael

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---

From: "Raymond Forbes \(CV/ETL\)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2007 09:44:52 +0100

We have had similar discussion in ETSI many Times, I can confirm that
Currently, Two Countries mandate by law that SIM-less Emergency Calls
Shall be allowed. In Germany these calls are still traceable though the
Mobile may not be uniquely identifiable, as a dummy CLI is allocated to
the call, the actual Mobile Equipment may also be traced as the IMEI may
be sent over the air. In Austria I am not aware of the solution.

In the UK, Eire, Switzerland, and increasingly in other EU countries;
SIM-Less Emergency Calls are forbidden as the Mobile traceability is
mandated by law. In a number of countries like France and Portugal that
did allow SIM-less Emergency calls though not by mandate the laws and
systems now (or soon will) forbid them. The reason for this change is
that the Emergency services were flooded with Anonymous calls from
second hand traders of Mobile handsets. 

Regards,

Ray Forbes
Ericsson Limited
BU Networks (CV/ETL/BBC/D)
Telephone: +44 (0) 24 7656 3106
Mobile: +44 (0) 771 851 1361
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-----Original Message-----
From: Haberler Michael [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: 14 March 2007 06:25
To: Dawson, Martin
Cc: GEOPRIV WG; [email-masked]
Subject: [Ecrit] Re: [Geopriv] RE: Strawman Proposal

in Austria recommended procedure for mountaineers is to remove the SIM
before the hike to get better coverage for 140 (mountain rescue)

-Michael

---

From: Hannes Tschofenig <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2007 09:55:03 +0100

Hi Raymond,

one issue that is quite important to me is whether regulators will demand

* "unauthenticated network access" for emergency calls
This means that an emergency caller can attach to a network even though 
it does not have credentials for this network. For example, someone 
might just use Ericsson enterprise network (or my private WLAN DSL home 
network) for an emergency call.

* authenticated (but unauthorized) emergency calls where some form of 
authentication of the emergency caller needs to take place.

None of these two aspect directly correspond the concept of SIMless 
emergency calls since the credentials for the two mechanisms are 
typically different.
So, it remains open what it means to have SIM-less emergency calls on 
the Internet, from a technical and from a regulatory side. It might well 
be that the trend for a more restrictive user identification makes the 
entire subject irrelevant.

Ciao
Hannes

---

From: "Raymond Forbes \(CV/ETL\)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2007 10:21:17 +0100

Hannes,

Currently By analogy with the GSM Regulation, The German and Austrian
Regulators Demand Unauthenticated access on Publicly Licensed networks.
The Private Corporate Networks (CSP IP access; in the IP context) are
not subject to this regulation. 

This will be confusing to the IETF as they do not differentiate between
CSP networks and ISP networks. In their relationship with 3GPP the IETF
considered 3GPP network as Private Enterprise networks. Some Private
Enterprise Networks are nationally Licensed to Sell services to the
Public (T-Mobil-D1 or Vodafone-D2), and subject to regulation [they must
provide unauthenticated access, but authorise its use with IMEIs and
Dummy CLIs; analogous to P_Asserted_Identies in Validated in Proxies],
others Only provide corporate access (Siemens or Ericsson) and have a
closed community and less or no regulation in this context).

Germany and Austria are the only countries that mandate Unauthenticated
Access you may be closer to what their governments are thinking about IP
access

In Other Countries the regulation may be exactly the Opposite un UK,
Eire, Private Enterprise Networks are nationally Licensed to Sell
services to the Public (T-Mobile-UK or Vodafone-UK), and subject to
regulation they must forbid unauthenticated access.

You do not need to consider the case of Corporate CSP access, But
Publicly Incensed Enterprise Networks.

In All cases calls have to be authorised calls to allow traceability.

I am not sure that this helps except to say the technology need to
provide all cases, except unauthorised.

Currently the only Authentication Provide on VoIP Emergency calls is to
the ISP/CSP access using Radius or IPSec.

Regards,

Ray Forbes
Ericsson Limited

-----Original Message-----
From: Hannes Tschofenig [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: 14 March 2007 08:55
To: Raymond Forbes (CV/ETL)
Cc: Dawson, Martin; GEOPRIV WG; [email-masked]
Subject: Re: [Ecrit] Re: [Geopriv] RE: Strawman Proposal

Hi Raymond,

one issue that is quite important to me is whether regulators will
demand

* "unauthenticated network access" for emergency calls This means that
an emergency caller can attach to a network even though it does not have
credentials for this network. For example, someone might just use
Ericsson enterprise network (or my private WLAN DSL home
network) for an emergency call.

Ciao
Hannes

---

From: Henning Schulzrinne <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2007 08:28:42 -0400

> second hand traders of Mobile handsets.

I don't know what kind of location conveyance is used there (the  
equivalent of Phase II wireless seems less common in Europe), but it  
is pretty clear that reliable location delivery would help very  
little. It would be interesting to see where most of today's crank  
calls are coming from; if they are from pay phones on strip malls,  
location reporting isn't exactly going to help with that problem, as  
the location information for these is not in doubt.

I agree with Hannes that we need an overall threat model, not just a  
threat model for conveying location. After all, I suspect that NENA  
and PSAP don't really care whether bogus calls are prevented by some  
fancy crypto math or some truth inducer in handsets that makes it  
impossible for callers to lie when dialing 911.

Like I said before, I'm not opposed to investigating the role of  
signing location information, but I believe that it is being oversold.

Henning

---

From: Otmar Lendl <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2007 17:46:35 +0100

[Unrelated to ecrit/geopriv, but I'm curious.]

> second hand traders of Mobile handsets. 

If these anonymous test calls are reason for disabling a possible
life-saving feature (emergency calls from SIM-less phones), why didn't
the regulator instead force carriers to implement a simple test-number
which could be used by those second hand traders without bothering PSAPs?

It's not like these traders _want_ to harrass the PSAPs.

/ol
-- 
< Otmar Lendl ([email-masked]) | nic.at Systems Engineer >