Subject: Re: [Emu] A review Re: [Nea] I-D Action:draft-ietf-nea-pt-eap-02.txt

From: "Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2012 22:24:36 +0000

Hi Joe and Sam,

I've updated the PT-EAP draft to -03 version and included a new paragraph
in section 3.4 to read:

Note that tls-unique, as opposed to invoking a mutual cryptographic
   binding, is used as there is no keying material being generated by
   PT-EAP (the method is defined to facilitate the transport of posture
   data and is not an authentication method).  However, the NEA Client
   may host an EMA which can be used as the means to cryptographically
   bind the tls-unique content that may be validated by the Posture
   Validator interfacing with the EAP Server.  The binding of the
tls-unique to the client authentication prevents the client's message
   from being used in another context.  This prevents a poorly
   configured client from unintentionally compromising the NEA system.
   Strong mutual authentication of the NEA server and client is still
   REQUIRED to prevent the disclosure of possibly sensitive NEA client
   information to attacker.

To address the comments below.  Can you please review the updated draft
and let me know if that is sufficient?

Thanks, Nancy.

On 6/7/12 6:02 AM, "Sam Hartman" <[email-masked]> wrote:

>>>>>> "Joe" == Joe Salowey <[email-masked]> writes:
>
>    Joe> So, is your concern with using only MSK crypto binding with an
>inner EAP authentication method used to authenticate an
>unauthenticated/poorly authenticated tunnel or is it more specific to the
>nea-pt-eap method?
>    Joe> For the first concern it may be sufficient to discuss the issue
>in the security considerations.
>
>Sounds good to me and that is my concern.
>
>I see no reason EAP-PT needs more text than what we did for the cb
>draft.
>_______________________________________________
>Emu mailing list
>[email-masked]
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu