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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 15:04:08 -0400
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To: endymail <endymail@ietf.org>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>, IETF OpenPGP <openpgp@ietf.org>, IETF SMIME <smime@ietf.org>
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Subject: [Endymail] Proposal to use Proxy Re-Encryption in a messaging protocol
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NB: Please direct followups to endymail@ietf.org alone


The draft is at:

https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-mesh-recrypt-00.txt


At the last IETF, I made a presentation on the use of Proxy Re-Encryption
'recryption' at the CFRG session=. I think that this is a very powerful
technique that solves some real problems we are facing today that were
probably not as apparent when it was first proposed.

In particular, recryption allows end-to-end security to be preserved in
situations where it would normally be lost. For example in a mailing list
application or in a situation where Alice needs to read her email on
multiple devices, some of which might be mobile devices that could get
lost. Recryption also provides the ideal basis for Confidential Document
Control which is an access control system that uses data level encryption,

One slight holdup here is that there is a patent encumbrance that purports
to claim the use of recyption for DRM applications but this will expire
shortly, certainly before any project could get off the ground.


I have written an Internet draft showing how Recryption might be
implemented as a 'clean slate' protocol. Since we don't have anything like
a CDC application yet (Plasma maybe), this is going to be a requirement for
some situations. I am thinking we should probably try to build something
and work out how to get that running before working out how best to fit
these capabilities to S/MIME, OpenPGP, Jabber, etc.

Contrary to my usual practice, there is no code so far, well no
implementation code.I will be filling that in once I finish a few things
ahead of this in the queue, specifically using the Mesh to manage SSH keys.


The one technical holdup I see here is that if we are going to get people
to use it, usability can't be 'OK' or 'not bad'. The only way to get a new
crypto system off the ground is to design something that delivers usability
that is iPhone level perfect. I think that the Mesh makes that possible of
course but I will probably have to prove that with some demos. Which is why
I want to get the Mesh to manage SSH keys.

--001a114d38227e3edd053aadb633
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">NB:=
 Please direct followups to <a href=3D"mailto:endymail@ietf.org">endymail@i=
etf.org</a> alone</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:smal=
l"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">The draft is at:<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D""><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/id/draft=
-hallambaker-mesh-recrypt-00.txt">https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker=
-mesh-recrypt-00.txt</a><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:sma=
ll"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">At the=
 last IETF, I made a presentation on the use of Proxy Re-Encryption &#39;re=
cryption&#39; at the CFRG session=3D. I think that this is a very powerful =
technique that solves some real problems we are facing today that were prob=
ably not as apparent when it was first proposed.</div><div class=3D"gmail_d=
efault" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" st=
yle=3D"font-size:small">In particular, recryption allows end-to-end securit=
y to be preserved in situations where it would normally be lost. For exampl=
e in a mailing list application or in a situation where Alice needs to read=
 her email on multiple devices, some of which might be mobile devices that =
could get lost. Recryption also provides the ideal basis for Confidential D=
ocument Control which is an access control system that uses data level encr=
yption,</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></d=
iv><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">One slight holdup=
 here is that there is a patent encumbrance that purports to claim the use =
of recyption for DRM applications but this will expire shortly, certainly b=
efore any project could get off the ground.</div><div class=3D"gmail_defaul=
t" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-s=
ize:small">I have written an Internet draft showing how Recryption might be=
 implemented as a &#39;clean slate&#39; protocol. Since we don&#39;t have a=
nything like a CDC application yet (Plasma maybe), this is going to be a re=
quirement for some situations. I am thinking we should probably try to buil=
d something and work out how to get that running before working out how bes=
t to fit these capabilities to S/MIME, OpenPGP, Jabber, etc.</div><div clas=
s=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail=
_default" style=3D"font-size:small">Contrary to my usual practice, there is=
 no code so far, well no implementation code.I will be filling that in once=
 I finish a few things ahead of this in the queue, specifically using the M=
esh to manage SSH keys.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-siz=
e:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">The one tec=
hnical holdup I see here is that if we are going to get people to use it, u=
sability can&#39;t be &#39;OK&#39; or &#39;not bad&#39;. The only way to ge=
t a new crypto system off the ground is to design something that delivers u=
sability that is iPhone level perfect. I think that the Mesh makes that pos=
sible of course but I will probably have to prove that with some demos. Whi=
ch is why I want to get the Mesh to manage SSH keys.</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default=
" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D=
"font-size:small"><br></div></div>

--001a114d38227e3edd053aadb633--


From nobody Mon Aug 22 19:48:59 2016
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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 19:48:33 -0700
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To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
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Cc: messaging <messaging@moderncrypto.org>, endymail@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Endymail] [messaging] Mesh/Recrypt
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On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 4:48 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.co=
m
> wrote:

> =E2=80=8BI suggested followups to the endymail@ietf.org mailing list rath=
er than
> CFRG though.
>

Ok, CC'd! That said, here's a followup:

I was kind of confused why you cite RFC7748, but then go on to explain
things in terms of classical Diffie-Hellman.

As far as an ECC-based approach goes, I think something like the multiparty
Signal protocol[1] is a good starting point for how to solve the general
problem, and, as far as I can tell, addresses most of the concerns you
cited as a motivation.

The specific approach you detailed could be adapted to ECC as well.

[1] I'm not sure there's a more recent overview than this, which is
probably out-of-date: https://whispersystems.org/blog/private-groups/

--=20
Tony Arcieri

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On M=
on, Aug 22, 2016 at 4:48 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:phill@hallambaker.com" target=3D"_blank">phill@hallambaker.c=
om</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-size:small">=E2=80=8BI suggested fol=
lowups to the <a href=3D"mailto:endymail@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">endyma=
il@ietf.org</a> mailing list rather than CFRG though.<br></div></div></bloc=
kquote><div><br></div><div>Ok, CC&#39;d! That said, here&#39;s a followup:<=
/div><div><br></div><div>I was kind of confused why you cite=C2=A0<span sty=
le=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap">RFC7748, but then go on to exp=
lain things in terms of classical Diffie-Hellman.</span></div><div><span st=
yle=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap"><br></span></div><div><span s=
tyle=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap">As far as an ECC-based appro=
ach goes, I think something like the multiparty Signal protocol[1] is a goo=
d starting point for how to solve the general problem, and, as far as I can=
 tell, addresses most of the concerns you cited as a motivation.</span></di=
v><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap"><br></span></d=
iv><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap">The specific =
approach you detailed could be adapted to ECC as well.</span></div></div><d=
iv><br></div><div>[1] I&#39;m not sure there&#39;s a more recent overview t=
han this, which is probably out-of-date:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://whispersys=
tems.org/blog/private-groups/">https://whispersystems.org/blog/private-grou=
ps/</a></div><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smar=
tmail=3D"gmail_signature">Tony Arcieri<br></div>
</div></div>

--001a1142e55094afe1053ab4349f--


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Subject: Re: [Endymail] [messaging] Mesh/Recrypt
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On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 10:48 PM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 4:48 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <
> phill@hallambaker.com> wrote:
>
>> =E2=80=8BI suggested followups to the endymail@ietf.org mailing list rat=
her than
>> CFRG though.
>>
>
> Ok, CC'd! That said, here's a followup:
>
> I was kind of confused why you cite RFC7748, but then go on to explain
> things in terms of classical Diffie-Hellman.
>

=E2=80=8BA limitation in my development environment=E2=80=8B. I have classi=
cal DH and NIST
curves. But I don't have the new curves or the abilty to do the EC math
outside the crypto library so I can't to the recryption at the mo.


As far as an ECC-based approach goes, I think something like the multiparty
> Signal protocol[1] is a good starting point for how to solve the general
> problem, and, as far as I can tell, addresses most of the concerns you
> cited as a motivation.
>
> The specific approach you detailed could be adapted to ECC as well.
>
> [1] I'm not sure there's a more recent overview than this, which is
> probably out-of-date: https://whispersystems.org/blog/private-groups/
>
>
=E2=80=8BThe math is very similar and they can probably adapt very easily. =
The
difference is that their problem statement is for synchronous communication
with all the parties present for the key exchange. Recryption allows the
asynchronous case to be supported as well.

The CDC problem is essentially the problem of how do I mark a document with
a security label in a way that the administrator of the security label can
grant access to a new reader by adding them to the label.

I will read up on that though, thanks!=E2=80=8B

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br=
></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Au=
g 22, 2016 at 10:48 PM, Tony Arcieri <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:bascule@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">bascule@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wro=
te:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_=
extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><span class=3D"">On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at =
4:48 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:phill=
@hallambaker.com" target=3D"_blank">phill@hallambaker.com</a>&gt;</span> wr=
ote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div style=3D"font-size:small">=E2=80=8BI suggested followups to the <a hre=
f=3D"mailto:endymail@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">endymail@ietf.org</a> mail=
ing list rather than CFRG though.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></di=
v></span><div>Ok, CC&#39;d! That said, here&#39;s a followup:</div><div><br=
></div><div>I was kind of confused why you cite=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:r=
gb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap">RFC7748, but then go on to explain things i=
n terms of classical Diffie-Hellman.</span></div></div></div></div></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:sm=
all">=E2=80=8BA limitation in my development environment=E2=80=8B. I have c=
lassical DH and NIST curves. But I don&#39;t have the new curves or the abi=
lty to do the EC math outside the crypto library so I can&#39;t to the recr=
yption at the mo.</div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1=
ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap">As far as an ECC=
-based approach goes, I think something like the multiparty Signal protocol=
[1] is a good starting point for how to solve the general problem, and, as =
far as I can tell, addresses most of the concerns you cited as a motivation=
.</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap"><b=
r></span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap">T=
he specific approach you detailed could be adapted to ECC as well.</span></=
div></div><div><br></div><div>[1] I&#39;m not sure there&#39;s a more recen=
t overview than this, which is probably out-of-date:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https:=
//whispersystems.org/blog/private-groups/" target=3D"_blank">https://<wbr>w=
hispersystems.org/blog/<wbr>private-groups/</a></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"=
><font color=3D"#888888"><div><br></div></font></span></div></div></blockqu=
ote><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:sma=
ll">=E2=80=8BThe math is very similar and they can probably adapt very easi=
ly. The difference is that their problem statement is for synchronous commu=
nication with all the parties present for the key exchange. Recryption allo=
ws the asynchronous case to be supported as well.</div><div class=3D"gmail_=
default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" s=
tyle=3D"font-size:small">The CDC problem is essentially the problem of how =
do I mark a document with a security label in a way that the administrator =
of the security label can grant access to a new reader by adding them to th=
e label.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">I will read up o=
n that though, thanks!=E2=80=8B</div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div></div></div=
></div>

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Subject: Re: [Endymail] [messaging] Mesh/Recrypt
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On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 07:48:33PM -0700, Tony Arcieri wrote:
>As far as an ECC-based approach goes, I think something like the multiparty
>Signal protocol[1] is a good starting point for how to solve the general

[snip]

>[1] I'm not sure there's a more recent overview than this, which is
>probably out-of-date: https://whispersystems.org/blog/private-groups/

Based on a bit of experimenting with the various language 
implementations of libsignal, I'm pretty sure Signal group messages 
don't do the encrypt-to-each-recipient thing anymore.  But I haven't 
tried to interoperate with or even study the mainline client, so it's 
possible I'm missing something.

-andy

