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Thread-Topic: IESG review of NAT traversal draft and encrypted parameters
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From: Miika Komu <miika.komu@ericsson.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
CC: "hipsec@ietf.org" <hipsec@ietf.org>, Gonzalo Camarillo <gonzalo.camarillo@ericsson.com>, "hip-chairs@ietf.org" <hip-chairs@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-hip-native-nat-traversal@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-hip-native-nat-traversal@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-hip-native-nat-traversal-28: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Subject: Re: [Hipsec] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-hip-native-nat-traversal-28: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 11:37:03 -0800
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Cc: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, hipsec@ietf.org,  Gonzalo Camarillo <gonzalo.camarillo@ericsson.com>, draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis@ietf.org, hip-chairs@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Hipsec] Eric Rescorla's No Objection on draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-19: (with COMMENT)
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On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 12:07 PM Miika Komu <mkomu@kapsi.fi> wrote:

> Hi Eric,
>
> On 5/7/18 00:41, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > Eric Rescorla has entered the following ballot position for
> > draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-19: No Objection
> >
> > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
> > introductory paragraph, however.)
> >
> >
> > Please refer to
> https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> >
> >
> > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis/
> >
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > COMMENT:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Rich version of this review at:
> > https://mozphab-ietf.devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D3709
> >
> >
> > Maybe I'm missing something important, but I don't see in this
> > document how you go from a HI (or HIT) to the corresponding IP
> > locator. That seems pretty critical to making this work. Can you point
> > me in the right direction?
>
> (I interpret "right" direction here as how to implement this in
> practice; please let me know if you were asking for something else)
>
> Existing applications can utilize LSIs or HITs, for instance, via
> /etc/hosts in Linux or if the developer/user uses them directly.
> Mappings can be configured manually. A better way is to use ,e.g., DNS
> to store the FQDN, HIs, IP address mappings:
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8005
>
> An application can receive LSIs or HITs from DNS queries when a HI
> record exists for a host. This can be implemented  in the local resolver
> library (e.g. glibc in Linux) supports it and sends the HI-to-IP address
> mapping to the local HIP daemon. As an alternative implementation
> technique, dynamic relinking of applications (i.e., LD_PRELOAD in Linux):
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6538#section-4.1
>
> As yet another alternative, RFC5338 (section 3.2) suggests interposing
> HIP-aware agents (think about HIP-capable DNS proxy like "dnsmasq" in
> Linux) that translate HIs into LSIs and HITs to the application and
> cache the IP address mapping to the HIP daemon:
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5338#section-3.2
>
> That's all for existing applications. New HIP native applications could
> use DNS library extensions for getaddrinfo() that would be implemented
> e.g. in glibc in Linux:
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6317
>
> All of the mentioned references are mentioned in the draft. Should I add
> something more compressed along these lines of text or is this too
> detailed?
>

Maybe I'm missing something, but it seems like this is not an interoperable
state of affairs.


> IMPORTANT
> > S 11.3.1.
> >>       avoiding manual configurations.  The three components are further
> >>       described in the HIP experiment report [RFC6538].
> >>
> >>       Based on the interviews, Levae et al suggest further directions to
> >>       facilitate HIP deployment.  Transitioning the HIP specifications
> to
> >>       the standards track may help, but other measures could be taken.
> As
> >
> > This confuses me, because we seem to be looking to advance some of the
> > HIP specs (e.g., hip-dex) at PS
>
> Can you elaborate? And do you mean protocol stack by PS?
>

Proposed Standard.



> > COMMENTS
> > S 3.1.
> >>          were obtained.  For 64 bits, this number is roughly 4
> billion.  A
> >>          hash size of 64 bits may be too small to avoid collisions in a
> >>          large population; for example, there is a 1% chance of
> collision
> >>          in a population of 640M.  For 100 bits (or more), we would not
> >>          expect a collision until approximately 2**50 (1 quadrillion)
> >>          hashes were generated.
> >
> > It's not just a matter of collisions being hard, but also of being
> > difficult to produce an HI with a given name.
>
> ...where name would be the hash (i.e. HIT). So I added:
>
> Besides accidental collisions, it is also worth noting that intentional
> collisions are difficult to accomplish because generating a valid,
> colliding hash along with its private-public key is computationally
> challenging.
>
> Did I capture your thinking correctly?
>

Well, this isn't a collision; it's what's called a preimage. I.e.,
computing a public
key with a given HIT. Anyway, as far as I can tell, in HIP being able to
compute
a preimage for HIT Y = H(K_X) is equivalent to breaking key K_X, so that
means
that that function must have reasonable strength. 2^64 is nowhere near
enough and the typical expected security level of IETF protocols is 2^128,
so that means that the full width of the IPv6 address has to be used.



> S 4.
> >>       'well known', some unpublished or 'anonymous'.  A system may self-
> >>       assert its own identity, or may use a third-party authenticator
> like
> >>       DNSSEC [RFC2535], PGP, or X.509 to 'notarize' the identity
> assertion
> >>       to another namespace.  It is expected that the Host Identifiers
> will
> >>       initially be authenticated with DNSSEC and that all
> implementations
> >>       will support DNSSEC as a minimal baseline.
> >
> > This wasn't a very good assumption when 4423 was published, and it
> > seems even worse now, given the low rate of deployment of DNSSEC and
> > the fact that we know many middleboxes break DNSSEC.
>
> Then I guess it would be fine to remove the last sentence?
>


Yes, I think that would be good to do.


> > S 4.3.
> >>       packet.  Consequently, a HIT should be unique in the whole IP
> >>       universe as long as it is being used.  In the extremely rare case
> of
> >>       a single HIT mapping to more than one Host Identity, the Host
> >>       Identifiers (public keys) will make the final difference.  If
> there
> >>       is more than one public key for a given node, the HIT acts as a
> hint
> >>       for the correct public key to use.
> >
> > How do you handle second-preimage attacks on the hash?
>
> I guess you are referring to this:
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7343#section-5
>
> (Please let me know if an explicit reference is needed)
>

No, I'm referring to the point I raised above.



> > S 5.1.
> >>       At the server side, utilizing DNS is a better alternative than a
> >>       shared Host Identity to implement load balancing.  A single FQDN
> >>       entry can be configured to refer to multiple Host Identities.
> Each
> >>       of the FQDN entries can be associated with the related locators,
> or a
> >>       single shared locator in the case the servers are using the same
> HIP
> >>       rendezvous server Section 6.3 or HIP relay server Section 6.4.
> >
> > This is becoming a less common practice. How do you handle anycast,
> > which is the modern practice?
>
> I added the following statement:
>
> "It is also worth noting that opportunistic mode is also required
>
>
> in practice when anycast IP addresses would be utilized as locators:"
>
> Does this address your concern?
>
> Btw, opportunistic mode is further described in the following documents:
>

I'm not following how this solves the problem. It seems like you're still
going to get
badly suboptimal routing.

-Ekr


> Existing apps:
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6538#section-2.3.2
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5338#section-3.2
>
> HIP native apps:
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6317#section-4.1.1
>
> > S 7.
> >>
> >>       The encapsulation format for the data plane used for carrying the
> >>       application-layer traffic can be dynamically negotiated during the
> >>       key exchange.  For instance, HICCUPS extensions [RFC6078] define
> one
> >>       way to transport application-layer datagrams directly over the HIP
> >>       control plane, protected by asymmetric key cryptography.  Also,
> S-RTP
> >
> > Nit: SRTP, no hyphen
>
> Thanks, fixed!
>

--0000000000002711c2057b31e2d6
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue=
, Nov 20, 2018 at 12:07 PM Miika Komu &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mkomu@kapsi.fi"=
>mkomu@kapsi.fi</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi E=
ric,<br>
<br>
On 5/7/18 00:41, Eric Rescorla wrote:<br>
&gt; Eric Rescorla has entered the following ballot position for<br>
&gt; draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-19: No Objection<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all<=
br>
&gt; email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut thi=
s<br>
&gt; introductory paragraph, however.)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Please refer to <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss=
-criteria.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/i=
esg/statement/discuss-criteria.html</a><br>
&gt; for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:<br=
>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis=
/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/dr=
aft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis/</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; ----------------------------------------------------------------------=
<br>
&gt; COMMENT:<br>
&gt; ----------------------------------------------------------------------=
<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Rich version of this review at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://mozphab-ietf.devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D3709" rel=3D"nor=
eferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://mozphab-ietf.devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D3709<=
/a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Maybe I&#39;m missing something important, but I don&#39;t see in this=
<br>
&gt; document how you go from a HI (or HIT) to the corresponding IP<br>
&gt; locator. That seems pretty critical to making this work. Can you point=
<br>
&gt; me in the right direction?<br>
<br>
(I interpret &quot;right&quot; direction here as how to implement this in <=
br>
practice; please let me know if you were asking for something else)<br>
<br>
Existing applications can utilize LSIs or HITs, for instance, via <br>
/etc/hosts in Linux or if the developer/user uses them directly. <br>
Mappings can be configured manually. A better way is to use ,e.g., DNS <br>
to store the FQDN, HIs, IP address mappings:<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8005" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8005</a><br>
<br>
An application can receive LSIs or HITs from DNS queries when a HI <br>
record exists for a host. This can be implemented=C2=A0 in the local resolv=
er <br>
library (e.g. glibc in Linux) supports it and sends the HI-to-IP address <b=
r>
mapping to the local HIP daemon. As an alternative implementation <br>
technique, dynamic relinking of applications (i.e., LD_PRELOAD in Linux):<b=
r>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6538#section-4.1" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6538#section-4.1</a><b=
r>
<br>
As yet another alternative, RFC5338 (section 3.2) suggests interposing <br>
HIP-aware agents (think about HIP-capable DNS proxy like &quot;dnsmasq&quot=
; in <br>
Linux) that translate HIs into LSIs and HITs to the application and <br>
cache the IP address mapping to the HIP daemon:<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5338#section-3.2" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5338#section-3.2</a><b=
r>
<br>
That&#39;s all for existing applications. New HIP native applications could=
 <br>
use DNS library extensions for getaddrinfo() that would be implemented <br>
e.g. in glibc in Linux:<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6317" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6317</a><br>
<br>
All of the mentioned references are mentioned in the draft. Should I add <b=
r>
something more compressed along these lines of text or is this too detailed=
?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Maybe I&#39;m missing something, but =
it seems like this is not an interoperable state of affairs.</div><div><br>=
</div><div> <br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0=
 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
&gt; IMPORTANT<br>
&gt; S 11.3.1.<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0avoiding manual configurations.=C2=A0 Th=
e three components are further<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0described in the HIP experiment report [=
RFC6538].<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 <br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Based on the interviews, Levae et al sug=
gest further directions to<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0facilitate HIP deployment.=C2=A0 Transit=
ioning the HIP specifications to<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the standards track may help, but other =
measures could be taken.=C2=A0 As<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This confuses me, because we seem to be looking to advance some of the=
<br>
&gt; HIP specs (e.g., hip-dex) at PS<br>
<br>
Can you elaborate? And do you mean protocol stack by PS?<br></blockquote><d=
iv><br></div><div>Proposed Standard.</div><div> <br></div><div>=C2=A0</div>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
&gt; COMMENTS<br>
&gt; S 3.1.<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 were obtained.=C2=A0 For 64 bits=
, this number is roughly 4 billion.=C2=A0 A<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 hash size of 64 bits may be too =
small to avoid collisions in a<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 large population; for example, t=
here is a 1% chance of collision<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 in a population of 640M.=C2=A0 F=
or 100 bits (or more), we would not<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 expect a collision until approxi=
mately 2**50 (1 quadrillion)<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 hashes were generated.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; It&#39;s not just a matter of collisions being hard, but also of being=
<br>
&gt; difficult to produce an HI with a given name.<br>
<br>
...where name would be the hash (i.e. HIT). So I added:<br>
<br>
Besides accidental collisions, it is also worth noting that intentional <br=
>
collisions are difficult to accomplish because generating a valid, <br>
colliding hash along with its private-public key is computationally <br>
challenging.<br>
<br>
Did I capture your thinking correctly?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>=
Well, this isn&#39;t a collision; it&#39;s what&#39;s called a preimage. I.=
e., computing a public</div><div>key with a given HIT. Anyway, as far as I =
can tell, in HIP being able to compute</div><div>a preimage for HIT Y =3D H=
(K_X) is equivalent to breaking key K_X, so that means</div><div>that that =
function must have reasonable strength. 2^64 is nowhere near</div><div>enou=
gh and the typical expected security level of IETF protocols is 2^128,</div=
><div>so that means that the full width of the IPv6 address has to be used.=
</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-lef=
t:1ex">
&gt; S 4.<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&#39;well known&#39;, some unpublished o=
r &#39;anonymous&#39;.=C2=A0 A system may self-<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0assert its own identity, or may use a th=
ird-party authenticator like<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0DNSSEC [RFC2535], PGP, or X.509 to &#39;=
notarize&#39; the identity assertion<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0to another namespace.=C2=A0 It is expect=
ed that the Host Identifiers will<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0initially be authenticated with DNSSEC a=
nd that all implementations<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0will support DNSSEC as a minimal baselin=
e.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This wasn&#39;t a very good assumption when 4423 was published, and it=
<br>
&gt; seems even worse now, given the low rate of deployment of DNSSEC and<b=
r>
&gt; the fact that we know many middleboxes break DNSSEC.<br>
<br>
Then I guess it would be fine to remove the last sentence?<br></blockquote>=
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Yes, I think that would be good to do.</=
div><div> <br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0=
 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt; S 4.3.<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0packet.=C2=A0 Consequently, a HIT should=
 be unique in the whole IP<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0universe as long as it is being used.=C2=
=A0 In the extremely rare case of<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0a single HIT mapping to more than one Ho=
st Identity, the Host<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Identifiers (public keys) will make the =
final difference.=C2=A0 If there<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0is more than one public key for a given =
node, the HIT acts as a hint<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0for the correct public key to use.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; How do you handle second-preimage attacks on the hash?<br>
<br>
I guess you are referring to this:<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7343#section-5" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7343#section-5</a><br>
<br>
(Please let me know if an explicit reference is needed)<br></blockquote><di=
v><br></div><div>No, I&#39;m referring to the point I raised above.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
&gt; S 5.1.<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0At the server side, utilizing DNS is a b=
etter alternative than a<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0shared Host Identity to implement load b=
alancing.=C2=A0 A single FQDN<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0entry can be configured to refer to mult=
iple Host Identities.=C2=A0 Each<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0of the FQDN entries can be associated wi=
th the related locators, or a<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0single shared locator in the case the se=
rvers are using the same HIP<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0rendezvous server Section 6.3 or HIP rel=
ay server Section 6.4.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This is becoming a less common practice. How do you handle anycast,<br=
>
&gt; which is the modern practice?<br>
<br>
I added the following statement:<br>
<br>
&quot;It is also worth noting that opportunistic mode is also required <br>
<br>
<br>
in practice when anycast IP addresses would be utilized as locators:&quot;<=
br>
<br>
Does this address your concern?<br>
<br>
Btw, opportunistic mode is further described in the following documents:<br=
></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m not following how this solves the=
 problem. It seems like you&#39;re still going to get</div><div>badly subop=
timal routing.</div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Existing apps:<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6538#section-2.3.2" rel=3D"norefe=
rrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6538#section-2.3.2</=
a><br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5338#section-3.2" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5338#section-3.2</a><b=
r>
<br>
HIP native apps:<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6317#section-4.1.1" rel=3D"norefe=
rrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6317#section-4.1.1</=
a><br>
<br>
&gt; S 7.<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 <br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0The encapsulation format for the data pl=
ane used for carrying the<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0application-layer traffic can be dynamic=
ally negotiated during the<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0key exchange.=C2=A0 For instance, HICCUP=
S extensions [RFC6078] define one<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0way to transport application-layer datag=
rams directly over the HIP<br>
&gt;&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0control plane, protected by asymmetric k=
ey cryptography.=C2=A0 Also, S-RTP<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Nit: SRTP, no hyphen<br>
<br>
Thanks, fixed!<br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--0000000000002711c2057b31e2d6--


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From: Miika Komu <mkomu@kapsi.fi>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Hipsec] Eric Rescorla's No Objection on draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-19: (with COMMENT)
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Hi Eric,

On 5/7/18 00:41, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> Eric Rescorla has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-19: No Objection
> 
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
> 
> 
> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> 
> 
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis/
> 
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Rich version of this review at:
> https://mozphab-ietf.devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D3709
> 
> 
> Maybe I'm missing something important, but I don't see in this
> document how you go from a HI (or HIT) to the corresponding IP
> locator. That seems pretty critical to making this work. Can you point
> me in the right direction?

(I interpret "right" direction here as how to implement this in 
practice; please let me know if you were asking for something else)

Existing applications can utilize LSIs or HITs, for instance, via 
/etc/hosts in Linux or if the developer/user uses them directly. 
Mappings can be configured manually. A better way is to use ,e.g., DNS 
to store the FQDN, HIs, IP address mappings:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8005

An application can receive LSIs or HITs from DNS queries when a HI 
record exists for a host. This can be implemented  in the local resolver 
library (e.g. glibc in Linux) supports it and sends the HI-to-IP address 
mapping to the local HIP daemon. As an alternative implementation 
technique, dynamic relinking of applications (i.e., LD_PRELOAD in Linux):

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6538#section-4.1

As yet another alternative, RFC5338 (section 3.2) suggests interposing 
HIP-aware agents (think about HIP-capable DNS proxy like "dnsmasq" in 
Linux) that translate HIs into LSIs and HITs to the application and 
cache the IP address mapping to the HIP daemon:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5338#section-3.2

That's all for existing applications. New HIP native applications could 
use DNS library extensions for getaddrinfo() that would be implemented 
e.g. in glibc in Linux:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6317

All of the mentioned references are mentioned in the draft. Should I add 
something more compressed along these lines of text or is this too detailed?

> IMPORTANT
> S 11.3.1.
>>       avoiding manual configurations.  The three components are further
>>       described in the HIP experiment report [RFC6538].
>>    
>>       Based on the interviews, Levae et al suggest further directions to
>>       facilitate HIP deployment.  Transitioning the HIP specifications to
>>       the standards track may help, but other measures could be taken.  As
> 
> This confuses me, because we seem to be looking to advance some of the
> HIP specs (e.g., hip-dex) at PS

Can you elaborate? And do you mean protocol stack by PS?

(This text is based on the subjective opinions of the interviewed 
people. So I don't think it matters so much)

> COMMENTS
> S 3.1.
>>          were obtained.  For 64 bits, this number is roughly 4 billion.  A
>>          hash size of 64 bits may be too small to avoid collisions in a
>>          large population; for example, there is a 1% chance of collision
>>          in a population of 640M.  For 100 bits (or more), we would not
>>          expect a collision until approximately 2**50 (1 quadrillion)
>>          hashes were generated.
> 
> It's not just a matter of collisions being hard, but also of being
> difficult to produce an HI with a given name.

...where name would be the hash (i.e. HIT). So I added:

Besides accidental collisions, it is also worth noting that intentional 
collisions are difficult to accomplish because generating a valid, 
colliding hash along with its private-public key is computationally 
challenging.

Did I capture your thinking correctly?

> S 4.
>>       'well known', some unpublished or 'anonymous'.  A system may self-
>>       assert its own identity, or may use a third-party authenticator like
>>       DNSSEC [RFC2535], PGP, or X.509 to 'notarize' the identity assertion
>>       to another namespace.  It is expected that the Host Identifiers will
>>       initially be authenticated with DNSSEC and that all implementations
>>       will support DNSSEC as a minimal baseline.
> 
> This wasn't a very good assumption when 4423 was published, and it
> seems even worse now, given the low rate of deployment of DNSSEC and
> the fact that we know many middleboxes break DNSSEC.

Then I guess it would be fine to remove the last sentence?

> S 4.3.
>>       packet.  Consequently, a HIT should be unique in the whole IP
>>       universe as long as it is being used.  In the extremely rare case of
>>       a single HIT mapping to more than one Host Identity, the Host
>>       Identifiers (public keys) will make the final difference.  If there
>>       is more than one public key for a given node, the HIT acts as a hint
>>       for the correct public key to use.
> 
> How do you handle second-preimage attacks on the hash?

I guess you are referring to this:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7343#section-5

(Please let me know if an explicit reference is needed)

> S 5.1.
>>       At the server side, utilizing DNS is a better alternative than a
>>       shared Host Identity to implement load balancing.  A single FQDN
>>       entry can be configured to refer to multiple Host Identities.  Each
>>       of the FQDN entries can be associated with the related locators, or a
>>       single shared locator in the case the servers are using the same HIP
>>       rendezvous server Section 6.3 or HIP relay server Section 6.4.
> 
> This is becoming a less common practice. How do you handle anycast,
> which is the modern practice?

I added the following statement:

"It is also worth noting that opportunistic mode is also required 
 

in practice when anycast IP addresses would be utilized as locators:"

Does this address your concern?

Btw, opportunistic mode is further described in the following documents:

Existing apps:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6538#section-2.3.2
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5338#section-3.2

HIP native apps:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6317#section-4.1.1

> S 7.
>>    
>>       The encapsulation format for the data plane used for carrying the
>>       application-layer traffic can be dynamically negotiated during the
>>       key exchange.  For instance, HICCUPS extensions [RFC6078] define one
>>       way to transport application-layer datagrams directly over the HIP
>>       control plane, protected by asymmetric key cryptography.  Also, S-RTP
> 
> Nit: SRTP, no hyphen

Thanks, fixed!

