And last but not least, Case three DDoS.

DDOS attacks =

Are Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks a legitimate f= orm of online protest protected by the right to freedom of speech and assoc= iation? Can they be seen as the equivalent to =E2=80=98million-(wo)men marc= hes=E2=80=99, or sit-ins? Or are they a threat to freedom of expression and= access to information, by limiting access to websites and in certain cases= the freedom of speech of others? These questions are crucial in our day an= d age, where political debates, civil disobedience and other forms of activ= ism are increasingly moving online.

Many individuals, not excluding= IETF engineers, have argued that DDoS attacks are fundamentally against fr= eedom of speech. Technically DDoS attacks are when multiple computers overl= oad the bandwidth or resources of a website (or other system) by flooding i= t with traffic, causing it to temporarily stop being available to users. In= their 2010 report Zuckerman et al argue that DDoS attacks are a bad thing = because they are increasingly used by governments to attack and silence cri= tics. Their research demonstrates that in many countries independent media = outlets and human rights organizations are the victim of DDoS attacks, whic= h are directly or indirectly linked to their governments. These types of at= tacks are particularly complicated because attribution is difficult, creati= ng a situation in which governments can effectively censor content, while b= eing able to deny involvement in the attacks (Zuckerman et al 2010). DDoS a= ttacks can thus stifle freedom of expression, complicate independent media = and human rights organizations to exercise their right to online freedom of= association, while facilitating the ability of governments to censor disse= nt.=C2=A0

In addition, DDoS attacks are increasingly used as an ext= ortion tactic, with criminals flooding a website =E2=80=93 rendering it ina= ccessible =E2=80=93 until the owner pays them a certain amount of money to = stop the attack. The costs of mitigating such attacks, either by improving = security to prevent them or paying off the attackers, ends up being paid by= the consumer. All of these issues seem to suggest that the IETF should try= to ensure that their protocols cannot be used for DDoS attacks. Decreasing= the number of vulnerabilities in the network stacks of routers or computer= s, reducing flaws in HTTPS implementations, and depreciating non-secure HTT= P protocols could address this issue. The IETF can clearly play a role in b= ringing about some of these changes, and has indicated in RFC 7258 its comm= itment to mitigating =E2=80=98pervasive monitoring (=E2=80=A6) in the desig= n of IETF protocols, where possible.=E2=80=99 This means the use of encrypt= ion should become standard. Effectively, for the web this means standard us= e of HTTPS. The IETF could redirect its work such that HTPPS becomes part-a= nd-parcel of its standards. However, next to the various technical trade-of= fs that this might lead to it is important to consider that DDoS attacks ar= e also fundamentally a method for exercising freedom of speech.

DDo= S although disruptive, and silencing at times, can also enable as protest a= nd speech. Or as Sauter (2014) argues: =E2=80=98though DDoS as a tactic is = still relatively novel, it fits within a centuries- long tradition of break= ing laws and disrupting business as usual to make a political point. These = actions aren=E2=80=99t simply disruption for disruption=E2=80=99s sake. Rat= her they serve to help the activist or dissenter to direct the attention of= the public through the interpolation of difference into routine.=E2=80=99 = (30-31). An often heard argument against DDoS attacks is that you cannot co= nstrue it as a means to exercise your right to freedom of speech, when the = means used effectively impede the right of the party on the receiving end o= f the attack to exercise that same right.

The problem with this lin= e of argumentation is that it conveniently ignores the fact that online DDo= S attacks are often the only effective way for activists to gain the attent= ion of the media, the government or other parties of interest. Simply putti= ng up a website for a cause won=E2=80=99t garner the same amount of attenti= on as directly confronting the issue via the website of the individual or o= rganization at the heart of the issue. The ability of activists to do so sh= ould be protected, especially considering the fact that as Sauter (2014:4) = explains: =E2=80=98Collectively, we have allowed the construction of an ent= ire public sphere, the Internet, which by accidents of evolution and design= , has none of the inherent free speech guarantees we have come to expect. D= issenting voices are pushed out of the paths of potential audiences, effect= ively removing them from the public discourse. There is nowhere online for = an activist to stand with her friends and her sign. She might set up a dedi= cated blog=E2=80=94which may or may not ever be read=E2=80=94but it is much= harder for her to stand collectively with others against a corporate giant= in the online space.=E2=80=99 Although the Internet is often compared to p= ublic space, it is not. Rather the opposite. The Internet is almost entirel= y owned by private entities. Or as Sauter (2014:35) states: =E2=80=98It is = the nature of the online environment itself that has made disruptive tactic= s such as activist DDoS actions increasingly necessary.=E2=80=99 If there i= s no true public space online, the individuals managing the Internet archit= ecture should allow for DDoS attacks to happen, when they are part of a leg= itimate freedom of speech campaigns.

The question of how the IETF s= hould respond to this is two-fold: first, it would require developing a met= hod to establish when a DDoS attack is a legitimate expression of the right= to freedom of speech, or whether it impedes on it. Second, it asks the IET= F to reflect upon its role in creating a commercialized Internet that has n= o defacto public space of inherent protections for freedom of speech. One o= f the founding fathers of the Internet, David Clark, recently published a p= aper warning that the future of the Internet is in danger. He argues that t= he private sector control over the Internet is too strong, limiting the myr= iad of ways in which it can be used (Daedalus 2016), including for freedom = of speech. As such, it is important for the IETF to consider the fact that = DDoS attacks are inherently dual-use and not take immediate sides on this d= iscussion.

Literature referenced:

Bray, T., 2= 012. ID 2616 A New HTTP Status Code for Legally-restricted Resources draft-= tbray-http-legally-restricted-status-00. Retrieved on May 1, 2015, from https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tbray-http-legally-restricted-sta= tus-00.

Clark, D., 2015. The Contingent Internet. Daedalus W= inter 2016, Vol. 145, No. 1: 9=E2=80=9317. Retrieved on January 1, 2016 fro= m http://www.m= itpressjournals.org/toc/daed/current.

Sauter, M., 2014. The Comi= ng Swarm. London: Bloomsbury.

Walfish, M., Stribling, J., Krohn,= M., Balakrishnan, H., Morris, R., & Shenker, S. 2004. Middleboxes No L= onger Considered Harmful. Retrieved on May 24, 2015, from http://nms.csail.mit.edu/doa

Zuckerm= an, E., et al. 2010. Report on Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks= . Retrieved on January 1, 2016 from https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/2010= _DDoS_Attacks_Human_Rights_and_Media.pdf.

--001a11c1b76e38998e0529b6462b-- From nobody Tue Jan 19 13:26:34 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5870B1B366A for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 13:26:33 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.698 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.698 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, MANGLED_WOMEN=2.3, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id m_rdy85g0Mm1 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 13:26:30 -0800 (PST) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CFFAA1B366B for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 13:26:29 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id B9D25BE97; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:26:27 +0000 (GMT) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FdTAQX6oyfId; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:26:24 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [10.87.48.91] (unknown [86.46.20.159]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5DBBDBE9F; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:26:24 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1453238784; bh=C/i7zaIxLUtzFAJZcUDlrMuGTjp3pB8cwP/sVSAp6Ss=; h=Subject:To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=lNVqEEWtyEnBjd3GhNCU9fmWQPsxeGUg45IvpI1AeftlMJ0dn1bgOn+WVTYPFJPAa hLwC3wHnnyppg+xnOA6p63Fx6fxW3HD99W+OEG/N24crEENFPIsBn1f/J2MHkxRbG3 BnBJTAsBcSpMbZSOgnXR6H8aS0Ti6wSaXr/r9mdo= To: Corinne Cath , hrpc@irtf.org References: From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=D66EA7906F0B897FB2E97D582F3C8736805F8DA2; url= Message-ID: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:26:21 +0000 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:26:33 -0000 Hmm. Can you give some examples of when a DDoS has only involved willing participants/"protesters" and a target? AFAIK, for almost all (as in 99.9ish%) cases of DDoS, the clients are likely hacked computers belonging to unrelated parties and nothing to do with those who want to protest nor with those who are the target of the protest. Doesn't that mean that the million-person march analogy is busted? For a march to be a good analogy for a DDoS, the million people would be being press-ganged into marching and would not be choosing to march. Seems to me that DDoS as a method of protest is just a not a useful concept. (I can imagine methods of protest that use the Internet, but I can't see it being useful to call any of those a DDoS.) S. On 19/01/16 21:08, Corinne Cath wrote: > And last but not least, Case three DDoS. > > > *DDOS attacks * > > Are Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks a legitimate form of > online protest protected by the right to freedom of speech and association? > Can they be seen as the equivalent to ‘million-(wo)men marches’, or > sit-ins? Or are they a threat to freedom of expression and access to > information, by limiting access to websites and in certain cases the > freedom of speech of others? These questions are crucial in our day and > age, where political debates, civil disobedience and other forms of > activism are increasingly moving online. > > Many individuals, not excluding IETF engineers, have argued that DDoS > attacks are fundamentally against freedom of speech. Technically DDoS > attacks are when multiple computers overload the bandwidth or resources of > a website (or other system) by flooding it with traffic, causing it to > temporarily stop being available to users. In their 2010 report Zuckerman > et al argue that DDoS attacks are a bad thing because they are increasingly > used by governments to attack and silence critics. Their research > demonstrates that in many countries independent media outlets and human > rights organizations are the victim of DDoS attacks, which are directly or > indirectly linked to their governments. These types of attacks are > particularly complicated because attribution is difficult, creating a > situation in which governments can effectively censor content, while being > able to deny involvement in the attacks (Zuckerman et al 2010). DDoS > attacks can thus stifle freedom of expression, complicate independent media > and human rights organizations to exercise their right to online freedom of > association, while facilitating the ability of governments to censor > dissent. > > In addition, DDoS attacks are increasingly used as an extortion tactic, > with criminals flooding a website – rendering it inaccessible – until the > owner pays them a certain amount of money to stop the attack. The costs of > mitigating such attacks, either by improving security to prevent them or > paying off the attackers, ends up being paid by the consumer. All of these > issues seem to suggest that the IETF should try to ensure that their > protocols cannot be used for DDoS attacks. Decreasing the number of > vulnerabilities in the network stacks of routers or computers, reducing > flaws in HTTPS implementations, and depreciating non-secure HTTP protocols > could address this issue. The IETF can clearly play a role in bringing > about some of these changes, and has indicated in RFC 7258 its commitment > to mitigating ‘pervasive monitoring (…) in the design of IETF protocols, > where possible.’ This means the use of encryption should become standard. > Effectively, for the web this means standard use of HTTPS. The IETF could > redirect its work such that HTPPS becomes part-and-parcel of its standards. > However, next to the various technical trade-offs that this might lead to > it is important to consider that DDoS attacks are also fundamentally a > method for exercising freedom of speech. > > DDoS although disruptive, and silencing at times, can also enable as > protest and speech. Or as Sauter (2014) argues: ‘though DDoS as a tactic is > still relatively novel, it fits within a centuries- long tradition of > breaking laws and disrupting business as usual to make a political point. > These actions aren’t simply disruption for disruption’s sake. Rather they > serve to help the activist or dissenter to direct the attention of the > public through the interpolation of difference into routine.’ (30-31). An > often heard argument against DDoS attacks is that you cannot construe it as > a means to exercise your right to freedom of speech, when the means used > effectively impede the right of the party on the receiving end of the > attack to exercise that same right. > > The problem with this line of argumentation is that it conveniently ignores > the fact that online DDoS attacks are often the only effective way for > activists to gain the attention of the media, the government or other > parties of interest. Simply putting up a website for a cause won’t garner > the same amount of attention as directly confronting the issue via the > website of the individual or organization at the heart of the issue. The > ability of activists to do so should be protected, especially considering > the fact that as Sauter (2014:4) explains: ‘Collectively, we have allowed > the construction of an entire public sphere, the Internet, which by > accidents of evolution and design, has none of the inherent free speech > guarantees we have come to expect. Dissenting voices are pushed out of the > paths of potential audiences, effectively removing them from the public > discourse. There is nowhere online for an activist to stand with her > friends and her sign. She might set up a dedicated blog—which may or may > not ever be read—but it is much harder for her to stand collectively with > others against a corporate giant in the online space.’ Although the > Internet is often compared to public space, it is not. Rather the opposite. > The Internet is almost entirely owned by private entities. Or as Sauter > (2014:35) states: ‘It is the nature of the online environment itself that > has made disruptive tactics such as activist DDoS actions increasingly > necessary.’ If there is no true public space online, the individuals > managing the Internet architecture should allow for DDoS attacks to happen, > when they are part of a legitimate freedom of speech campaigns. > > The question of how the IETF should respond to this is two-fold: first, it > would require developing a method to establish when a DDoS attack is a > legitimate expression of the right to freedom of speech, or whether it > impedes on it. Second, it asks the IETF to reflect upon its role in > creating a commercialized Internet that has no defacto public space of > inherent protections for freedom of speech. One of the founding fathers of > the Internet, David Clark, recently published a paper warning that the > future of the Internet is in danger. He argues that the private sector > control over the Internet is too strong, limiting the myriad of ways in > which it can be used (Daedalus 2016), including for freedom of speech. As > such, it is important for the IETF to consider the fact that DDoS attacks > are inherently dual-use and not take immediate sides on this discussion. > > > > *Literature referenced:* > > Bray, T., 2012. ID 2616 A New HTTP Status Code for Legally-restricted > Resources draft-tbray-http-legally-restricted-status-00. Retrieved on May > 1, 2015, from > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tbray-http-legally-restricted-status-00. > > > Clark, D., 2015. The Contingent Internet. Daedalus Winter 2016, Vol. 145, > No. 1: 9–17. Retrieved on January 1, 2016 from > http://www.mitpressjournals.org/toc/daed/current. > > Sauter, M., 2014. The Coming Swarm. London: Bloomsbury. > > > Walfish, M., Stribling, J., Krohn, M., Balakrishnan, H., Morris, R., & > Shenker, S. 2004. Middleboxes No Longer Considered Harmful. Retrieved on > May 24, 2015, from http://nms.csail.mit.edu/doa > > > Zuckerman, E., et al. 2010. Report on Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) > Attacks. Retrieved on January 1, 2016 from > https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/2010_DDoS_Attacks_Human_Rights_and_Media.pdf > . > > > > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc > From nobody Tue Jan 19 13:35:00 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 09A281B367A for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 13:34:59 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.901 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.901 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, MANGLED_WOMEN=2.3, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0gtpFtnSNhd5 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 13:34:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from relay15.mail.ox.ac.uk (relay15.mail.ox.ac.uk [163.1.2.163]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 61E971B3672 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 13:34:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp5.mail.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.207]) by relay15.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aLdvR-0001oI-o6; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:34:53 +0000 Received: from [78.156.66.104] (helo=localhost) by smtp5.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aLdvR-0007om-HU; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:34:53 +0000 Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:34:49 +0000 From: Joss Wright To: Stephen Farrell Message-ID: <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-Oxford-Username: inet0123 Archived-At: Cc: Corinne Cath , hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:34:59 -0000 The use of LOIC by 4chan and Anonymous are probably the most well-known examples that spring to mind. The Wikipedia page ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_Orbit_Ion_Cannon#Notable_uses ) notes "Project Chanology", "Operation Payback", and "Operation Megaupload" as occasions in which LOIC was used for protest. Having said that, I do agree that DDoS will not, in the vast majority of cases, have relied on what the page linked above calls 'voluntary botnets'. J On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 09:26:21PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > Hmm. Can you give some examples of when a DDoS has only involved willing > participants/"protesters" and a target? AFAIK, for almost all (as in > 99.9ish%) cases of DDoS, the clients are likely hacked computers belonging to > unrelated parties and nothing to do with those who want to protest nor with > those who are the target of the protest. > > Doesn't that mean that the million-person march analogy is busted? For a march > to be a good analogy for a DDoS, the million people would be being > press-ganged into marching and would not be choosing to march. > > Seems to me that DDoS as a method of protest is just a not a useful concept. > (I can imagine methods of protest that use the Internet, but I can't see it > being useful to call any of those a DDoS.) > > S. > > On 19/01/16 21:08, Corinne Cath wrote: > > And last but not least, Case three DDoS. > > > > > > *DDOS attacks * > > > > Are Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks a legitimate form of online > > protest protected by the right to freedom of speech and association? Can > > they be seen as the equivalent to ‘million-(wo)men marches’, or sit-ins? Or > > are they a threat to freedom of expression and access to information, by > > limiting access to websites and in certain cases the freedom of speech of > > others? These questions are crucial in our day and age, where political > > debates, civil disobedience and other forms of activism are increasingly > > moving online. > > > > Many individuals, not excluding IETF engineers, have argued that DDoS > > attacks are fundamentally against freedom of speech. Technically DDoS > > attacks are when multiple computers overload the bandwidth or resources of a > > website (or other system) by flooding it with traffic, causing it to > > temporarily stop being available to users. In their 2010 report Zuckerman et > > al argue that DDoS attacks are a bad thing because they are increasingly > > used by governments to attack and silence critics. Their research > > demonstrates that in many countries independent media outlets and human > > rights organizations are the victim of DDoS attacks, which are directly or > > indirectly linked to their governments. These types of attacks are > > particularly complicated because attribution is difficult, creating a > > situation in which governments can effectively censor content, while being > > able to deny involvement in the attacks (Zuckerman et al 2010). DDoS attacks > > can thus stifle freedom of expression, complicate independent media and > > human rights organizations to exercise their right to online freedom of > > association, while facilitating the ability of governments to censor > > dissent. > > > > In addition, DDoS attacks are increasingly used as an extortion tactic, with > > criminals flooding a website – rendering it inaccessible – until the owner > > pays them a certain amount of money to stop the attack. The costs of > > mitigating such attacks, either by improving security to prevent them or > > paying off the attackers, ends up being paid by the consumer. All of these > > issues seem to suggest that the IETF should try to ensure that their > > protocols cannot be used for DDoS attacks. Decreasing the number of > > vulnerabilities in the network stacks of routers or computers, reducing > > flaws in HTTPS implementations, and depreciating non-secure HTTP protocols > > could address this issue. The IETF can clearly play a role in bringing about > > some of these changes, and has indicated in RFC 7258 its commitment to > > mitigating ‘pervasive monitoring (…) in the design of IETF protocols, where > > possible.’ This means the use of encryption should become standard. > > Effectively, for the web this means standard use of HTTPS. The IETF could > > redirect its work such that HTPPS becomes part-and-parcel of its standards. > > However, next to the various technical trade-offs that this might lead to it > > is important to consider that DDoS attacks are also fundamentally a method > > for exercising freedom of speech. > > > > DDoS although disruptive, and silencing at times, can also enable as protest > > and speech. Or as Sauter (2014) argues: ‘though DDoS as a tactic is still > > relatively novel, it fits within a centuries- long tradition of breaking > > laws and disrupting business as usual to make a political point. These > > actions aren’t simply disruption for disruption’s sake. Rather they serve to > > help the activist or dissenter to direct the attention of the public through > > the interpolation of difference into routine.’ (30-31). An often heard > > argument against DDoS attacks is that you cannot construe it as a means to > > exercise your right to freedom of speech, when the means used effectively > > impede the right of the party on the receiving end of the attack to exercise > > that same right. > > > > The problem with this line of argumentation is that it conveniently ignores > > the fact that online DDoS attacks are often the only effective way for > > activists to gain the attention of the media, the government or other > > parties of interest. Simply putting up a website for a cause won’t garner > > the same amount of attention as directly confronting the issue via the > > website of the individual or organization at the heart of the issue. The > > ability of activists to do so should be protected, especially considering > > the fact that as Sauter (2014:4) explains: ‘Collectively, we have allowed > > the construction of an entire public sphere, the Internet, which by > > accidents of evolution and design, has none of the inherent free speech > > guarantees we have come to expect. Dissenting voices are pushed out of the > > paths of potential audiences, effectively removing them from the public > > discourse. There is nowhere online for an activist to stand with her friends > > and her sign. She might set up a dedicated blog—which may or may not ever be > > read—but it is much harder for her to stand collectively with others against > > a corporate giant in the online space.’ Although the Internet is often > > compared to public space, it is not. Rather the opposite. The Internet is > > almost entirely owned by private entities. Or as Sauter (2014:35) states: > > ‘It is the nature of the online environment itself that has made disruptive > > tactics such as activist DDoS actions increasingly necessary.’ If there is > > no true public space online, the individuals managing the Internet > > architecture should allow for DDoS attacks to happen, when they are part of > > a legitimate freedom of speech campaigns. > > > > The question of how the IETF should respond to this is two-fold: first, it > > would require developing a method to establish when a DDoS attack is a > > legitimate expression of the right to freedom of speech, or whether it > > impedes on it. Second, it asks the IETF to reflect upon its role in creating > > a commercialized Internet that has no defacto public space of inherent > > protections for freedom of speech. One of the founding fathers of the > > Internet, David Clark, recently published a paper warning that the future of > > the Internet is in danger. He argues that the private sector control over > > the Internet is too strong, limiting the myriad of ways in which it can be > > used (Daedalus 2016), including for freedom of speech. As such, it is > > important for the IETF to consider the fact that DDoS attacks are inherently > > dual-use and not take immediate sides on this discussion. > > > > > > > > *Literature referenced:* > > > > Bray, T., 2012. ID 2616 A New HTTP Status Code for Legally-restricted > > Resources draft-tbray-http-legally-restricted-status-00. Retrieved on May 1, > > 2015, from > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tbray-http-legally-restricted-status-00. > > > > > > Clark, D., 2015. The Contingent Internet. Daedalus Winter 2016, Vol. 145, > > No. 1: 9–17. Retrieved on January 1, 2016 from > > http://www.mitpressjournals.org/toc/daed/current. > > > > Sauter, M., 2014. The Coming Swarm. London: Bloomsbury. > > > > > > Walfish, M., Stribling, J., Krohn, M., Balakrishnan, H., Morris, R., & > > Shenker, S. 2004. Middleboxes No Longer Considered Harmful. Retrieved on May > > 24, 2015, from http://nms.csail.mit.edu/doa > > > > > > Zuckerman, E., et al. 2010. Report on Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) > > Attacks. Retrieved on January 1, 2016 from > > https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/2010_DDoS_Attacks_Human_Rights_and_Media.pdf > > . > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list > > hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc > > > > _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc -- Dr. Joss Wright | Research Fellow Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/?id=176 From nobody Tue Jan 19 13:49:23 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3E9051B36B2 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 13:49:22 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.398 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.398 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, MANGLED_WOMEN=2.3, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id iR41wfS83ffy for ; 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BLUPR0201MB1505; 5:QvmwgVLVual7mxSuJgJt1geAeK2kL757NqS+QlZt+lngweIQ4O+IymAO7EwzX/L+F0mOLZY35Q4IArYS7bh3mOWcw12A9eeHQdh337dyAd2yvHl5SfJsupTwHxweEpwW0sH9fG+MCqi74wISBTdSxw==; 24:1V0/wpOtwdZOwrToFVg7WmkTDpNqG7nmrVlSGBGzKmaMsbpPMPFyTMSFw4QOJvpnBo6owdNBAQBuC/Lsj/7oyGCiRh6kNpPuGLRdVFeMKVo= SpamDiagnosticOutput: 1:23 SpamDiagnosticMetadata: NSPM X-OriginatorOrg: asc.upenn.edu X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalArrivalTime: 19 Jan 2016 21:48:57.2707 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Id: c4c10fc3-fa47-4237-865d-872eb0388a0c X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-OriginalAttributedTenantConnectingIp: TenantId=c4c10fc3-fa47-4237-865d-872eb0388a0c; Ip=[128.91.58.229]; Helo=[exchange.asc.upenn.edu] X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-FromEntityHeader: HybridOnPrem X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: BLUPR0201MB1505 Archived-At: Cc: Corinne Cath , "hrpc@irtf.org" Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:49:22 -0000 Operation Ababil: http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2012/09/dissecting-operation= -ababil-osint.html=0A= Green Movement DDoS: https://www.nartv.org/2009/06/16/iran-ddos/=0A= =0A= ________________________________________=0A= From: hrpc [hrpc-bounces@irtf.org] on behalf of Joss Wright [joss.wright@oi= i.ox.ac.uk]=0A= Sent: Tuesday, January 19, 2016 4:34 PM=0A= To: Stephen Farrell=0A= Cc: Corinne Cath; hrpc@irtf.org=0A= Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS=0A= =0A= The use of LOIC by 4chan and Anonymous are probably the most well-known exa= mples=0A= that spring to mind.=0A= =0A= The Wikipedia page (=0A= https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_Orbit_Ion_Cannon#Notable_uses ) notes "Pr= oject=0A= Chanology", "Operation Payback", and "Operation Megaupload" as occasions in= =0A= which LOIC was used for protest.=0A= =0A= Having said that, I do agree that DDoS will not, in the vast majority of ca= ses,=0A= have relied on what the page linked above calls 'voluntary botnets'.=0A= =0A= J=0A= =0A= On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 09:26:21PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote:=0A= >=0A= > Hmm. Can you give some examples of when a DDoS has only involved willing= =0A= > participants/"protesters" and a target? AFAIK, for almost all (as in=0A= > 99.9ish%) cases of DDoS, the clients are likely hacked computers belongin= g to=0A= > unrelated parties and nothing to do with those who want to protest nor wi= th=0A= > those who are the target of the protest.=0A= >=0A= > Doesn't that mean that the million-person march analogy is busted? For a = march=0A= > to be a good analogy for a DDoS, the million people would be being=0A= > press-ganged into marching and would not be choosing to march.=0A= >=0A= > Seems to me that DDoS as a method of protest is just a not a useful conce= pt.=0A= > (I can imagine methods of protest that use the Internet, but I can't see = it=0A= > being useful to call any of those a DDoS.)=0A= >=0A= > S.=0A= >=0A= > On 19/01/16 21:08, Corinne Cath wrote:=0A= > > And last but not least, Case three DDoS.=0A= > >=0A= > >=0A= > > *DDOS attacks *=0A= > >=0A= > > Are Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks a legitimate form of o= nline=0A= > > protest protected by the right to freedom of speech and association? C= an=0A= > > they be seen as the equivalent to =91million-(wo)men marches=92, or sit= -ins? Or=0A= > > are they a threat to freedom of expression and access to information, b= y=0A= > > limiting access to websites and in certain cases the freedom of speech = of=0A= > > others? These questions are crucial in our day and age, where political= =0A= > > debates, civil disobedience and other forms of activism are increasingl= y=0A= > > moving online.=0A= > >=0A= > > Many individuals, not excluding IETF engineers, have argued that DDoS= =0A= > > attacks are fundamentally against freedom of speech. Technically DDoS= =0A= > > attacks are when multiple computers overload the bandwidth or resources= of a=0A= > > website (or other system) by flooding it with traffic, causing it to=0A= > > temporarily stop being available to users. In their 2010 report Zuckerm= an et=0A= > > al argue that DDoS attacks are a bad thing because they are increasingl= y=0A= > > used by governments to attack and silence critics. Their research=0A= > > demonstrates that in many countries independent media outlets and human= =0A= > > rights organizations are the victim of DDoS attacks, which are directly= or=0A= > > indirectly linked to their governments. These types of attacks are=0A= > > particularly complicated because attribution is difficult, creating a= =0A= > > situation in which governments can effectively censor content, while be= ing=0A= > > able to deny involvement in the attacks (Zuckerman et al 2010). DDoS at= tacks=0A= > > can thus stifle freedom of expression, complicate independent media and= =0A= > > human rights organizations to exercise their right to online freedom of= =0A= > > association, while facilitating the ability of governments to censor=0A= > > dissent.=0A= > >=0A= > > In addition, DDoS attacks are increasingly used as an extortion tactic,= with=0A= > > criminals flooding a website =96 rendering it inaccessible =96 until th= e owner=0A= > > pays them a certain amount of money to stop the attack. The costs of=0A= > > mitigating such attacks, either by improving security to prevent them o= r=0A= > > paying off the attackers, ends up being paid by the consumer. All of th= ese=0A= > > issues seem to suggest that the IETF should try to ensure that their=0A= > > protocols cannot be used for DDoS attacks. Decreasing the number of=0A= > > vulnerabilities in the network stacks of routers or computers, reducing= =0A= > > flaws in HTTPS implementations, and depreciating non-secure HTTP protoc= ols=0A= > > could address this issue. The IETF can clearly play a role in bringing = about=0A= > > some of these changes, and has indicated in RFC 7258 its commitment to= =0A= > > mitigating =91pervasive monitoring (=85) in the design of IETF protocol= s, where=0A= > > possible.=92 This means the use of encryption should become standard.= =0A= > > Effectively, for the web this means standard use of HTTPS. The IETF cou= ld=0A= > > redirect its work such that HTPPS becomes part-and-parcel of its standa= rds.=0A= > > However, next to the various technical trade-offs that this might lead = to it=0A= > > is important to consider that DDoS attacks are also fundamentally a met= hod=0A= > > for exercising freedom of speech.=0A= > >=0A= > > DDoS although disruptive, and silencing at times, can also enable as pr= otest=0A= > > and speech. Or as Sauter (2014) argues: =91though DDoS as a tactic is s= till=0A= > > relatively novel, it fits within a centuries- long tradition of breakin= g=0A= > > laws and disrupting business as usual to make a political point. These= =0A= > > actions aren=92t simply disruption for disruption=92s sake. Rather they= serve to=0A= > > help the activist or dissenter to direct the attention of the public th= rough=0A= > > the interpolation of difference into routine.=92 (30-31). An often hear= d=0A= > > argument against DDoS attacks is that you cannot construe it as a means= to=0A= > > exercise your right to freedom of speech, when the means used effective= ly=0A= > > impede the right of the party on the receiving end of the attack to exe= rcise=0A= > > that same right.=0A= > >=0A= > > The problem with this line of argumentation is that it conveniently ign= ores=0A= > > the fact that online DDoS attacks are often the only effective way for= =0A= > > activists to gain the attention of the media, the government or other= =0A= > > parties of interest. Simply putting up a website for a cause won=92t ga= rner=0A= > > the same amount of attention as directly confronting the issue via the= =0A= > > website of the individual or organization at the heart of the issue. Th= e=0A= > > ability of activists to do so should be protected, especially consideri= ng=0A= > > the fact that as Sauter (2014:4) explains: =91Collectively, we have all= owed=0A= > > the construction of an entire public sphere, the Internet, which by=0A= > > accidents of evolution and design, has none of the inherent free speech= =0A= > > guarantees we have come to expect. Dissenting voices are pushed out of = the=0A= > > paths of potential audiences, effectively removing them from the public= =0A= > > discourse. There is nowhere online for an activist to stand with her fr= iends=0A= > > and her sign. She might set up a dedicated blog=97which may or may not = ever be=0A= > > read=97but it is much harder for her to stand collectively with others = against=0A= > > a corporate giant in the online space.=92 Although the Internet is ofte= n=0A= > > compared to public space, it is not. Rather the opposite. The Internet= is=0A= > > almost entirely owned by private entities. Or as Sauter (2014:35) state= s:=0A= > > =91It is the nature of the online environment itself that has made disr= uptive=0A= > > tactics such as activist DDoS actions increasingly necessary.=92 If the= re is=0A= > > no true public space online, the individuals managing the Internet=0A= > > architecture should allow for DDoS attacks to happen, when they are par= t of=0A= > > a legitimate freedom of speech campaigns.=0A= > >=0A= > > The question of how the IETF should respond to this is two-fold: first,= it=0A= > > would require developing a method to establish when a DDoS attack is a= =0A= > > legitimate expression of the right to freedom of speech, or whether it= =0A= > > impedes on it. Second, it asks the IETF to reflect upon its role in cre= ating=0A= > > a commercialized Internet that has no defacto public space of inherent= =0A= > > protections for freedom of speech. One of the founding fathers of the= =0A= > > Internet, David Clark, recently published a paper warning that the futu= re of=0A= > > the Internet is in danger. He argues that the private sector control ov= er=0A= > > the Internet is too strong, limiting the myriad of ways in which it can= be=0A= > > used (Daedalus 2016), including for freedom of speech. As such, it is= =0A= > > important for the IETF to consider the fact that DDoS attacks are inher= ently=0A= > > dual-use and not take immediate sides on this discussion.=0A= > >=0A= > >=0A= > >=0A= > > *Literature referenced:*=0A= > >=0A= > > Bray, T., 2012. ID 2616 A New HTTP Status Code for Legally-restricted= =0A= > > Resources draft-tbray-http-legally-restricted-status-00. Retrieved on M= ay 1,=0A= > > 2015, from=0A= > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tbray-http-legally-restricted-status-= 00.=0A= > >=0A= > >=0A= > > Clark, D., 2015. The Contingent Internet. Daedalus Winter 2016, Vol. 14= 5,=0A= > > No. 1: 9=9617. Retrieved on January 1, 2016 from=0A= > > http://www.mitpressjournals.org/toc/daed/current.=0A= > >=0A= > > Sauter, M., 2014. The Coming Swarm. London: Bloomsbury.=0A= > >=0A= > >=0A= > > Walfish, M., Stribling, J., Krohn, M., Balakrishnan, H., Morris, R., &= =0A= > > Shenker, S. 2004. Middleboxes No Longer Considered Harmful. Retrieved o= n May=0A= > > 24, 2015, from http://nms.csail.mit.edu/doa=0A= > >=0A= > >=0A= > > Zuckerman, E., et al. 2010. Report on Distributed Denial of Service (DD= oS)=0A= > > Attacks. Retrieved on January 1, 2016 from=0A= > > https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/2010_DD= oS_Attacks_Human_Rights_and_Media.pdf=0A= > > .=0A= > >=0A= > >=0A= > >=0A= > > _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list=0A= > > hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc=0A= > >=0A= >=0A= > _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list=0A= > hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc=0A= =0A= --=0A= Dr. Joss Wright | Research Fellow=0A= Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford=0A= http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/?id=3D176=0A= =0A= _______________________________________________=0A= hrpc mailing list=0A= hrpc@irtf.org=0A= https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc=0A= From nobody Tue Jan 19 13:50:59 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 534551B3677 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 13:50:57 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.201 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.201 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BbZLD8-geG77 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 13:50:54 -0800 (PST) Received: from relay14.mail.ox.ac.uk (relay14.mail.ox.ac.uk [163.1.2.162]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 83CDD1B36A7 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 13:50:54 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp6.mail.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.206]) by relay14.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aLeAv-000402-kH; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:50:53 +0000 Received: from [78.156.66.104] (helo=localhost) by smtp6.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aLeAv-0009RZ-KG; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:50:53 +0000 Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:50:59 +0000 From: Joss Wright To: Corinne Cath Message-ID: <20160119215059.GC1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-Oxford-Username: inet0123 Archived-At: Cc: hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case one: Status code 451 X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:50:57 -0000 I've always been confused by the proposals for status code 451, as it's always seemed to me largely pointless, apart from the political message sent by the existence of the code, for a server to respond with an error code for censorship, as the vast majority of internet filtering occurs in the network rather than at the server itself. (Servers with resources blocked by China's Golden Shield, for example, don't have the opportunity to send a code -- they simply never receive the requests. Obviously the filtering system is unlikely to inject a 451 itself. Even for those states that do choose to notify users of blocked content, such as Qatar, that doesn't seem appropriate for a 4xx series status code.) It only seems to make sense in situations where a server operator has been ordered to remove hosted content, or not to serve it to particular classes of user. As I've not been part of the discussion, I'm interested as to whether that has been the stated purpose of the code? Joss On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 09:03:03PM +0000, Corinne Cath wrote: > As promised, case number 1. > > > *Status Code 451* > > Every Internet user has run into the ‘404 Not Found’ Hypertext Transfer > Protocol (HTTP) status code when trying, and failing, to access a particular > website. It is a response status that the server sends to the browser, when > the server cannot locate the URL. ‘403 Forbidden’ is another example of this > class of code signals that gives users information about what is going on. In > the ‘403’ case the server can be reached, but is blocking the request because > the user is trying to access content forbidden to them. This can be because > the specific user is not allowed access to the content (like a government > employee trying to access pornography on a work-computer) or because access is > restricted to all users (like social network sites in certain countries). As > surveillance and censorship of the Internet is becoming more commonplace, > voices were raised at the IETF to introduce a new status code that indicates > when something is not available for ‘legal reasons’ (like censorship): > > The [451 status] code would allow server operators to operate with greater > transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public policy affect > their operation. This transparency may be beneficial both to these operators > and to end-users (Bray 2012:3). > > The status code would be named ‘451’, a reference to Bradbury’s famous novel > on censorship. In practice the code would look like this: > > > [image: Inline image 3] > > Figure 5. Status code 451 (Source: Website Bray, author of the 451-status code > ID) > > During the IETF meeting in Dallas, there was discussion about the usefulness > of ‘451’. The main tension revolved around the lack of an apparent > machine-readable technical use of the information. The extent to which ‘451’ > is just ‘political theater’ or whether it has a concrete technical use was > heatedly debated. Some argued that ‘the 451 status code is just a status code > with a response body’ others said it was problematic because ‘it brings law > into the picture’ [1] . Again others argued that it would be useful for > individuals, or organizations like the ‘Chilling Effects’ project, crawling > the web to get an indication of censorship (IETF discussion on ‘451’ – > author’s field notes March 2015). > > There was no outright objection during the Dallas meeting against moving > forward on status code ‘451’, and on December 18, 2015 the Internet > Engineering Steering Group approved publication of "An HTTP Status Code to > Report Legal Obstacles". It is still in the process of becoming an RFC, but > could effectively be used from the day of approval. > > What is interesting about this particular case is that not only technical > arguments but also the status code’s outright potential political use for > civil society played a substantial role in shaping the discussion, and the > decision to move forward with this technology. > > [1] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/minutes?item=minutes-92-httpbis.html, > discussions on 451 at IETF 92 in Dallas > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc -- Dr. Joss Wright | Research Fellow Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/?id=176 From nobody Tue Jan 19 13:55:23 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C3F1F1B36B6 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 13:55:22 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.302 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.302 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id w8DT2z4KAX_Q for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 13:55:21 -0800 (PST) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 060341B36A2 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 13:55:21 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9E46BBE87; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:55:19 +0000 (GMT) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id WWxzv5lS0Sgh; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:55:18 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [10.87.48.91] (unknown [86.46.20.159]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 13181BE77; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:55:18 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1453240518; bh=RNFgywqEZ2H7RO/f8cndx/syk2VpzdetFxWHocRMAA0=; h=Subject:To:References:Cc:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=TcFP4wBz381hb8R23THGWZx3iNnSO8YpnGnr35uZ0GACtJqADYvk87HMjOcdabs1h y1ulhe/SNdp2UBKo8DCymINVszR/3wnhHxvOKxZkpnaj6QjzWCgG9A1CJjzSrOu8H5 eg3mgJrj2qWXkIAqko4KYEUtbom2uYXJXJ+9b/Cw= To: Joss Wright References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=D66EA7906F0B897FB2E97D582F3C8736805F8DA2; url= Message-ID: <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:55:17 +0000 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Cc: Corinne Cath , hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:55:22 -0000 On 19/01/16 21:34, Joss Wright wrote: > > Having said that, I do agree that DDoS will not, in the vast majority of cases, > have relied on what the page linked above calls 'voluntary botnets'. Right. And in my little head at least forms of protest that involve involuntary participation by O(10^5) unrelated parties are far more dubious than forms of protest that are voluntary. Especially when the involuntary participant's networks need to be compromised as part of the "protest" in ways that are very likely to be abused by others. But in any case, I think if the IETF wants to be consistent in considering pervasive monitoring an attack regardless of motivation, then we need to treat DDoS in the same way - as an attack and nothing else, regardless of motivation. S. PS: That there are a handful of cases where "voluntary botnets" were used does not IMO counter the above. If one is interested in those then one would be far better off not using the term DDoS I reckon. From nobody Tue Jan 19 14:06:31 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A97861B36CF for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:06:25 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.302 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.302 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 44tMiHXUjuVT for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:06:23 -0800 (PST) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 229F31A19F7 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:06:22 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 66795BE87; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:06:21 +0000 (GMT) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id K6RIYImLbLNd; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:06:19 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [10.87.48.91] (unknown [86.46.20.159]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9FCE2BE83; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:06:18 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1453241179; bh=tmIi9v9wYD9aNj0LBb4VBdOHHs6JTDTTE1Ou07Tn8m4=; h=Subject:To:References:Cc:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=ycJt/xouMDOodLdE/FDuMfIa4/6PMb+1lM0n+iylmteYEPwsdS4hYDAWmWQH6e9DM Z4b3dds8trRQFVS/h7Q6KVANGGR0D/R6GcUy55C8Vp8yn2msF+AzC47rDDvOP172xl m8m5WsvPP/GqI/j2uSeLXqXxh8kNGB0a8l4iVFak= To: Joss Wright , Corinne Cath References: <20160119215059.GC1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=D66EA7906F0B897FB2E97D582F3C8736805F8DA2; url= Message-ID: <569EB359.3050405@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:06:17 +0000 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20160119215059.GC1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Archived-At: Cc: hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case one: Status code 451 X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:06:25 -0000 On 19/01/16 21:50, Joss Wright wrote: > I've always been confused by the proposals for status code 451, as it's always > seemed to me largely pointless, apart from the political message sent by the > existence of the code, for a server to respond with an error code for > censorship, as the vast majority of internet filtering occurs in the network > rather than at the server itself. > > (Servers with resources blocked by China's Golden Shield, for example, don't > have the opportunity to send a code -- they simply never receive the requests. > Obviously the filtering system is unlikely to inject a 451 itself. Even for > those states that do choose to notify users of blocked content, such as Qatar, > that doesn't seem appropriate for a 4xx series status code.) > > It only seems to make sense in situations where a server operator has been > ordered to remove hosted content, or not to serve it to particular classes of > user. As I've not been part of the discussion, I'm interested as to whether that > has been the stated purpose of the code? I wasn't very active in this myself but some people with whom I chatted were convinced by the fact that 451 allowed for automation. For example if you get a 451 response a UA might be able to re-try the request via some other n/w path. Similarly, a crawler might be able to correlate the places in which one gets a 451 and produce e.g. useful statistics or maps. S. > > Joss > > On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 09:03:03PM +0000, Corinne Cath wrote: >> As promised, case number 1. >> >> >> *Status Code 451* >> >> Every Internet user has run into the ‘404 Not Found’ Hypertext Transfer >> Protocol (HTTP) status code when trying, and failing, to access a particular >> website. It is a response status that the server sends to the browser, when >> the server cannot locate the URL. ‘403 Forbidden’ is another example of this >> class of code signals that gives users information about what is going on. In >> the ‘403’ case the server can be reached, but is blocking the request because >> the user is trying to access content forbidden to them. This can be because >> the specific user is not allowed access to the content (like a government >> employee trying to access pornography on a work-computer) or because access is >> restricted to all users (like social network sites in certain countries). As >> surveillance and censorship of the Internet is becoming more commonplace, >> voices were raised at the IETF to introduce a new status code that indicates >> when something is not available for ‘legal reasons’ (like censorship): >> >> The [451 status] code would allow server operators to operate with greater >> transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public policy affect >> their operation. This transparency may be beneficial both to these operators >> and to end-users (Bray 2012:3). >> >> The status code would be named ‘451’, a reference to Bradbury’s famous novel >> on censorship. In practice the code would look like this: >> >> >> [image: Inline image 3] >> >> Figure 5. Status code 451 (Source: Website Bray, author of the 451-status code >> ID) >> >> During the IETF meeting in Dallas, there was discussion about the usefulness >> of ‘451’. The main tension revolved around the lack of an apparent >> machine-readable technical use of the information. The extent to which ‘451’ >> is just ‘political theater’ or whether it has a concrete technical use was >> heatedly debated. Some argued that ‘the 451 status code is just a status code >> with a response body’ others said it was problematic because ‘it brings law >> into the picture’ [1] . Again others argued that it would be useful for >> individuals, or organizations like the ‘Chilling Effects’ project, crawling >> the web to get an indication of censorship (IETF discussion on ‘451’ – >> author’s field notes March 2015). >> >> There was no outright objection during the Dallas meeting against moving >> forward on status code ‘451’, and on December 18, 2015 the Internet >> Engineering Steering Group approved publication of "An HTTP Status Code to >> Report Legal Obstacles". It is still in the process of becoming an RFC, but >> could effectively be used from the day of approval. >> >> What is interesting about this particular case is that not only technical >> arguments but also the status code’s outright potential political use for >> civil society played a substantial role in shaping the discussion, and the >> decision to move forward with this technology. >> >> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/minutes?item=minutes-92-httpbis.html, >> discussions on 451 at IETF 92 in Dallas > > > >> _______________________________________________ >> hrpc mailing list >> hrpc@irtf.org >> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc > > From nobody Tue Jan 19 14:15:59 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8DA2C1B36D4 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:15:57 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -6.201 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.201 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, GB_I_LETTER=-2, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id DqKwg-hzpxdi for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:15:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from relay13.mail.ox.ac.uk (relay13.mail.ox.ac.uk [129.67.1.166]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 278C51ACDFD for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:15:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp6.mail.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.206]) by relay13.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aLeZ7-0007SI-hE; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:15:53 +0000 Received: from [78.156.66.104] (helo=localhost) by smtp6.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aLeZ7-000AKm-KQ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:15:53 +0000 Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:15:43 +0000 From: Joss Wright To: Stephen Farrell Message-ID: <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-Oxford-Username: inet0123 Archived-At: Cc: Corinne Cath , hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:15:57 -0000 On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 09:55:17PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote: > On 19/01/16 21:34, Joss Wright wrote: > > > > Having said that, I do agree that DDoS will not, in the vast majority of > > cases, have relied on what the page linked above calls 'voluntary botnets'. > > Right. And in my little head at least forms of protest that involve > involuntary participation by O(10^5) unrelated parties are far more dubious > than forms of protest that are voluntary. Especially when the involuntary > participant's networks need to be compromised as part of the "protest" in ways > that are very likely to be abused by others. No disagreement here. > But in any case, I think if the IETF wants to be consistent in considering > pervasive monitoring an attack regardless of motivation, then we need to treat > DDoS in the same way - as an attack and nothing else, regardless of > motivation. Voluntary pervasive monitoring? Isn't that called Facebook? :) In any case, I don't see what complications there could be to the IETF's position here -- I certainly wouldn't expect anything other than attempts to prevent the possibility of DDoS and view it as an attack. (Although I admit I'd genuinely love to see some proposals for "methods to facilitatejustified DDoS of nasty resources".) > PS: That there are a handful of cases where "voluntary botnets" were used does > not IMO counter the above. If one is interested in those then one would be far > better off not using the term DDoS I reckon. Well, I don't think you could reasonably call it anything other than a DDoS -- every one of those letters is just as applicable to organised, voluntary DDoS as to the more evil kind. If you specifically wanted to refer to them then I'd expect a clear qualification ("collective action DDoS"), but I hardly think it's likely to cause confusion. In fact, the other term that's floated up is probably more a source of confusion. "Botnet" has clear implications of compromised machines, so I'd say that 'voluntary botnet' is tending towards the oxymoronic. J -- Dr. Joss Wright | Research Fellow Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/?id=176 From nobody Tue Jan 19 14:18:59 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F12B11B36F2 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:18:57 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.201 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.201 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8d9hgyUHLbFn for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:18:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from relay11.mail.ox.ac.uk (relay11.mail.ox.ac.uk [129.67.1.162]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2EE681B36F1 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:18:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp4.mail.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.207]) by relay11.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aLec1-0002oi-aq; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:18:53 +0000 Received: from [78.156.66.104] (helo=localhost) by smtp4.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aLec1-0004wg-Ds; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:18:53 +0000 Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:18:04 +0000 From: Joss Wright To: Stephen Farrell Message-ID: <20160119221804.GE1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> References: <20160119215059.GC1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB359.3050405@cs.tcd.ie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <569EB359.3050405@cs.tcd.ie> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-Oxford-Username: inet0123 Archived-At: Cc: Corinne Cath , hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case one: Status code 451 X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:18:58 -0000 On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 10:06:17PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > > On 19/01/16 21:50, Joss Wright wrote: > > I've always been confused by the proposals for status code 451, as it's > > always seemed to me largely pointless, apart from the political message sent > > by the existence of the code, for a server to respond with an error code for > > censorship, as the vast majority of internet filtering occurs in the network > > rather than at the server itself. > > > > (Servers with resources blocked by China's Golden Shield, for example, don't > > have the opportunity to send a code -- they simply never receive the > > requests. Obviously the filtering system is unlikely to inject a 451 > > itself. Even for those states that do choose to notify users of blocked > > content, such as Qatar, that doesn't seem appropriate for a 4xx series > > status code.) > > > > It only seems to make sense in situations where a server operator has been > > ordered to remove hosted content, or not to serve it to particular classes > > of user. As I've not been part of the discussion, I'm interested as to > > whether that has been the stated purpose of the code? > > I wasn't very active in this myself but some people with whom I chatted were > convinced by the fact that 451 allowed for automation. For example if you get > a 451 response a UA might be able to re-try the request via some other n/w > path. Similarly, a crawler might be able to correlate the places in which one > gets a 451 and produce e.g. useful statistics or maps. How would a UA get a 451, though, if it can't reach the server in the first place due to network filtering? (This is a long-term and genuine confusion regarding this proposal -- I really want to know if I'm missing something obvious.) > > S. > > > > > > Joss > > > > On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 09:03:03PM +0000, Corinne Cath wrote: > >> As promised, case number 1. > >> > >> > >> *Status Code 451* > >> > >> Every Internet user has run into the ‘404 Not Found’ Hypertext Transfer > >> Protocol (HTTP) status code when trying, and failing, to access a > >> particular website. It is a response status that the server sends to the > >> browser, when the server cannot locate the URL. ‘403 Forbidden’ is another > >> example of this class of code signals that gives users information about > >> what is going on. In the ‘403’ case the server can be reached, but is > >> blocking the request because the user is trying to access content forbidden > >> to them. This can be because the specific user is not allowed access to the > >> content (like a government employee trying to access pornography on a > >> work-computer) or because access is restricted to all users (like social > >> network sites in certain countries). As surveillance and censorship of the > >> Internet is becoming more commonplace, voices were raised at the IETF to > >> introduce a new status code that indicates when something is not available > >> for ‘legal reasons’ (like censorship): > >> > >> The [451 status] code would allow server operators to operate with greater > >> transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public policy affect > >> their operation. This transparency may be beneficial both to these > >> operators and to end-users (Bray 2012:3). > >> > >> The status code would be named ‘451’, a reference to Bradbury’s famous > >> novel on censorship. In practice the code would look like this: > >> > >> > >> [image: Inline image 3] > >> > >> Figure 5. Status code 451 (Source: Website Bray, author of the 451-status > >> code ID) > >> > >> During the IETF meeting in Dallas, there was discussion about the > >> usefulness of ‘451’. The main tension revolved around the lack of an > >> apparent machine-readable technical use of the information. The extent to > >> which ‘451’ is just ‘political theater’ or whether it has a concrete > >> technical use was heatedly debated. Some argued that ‘the 451 status code > >> is just a status code with a response body’ others said it was problematic > >> because ‘it brings law into the picture’ [1] . Again others argued that it > >> would be useful for individuals, or organizations like the ‘Chilling > >> Effects’ project, crawling the web to get an indication of censorship (IETF > >> discussion on ‘451’ – author’s field notes March 2015). > >> > >> There was no outright objection during the Dallas meeting against moving > >> forward on status code ‘451’, and on December 18, 2015 the Internet > >> Engineering Steering Group approved publication of "An HTTP Status Code to > >> Report Legal Obstacles". It is still in the process of becoming an RFC, but > >> could effectively be used from the day of approval. > >> > >> What is interesting about this particular case is that not only technical > >> arguments but also the status code’s outright potential political use for > >> civil society played a substantial role in shaping the discussion, and the > >> decision to move forward with this technology. > >> > >> [1] http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/minutes?item=minutes-92-httpbis.html, > >> discussions on 451 at IETF 92 in Dallas > > > > > > > >> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list > >> hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc > > > > -- Dr. Joss Wright | Research Fellow Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/?id=176 From nobody Tue Jan 19 14:22:38 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 907601B3700 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:22:37 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.601 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.601 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, GB_I_LETTER=-2, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id p06F6tAQ92Z3 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:22:35 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx-out03.mykolab.com (mx01.mykolab.com [95.128.36.1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 069B11B36F5 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:22:34 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at kolabnow.com Received: from mx03.mykolab.com (mx03.mykolab.com [10.20.7.101]) by mx-out03.mykolab.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9D4122676E; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 23:22:31 +0100 (CET) To: Joss Wright References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> From: Paul Ferguson Organization: Clowns R. Mofos Message-ID: <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:22:24 -0800 In-Reply-To: <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Cc: Corinne Cath , hrpc@irtf.org, Stephen Farrell Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:22:37 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 1/19/2016 2:15 PM, Joss Wright wrote: > On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 09:55:17PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote: >> On 19/01/16 21:34, Joss Wright wrote: >>> >>> Having said that, I do agree that DDoS will not, in the vast >>> majority of cases, have relied on what the page linked above >>> calls 'voluntary botnets'. >> >> Right. And in my little head at least forms of protest that >> involve involuntary participation by O(10^5) unrelated parties >> are far more dubious than forms of protest that are voluntary. >> Especially when the involuntary participant's networks need to be >> compromised as part of the "protest" in ways that are very likely >> to be abused by others. > > No disagreement here. > >> But in any case, I think if the IETF wants to be consistent in >> considering pervasive monitoring an attack regardless of >> motivation, then we need to treat DDoS in the same way - as an >> attack and nothing else, regardless of motivation. > > Voluntary pervasive monitoring? Isn't that called Facebook? :) > > In any case, I don't see what complications there could be to the > IETF's position here -- I certainly wouldn't expect anything other > than attempts to prevent the possibility of DDoS and view it as an > attack. (Although I admit I'd genuinely love to see some proposals > for "methods to facilitatejustified DDoS of nasty resources".) > >> PS: That there are a handful of cases where "voluntary botnets" >> were used does not IMO counter the above. If one is interested in >> those then one would be far better off not using the term DDoS I >> reckon. > > Well, I don't think you could reasonably call it anything other > than a DDoS -- every one of those letters is just as applicable to > organised, voluntary DDoS as to the more evil kind. If you > specifically wanted to refer to them then I'd expect a clear > qualification ("collective action DDoS"), but I hardly think it's > likely to cause confusion. In fact, the other term that's floated > up is probably more a source of confusion. "Botnet" has clear > implications of compromised machines, so I'd say that 'voluntary > botnet' is tending towards the oxymoronic. > One of the things that most people who try to rationalize a DoS attack as a "justified method of protest" forget that a lot of innocent bystanders are negatively affected by the "collateral damage" that DoS attacks create, which is directly related to the proximity of the bystander to the target relative to shared bandwidth or other resources. An attack is an attack is an attack... There is no such thing as "justifiable" attack when it essentially harms innocent bystanders, regardless of one's politics. "The freedom to swing your fist stops when it hits my face." Period. $.02, - - ferg - -- Paul Ferguson PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2 Key fingerprint: 19EC 2945 FEE8 D6C8 58A1 CE53 2896 AC75 54DC 85B2 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iF4EAREIAAYFAlaetyAACgkQKJasdVTchbLWgwD+J37cPB8RiVxZSYIiwCPLNC0p HFSRdKiUpSJ2N9iUzTwBALUKbdiXMmirWHN5zOE0QKekd9llAxcnjERYU/j5aJ7O =j/NH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Tue Jan 19 14:32:02 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 150A31B3727 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:32:00 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.201 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.201 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id nnXqmCZefTeN for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:31:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from relay11.mail.ox.ac.uk (relay11.mail.ox.ac.uk [129.67.1.162]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BDE021B3725 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:31:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp4.mail.ox.ac.uk ([129.67.1.207]) by relay11.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aLeob-00044q-b8; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:31:53 +0000 Received: from [78.156.66.104] (helo=localhost) by smtp4.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aLeob-0005J6-E5; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:31:53 +0000 Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:31:27 +0000 From: Joss Wright To: Paul Ferguson Message-ID: <20160119223127.GF1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-Oxford-Username: inet0123 Archived-At: Cc: Corinne Cath , hrpc@irtf.org, Stephen Farrell Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:32:00 -0000 On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 02:22:24PM -0800, Paul Ferguson wrote: > One of the things that most people who try to rationalize a DoS attack > as a "justified method of protest" forget that a lot of innocent > bystanders are negatively affected by the "collateral damage" that DoS > attacks create, which is directly related to the proximity of the > bystander to the target relative to shared bandwidth or other resources. A point that's equally applicable to real-world sit-ins, strikes, graffiti, protests, and various other forms of direct action. I'm not disagreeing at all, but this strikes me as exactly the point of these discussions: this is tying into a much wider set of issues. Joss -- Dr. Joss Wright | Research Fellow Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/?id=176 From nobody Tue Jan 19 14:32:56 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C7D4A1B3725 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:32:55 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id R-NgNV4dAuJE for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:32:53 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (mx2.yitter.info [50.116.54.116]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C88ED1B3724 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:32:53 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5AD5D108B5 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:32:53 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at crankycanuck.ca Received: from mx2.yitter.info ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mx2.yitter.info [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id pm1B9s_lpZ6c for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:32:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (c-73-142-157-135.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.142.157.135]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 71427105E5 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:32:52 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 17:32:50 -0500 From: Andrew Sullivan To: hrpc@irtf.org Message-ID: <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:32:56 -0000 On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 02:22:24PM -0800, Paul Ferguson wrote: > One of the things that most people who try to rationalize a DoS attack > as a "justified method of protest" forget that a lot of innocent > bystanders are negatively affected by the "collateral damage" that DoS > attacks create, which is directly related to the proximity of the > bystander to the target relative to shared bandwidth or other resources. In general, I agree with the doubts being cast on DDoS as legitimate protest. But the "collateral damage" argument is, I think, a bad one against it. When in the physical world workers hold a strike and picket an employer and so on, there is no question that many people are negatively affected. But that isn't "collateral damage". That's in fact the point. Having a strike such that a business is negatively affected does not mean it is negatively affected in terms of being able to make its stuff. It's instead negatively affected in terms of being able to deliver to its customers, proceed with its ordinary business with orhers, and so on. Negatively affecting those others is a significant part of the point of a work stoppage. So it is with a DDoS (whether for supposedly-legitimate or -illegitimate purposes). It is not enough to take the target off the Internet, because that will last only a short while at best and is unlikely to result in permanent changes. But driving away customers, driving up costs of hosting or transit (because of the risk), making it harder to find hosting locations (same reason), and negatively affecting others on the same network (thereby driving up risk, so the previous two items) are all long-term effects that the DDoS might have. If the DDoS has any aim at all (apart from simple destruction, that is), then that "collateral damage" is in fact part of the intended damage. It needs to be, or the attack wouldn't have the desired effect. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com From nobody Tue Jan 19 14:46:00 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 685891B3750 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:45:59 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.601 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.601 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id gQmWEfWNom-p for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:45:57 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx-out01.mykolab.com (mx01.mykolab.com [95.128.36.1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1AD271B2ECF for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:45:56 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at kolabnow.com Received: from mx03.mykolab.com (mx03.mykolab.com [10.20.7.101]) by mx-out01.mykolab.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 24C3765C23; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 23:45:54 +0100 (CET) To: Andrew Sullivan References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> From: Paul Ferguson X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 Organization: Clowns R. Mofos Message-ID: <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:45:47 -0800 In-Reply-To: <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Cc: hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 22:45:59 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 1/19/2016 2:32 PM, Andrew Sullivan wrote: > On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 02:22:24PM -0800, Paul Ferguson wrote: >> One of the things that most people who try to rationalize a DoS >> attack as a "justified method of protest" forget that a lot of >> innocent bystanders are negatively affected by the "collateral >> damage" that DoS attacks create, which is directly related to the >> proximity of the bystander to the target relative to shared >> bandwidth or other resources. > > In general, I agree with the doubts being cast on DDoS as > legitimate protest. But the "collateral damage" argument is, I > think, a bad one against it. > > When in the physical world workers hold a strike and picket an > employer and so on, there is no question that many people are > negatively affected. But that isn't "collateral damage". That's > in fact the point. Having a strike such that a business is > negatively affected does not mean it is negatively affected in > terms of being able to make its stuff. It's instead negatively > affected in terms of being able to deliver to its customers, > proceed with its ordinary business with orhers, and so on. > Negatively affecting those others is a significant part of the > point of a work stoppage. > > So it is with a DDoS (whether for supposedly-legitimate or > -illegitimate purposes). It is not enough to take the target off > the Internet, because that will last only a short while at best and > is unlikely to result in permanent changes. But driving away > customers, driving up costs of hosting or transit (because of the > risk), making it harder to find hosting locations (same reason), > and negatively affecting others on the same network (thereby > driving up risk, so the previous two items) are all long-term > effects that the DDoS might have. If the DDoS has any aim at all > (apart from simple destruction, that is), then that "collateral > damage" is in fact part of the intended damage. It needs to be, or > the attack wouldn't have the desired effect. > I would disagree that these are analogous (protests in the "real world" vs. DoS attacks as a form of protest). In the "real world", protesters get arrested if they don't play by the rules, e.g. don't block traffic, cause risks to bystanders, carry firearms, etc., and if they violate those rules, they are subject to being arrested and charged by law enforcement. Of course, things don't always follow the script in the "real world", and there are frequently "collateral damages" as you describe above. The difference here is that there are guidelines -- usually municipality-by-municipality -- in the case of protests in the "real world", and protests are allowed if certain guidelines are followed. There are no guidelines that I am aware of for conducting a DDoS that proscribes how not to harm others instead of the target of said attack. - - ferg - -- Paul Ferguson PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2 Key fingerprint: 19EC 2945 FEE8 D6C8 58A1 CE53 2896 AC75 54DC 85B2 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iF4EAREIAAYFAlaevJsACgkQKJasdVTchbLY0wD5AQ+OezHiOQn0xEvkB5K9rELd XpslHOSheRWT9OEsd1cBALU1vOkPx2Crqqw3c9Rwo2+gL3QADHQZ3SCougBYhkhk =dGwl -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Tue Jan 19 15:00:52 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63A321A1B5C for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 15:00:50 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.602 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.602 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id yi4wt8aqcwTX for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 15:00:47 -0800 (PST) Received: from mxout-07.mxes.net (mxout-07.mxes.net [216.86.168.182]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3725D1A1A4A for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 15:00:47 -0800 (PST) Received: from [192.168.1.101] (unknown [120.149.194.112]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.mxes.net (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0248E22E25F; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 18:00:41 -0500 (EST) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 8.2 $2104$) From: Mark Nottingham In-Reply-To: <20160119221804.GE1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 10:00:38 +1100 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <0B1B3A4C-19C7-46F5-B8B0-70541A96260C@mnot.net> References: <20160119215059.GC1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB359.3050405@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221804.GE1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> To: Joss Wright X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.2104) Archived-At: Cc: Corinne Cath , hrpc@irtf.org, Stephen Farrell Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case one: Status code 451 X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 23:00:50 -0000 The major use case is on the Web server itself, not the network. E.g., = Google, Github, Facebook, etc. are all constantly asked to censor = content in various jurisdictions. 451 allows this to be easily = discovered, e.g., by the Lumen Database.=20 > On 20 Jan 2016, at 9:18 am, Joss Wright = wrote: >=20 > On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 10:06:17PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>=20 >>=20 >> On 19/01/16 21:50, Joss Wright wrote: >>> I've always been confused by the proposals for status code 451, as = it's >>> always seemed to me largely pointless, apart from the political = message sent >>> by the existence of the code, for a server to respond with an error = code for >>> censorship, as the vast majority of internet filtering occurs in the = network >>> rather than at the server itself. >>>=20 >>> (Servers with resources blocked by China's Golden Shield, for = example, don't >>> have the opportunity to send a code -- they simply never receive the >>> requests. Obviously the filtering system is unlikely to inject a = 451 >>> itself. Even for those states that do choose to notify users of = blocked >>> content, such as Qatar, that doesn't seem appropriate for a 4xx = series >>> status code.) >>>=20 >>> It only seems to make sense in situations where a server operator = has been >>> ordered to remove hosted content, or not to serve it to particular = classes >>> of user. As I've not been part of the discussion, I'm interested as = to >>> whether that has been the stated purpose of the code? >>=20 >> I wasn't very active in this myself but some people with whom I = chatted were >> convinced by the fact that 451 allowed for automation. For example = if you get >> a 451 response a UA might be able to re-try the request via some = other n/w >> path. Similarly, a crawler might be able to correlate the places in = which one >> gets a 451 and produce e.g. useful statistics or maps. >=20 > How would a UA get a 451, though, if it can't reach the server in the = first > place due to network filtering? (This is a long-term and genuine = confusion > regarding this proposal -- I really want to know if I'm missing = something > obvious.) >=20 >>=20 >> S. >>=20 >>=20 >>>=20 >>> Joss >>>=20 >>> On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 09:03:03PM +0000, Corinne Cath wrote: >>>> =E2=80=8BAs promised, case number 1. =E2=80=8B >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> *Status Code 451* >>>>=20 >>>> Every Internet user has run into the =E2=80=98404 Not Found=E2=80=99 = Hypertext Transfer >>>> Protocol (HTTP) status code when trying, and failing, to access a >>>> particular website. It is a response status that the server sends = to the >>>> browser, when the server cannot locate the URL. =E2=80=98403 = Forbidden=E2=80=99 is another >>>> example of this class of code signals that gives users information = about >>>> what is going on. In the =E2=80=98403=E2=80=99 case the server can = be reached, but is >>>> blocking the request because the user is trying to access content = forbidden >>>> to them. This can be because the specific user is not allowed = access to the >>>> content (like a government employee trying to access pornography on = a >>>> work-computer) or because access is restricted to all users (like = social >>>> network sites in certain countries). As surveillance and = censorship of the >>>> Internet is becoming more commonplace, voices were raised at the = IETF to >>>> introduce a new status code that indicates when something is not = available >>>> for =E2=80=98legal reasons=E2=80=99 (like censorship): >>>>=20 >>>> The [451 status] code would allow server operators to operate with = greater >>>> transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public policy = affect >>>> their operation. This transparency may be beneficial both to these >>>> operators and to end-users (Bray 2012:3). >>>>=20 >>>> The status code would be named =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99, a reference = to Bradbury=E2=80=99s famous >>>> novel on censorship. In practice the code would look like this: >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> [image: Inline image 3] >>>>=20 >>>> Figure 5. Status code 451 (Source: Website Bray, author of the = 451-status >>>> code ID) >>>>=20 >>>> During the IETF meeting in Dallas, there was discussion about the >>>> usefulness of =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99. The main tension revolved = around the lack of an >>>> apparent machine-readable technical use of the information. The = extent to >>>> which =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99 is just =E2=80=98political theater=E2=80=99= or whether it has a concrete >>>> technical use was heatedly debated. Some argued that =E2=80=98the = 451 status code >>>> is just a status code with a response body=E2=80=99 others said it = was problematic >>>> because =E2=80=98it brings law into the picture=E2=80=99 [1] . = Again others argued that it >>>> would be useful for individuals, or organizations like the = =E2=80=98Chilling >>>> Effects=E2=80=99 project, crawling the web to get an indication of = censorship (IETF >>>> discussion on =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99 =E2=80=93 author=E2=80=99s = field notes March 2015). >>>>=20 >>>> There was no outright objection during the Dallas meeting against = moving >>>> forward on status code =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99, and on December 18, = 2015 the Internet >>>> Engineering Steering Group approved publication of "An HTTP Status = Code to >>>> Report Legal Obstacles". It is still in the process of becoming an = RFC, but >>>> could effectively be used from the day of approval. >>>>=20 >>>> What is interesting about this particular case is that not only = technical >>>> arguments but also the status code=E2=80=99s outright potential = political use for >>>> civil society played a substantial role in shaping the discussion, = and the >>>> decision to move forward with this technology. >>>>=20 >>>> [1] = http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/minutes?item=3Dminutes-92-httpbis.html, >>>> discussions on 451 at IETF 92 in Dallas >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list >>>> hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>=20 >>>=20 >=20 > --=20 > Dr. Joss Wright | Research Fellow=20 > Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford > http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/?id=3D176 >=20 > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc -- Mark Nottingham https://www.mnot.net/ From nobody Tue Jan 19 15:45:21 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F35B01B37E6 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 15:45:19 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hy5NfMSr_RDu for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 15:45:18 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (mx2.yitter.info [IPv6:2600:3c03::f03c:91ff:fedf:cfab]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 468C61B37E4 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 15:45:18 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTP id B84BE108B4 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 23:45:17 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at crankycanuck.ca Received: from mx2.yitter.info ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mx2.yitter.info [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 7JXJTJq_I_zy for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 23:45:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (c-73-142-157-135.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.142.157.135]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A62C8105E5 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 23:45:16 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 18:45:14 -0500 From: Andrew Sullivan To: hrpc@irtf.org Message-ID: <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 23:45:20 -0000 On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 02:45:47PM -0800, Paul Ferguson wrote: > In the "real world", protesters get arrested if they don't play by the > rules, e.g. don't block traffic, cause risks to bystanders, carry > firearms, etc., and if they violate those rules, they are subject to > being arrested and charged by law enforcement. […] > There are no guidelines that I am aware of for conducting a DDoS that > proscribes how not to harm others instead of the target of said attack. The way all those meat-world rules got adopted, as a matter of history, was through the working out of whether or not there was a right to strike. Over time, as some jurisdictions determined that there was such a right, they codified the way that you were allowed to exercise the right. If you believe in natural rights (I'm with Bentham on them, but let's set that aside), and if you believe that online protest through this mechanism is such a right, then the analogy is quite strong: here is a natural right that you have and that is not recognized, and so there are no accepted ways yet for how you exercise the right. But as the right gets recognized, so do acceptable ways of exercising it. A DDoS that includes unwilling participant computers is presumably not allowed for the same reason that a strike cannot force non-unionized employees to support the strike. A DDoS that causes unfortunate consequences for the hosting business, however, might still conform to the analogy. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com From nobody Tue Jan 19 16:01:06 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6381E1B3805 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 16:01:04 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.302 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.302 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BA0QlDWzjmWl for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 16:01:02 -0800 (PST) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 133DF1B3814 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 16:01:01 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 21D77BE8A; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:00:59 +0000 (GMT) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id J5uEPyV-Mzo2; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:00:58 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [10.87.48.83] (unknown [86.46.20.159]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9770CBE83; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:00:57 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1453248057; bh=zgRARs2dDfhqLst6pzxoBetRrQbNvh462jTEvGqGS7g=; h=Subject:To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=fFFWj4nTg2Idqid/fuyZOBo9GBhM8qR/eIsVi1k9vUagmMElGP+U9Y4Ay6zcTw2Ob 8j0IVsFwmp6Abx1X3ZRRFm9+a/ieS1e3005AnipjuJYHH9p+yJZlb3TB25bQ3F0eCh 9IMD5I0bjWPH/wytnquPk2mQmccOxHEjDn0DA8T4= To: Andrew Sullivan , hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=D66EA7906F0B897FB2E97D582F3C8736805F8DA2; url= Message-ID: <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:00:57 +0000 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:01:04 -0000 On 19/01/16 23:45, Andrew Sullivan wrote: > On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 02:45:47PM -0800, Paul Ferguson wrote: >> In the "real world", protesters get arrested if they don't play by the >> rules, e.g. don't block traffic, cause risks to bystanders, carry >> firearms, etc., and if they violate those rules, they are subject to >> being arrested and charged by law enforcement. > > […] > >> There are no guidelines that I am aware of for conducting a DDoS that >> proscribes how not to harm others instead of the target of said attack. > > The way all those meat-world rules got adopted, as a matter of > history, was through the working out of whether or not there was a > right to strike. Over time, as some jurisdictions determined that > there was such a right, they codified the way that you were allowed to > exercise the right. > > If you believe in natural rights (I'm with Bentham on them, but let's > set that aside), and if you believe that online protest through this > mechanism is such a right, then the analogy is quite strong: here is a > natural right that you have and that is not recognized, and so there > are no accepted ways yet for how you exercise the right. But as the > right gets recognized, so do acceptable ways of exercising it. A DDoS > that includes unwilling participant computers is presumably not > allowed for the same reason that a strike cannot force non-unionized > employees to support the strike. A DDoS that causes unfortunate > consequences for the hosting business, however, might still conform to > the analogy. I really think this is a bad analogy stretched way beyond breaking point. In a strike the strikers also suffer and the side effects on uninvolved parties are mostly minimal. Yes, one could try find a really exceptional case that's significantly different. I think we've agreed that 99.9% of DDoS involves botnets and deliberate and lasting damage to tens or hundreds of thousands of uninvolved parties' networks or computers. Yes, there might have been a handful of DoS-like attacks that were different. But strikes and DDoS are just not similar things at all as can be seen from the above. And Andrew, even if your analogy was not so utterly broken (as it in fact is:-) what explanatory benefit do we gain from it? I think the answer is none, so it's both a broken and a useless analogy, no matter that it might superficially sound less broken and as if it might maybe possibly explain something even if we can't say what. It could be useful for hrpc to discuss forms of protest on the Internet (in support of freedom of expression say) but this particular discussion isn't IMO useful and seems to rest on a misunderstanding of the very different nature of protests like strikes and DDoS. S. > > Best regards, > > A > From nobody Tue Jan 19 16:17:22 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 37C101B3845 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 16:17:21 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id f-O1Pkds5hOo for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 16:17:19 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (mx2.yitter.info [IPv6:2600:3c03::f03c:91ff:fedf:cfab]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3D8DB1B3844 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 16:17:18 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTP id D6A5A108B4 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:17:17 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at crankycanuck.ca Received: from mx2.yitter.info ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mx2.yitter.info [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id vSUXI4aGUGYT for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:17:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (c-73-142-157-135.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.142.157.135]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 01D2B105E5 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:17:16 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 19:17:15 -0500 From: Andrew Sullivan To: hrpc@irtf.org Message-ID: <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:17:21 -0000 On Wed, Jan 20, 2016 at 12:00:57AM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote: > And Andrew, even if your analogy was not so utterly broken > (as it in fact is:-) what explanatory benefit do we gain from > it? I seem to recall starting by saying that I think that there is no right to DDoSing anyway, but that the argument from "innocent bystanders" was a bad argument against DDoS rights. If you're going to make the "collateral damage" argument, you are stuck dealing with these kinds of analogies. I agree they can be attacked (all analogies can be), but it's a losing game. Arguments from precedent are all analogies and, by definition, analogies involve cases that have differences (otherwise, it's not an analogy). I prefer to deny the premise that we can even contemplate a right here. I think the reason DDoS isn't an acceptable political act or a protected right is precisely because it is an attack on the Internetworking infrastructure itself. It is therefore an attack on the very means of expression of any possible online right, and consequently it is absurd. If any argument about rights is to be coherent, it cannot rely on the absurdity of those rights. So there cannot be this right. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com From nobody Tue Jan 19 16:23:30 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1F4E11B384D for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 16:23:29 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.302 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.302 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 3Fnpo4lXvH1M for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 16:23:28 -0800 (PST) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D23CF1B384C for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 16:23:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8318BBE8B; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:23:26 +0000 (GMT) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8PcJ0n72lEXW; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:23:25 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [10.87.48.83] (unknown [86.46.20.159]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EF88DBE8A; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:23:24 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1453249405; bh=qBuXbnoLyMqFCscpBgFA5S7GMMGx5ALHRoUYzcZCZ7k=; h=Subject:To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=pD3z9Kn0VBtBV8kt842AZebAB3KTfWCzISV56OJryXibSeqf42uKEbAvKlDbR2n8K BXsv65qnpQFDzIJu5JJiIMZP2MX+bh2w5bhBVIRJ2ua5jxQ9ozd5fHVWCz+Xe3K/ns BVr7soxJm0U8IZzKRh0/zi2v8gFAfJYtPGQHx8Cs= To: Andrew Sullivan , hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=D66EA7906F0B897FB2E97D582F3C8736805F8DA2; url= Message-ID: <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:23:24 +0000 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:23:29 -0000 On 20/01/16 00:17, Andrew Sullivan wrote: > I prefer to deny the premise that we can even contemplate a right > here. I think the reason DDoS isn't an acceptable political act or a > protected right is precisely because it is an attack on the > Internetworking infrastructure itself. It is therefore an attack on > the very means of expression of any possible online right, and > consequently it is absurd. If any argument about rights is to be > coherent, it cannot rely on the absurdity of those rights. So there > cannot be this right. I agree that there is no such "right to DDoS" and that DDoS is unacceptable and ought always be treated as an attack regardless of anyone's real or claimed motivation. Cheers, S. From nobody Tue Jan 19 18:10:52 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CA94B1A0127 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 18:10:50 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.102 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.102 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_20=-0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, J_CHICKENPOX_12=0.6, J_CHICKENPOX_21=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id vbkSj1bWt9l2 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 18:10:48 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.gn.apc.org (mail.gn.apc.org [37.220.108.136]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5FC9B1A0122 for ; Tue, 19 Jan 2016 18:10:48 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.gn.apc.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5860720153C9 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 02:10:46 +0000 (GMT) X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at mail.gn.apc.org Received: from mail.gn.apc.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.gn.apc.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id sUXtotIwaviH for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 02:10:45 +0000 (GMT) Received: from anonymous ([10.254.254.3]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: mallory) by mail.gn.apc.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 995F1201423E for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 02:10:44 +0000 (GMT) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> From: Mallory Knodel X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 Message-ID: <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:11:07 -0500 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="QmrWaPvCQfWX8gGleCv5qJSQAqaPTjiFC" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 02:10:51 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --QmrWaPvCQfWX8gGleCv5qJSQAqaPTjiFC Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------090902090800030301010400" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------090902090800030301010400 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > On 20/01/16 00:17, Andrew Sullivan wrote: >> I prefer to deny the premise that we can even contemplate a right >> here. I think the reason DDoS isn't an acceptable political act or a >> protected right is precisely because it is an attack on the >> Internetworking infrastructure itself. It is therefore an attack on >> the very means of expression of any possible online right, and >> consequently it is absurd. If any argument about rights is to be >> coherent, it cannot rely on the absurdity of those rights. So there >> cannot be this right. > I agree that there is no such "right to DDoS" and that DDoS > is unacceptable and ought always be treated as an attack > regardless of anyone's real or claimed motivation. I agree; expressing this as a right is literally nonsense. What is civil disobedience without the "disobedience" part? As a supporter of activists who use DDoS, I think it's fine, if not great, that most people hate it. It's that discomfort that makes it work. But more to the original point: > first, it would require developing a method to establish when a DDoS > attack is a legitimate expression of the right to freedom of speech, > or whether it impedes on it. Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I mean, for the purposes of making the internet work better perhaps we should try. I don't think this will get in the way of activists using the internet in creative ways to make a point. > Second, it asks the IETF to reflect upon its role in creating a > commercialized Internet that has no defacto public space of inherent > protections for freedom of speech. One of the founding fathers of the > Internet, David Clark, recently published a paper warning that the > future of the Internet is in danger. He argues that the private sector > control over the Internet is too strong, limiting the myriad of ways > in which it can be used (Daedalus 2016), including for freedom of speec= h. This is very important. I want to think more about how to make all conversations this conversation. > As such, it is important for the IETF to consider the fact that DDoS > attacks are inherently dual-use and not take immediate sides on this > discussion.=20 Yes, DDoS is dual use. But again, even *if* we could get everyone to agree that DDoS is not a denial of free expression, not to mention an act that is widely condoned, then the action simply loses its teeth. The last thing we want is the online equivalent of "free speech zones"[0] sanctioned by IETF or anyone for that matter. -Mallory [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_speech_zone --=20 Mallory Knodel Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 --------------090902090800030301010400 Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:


On 20/01/16 00:17, Andrew Sullivan wrote:

I prefer to deny the premise that we can even cont=
emplate a right
here.  I think the reason DDoS isn't an acceptable political act or a
protected right is precisely because it is an attack on the
Internetworking infrastructure itself.  It is therefore an attack on
the very means of expression of any possible online right, and
consequently it is absurd.  If any argument about rights is to be
coherent, it cannot rely on the absurdity of those rights.  So there
cannot be this right.

I agree that there is no such "right to DDoS" and that DDoS
is unacceptable and ought always be treated as an attack
regardless of anyone's real or claimed motivation.

I agree; expressing this as a right is literally nonsense. What is civil disobedience without the "disobedience" part? As a supporter of activists who use DDoS, I think it's fine, if not great, that most people hate it. It's that discomfort that makes it work.

But more to the original point:

first, it would require developing a method= to establish when a DDoS attack is a legitimate expression of the right to freedom of speech, or whether it impedes on it.
Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I mean, for the purposes of making the internet work better perhaps we should try. I don't think this will get in the way of activists using the internet in creative ways to make a point.
Second, it asks the IETF to reflect upon its role in creating a commercialized Internet that has no defacto public space of inherent protections for freedom of speech. One of the founding fathers of the Internet, David Clark, recently published a paper warning that the future of the Internet is in danger. He argues that the private sector control over the Internet is too strong, limiting the myriad of ways in which it can be used (Daedalus 2016), including for freedom of speech.
This is very important. I want to think more about how to make all conversations this conversation.

As such, it is important for the IETF to consider the fact that DDoS attacks are inherently dual-use and not take immediate sides on this discussion.

Yes, DDoS is dual use. But again, even *if* we could get everyone to agree that DDoS is not a denial of free expression, not to mention an act that is widely condoned, then the action simply loses its teeth. The last thing we want is the online equivalent of "free speech zones"[0] sanctioned by IETF or anyone for that matter.

-Mallory

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_speech_zone<= /a>

--
Mallory Knodel
Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org
gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780

--------------090902090800030301010400-- --QmrWaPvCQfWX8gGleCv5qJSQAqaPTjiFC Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWnuy7AAoJEAwyonG9PMeAmZAH/3si6EQ6u1TATkUj4AdNm/nq aSiBVTsfnFHzcUoNjudTiWL6VjJtWD0gZph1AzSQTy5Mg8LwTZsjHAqlk7+GSwqs ndvNOu92tMiRLP+bYExVruPTMHlg8M3w6E+9oEovGN7DqzyMgOk3NoV2UQah1v/y T4dtb+otzYg6xIb7V389K+B6OKpoGJMK+aSXbAkQEJcl3dUT7nAu4m29n1ugLLUu Ibb8qI8qemYhwlE1A9/OjBvFTsUlpiIl6hQKIVn7+0Vg48bUwqPrKCbg+8tzB6fc 64vJ/4NkMPyMn44Z5jZtr7zKFUggA9MPvlmsPH/gndkkcp1reKKq6uxwGR+YDG0= =EyBc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --QmrWaPvCQfWX8gGleCv5qJSQAqaPTjiFC-- From nobody Wed Jan 20 00:23:35 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 463FC1B3915 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:23:34 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.195 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.195 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HELO_EQ_NL=0.55, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id zsjQddszYBmK for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:23:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from positron.dckd.nl (positron.dckd.nl [94.142.246.99]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B62CB1B3911 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 00:23:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from [172.20.10.6] (unknown [92.69.222.174]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by positron.dckd.nl (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CABC610A34; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 09:23:30 +0100 (CET) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) From: Jeroen van der Ham X-Mailer: iPad Mail (13C75) In-Reply-To: <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 09:23:29 +0100 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> To: Mallory Knodel Archived-At: Cc: hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 08:23:34 -0000 > On 20 Jan 2016, at 03:11, Mallory Knodel wrote: >=20 >> On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >=20 >> first, it would require developing a method to establish when a DDoS atta= ck is a legitimate expression of the right to freedom of speech, or whether i= t impedes on it. >=20 > Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I mean, for the p= urposes of making the internet work better perhaps we should try. I don't th= ink this will get in the way of activists using the internet in creative way= s to make a point. One way to at least make it harder is universal adoption of BCP38 and 84. This way you make performing DDoSes harder, and certainly more attributable.= Making it harder for DDoS attackers to hide, may make it more acceptable as a= form of legitimate protest. Although I completely agree that most DDoS atta= cks currently are not in this category. Most attacks currently are either ex= tortion or disrupting technical services in schools. Another form of protest on the Internet currently seem to be defacements. Ho= wever, these are currently more akin to graffiti and less to blocking access= to services. Jeroen.= From nobody Wed Jan 20 01:46:11 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A8B9F1ACD4B for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 01:46:09 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.199 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.199 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, J_CHICKENPOX_102=0.6, J_CHICKENPOX_42=0.6, J_CHICKENPOX_82=0.6, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id P9Zv4MnE6RIc for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 01:46:07 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-wm0-x22e.google.com (mail-wm0-x22e.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c09::22e]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 386651ACD16 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 01:46:07 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-wm0-x22e.google.com with SMTP id r129so123471337wmr.0 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 01:46:07 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=U+0PYL2s9+J/zD8gASYTciuFF0kIfOwilvNA61buELI=; b=d8O6AAiZSMgMeVKq9OMs3jV7rX5zc/fgMtE2uVF3erzFMw1a5+OHLys3nGSqIbPyyQ LZ+eQ2UTuV0SEHGvqb0JqS+/ZkSR/9LWoS4EQuP4zxmrH5yts+fOyWROO49NnJeGQusl IDnNcvoXU5BkDBqQn6GjR6WuHPtyoPbKFeb3f3So6Q+YmU3lTttMvGei4UZcJmIg2Fph BMUEsT/dxbUABV1iyav4uTW6yayE7kaNUZmx7fpq23p4YLEi8y4fFsnRf+NX3APWuhBP GC6s5h7MnqNWLtU1K23V7bSfdxLbR6p9Ru/VTajeoXwN4Rhu86SUogMdeB17ftX5PyIv mm+g== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=U+0PYL2s9+J/zD8gASYTciuFF0kIfOwilvNA61buELI=; b=cyx9OqpjyRjHj4zffdzqXuthFOz2LwKfIOgX0hyC4aQHYIDgsAPIpi1MbDrlNqP9ez 2FtyMPhC7GZgIHWH5ApN2pZUldA4pBbiTZWGnzZ03ud6wdk9lIuJpfkb2LliROcb81n3 mNgLP85Snpzq6QP9lafoY8xx5k2CSkXT4xElPmYIqjXQ1EEJzdAZIlp71KfuIIyanPzd wOSDBHQhw679TJjy0quYon4OuL+N+1mB7vHNgciQTaa2t1DNJYwv+Ck7oeeRiw1GeTq/ X2zIDrKqnZ86XGTzwr4bAbS9/+gI+r7szWJ0YIwIBRVm5hrVV8/o3HR4dHez2Al1v7BC 2rQg== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQmK7na54D9M93ghuzvXl9GWq57c1Oj6Ey+rcS/8NcodctOzrFUN8KXIOR6XwImpNz45j2PVlzbsnI45lBDjNNDF8agM+Q== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.194.63.40 with SMTP id d8mr34822941wjs.127.1453283165763; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 01:46:05 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.194.5.103 with HTTP; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 01:46:05 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.194.5.103 with HTTP; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 01:46:05 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 10:46:05 +0100 Message-ID: From: Seun Ojedeji To: Jeroen van der Ham Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7ba97644da835b0529c0da4e Archived-At: Cc: Mallory Knodel , hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 09:46:09 -0000 --047d7ba97644da835b0529c0da4e Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Well, DDoS is not a protocol but a procedure/process that relies on/use existing protocols. Those protocols have their own benefits/advantages that cannot be underestimated. I know network admin colleagues(oh yes probably guilty as well) who for one reason or the other have utilised those targeted DDoS (ideas) towards an intruder (whether it's legitimate or a right is a different thing) So while I am not supporting that DDoS is a good thing, my point is that as one looks to review existing RFCs(if required) or adopt best practice(as you indicated), it has to be that creativity and innovation opportunities is not lost as that is one of the reasons the internet has naturally grown and flourished. I personally like BCPs referenced and appreciate using BCP approach to address these issues as much as possible. Lastly, I use a modified version of Stephen's statement, "Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS...for the purposes of making the internet work better AND REMAIN OPEN perhaps we should NOT try..." Regards On 20 Jan 2016 09:23, "Jeroen van der Ham" wrote: > > On 20 Jan 2016, at 03:11, Mallory Knodel wrote: > > > >> On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > > >> first, it would require developing a method to establish when a DDoS > attack is a legitimate expression of the right to freedom of speech, or > whether it impedes on it. > > > > Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I mean, for > the purposes of making the internet work better perhaps we should try. I > don't think this will get in the way of activists using the internet in > creative ways to make a point. > > One way to at least make it harder is universal adoption of BCP38 and 84. > This way you make performing DDoSes harder, and certainly more > attributable. > > Making it harder for DDoS attackers to hide, may make it more acceptable > as a form of legitimate protest. Although I completely agree that most DDoS > attacks currently are not in this category. Most attacks currently are > either extortion or disrupting technical services in schools. > > Another form of protest on the Internet currently seem to be defacements. > However, these are currently more akin to graffiti and less to blocking > access to services. > > Jeroen. > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc > --047d7ba97644da835b0529c0da4e Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Well, DDoS is not a protocol but a procedure/process that re= lies on/use existing protocols. Those protocols have their own benefits/adv= antages that cannot be underestimated. I know network admin colleagues(oh y= es probably guilty as well) who for one reason or the other have utilised t= hose targeted DDoS (ideas) towards an intruder (whether it's legitimate= or a right is a different thing)

So while I am not supporting that DDoS is a good thing, my p= oint is that as one looks to review existing RFCs(if required) or adopt bes= t practice(as you indicated), it has to be that creativity and innovation o= pportunities is not lost as that is one of the reasons the internet has nat= urally grown and flourished.=C2=A0 I personally like BCPs referenced and ap= preciate using BCP approach to address these issues as much as possible.
Lastly, I use a modified version of Stephen's statement,= "Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS...for the purposes of mak= ing the internet work better AND REMAIN OPEN perhaps we should NOT try...&q= uot;

Regards

On 20 Jan 2016 09:23, "Jeroen van der Ham&q= uot; <jeroen@os3.nl> wrote:
> On 20 Jan 2016, at = 03:11, Mallory Knodel <mallory@apc.or= g> wrote:
>
>> On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>
>> first, it would require developing a method to establish when a DD= oS attack is a legitimate expression of the right to freedom of speech, or = whether it impedes on it.
>
> Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I mean, for = the purposes of making the internet work better perhaps we should try. I do= n't think this will get in the way of activists using the internet in c= reative ways to make a point.

One way to at least make it harder is universal adoption of BCP38 and 84. This way you make performing DDoSes harder, and certainly more attributable= .

Making it harder for DDoS attackers to hide, may make it more acceptable as= a form of legitimate protest. Although I completely agree that most DDoS a= ttacks currently are not in this category. Most attacks currently are eithe= r extortion or disrupting technical services in schools.

Another form of protest on the Internet currently seem to be defacements. H= owever, these are currently more akin to graffiti and less to blocking acce= ss to services.

Jeroen.
_______________________________________________
hrpc mailing list
hrpc@irtf.org
https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc

--047d7ba97644da835b0529c0da4e-- From nobody Wed Jan 20 02:27:13 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D8A161B39D9 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 02:27:12 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.302 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.302 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id k3ILIRw5Y4I4 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 02:27:11 -0800 (PST) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4C6221B39D6 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 02:27:11 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 92FA8BE49; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 10:27:08 +0000 (GMT) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id a0Z2jNfZ8D5I; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 10:27:08 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [134.226.36.93] (bilbo.dsg.cs.tcd.ie [134.226.36.93]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id F14D0BE47; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 10:27:07 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1453285628; bh=xCYACG94XiKDWqUxJv0kQIMy1zkiQVT9Fmg/Via2h/I=; h=Subject:To:References:Cc:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=lWFnU+uxUl5RyiApwyosntxgjOBGTzc6EKJC7aW/1uLqODDFjxFANdM41TYfBEk+d WcNhDTSEjThATuP5wigkHYaYN2V0gQsCmqAVvfjJ1NHQacdRKpI1XfgUqENfGNLf+4 xGBCL6XvYeQxElp0aaAQiniX74QT30+Aqaqbt7UE= To: Jeroen van der Ham , Mallory Knodel References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=D66EA7906F0B897FB2E97D582F3C8736805F8DA2; url= X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 Message-ID: <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 10:27:07 +0000 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Archived-At: Cc: hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 10:27:13 -0000 The quoting below has gotten messed up and attributes text to me that I didn't write. I do not consider that that rights language is even appropriate when discussing DDoS, which is always and only an attack. And FWIW, IMO anyone who claims that any DDoS can ever be somthing other than an attack is as a side-effect damaging the work that we have been doing over the last few years to counter pervasive monitoring (PM). (And yes, that's why I'm so loud in this thread:-) Effectively countering PM (to the extent we can) requires us to not consider the motives of the attacker. In the case of DDoS we should follow the same logic, and conclude DDoS is always an attack. The only alternative I see is to (stupidly) start to consider some attacks and attackers as "ok" and therefore lose the ability to make a cogent argument against PM. Let's not do the latter. I'd argue that the right thing to do here for us all to agree that there's no utility in ever talking about DDoS other than as an attack, and to declare victory for this topic with that result. S On 20/01/16 08:23, Jeroen van der Ham wrote: >> On 20 Jan 2016, at 03:11, Mallory Knodel wrote: >> >>> On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >> >>> first, it would require developing a method to establish when a >>> DDoS attack is a legitimate expression of the right to freedom of >>> speech, or whether it impedes on it. >> >> Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I mean, >> for the purposes of making the internet work better perhaps we >> should try. I don't think this will get in the way of activists >> using the internet in creative ways to make a point. > > One way to at least make it harder is universal adoption of BCP38 and > 84. This way you make performing DDoSes harder, and certainly more > attributable. > > Making it harder for DDoS attackers to hide, may make it more > acceptable as a form of legitimate protest. Although I completely > agree that most DDoS attacks currently are not in this category. Most > attacks currently are either extortion or disrupting technical > services in schools. > > Another form of protest on the Internet currently seem to be > defacements. However, these are currently more akin to graffiti and > less to blocking access to services. > > Jeroen. _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing > list hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc > From nobody Wed Jan 20 16:21:34 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 95ECA1B2B81 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 16:21:33 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.221 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.221 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, J_CHICKENPOX_65=0.6, MIME_8BIT_HEADER=0.3, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id jUUGqPfFOy-C for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 16:21:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-vk0-x22a.google.com (mail-vk0-x22a.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:400c:c05::22a]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7DB0D1B2B7F for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 16:21:32 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-vk0-x22a.google.com with SMTP id k1so14572639vkb.2 for ; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 16:21:32 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=isoc-cr-org.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=from:to:subject:date:message-id:mime-version:content-type :content-transfer-encoding; bh=P8GOX9QVBWiQc8yj0rubxrn4/9Ge7PGzLmvq9M/342s=; b=e6mlUG1qp8OWKA/JMcnnWRAKw4bX3LDALBTgXpU49fHstrOWwXMeO/y1VMa8+hWajf hm1Ihwj95iEjK0ZneE6duUhwbVWKPpqvE/yQ99jHjmnuM3gJuKXLeC+1WEv3u6kfVtjh cm8MB23hGMbJ9HD74bE+POaH+kdw8LZglzcbWv4zboTln4o8ddqAGAdmIUllD724ADDu ePjQnGB9SX/x6JQHV1+LPeePdfv2LcRKMCDv0A+ZTESjP3u4a48ZZIoG4t7UZnx0qdHr LJ6nA4Cnm+9u3BQR6iQTT0o8P169/R2eqEM546m6orV4R40KVf6+QqKR17w+tZ3oeBXi i/KQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:subject:date:message-id:mime-version :content-type:content-transfer-encoding; bh=P8GOX9QVBWiQc8yj0rubxrn4/9Ge7PGzLmvq9M/342s=; b=Q0PP5w+L6pGHOJCsXvDd/yjv42+6OB3g/yobOj+L3bKUQUtBEbEpgXOzkylyaCOnqo m6JvFNjFv7i+QxWJl9gq2su408CFE8F9MuAakJtS5OCATC7u9D5fPBXIW4FxQuCRY3Ye CWE6um0I5Kkf+FugcICrYY3l3dwQfPED+WF8GmTXlvUob4UOIWCIbVvv/D/Y2F3T398T BNsixinZraSspeUb1c0ZDns/jlcaWT904UDScE6wTvfLyn1WyWcY2G8F37nJOXM7AlMc gz61rWjtVsa/SMNAykJXWgEXLFfSfL6rRY9Xf/a9HDH4nrggHtjn4ZF+OVnhxagP8icf iV8g== X-Gm-Message-State: AG10YORnfBBEOO+NZf6+rO2FUPXcxFMx5jk0NpFIZass8FST2wtTnwKtQ1FHRBEpWOzYRQ== X-Received: by 10.31.182.69 with SMTP id g66mr21505017vkf.73.1453335691523; Wed, 20 Jan 2016 16:21:31 -0800 (PST) Received: from [186.4.26.163] ([186.4.26.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id i126sm6971996vke.23.2016.01.20.16.21.30 for (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Wed, 20 Jan 2016 16:21:30 -0800 (PST) From: "Carlos =?utf-8?q?Guti=C3=A9rrez?= G." To: hrpc@irtf.org Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2016 18:21:28 -0600 Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Mailer: MailMate (1.9.3r5187) Archived-At: Subject: [hrpc] help X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 00:21:33 -0000 help Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez ===================== +506 8837 7176 Skype carlos.raulg Apartado 1571-1000 San Jose COSTA RICA On 20 Jan 2016, at 14:00, hrpc-request@irtf.org wrote: > Send hrpc mailing list submissions to > hrpc@irtf.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > hrpc-request@irtf.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > hrpc-owner@irtf.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of hrpc digest..." > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Case three: DDoS (Stephen Farrell) > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc From nobody Thu Jan 21 00:49:33 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 655761A1A80 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 00:49:32 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 2.923 X-Spam-Level: ** X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.923 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_40=-0.001, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545, J_CHICKENPOX_65=0.6, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Fjg7PuoDMXgX for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 00:49:30 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (vps784.greenhost.nl [213.108.108.114]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 496641A1A90 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 00:49:29 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D10D912403D for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 08:49:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTP id BA91C124036 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 08:49:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.article19.io ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.article19.io [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id EeWkJrO4pW64 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 08:49:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [145.18.161.216] (wcw-staff-145-18-161-216.wireless.uva.nl [145.18.161.216]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 901A0124032 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 08:49:27 +0000 (UTC) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: From: Niels ten Oever Message-ID: <56A09B95.7070805@article19.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 09:49:25 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] help X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 08:49:32 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hi Carlos, I guess this is less of an existential outcry and more of a mistake in addressee, I think you wanted to send this too: hrpc-request@irtf.org. Best, Niels Niels ten Oever Head of Digital Article 19 www.article19.org PGP fingerprint 8D9F C567 BEE4 A431 56C4 678B 08B5 A0F2 636D 68E9 On 01/21/2016 01:21 AM, Carlos Guti=C3=A9rrez G. wrote: > help >=20 >=20 > Carlos Ra=C3=BAl Guti=C3=A9rrez =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D +506 8837 7176 Skype > carlos.raulg Apartado 1571-1000 San Jose COSTA RICA On 20 Jan 2016, > at 14:00, hrpc-request@irtf.org wrote: >=20 >> Send hrpc mailing list submissions to hrpc@irtf.org >>=20 >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit=20 >> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc or, via email, send a >> message with subject or body 'help' to hrpc-request@irtf.org >>=20 >> You can reach the person managing the list at=20 >> hrpc-owner@irtf.org >>=20 >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more >> specific than "Re: Contents of hrpc digest..." Today's Topics: >>=20 >> 1. Re: Case three: DDoS (Stephen Farrell)=20 >> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing >> list hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >=20 > _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list=20 > hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >=20 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoJuVAAoJEAi1oPJjbWjpwrAIAKLCK6kvCvjXS1GLMHnpWEQp B/xBhXx0XCtKXRC+ug4Of7HN1GabUpkZkU0eLHltq2/yoUf0BREzktq62pgXwMWc +A+81PtR0qapLZ8LvsaJ7hphPG0waYd17n+mSmFo2ucll56pzEqeyfPhVGGMxKGE Vo9juynB0j1twfKqkW+PlZU4Y5dQpRY+LjrMeKCixM6DKmX/r1Mc0G66wK2ERk02 ooIYqzKQVswXgIsqO+atPt8I24IyW+hQim3BGu4fC+N9N2740jmuct7ZBsNA3q+l e/cwzEPFHoY6HwUgt5oBohSmxCh4DLVGAYpG6dZys8Xf+M+M+FcvI5PLRk/62Bc=3D =3DCaeP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Thu Jan 21 02:01:11 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 94E571A2130 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 02:01:10 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 3.124 X-Spam-Level: *** X-Spam-Status: No, score=3.124 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id t2k3_3Rttmc1 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 02:01:07 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (vps784.greenhost.nl [213.108.108.114]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3F3261A2182 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 02:01:06 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5090A164016 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:01:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTP id 40E73164013 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:01:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.article19.io ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.article19.io [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id Nmy05dWNXKN3 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:01:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [145.18.161.216] (wcw-staff-145-18-161-216.wireless.uva.nl [145.18.161.216]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 080E716400E for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:01:05 +0000 (UTC) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> From: Niels ten Oever X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 Message-ID: <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 11:01:04 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:01:10 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, Am enjoying this thread. Some replies inline: On 01/20/2016 11:27 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >=20 > The quoting below has gotten messed up and attributes text to me=20 > that I didn't write. >=20 > I do not consider that that rights language is even appropriate=20 > when discussing DDoS, which is always and only an attack. >=20 I think we're getting to the core of the matter here. > And FWIW, IMO anyone who claims that any DDoS can ever be somthing=20 > other than an attack is as a side-effect damaging the work that we=20 > have been doing over the last few years to counter pervasive=20 > monitoring (PM). (And yes, that's why I'm so loud in this > thread:-) >=20 If I can try to translate what Stephen is saying in rights langauge: IETF is working on freedom of expression and access to information (=3D connectivity), everything that hinders that, even if that falls under the Right to Association / Protest (some particular uses of DDoS), that is a inherent violation. If this is a correct representation, I'm not sure if it is in line with human rights law where human right should be balanced. Perhaps we could also consider 'proportionality' (of DDoS) here? > Effectively countering PM (to the extent we can) requires us to not > consider the motives of the attacker. In the case of DDoS we should > follow the same logic, and conclude DDoS is always an attack. The > only alternative I see is to (stupidly) start to consider some > attacks and attackers as "ok" and therefore lose the ability to > make a cogent argument against PM. Let's not do the latter. >=20 I don't think the IETF should consider the motive of the attacker, and I think one can still consider DDoS (in some cases) as legitimate while still trying to make it much harder (as Jeroen said for instance by implementing BCP38 and 84). > I'd argue that the right thing to do here for us all to agree that > there's no utility in ever talking about DDoS other than as an > attack, and to declare victory for this topic with that result. >=20 Am afraid we're not yet at this conclusion yet, but happy to continue to discuss. Cheers, Niels > S >=20 > On 20/01/16 08:23, Jeroen van der Ham wrote: >>> On 20 Jan 2016, at 03:11, Mallory Knodel >>> wrote: >>>=20 >>>> On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>=20 >>>> first, it would require developing a method to establish when >>>> a DDoS attack is a legitimate expression of the right to >>>> freedom of speech, or whether it impedes on it. >>>=20 >>> Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I >>> mean, for the purposes of making the internet work better >>> perhaps we should try. I don't think this will get in the way >>> of activists using the internet in creative ways to make a >>> point. >>=20 >> One way to at least make it harder is universal adoption of BCP38 >> and 84. This way you make performing DDoSes harder, and certainly >> more attributable. >>=20 >> Making it harder for DDoS attackers to hide, may make it more=20 >> acceptable as a form of legitimate protest. Although I >> completely agree that most DDoS attacks currently are not in this >> category. Most attacks currently are either extortion or >> disrupting technical services in schools. >>=20 >> Another form of protest on the Internet currently seem to be=20 >> defacements. However, these are currently more akin to graffiti >> and less to blocking access to services. >>=20 >> Jeroen. _______________________________________________ hrpc >> mailing list hrpc@irtf.org >> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>=20 >=20 > _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list=20 > hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >=20 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoKxgAAoJEAi1oPJjbWjp9scIAJDLo98a+NXg4qH2iXq9ENlz 23yuk6qzR/T/RifGrzwN710qDwMDT0HkJ/o7S44apwmu3JAjYeSXEuMjDS2TerB8 ip3+CvHgsn91aM0vERmY8DZoTH1jYLqRueUASKc+t5vT++OWXLqUJ+UG+88FtNl1 lItU9W8jeLQqhIdpKUkBw7gSopetFfiU+683+BVfwFJA2Jfm1oDrawcQh4hpl7f0 itDJljuEUlQtLC2uXzUBM2QnTI04SvvreKCt/qLnG2uh9XiHA3LU/lskHgl26N5X QuTngnmPifnzMFmaxVtW4qulXah6h00JmOQwZaAb7LNrBU/lXj7KWrAlhwMcYy0=3D =3Dfaib -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Thu Jan 21 02:07:49 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2DE071A21BF for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 02:07:48 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 4.324 X-Spam-Level: **** X-Spam-Status: No, score=4.324 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545, J_CHICKENPOX_12=0.6, J_CHICKENPOX_21=0.6, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LKWPJIytp8Z8 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 02:07:46 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (vps784.greenhost.nl [213.108.108.114]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B428D1A21B7 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 02:07:46 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9094D164017 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:07:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTP id 79515164013 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:07:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.article19.io ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.article19.io [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id GsxETE8OH1Eh for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:07:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [145.18.161.216] (wcw-staff-145-18-161-216.wireless.uva.nl [145.18.161.216]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3EBF516400E for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:07:45 +0000 (UTC) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> From: Niels ten Oever X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 Message-ID: <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 11:07:44 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:07:48 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hi Mallory, On 01/20/2016 03:11 AM, Mallory Knodel wrote: >=20 >=20 > On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>=20 >> On 20/01/16 00:17, Andrew Sullivan wrote: >>> I prefer to deny the premise that we can even contemplate a >>> right here. I think the reason DDoS isn't an acceptable >>> political act or a protected right is precisely because it is >>> an attack on the Internetworking infrastructure itself. It is >>> therefore an attack on the very means of expression of any >>> possible online right, and consequently it is absurd. If any >>> argument about rights is to be coherent, it cannot rely on the >>> absurdity of those rights. So there cannot be this right. >> I agree that there is no such "right to DDoS" and that DDoS is >> unacceptable and ought always be treated as an attack regardless >> of anyone's real or claimed motivation. >=20 > I agree; expressing this as a right is literally nonsense. What is > civil disobedience without the "disobedience" part? As a supporter > of activists who use DDoS, I think it's fine, if not great, that > most people hate it. It's that discomfort that makes it work. >=20 I have a hard time understanding your argument here Mallory. Do you think everyone who used DDoS should be exposed to legal cases because else it would not be an effective tool and it is the risk of the game? > But more to the original point: >=20 >> first, it would require developing a method to establish when a >> DDoS attack is a legitimate expression of the right to freedom of >> speech, or whether it impedes on it. >=20 > Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I mean, > for the purposes of making the internet work better perhaps we > should try. I don't think this will get in the way of activists > using the internet in creative ways to make a point. >=20 >> Second, it asks the IETF to reflect upon its role in creating a=20 >> commercialized Internet that has no defacto public space of >> inherent protections for freedom of speech. One of the founding >> fathers of the Internet, David Clark, recently published a paper >> warning that the future of the Internet is in danger. He argues >> that the private sector control over the Internet is too strong, >> limiting the myriad of ways in which it can be used (Daedalus >> 2016), including for freedom of speech. >=20 > This is very important. I want to think more about how to make all=20 > conversations this conversation. >=20 >> As such, it is important for the IETF to consider the fact that >> DDoS attacks are inherently dual-use and not take immediate sides >> on this discussion. >=20 > Yes, DDoS is dual use. But again, even *if* we could get everyone > to agree that DDoS is not a denial of free expression, not to > mention an act that is widely condoned, then the action simply > loses its teeth. The last thing we want is the online equivalent of > "free speech zones"[0] sanctioned by IETF or anyone for that > matter. >=20 Here you seem to say that legal / accepted protest is ineffective. Am I right? #confused. Best, Niels > -Mallory >=20 > [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_speech_zone -- Mallory > Knodel Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org > gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 > 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 >=20 >=20 > _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list=20 > hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >=20 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoK3wAAoJEAi1oPJjbWjpghYH/RXHOQG4U+GLgbOYhckr6Dv/ 3H9LD9gtJSUPsuvQ/DhaaWGPc0Sj/EEevGI3HcsNffpNyk8N1cbzkM8AZ/i0BASy FQRKooHyD4loklzDmus0MTx5Wvz7jpnIXUGgZR2Lhnfm2ZZ1bcb+TiF/rgkjEb6v TFl3xxzkD6YsR4TT8CGfKhkmQSi5XuxRCx7Zxj1AikHXwK7WUuQ1EDLXz/RJlEob whRX3eB0ioCtmpGx1XJJb9Rx6nRt0gluQf27o9649A/Q3grNtNR1AePkNUCoF7VZ XD7ijUQLETzwXuRsC5FpYPTdpg6v4uLgWKZyPnLoE5g3ofc3wGTbVJUO2J7NN00=3D =3DV/H6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Thu Jan 21 02:27:00 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 311091A6F6F for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 02:26:59 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 1.824 X-Spam-Level: * X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.824 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_05=-0.5, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id J9OqeJqYWcp0 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 02:26:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (vps784.greenhost.nl [213.108.108.114]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 29DDC1A6F6E for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 02:26:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0E6DB174030 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:26:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTP id 00FF1174026 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:26:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.article19.io ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.article19.io [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id QLW9CBGDHhVP for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:26:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [145.18.161.216] (wcw-staff-145-18-161-216.wireless.uva.nl [145.18.161.216]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D6C2E174023 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:26:53 +0000 (UTC) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: <20160119215059.GC1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB359.3050405@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221804.GE1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <0B1B3A4C-19C7-46F5-B8B0-70541A96260C@mnot.net> From: Niels ten Oever X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 Message-ID: <56A0B26D.4070204@article19.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 11:26:53 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <0B1B3A4C-19C7-46F5-B8B0-70541A96260C@mnot.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case one: Status code 451 X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:26:59 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 ISPs who are ordered to block content could also serve this message, right? The arguments for this are AFAIK: 1. Transparency (reason for blocking, possibility to complain) 2. Measure-ability 3. Possibility for re-try via another path / trigger Tor, VPN, etc. At 32C3 an argument was made that HTTP error code 451 would somehow grant legitimacy to censorship. I do not agree with this argument, but I think it's good to discuss this point. Best, Niels Niels ten Oever Head of Digital Article 19 www.article19.org PGP fingerprint 8D9F C567 BEE4 A431 56C4 678B 08B5 A0F2 636D 68E9 On 01/20/2016 12:00 AM, Mark Nottingham wrote: > The major use case is on the Web server itself, not the network.=20 > E.g., Google, Github, Facebook, etc. are all constantly asked to=20 > censor content in various jurisdictions. 451 allows this to be > easily discovered, e.g., by the Lumen Database. >=20 >=20 >> On 20 Jan 2016, at 9:18 am, Joss Wright >> wrote: >>=20 >> On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 10:06:17PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> On 19/01/16 21:50, Joss Wright wrote: >>>> I've always been confused by the proposals for status code >>>> 451, as it's always seemed to me largely pointless, apart >>>> from the political message sent by the existence of the code, >>>> for a server to respond with an error code for censorship, as >>>> the vast majority of internet filtering occurs in the network >>>> rather than at the server itself. >>>>=20 >>>> (Servers with resources blocked by China's Golden Shield, >>>> for example, don't have the opportunity to send a code -- >>>> they simply never receive the requests. Obviously the >>>> filtering system is unlikely to inject a 451 itself. Even for >>>> those states that do choose to notify users of blocked >>>> content, such as Qatar, that doesn't seem appropriate for a >>>> 4xx series status code.) >>>>=20 >>>> It only seems to make sense in situations where a server=20 >>>> operator has been ordered to remove hosted content, or not >>>> to serve it to particular classes of user. As I've not been >>>> part of the discussion, I'm interested as to whether that has >>>> been the stated purpose of the code? >>>=20 >>> I wasn't very active in this myself but some people with whom >>> I chatted were convinced by the fact that 451 allowed for=20 >>> automation. For example if you get a 451 response a UA might >>> be able to re-try the request via some other n/w path. >>> Similarly, a crawler might be able to correlate the places in >>> which one gets a 451 and produce e.g. useful statistics or >>> maps. >>=20 >> How would a UA get a 451, though, if it can't reach the server >> in the first place due to network filtering? (This is a long-term >> and genuine confusion regarding this proposal -- I really want to >> know if I'm missing something obvious.) >>=20 >>>=20 >>> S. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Joss >>>>=20 >>>> On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 09:03:03PM +0000, Corinne Cath >>>> wrote: >>>>> =E2=80=8BAs promised, case number 1. =E2=80=8B >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> *Status Code 451* >>>>>=20 >>>>> Every Internet user has run into the =E2=80=98404 Not Found=E2=80=99= =20 >>>>> Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) status code when >>>>> trying, and failing, to access a particular website. It is >>>>> a response status that the server sends to the browser, >>>>> when the server cannot locate the URL. =E2=80=98403 Forbidden=E2=80= =99 is >>>>> another example of this class of code signals that gives >>>>> users information about what is going on. In the =E2=80=98403=E2=80= =99 case >>>>> the server can be reached, but is blocking the request >>>>> because the user is trying to access content forbidden to >>>>> them. This can be because the specific user is not allowed >>>>> access to the content (like a government employee trying to >>>>> access pornography on a work-computer) or because access >>>>> is restricted to all users (like social network sites in >>>>> certain countries). As surveillance and censorship of the >>>>> Internet is becoming more commonplace, voices were raised >>>>> at the IETF to introduce a new status code that indicates >>>>> when something is not available for =E2=80=98legal reasons=E2=80=99= (like >>>>> censorship): >>>>>=20 >>>>> The [451 status] code would allow server operators to >>>>> operate with greater transparency in circumstances where >>>>> issues of law or public policy affect their operation. >>>>> This transparency may be beneficial both to these operators >>>>> and to end-users (Bray 2012:3). >>>>>=20 >>>>> The status code would be named =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99, a reference t= o=20 >>>>> Bradbury=E2=80=99s famous novel on censorship. In practice the >>>>> code would look like this: >>>>>=20 >>>>>=20 >>>>> [image: Inline image 3] >>>>>=20 >>>>> Figure 5. Status code 451 (Source: Website Bray, author of=20 >>>>> the 451-status code ID) >>>>>=20 >>>>> During the IETF meeting in Dallas, there was discussion >>>>> about the usefulness of =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99. The main tension rev= olved >>>>> around the lack of an apparent machine-readable technical >>>>> use of the information. The extent to which =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99 i= s just >>>>> =E2=80=98political theater=E2=80=99 or whether it has a concrete te= chnical >>>>> use was heatedly debated. Some argued that =E2=80=98the 451 status >>>>> code is just a status code with a response body=E2=80=99 others >>>>> said it was problematic because =E2=80=98it brings law into the >>>>> picture=E2=80=99 [1] . Again others argued that it would be useful >>>>> for individuals, or organizations like the =E2=80=98Chilling >>>>> Effects=E2=80=99 project, crawling the web to get an indication of >>>>> censorship (IETF discussion on =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99 =E2=80=93 auth= or=E2=80=99s field notes >>>>> March 2015). >>>>>=20 >>>>> There was no outright objection during the Dallas meeting=20 >>>>> against moving forward on status code =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99, and on >>>>> December 18, 2015 the Internet Engineering Steering Group >>>>> approved publication of "An HTTP Status Code to Report >>>>> Legal Obstacles". It is still in the process of becoming an >>>>> RFC, but could effectively be used from the day of >>>>> approval. >>>>>=20 >>>>> What is interesting about this particular case is that not=20 >>>>> only technical arguments but also the status code=E2=80=99s >>>>> outright potential political use for civil society played >>>>> a substantial role in shaping the discussion, and the >>>>> decision to move forward with this technology. >>>>>=20 >>>>> [1]=20 >>>>> http://tools.ietf.org/wg/httpbis/minutes?item=3Dminutes-92-httpbis.= h tml, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>=20 discussions on 451 at IETF 92 in Dallas >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>> _______________________________________________ hrpc >>>>> mailing list hrpc@irtf.org=20 >>>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>=20 >> -- Dr. Joss Wright | Research Fellow Oxford Internet Institute,=20 >> University of Oxford http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/?id=3D176 >>=20 >> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list >> hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >=20 > -- Mark Nottingham https://www.mnot.net/ >=20 > _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list=20 > hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >=20 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoLJtAAoJEAi1oPJjbWjpN0wH/2NmmSd7KKpehvawZU4W4to5 lRcGIDapKdcpTIB9EKuXiMAfAozAZPnk531ZRkwMEGIQgHSHtXhDYRwnMVicNZQ0 OOHsF7seqoiLF3bK1aubt41M7ceV4h78SDYRf/V9e0lzdT996IkMRZ0PScwTHrd4 d3MqityiXIs7qFAhGw4sovXmwGyIR/R6MRtLBpj906EPFDgFIecRvMLGnSIrM79a VBnkDDa07PqoPrioRTmg1y2Cy/BJS2VU8/ei7vqtQd/vtOTiYLJiaGtXd5sxvdtO vLnwKqtVh4VxHfXAMv9bU5/5//XdC/PQ4hFRJBIuaP3xWFd88JEpuoIHZxE2NDg=3D =3D+TFo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Thu Jan 21 02:59:58 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C82931A1BBD for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 02:59:57 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.201 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.201 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Iye_PB66GCeB for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 02:59:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from relay14.mail.ox.ac.uk (relay14.mail.ox.ac.uk [163.1.2.162]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C4D7B1A1A55 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 02:59:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp5.mail.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.207]) by relay14.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aMCy1-00076N-ke; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:59:53 +0000 Received: from client-8-39.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk ([192.76.8.39] helo=localhost) by smtp5.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aMCy1-0001Iv-HF; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:59:53 +0000 Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:59:58 +0000 From: Joss Wright To: Jeroen van der Ham Message-ID: <20160121105958.GN1956@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> References: <20160119215059.GC1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB359.3050405@cs.tcd.ie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-Oxford-Username: inet0123 Archived-At: Cc: Corinne Cath , hrpc@irtf.org, Stephen Farrell Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case one: Status code 451 X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:59:58 -0000 On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 11:44:57AM +0100, Jeroen van der Ham wrote: > Hi, > > > On 19 Jan 2016, at 23:06, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > > > I wasn't very active in this myself but some people with whom I chatted were > > convinced by the fact that 451 allowed for automation. For example if you > > get a 451 response a UA might be able to re-try the request via some other > > n/w path. Similarly, a crawler might be able to correlate the places in > > which one gets a 451 and produce e.g. useful statistics or maps. > > > > To me this seems entirely the wrong argument to convince operators to use this > status code. > > My impression is that this would be used for content that is removed or > blocked for legal reasons, for instance copyright infringement, gambling laws, > child abuse, et cetera. > > It then informs the user about the reason that content is no longer available, > and perhaps also informs. It should also enlighten them about possible actions > that could be taken, such as filing a complaint with the authorities. In any > case it at least informs the user that this is not a technical problem. > > Jeroen. That makes a lot of sense. Mainly because the use of the 451 only seems to apply in the more cooperative, legal version of content removal achieved through requests to providers, rather than the adversarial blocking achieved by a filtering entity on the network. Using it as a mechanism to provide automated means to route around such legally-requested filtering seems like it would be counterproductive. Joss -- Dr. Joss Wright | Research Fellow Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/?id=176 From nobody Thu Jan 21 03:57:28 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 61FC91A7013 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 03:57:27 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.302 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.302 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0Ow9re5j1_k4 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 03:57:24 -0800 (PST) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 984CE1A700F for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 03:57:24 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 257E2BE53; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 11:57:22 +0000 (GMT) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Cv1rHzZS-J3j; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 11:57:20 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [10.87.48.95] (unknown [86.46.20.159]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 22863BE64; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 11:57:20 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1453377440; bh=8oQQyuKLJ7V0jSQ6EG/02pJ4GdVX0rbZZ4/gW+Wbpog=; h=Subject:To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=AfySRGxjbs2h84NYQ4k27AN58VgXJwKJYUrF4Ch3aWK24N0dEk/FWv1Kcx22PDfSy og8iExfyn9abgBXU28/A0Uw2da5ABp68iUrvc1Zj4mfSLeAHmNCpbDT0fy82ib0aYn vqLOr0xadHQIR7W6Uy7j938EuT+hTOYdlesmlnw0= To: Niels ten Oever , hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=D66EA7906F0B897FB2E97D582F3C8736805F8DA2; url= Message-ID: <56A0C79A.2090500@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 11:57:14 +0000 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="W9b219JPs25ar7MRxX6Hv9OGs21fFlQLg" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 11:57:27 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --W9b219JPs25ar7MRxX6Hv9OGs21fFlQLg Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Niels, On 21/01/16 10:01, Niels ten Oever wrote: > Hi all, >=20 > Am enjoying this thread. Some replies inline: >=20 > On 01/20/2016 11:27 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >=20 >> The quoting below has gotten messed up and attributes text to me=20 >> that I didn't write. >=20 >> I do not consider that that rights language is even appropriate=20 >> when discussing DDoS, which is always and only an attack. >=20 >=20 > I think we're getting to the core of the matter here. Yes, DDoS is only an attack. >=20 >> And FWIW, IMO anyone who claims that any DDoS can ever be somthing=20 >> other than an attack is as a side-effect damaging the work that we=20 >> have been doing over the last few years to counter pervasive=20 >> monitoring (PM). (And yes, that's why I'm so loud in this >> thread:-) >=20 >=20 > If I can try to translate what Stephen is saying in rights langauge: > IETF is working on freedom of expression and access to information (=3D= > connectivity), everything that hinders that, even if that falls under > the Right to Association / Protest (some particular uses of DDoS), > that is a inherent violation. FWIW, I think I disagree with every possible way in which I can read the above paragraph, while still being entirely unclear what it's meant to mean:-) It is certainly not something I can imagine as a translation of what I said. And what I said was that I don't think rights language is useful or appropriate when discussing DDoS, so "translating" my actual statement into rights language should I think result in a NULL statement and not the above. S. >=20 > If this is a correct representation, I'm not sure if it is in line > with human rights law where human right should be balanced. >=20 > Perhaps we could also consider 'proportionality' (of DDoS) here? >=20 >=20 >> Effectively countering PM (to the extent we can) requires us to not >> consider the motives of the attacker. In the case of DDoS we should >> follow the same logic, and conclude DDoS is always an attack. The >> only alternative I see is to (stupidly) start to consider some >> attacks and attackers as "ok" and therefore lose the ability to >> make a cogent argument against PM. Let's not do the latter. >=20 >=20 > I don't think the IETF should consider the motive of the attacker, and > I think one can still consider DDoS (in some cases) as legitimate > while still trying to make it much harder (as Jeroen said for instance > by implementing BCP38 and 84). >=20 >> I'd argue that the right thing to do here for us all to agree that >> there's no utility in ever talking about DDoS other than as an >> attack, and to declare victory for this topic with that result. >=20 >=20 > Am afraid we're not yet at this conclusion yet, but happy to continue > to discuss. >=20 > Cheers, >=20 > Niels >=20 >> S >=20 >> On 20/01/16 08:23, Jeroen van der Ham wrote: >>>> On 20 Jan 2016, at 03:11, Mallory Knodel >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>> >>>>> first, it would require developing a method to establish when >>>>> a DDoS attack is a legitimate expression of the right to >>>>> freedom of speech, or whether it impedes on it. >>>> >>>> Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I >>>> mean, for the purposes of making the internet work better >>>> perhaps we should try. I don't think this will get in the way >>>> of activists using the internet in creative ways to make a >>>> point. >>> >>> One way to at least make it harder is universal adoption of BCP38 >>> and 84. This way you make performing DDoSes harder, and certainly >>> more attributable. >>> >>> Making it harder for DDoS attackers to hide, may make it more=20 >>> acceptable as a form of legitimate protest. Although I >>> completely agree that most DDoS attacks currently are not in this >>> category. Most attacks currently are either extortion or >>> disrupting technical services in schools. >>> >>> Another form of protest on the Internet currently seem to be=20 >>> defacements. However, these are currently more akin to graffiti >>> and less to blocking access to services. >>> >>> Jeroen. _______________________________________________ hrpc >>> mailing list hrpc@irtf.org >>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>> >=20 >> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list=20 >> hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >=20 >=20 > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >=20 --W9b219JPs25ar7MRxX6Hv9OGs21fFlQLg Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoMefAAoJEC88hzaAX42iL8QH/iLFmSbVr/KkYQz9p3P+HaMD RbM5NBg83pRcqFo0wexxqC8e0QarP6tnhm4AB7SzX9gSJbz0uJ7VjJvTTRJ7lbMB K888wI26j6LJmqsR2jLAIpx63+wChBnvA7ii7G82n47oIUNdxflqmOZkNkXIdPA6 a+s8S6aUnrL2Ma8TTvbP3ySby+3YHxTMjV1wOOeiOwHdF4TlJKqHc2qLTCF4i9O0 iVfRUW7id4Vc78Tqh9qjHXjxeYXLyg4GCMiwWqv/GzmMUFRVkZLUd1FhWlFa5Wtj v3OAivLp80n5cyJ7EwXDlcpI1zcVn0FI7dZ4XNCL48EWQZ+VZ4e7uD0ZWKjRpmk= =5xNg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --W9b219JPs25ar7MRxX6Hv9OGs21fFlQLg-- From nobody Thu Jan 21 04:16:14 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8E4481ACDFB for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:16:13 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.424 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.424 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id uSJNkv4V3UF7 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:16:10 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (vps784.greenhost.nl [213.108.108.114]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 033B11ACDF7 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:16:09 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 32F9316402D; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:16:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTP id 23D8516401D; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:16:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.article19.io ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.article19.io [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id Ck37iZhJIGG9; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:16:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [145.18.161.216] (wcw-staff-145-18-161-216.wireless.uva.nl [145.18.161.216]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E282716401B; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:16:07 +0000 (UTC) To: Stephen Farrell , hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> <56A0C79A.2090500@cs.tcd.ie> From: Niels ten Oever X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 Message-ID: <56A0CC07.4060809@article19.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:16:07 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <56A0C79A.2090500@cs.tcd.ie> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:16:13 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hi Stephen, On 01/21/2016 12:57 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >=20 > Hi Niels, >=20 > On 21/01/16 10:01, Niels ten Oever wrote: >> Hi all, >>=20 >> Am enjoying this thread. Some replies inline: >>=20 >> On 01/20/2016 11:27 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>=20 >>> The quoting below has gotten messed up and attributes text to >>> me that I didn't write. >>=20 >>> I do not consider that that rights language is even appropriate >>> when discussing DDoS, which is always and only an attack. >>=20 >>=20 >> I think we're getting to the core of the matter here. >=20 > Yes, DDoS is only an attack. >=20 Something in never only one thing imho. >>=20 >>> And FWIW, IMO anyone who claims that any DDoS can ever be >>> somthing other than an attack is as a side-effect damaging the >>> work that we have been doing over the last few years to counter >>> pervasive monitoring (PM). (And yes, that's why I'm so loud in >>> this thread:-) >>=20 >>=20 >> If I can try to translate what Stephen is saying in rights >> langauge: IETF is working on freedom of expression and access to >> information (=3D connectivity), everything that hinders that, even >> if that falls under the Right to Association / Protest (some >> particular uses of DDoS), that is a inherent violation. >=20 > FWIW, I think I disagree with every possible way in which I can > read the above paragraph, while still being entirely unclear what > it's meant to mean:-) We seem to have this problem more often ;) >=20 > It is certainly not something I can imagine as a translation of > what I said. And what I said was that I don't think rights language > is useful or appropriate when discussing DDoS, That is another argument, right? Saying DDoS should not be a right, or DDoS is not a form of digital protest or association is something else than saying rights language is not useful or appropriate. Let me know which of the above (or other) you deem correct. > so "translating" my actual statement into rights language should I > think result in a NULL statement and not the above. OK, maybe it was indeed a summary of earlier point. Let me try to summarize that para again: DDoS is strengthening the case for pervasive monitoring and therefore DDoS is indirectly undermining the rights to privacy. My problem with this point would be: PM is the only way to react to DDoS, right? Best, Niels >=20 > S. >=20 >>=20 >> If this is a correct representation, I'm not sure if it is in >> line with human rights law where human right should be balanced. >>=20 >> Perhaps we could also consider 'proportionality' (of DDoS) here? >>=20 >>=20 >>> Effectively countering PM (to the extent we can) requires us to >>> not consider the motives of the attacker. In the case of DDoS >>> we should follow the same logic, and conclude DDoS is always an >>> attack. The only alternative I see is to (stupidly) start to >>> consider some attacks and attackers as "ok" and therefore lose >>> the ability to make a cogent argument against PM. Let's not do >>> the latter. >>=20 >>=20 >> I don't think the IETF should consider the motive of the >> attacker, and I think one can still consider DDoS (in some cases) >> as legitimate while still trying to make it much harder (as >> Jeroen said for instance by implementing BCP38 and 84). >>=20 >>> I'd argue that the right thing to do here for us all to agree >>> that there's no utility in ever talking about DDoS other than >>> as an attack, and to declare victory for this topic with that >>> result. >>=20 >>=20 >> Am afraid we're not yet at this conclusion yet, but happy to >> continue to discuss. >>=20 >> Cheers, >>=20 >> Niels >>=20 >>> S >>=20 >>> On 20/01/16 08:23, Jeroen van der Ham wrote: >>>>> On 20 Jan 2016, at 03:11, Mallory Knodel =20 >>>>> wrote: >>>>>=20 >>>>>> On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>>>=20 >>>>>> first, it would require developing a method to establish >>>>>> when a DDoS attack is a legitimate expression of the >>>>>> right to freedom of speech, or whether it impedes on it. >>>>>=20 >>>>> Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. >>>>> I mean, for the purposes of making the internet work >>>>> better perhaps we should try. I don't think this will get >>>>> in the way of activists using the internet in creative ways >>>>> to make a point. >>>>=20 >>>> One way to at least make it harder is universal adoption of >>>> BCP38 and 84. This way you make performing DDoSes harder, and >>>> certainly more attributable. >>>>=20 >>>> Making it harder for DDoS attackers to hide, may make it more >>>> acceptable as a form of legitimate protest. Although I=20 >>>> completely agree that most DDoS attacks currently are not in >>>> this category. Most attacks currently are either extortion >>>> or disrupting technical services in schools. >>>>=20 >>>> Another form of protest on the Internet currently seem to be >>>> defacements. However, these are currently more akin to >>>> graffiti and less to blocking access to services. >>>>=20 >>>> Jeroen. _______________________________________________ hrpc=20 >>>> mailing list hrpc@irtf.org=20 >>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>>=20 >>=20 >>> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing >>> list hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>=20 >>=20 >> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing >> list hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>=20 >=20 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoMwGAAoJEAi1oPJjbWjpgf0IAI8rk29MdtjvXAfg0J6BeCvU iWpTqjqf2RTgsoZlGhaXze+HiRMZWcWk+0Au/GAZIH2fCqdFbKP8mxsCucAejTbv 8ZGMFgsHcCdglm/J3qAlzQtGzaYM1idIUtO8XTCXrFHQWCjt4MdgTWJqwDsA04xN U3XTiH/QySyhRsKfBX/9CReBW9Zmxu4RzmA2oYvpyTwb2yJvgKDNjg1XkvDqKV4T Ym0IX0WiKyh4NXWdkdzwzBdo8lyMytx6Q2GErwGpZmQNA7Hrmm7gD9sX7n4GmKLy F36c+Hjb9GjF1BshYplkLeTx17/RlmAmzahzEQDpZiwyhBfrVNwNXtfJBT0cuc8=3D =3DQy9B -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Thu Jan 21 04:30:35 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E441B1A8AEA for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:30:34 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.15 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.15 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, HELO_EQ_DE=0.35, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id TYpGMotLlvsz for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:30:33 -0800 (PST) Received: from iramx2.ira.uni-karlsruhe.de (iramx2.ira.uni-karlsruhe.de [141.3.10.81]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 08BB31ACDB3 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:30:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from i72vorta.tm.uni-karlsruhe.de ([141.3.71.26] helo=i72vorta.tm.kit.edu) by iramx2.ira.uni-karlsruhe.de with esmtp port 25 iface 141.3.10.81 id 1aMENh-0006aB-Cm for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:30:29 +0100 Received: from [IPv6:::1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by i72vorta.tm.kit.edu (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4F919B00C92 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:30:29 +0100 (CET) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> From: Roland Bless Organization: Institute of Telematics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) Message-ID: <56A0CF65.70506@kit.edu> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:30:29 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.8.0.1) Gecko/20060111 Thunderbird/1.5 Mnenhy/0.7.3.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-ATIS-AV: ClamAV (iramx2.ira.uni-karlsruhe.de) X-ATIS-Timestamp: iramx2.ira.uni-karlsruhe.de 1453379429. Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:30:35 -0000 Hi, On 19.01.2016 at 22:55 Stephen Farrell wrote: > On 19/01/16 21:34, Joss Wright wrote: >> >> Having said that, I do agree that DDoS will not, in the vast majority of cases, >> have relied on what the page linked above calls 'voluntary botnets'. > > Right. And in my little head at least forms of protest that > involve involuntary participation by O(10^5) unrelated > parties are far more dubious than forms of protest that are > voluntary. Especially when the involuntary participant's > networks need to be compromised as part of the "protest" in > ways that are very likely to be abused by others. > > But in any case, I think if the IETF wants to be consistent > in considering pervasive monitoring an attack regardless of > motivation, then we need to treat DDoS in the same way - as > an attack and nothing else, regardless of motivation. +1 Regards, Roland From nobody Thu Jan 21 04:33:01 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E7C11B3048 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:32:58 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 2.323 X-Spam-Level: ** X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.323 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_20=-0.001, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id wZ42vcik8aeA for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:32:57 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (vps784.greenhost.nl [213.108.108.114]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1C4C81B2F83 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:32:57 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C6C1317C05B for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:32:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTP id B77A817C059 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:32:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.article19.io ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.article19.io [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id 0f7hiLI1Nkst for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:32:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [145.18.161.216] (wcw-staff-145-18-161-216.wireless.uva.nl [145.18.161.216]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 804CC17C04B for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:32:55 +0000 (UTC) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0CF65.70506@kit.edu> From: Niels ten Oever Message-ID: <56A0CFF6.3050204@article19.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:32:54 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <56A0CF65.70506@kit.edu> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:32:58 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 01/21/2016 01:30 PM, Roland Bless wrote: > Hi, > > On 19.01.2016 at 22:55 Stephen Farrell wrote: >> On 19/01/16 21:34, Joss Wright wrote: >>> >>> Having said that, I do agree that DDoS will not, in the vast >>> majority of cases, have relied on what the page linked above >>> calls 'voluntary botnets'. >> >> Right. And in my little head at least forms of protest that >> involve involuntary participation by O(10^5) unrelated parties >> are far more dubious than forms of protest that are voluntary. >> Especially when the involuntary participant's networks need to be >> compromised as part of the "protest" in ways that are very likely >> to be abused by others. >> >> But in any case, I think if the IETF wants to be consistent in >> considering pervasive monitoring an attack regardless of >> motivation, then we need to treat DDoS in the same way - as an >> attack and nothing else, regardless of motivation. > > +1 > What would be the argument for this though? That DDoS harms more rights (directly and indirectly) than it enables? Best, Niels -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoM/2AAoJEAi1oPJjbWjpyp0IAJUOueNWoaubgL3uf3aP4mYy tlYs9+lpvfP87O7XgUWh9enY9ze0xpn+i+UUaRVGQHgL/ePZJXGIeiedBm5AE9In ighpfNoPwzn2q1rg8xhpeDwWluhh08F23Fvd3w6NxtNLYPvEqk3jCRNztCxzSNFF Zj3V/ta2/GOiFoehAgWjuKQopsh/JD0hs+3i/hmcBSInYYvpQdmXUwZTWIk63Uq4 myW7Yh7taJDwjNpzgELFbg0zfS4JUGGQlhm+jIxizAqgeX3im5AX898on9vYuvh9 CKN1OrgjaREWT4k9YUa5HknvO8huC3P93gnL4OgAa1vFOD2RI3Vd696ZVeFkuX4= =oITh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Thu Jan 21 04:33:11 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CC13C1B305B for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:33:10 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.302 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.302 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id s2z9JiK4m4Rw for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:33:07 -0800 (PST) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BDFD91B305A for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:33:07 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 71C90BE54; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:33:06 +0000 (GMT) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LYTjP7PNZTna; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:33:04 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [10.87.48.95] (unknown [86.46.20.159]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AD2E7BE8B; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:33:02 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1453379583; bh=FVCBtzXgZsJqrdF60L1sj3xIu2/Nom6j1bGnCRC8C2k=; h=Subject:To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=Z9oXESHSS63r7FzEs7m39TWILhotCTxIdbbDHlaM+lehgU4e4wd6RUG5Sr3rHb7dG d0o+vMf3iE5x4B8Ld+ttZk+JiMJkIMD/wRlOVXAaHBkPRH1wuhtkpIz+Q1jwjkXRWc OuT8i0Bj2/buOl4J0cj2VB2wdN7/RsS9ACqgIdNM= To: Niels ten Oever , hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> <56A0C79A.2090500@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0CC07.4060809@article19.org> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=D66EA7906F0B897FB2E97D582F3C8736805F8DA2; url= Message-ID: <56A0CFF9.9090100@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:32:57 +0000 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <56A0CC07.4060809@article19.org> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="ehHg9Ad44eO5DNRXcQOfThcB4fuVqmqmg" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:33:11 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --ehHg9Ad44eO5DNRXcQOfThcB4fuVqmqmg Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hiya, On 21/01/16 12:16, Niels ten Oever wrote: > Hi Stephen, >=20 > On 01/21/2016 12:57 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >=20 >> Hi Niels, >=20 >> On 21/01/16 10:01, Niels ten Oever wrote: >>> Hi all, >>> >>> Am enjoying this thread. Some replies inline: >>> >>> On 01/20/2016 11:27 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>> >>>> The quoting below has gotten messed up and attributes text to >>>> me that I didn't write. >>> >>>> I do not consider that that rights language is even appropriate >>>> when discussing DDoS, which is always and only an attack. >>> >>> >>> I think we're getting to the core of the matter here. >=20 >> Yes, DDoS is only an attack. >=20 > Something in never only one thing imho. Disagree. DDoS is a pretty clearly defined technical term. It has nothing whatsoever to do with a million-person march as the origin of this thread wondered. That was IMO a simple misunderstanding that has lead to this pointless analogising. >=20 >>> >>>> And FWIW, IMO anyone who claims that any DDoS can ever be >>>> somthing other than an attack is as a side-effect damaging the >>>> work that we have been doing over the last few years to counter >>>> pervasive monitoring (PM). (And yes, that's why I'm so loud in >>>> this thread:-) >>> >>> >>> If I can try to translate what Stephen is saying in rights >>> langauge: IETF is working on freedom of expression and access to >>> information (=3D connectivity), everything that hinders that, even >>> if that falls under the Right to Association / Protest (some >>> particular uses of DDoS), that is a inherent violation. >=20 >> FWIW, I think I disagree with every possible way in which I can >> read the above paragraph, while still being entirely unclear what >> it's meant to mean:-) >=20 > We seem to have this problem more often ;) And that's fine for this group I reckon, given that (for me at least) a big part of the work here is figuring out useful translations. (Unlike the above:-) >=20 >=20 >> It is certainly not something I can imagine as a translation of >> what I said. And what I said was that I don't think rights language >> is useful or appropriate when discussing DDoS, >=20 > That is another argument, right?=20 That's the main argument. (And was at the top of the mail to which you responded I think.) > Saying DDoS should not be a right, or > DDoS is not a form of digital protest or association is something else > than saying rights language is not useful or appropriate. Let me know > which of the above (or other) you deem correct. >=20 >> so "translating" my actual statement into rights language should I >> think result in a NULL statement and not the above. >=20 > OK, maybe it was indeed a summary of earlier point. Let me try to > summarize that para again: >=20 > DDoS is strengthening the case for pervasive monitoring and therefore > DDoS is indirectly undermining the rights to privacy. No, that's not at all an accurate paraphrasing of the secondary argument I made. Let me try state it again: - Statement X: 'A claim that DDoS is sometimes "ok" depending on the attacker's motives' - Part of the argument against PM is that we don't consider the attacker's motives (see 7258 for why) - Defending statement X calls into question that part of the argument against PM and hence undermines that work S. >=20 > My problem with this point would be: PM is the only way to react to > DDoS, right? >=20 > Best, >=20 > Niels >=20 >=20 >=20 >=20 >=20 >=20 >> S. >=20 >>> >>> If this is a correct representation, I'm not sure if it is in >>> line with human rights law where human right should be balanced. >>> >>> Perhaps we could also consider 'proportionality' (of DDoS) here? >>> >>> >>>> Effectively countering PM (to the extent we can) requires us to >>>> not consider the motives of the attacker. In the case of DDoS >>>> we should follow the same logic, and conclude DDoS is always an >>>> attack. The only alternative I see is to (stupidly) start to >>>> consider some attacks and attackers as "ok" and therefore lose >>>> the ability to make a cogent argument against PM. Let's not do >>>> the latter. >>> >>> >>> I don't think the IETF should consider the motive of the >>> attacker, and I think one can still consider DDoS (in some cases) >>> as legitimate while still trying to make it much harder (as >>> Jeroen said for instance by implementing BCP38 and 84). >>> >>>> I'd argue that the right thing to do here for us all to agree >>>> that there's no utility in ever talking about DDoS other than >>>> as an attack, and to declare victory for this topic with that >>>> result. >>> >>> >>> Am afraid we're not yet at this conclusion yet, but happy to >>> continue to discuss. >>> >>> Cheers, >>> >>> Niels >>> >>>> S >>> >>>> On 20/01/16 08:23, Jeroen van der Ham wrote: >>>>>> On 20 Jan 2016, at 03:11, Mallory Knodel =20 >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> first, it would require developing a method to establish >>>>>>> when a DDoS attack is a legitimate expression of the >>>>>>> right to freedom of speech, or whether it impedes on it. >>>>>> >>>>>> Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. >>>>>> I mean, for the purposes of making the internet work >>>>>> better perhaps we should try. I don't think this will get >>>>>> in the way of activists using the internet in creative ways >>>>>> to make a point. >>>>> >>>>> One way to at least make it harder is universal adoption of >>>>> BCP38 and 84. This way you make performing DDoSes harder, and >>>>> certainly more attributable. >>>>> >>>>> Making it harder for DDoS attackers to hide, may make it more >>>>> acceptable as a form of legitimate protest. Although I=20 >>>>> completely agree that most DDoS attacks currently are not in >>>>> this category. Most attacks currently are either extortion >>>>> or disrupting technical services in schools. >>>>> >>>>> Another form of protest on the Internet currently seem to be >>>>> defacements. However, these are currently more akin to >>>>> graffiti and less to blocking access to services. >>>>> >>>>> Jeroen. _______________________________________________ hrpc=20 >>>>> mailing list hrpc@irtf.org=20 >>>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>>> >>> >>>> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing >>>> list hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing >>> list hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>> >=20 >=20 > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >=20 --ehHg9Ad44eO5DNRXcQOfThcB4fuVqmqmg Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoM/+AAoJEC88hzaAX42i5FUIAKWKMzYb5tKiXI6y/+KeYq6Y Ccv+jTbNqQzZRNAb+fuNhqZZUrOcftRicrRD7TkpBGkjC6FIjL+lxP4ofuwH3y41 gW3HYOYxhuyP0GmwfLSAlp7lCZjd/LBXxmVHmcAEvXacQf2PMXT+FArcdkdcPiYL S5J+jXtON2PyLAi+szeTCiB8J+7eOyKQ/DG/liqJ9ymLLp+igIcBexseqL9SNqAG apkmONLDdeFsFBc7pjZV6+XSnQKL1HFUwryh1tjIe8nN8OTeuMIqaCkKnepJug+9 lMv7oFVMX9m/uYgIRnSwJSbUIFTajMvxfTz+Vd9jZfsBNngZh/BTeIaLUBpNORw= =8Kul -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --ehHg9Ad44eO5DNRXcQOfThcB4fuVqmqmg-- From nobody Thu Jan 21 04:49:42 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D206F1B3098 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:49:39 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.424 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.424 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id OH9Uk90kdY28 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:49:37 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (vps784.greenhost.nl [213.108.108.114]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 96F7E1B309A for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:49:37 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 73F1017C05B; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:49:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTP id 627B417C059; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:49:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.article19.io ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.article19.io [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id nG5_MMSqpZey; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:49:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [145.18.161.216] (wcw-staff-145-18-161-216.wireless.uva.nl [145.18.161.216]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 289FD17C04B; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:49:36 +0000 (UTC) To: Stephen Farrell , hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> <56A0C79A.2090500@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0CC07.4060809@article19.org> <56A0CFF9.9090100@cs.tcd.ie> From: Niels ten Oever X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 Message-ID: <56A0D3DF.30603@article19.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:49:35 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <56A0CFF9.9090100@cs.tcd.ie> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:49:40 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Heya, On 01/21/2016 01:32 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >=20 > Hiya, >=20 > On 21/01/16 12:16, Niels ten Oever wrote: >> Hi Stephen, >>=20 >> On 01/21/2016 12:57 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>=20 >>> Hi Niels, >>=20 >>> On 21/01/16 10:01, Niels ten Oever wrote: >>>> Hi all, >>>>=20 >>>> Am enjoying this thread. Some replies inline: >>>>=20 >>>> On 01/20/2016 11:27 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>>=20 >>>>> The quoting below has gotten messed up and attributes text >>>>> to me that I didn't write. >>>>=20 >>>>> I do not consider that that rights language is even >>>>> appropriate when discussing DDoS, which is always and only >>>>> an attack. >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> I think we're getting to the core of the matter here. >>=20 >>> Yes, DDoS is only an attack. >>=20 >> Something in never only one thing imho. >=20 > Disagree. DDoS is a pretty clearly defined technical term. Yes, but a technical definition might not capture all dimensions of a concept/phenomena/object. >=20 > It has nothing whatsoever to do with a million-person march as the > origin of this thread wondered. That was IMO a simple=20 > misunderstanding that has lead to this pointless analogising. >=20 So you disregard these examples provided by Colin and Josh?: Operation Ababil: http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2012/09/dissecting-operation-ababil-osint.h tml Green Movement DDoS: https://www.nartv.org/2009/06/16/iran-ddos/ The use of LOIC by 4chan and Anonymous are probably the most well-known examples that spring to mind. The Wikipedia page ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_Orbit_Ion_Cannon#Notable_uses ) notes "Project Chanology", "Operation Payback", and "Operation Megaupload" as occasions in which LOIC was used for protest. >>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>> And FWIW, IMO anyone who claims that any DDoS can ever be=20 >>>>> somthing other than an attack is as a side-effect damaging >>>>> the work that we have been doing over the last few years to >>>>> counter pervasive monitoring (PM). (And yes, that's why I'm >>>>> so loud in this thread:-) >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> If I can try to translate what Stephen is saying in rights=20 >>>> langauge: IETF is working on freedom of expression and access >>>> to information (=3D connectivity), everything that hinders >>>> that, even if that falls under the Right to Association / >>>> Protest (some particular uses of DDoS), that is a inherent >>>> violation. >>=20 >>> FWIW, I think I disagree with every possible way in which I >>> can read the above paragraph, while still being entirely >>> unclear what it's meant to mean:-) >>=20 >> We seem to have this problem more often ;) >=20 > And that's fine for this group I reckon, given that (for me at > least) a big part of the work here is figuring out useful=20 > translations. (Unlike the above:-) >=20 >>=20 >>=20 >>> It is certainly not something I can imagine as a translation >>> of what I said. And what I said was that I don't think rights >>> language is useful or appropriate when discussing DDoS, >>=20 >> That is another argument, right? >=20 > That's the main argument. (And was at the top of the mail to which > you responded I think.) >=20 >> Saying DDoS should not be a right, or DDoS is not a form of >> digital protest or association is something else than saying >> rights language is not useful or appropriate. Let me know which >> of the above (or other) you deem correct. >>=20 >>> so "translating" my actual statement into rights language >>> should I think result in a NULL statement and not the above. >>=20 >> OK, maybe it was indeed a summary of earlier point. Let me try >> to summarize that para again: >>=20 >> DDoS is strengthening the case for pervasive monitoring and >> therefore DDoS is indirectly undermining the rights to privacy. >=20 > No, that's not at all an accurate paraphrasing of the secondary=20 > argument I made. Let me try state it again: >=20 > - Statement X: 'A claim that DDoS is sometimes "ok" depending on=20 > the attacker's motives' >=20 > - Part of the argument against PM is that we don't consider the=20 > attacker's motives (see 7258 for why) Yes, but it also says: PM is distinguished by being indiscriminate and very large scale That is not neccesarry the case with DDoS, right? Aren't we comparing apples and oranges? ~n., >=20 > - Defending statement X calls into question that part of the=20 > argument against PM and hence undermines that work >=20 > S. >=20 >>=20 >> My problem with this point would be: PM is the only way to react >> to DDoS, right? >>=20 >> Best, >>=20 >> Niels >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >>> S. >>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> If this is a correct representation, I'm not sure if it is >>>> in line with human rights law where human right should be >>>> balanced. >>>>=20 >>>> Perhaps we could also consider 'proportionality' (of DDoS) >>>> here? >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>> Effectively countering PM (to the extent we can) requires >>>>> us to not consider the motives of the attacker. In the case >>>>> of DDoS we should follow the same logic, and conclude DDoS >>>>> is always an attack. The only alternative I see is to >>>>> (stupidly) start to consider some attacks and attackers as >>>>> "ok" and therefore lose the ability to make a cogent >>>>> argument against PM. Let's not do the latter. >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> I don't think the IETF should consider the motive of the=20 >>>> attacker, and I think one can still consider DDoS (in some >>>> cases) as legitimate while still trying to make it much >>>> harder (as Jeroen said for instance by implementing BCP38 and >>>> 84). >>>>=20 >>>>> I'd argue that the right thing to do here for us all to >>>>> agree that there's no utility in ever talking about DDoS >>>>> other than as an attack, and to declare victory for this >>>>> topic with that result. >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> Am afraid we're not yet at this conclusion yet, but happy to=20 >>>> continue to discuss. >>>>=20 >>>> Cheers, >>>>=20 >>>> Niels >>>>=20 >>>>> S >>>>=20 >>>>> On 20/01/16 08:23, Jeroen van der Ham wrote: >>>>>>> On 20 Jan 2016, at 03:11, Mallory Knodel >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>=20 >>>>>>>> On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>>>>>=20 >>>>>>>> first, it would require developing a method to >>>>>>>> establish when a DDoS attack is a legitimate >>>>>>>> expression of the right to freedom of speech, or >>>>>>>> whether it impedes on it. >>>>>>>=20 >>>>>>> Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably >>>>>>> not. I mean, for the purposes of making the internet >>>>>>> work better perhaps we should try. I don't think this >>>>>>> will get in the way of activists using the internet in >>>>>>> creative ways to make a point. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> One way to at least make it harder is universal adoption >>>>>> of BCP38 and 84. This way you make performing DDoSes >>>>>> harder, and certainly more attributable. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Making it harder for DDoS attackers to hide, may make it >>>>>> more acceptable as a form of legitimate protest. Although >>>>>> I completely agree that most DDoS attacks currently are >>>>>> not in this category. Most attacks currently are either >>>>>> extortion or disrupting technical services in schools. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Another form of protest on the Internet currently seem to >>>>>> be defacements. However, these are currently more akin >>>>>> to graffiti and less to blocking access to services. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Jeroen. _______________________________________________ >>>>>> hrpc mailing list hrpc@irtf.org=20 >>>>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>> _______________________________________________ hrpc >>>>> mailing list hrpc@irtf.org >>>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing=20 >>>> list hrpc@irtf.org >>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing >> list hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>=20 >=20 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoNPfAAoJEAi1oPJjbWjpT6MH/3POQK+CxnIom+KFL1P0oBVO 2KTFITtUyRzHxc2xcb1ztQ6BI7wQxg4N3piifAV2jddt2+QoM1eKZJt1vPyABa6b ULYh6KdWYFg968ukqskL5cZmBwxfO6zQD6lIvA6t1aAN8A5vxWimJqkz0LHSn2WA e5TUI6KOeRAQGgZtFwSpkBn8FjKfuAZGO3aEVuo9j+7pAe+O7YV/npblUL2sZ3zU mOR4n6GRjBL6uRxUODjDKHxa78ItNDxFUSxrCTAFeufumEpCMpCOjjBHlEj90G+0 szDOCs+CgSKIVT/9wY+JeJLx3BcWLROL5+S935f1gaL62HdkjdeM5y7nBWWuXKc=3D =3DCqw4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Thu Jan 21 04:50:03 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id ED92B1B309D for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:50:00 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.201 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.201 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id qP0BK57yQPlJ for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:49:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from relay14.mail.ox.ac.uk (relay14.mail.ox.ac.uk [163.1.2.162]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0141B1B3075 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:49:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp6.mail.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.206]) by relay14.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aMEgT-0005d8-kI; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:49:53 +0000 Received: from client-8-39.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk ([192.76.8.39] helo=localhost) by smtp6.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aMEgT-000Abb-KG; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:49:53 +0000 Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:49:35 +0000 From: Joss Wright To: Stephen Farrell Message-ID: <20160121124935.GO1956@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> References: <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> <56A0C79A.2090500@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0CC07.4060809@article19.org> <56A0CFF9.9090100@cs.tcd.ie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="ALfTUftag+2gvp1h" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <56A0CFF9.9090100@cs.tcd.ie> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-Oxford-Username: inet0123 Archived-At: Cc: Niels ten Oever , hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:50:01 -0000 --ALfTUftag+2gvp1h Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 12:32:57PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote: =20 > No, that's not at all an accurate paraphrasing of the secondary argument I > made. Let me try state it again: >=20 > - Statement X: 'A claim that DDoS is sometimes "ok" depending on the > attacker's motives' This depends on scope. If you are only taking a pure 'attack or not' viewpo= int then of course an attack is an attack is an attack, as you've stated. The purpose of these discussions, as I understand them, is explicitly to includ= e a wider scope of human rights concerns. It's perfectly possible for it to be = 'just an attack' from a security perspective, and much more than 'just' an attack= in a broader context. Just as it would be feasible to say 'it's just packets bei= ng sent, why are you adding all this language about attacks'? Half of the problem here seems to be a complete lack of agreement on the appropriate level of abstraction for the problem, or even an acceptance that there are multiple possibly levels at which to view this.=20 > - Part of the argument against PM is that we don't consider the attacker's > motives (see 7258 for why) You do, however, consider the 'intent' of the communicating parties in your definition of an attack. > - Defending statement X calls into question that part of the argument aga= inst > PM and hence undermines that work Which is by no means a reason to stop the discussion. --=20 Dr. Joss Wright | Research Fellow=20 Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/?id=3D176 --ALfTUftag+2gvp1h Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iEYEABECAAYFAlag09gACgkQLCkMByTrb39YNACfZ/lwk23HPYuwVdYGpOQYM5LH mrMAnilKxO71fSyY8J26TBb9DAdjko+R =gPCX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --ALfTUftag+2gvp1h-- From nobody Thu Jan 21 04:58:14 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2EFF11B30BB for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:58:13 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.302 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.302 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ksiSRl5mrz45 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:58:10 -0800 (PST) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D6E961B30B6 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:58:09 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id D4066BE58; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:58:07 +0000 (GMT) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8fhK1n1LQ8DJ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:58:05 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [10.87.48.95] (unknown [86.46.20.159]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C765BBE56; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:58:04 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1453381085; bh=gHuHrSyEpR2NjjSHLdlnwQiTLfrcTu5UUpZ34xTdqrE=; h=Subject:To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=wPwhf0QheFFP0oigO6jXjH4kTQzmO6TtnEHaRcRG2J7lAuo8NXt+o4YwnPacXCIEJ f43E9GRYbfAyQRW7NI0H2hs4bDCM0JZYnNxFCFAoJBmxz4dBabhS2NfG1vgFy/BiqC xFSBSQZZYMhPo4UZcZK4gCzCQ2RtvlmGtmWQHHZo= To: Niels ten Oever , hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> <56A0C79A.2090500@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0CC07.4060809@article19.org> <56A0CFF9.9090100@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0D3DF.30603@article19.org> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=D66EA7906F0B897FB2E97D582F3C8736805F8DA2; url= Message-ID: <56A0D5D8.3050803@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:58:00 +0000 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <56A0D3DF.30603@article19.org> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="6BnA4ljCVunMaWFxowPORm5CxEPD3FvAB" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:58:13 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --6BnA4ljCVunMaWFxowPORm5CxEPD3FvAB Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 21/01/16 12:49, Niels ten Oever wrote: > Heya, >=20 > On 01/21/2016 01:32 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >=20 >> Hiya, >=20 >> On 21/01/16 12:16, Niels ten Oever wrote: >>> Hi Stephen, >>> >>> On 01/21/2016 12:57 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Niels, >>> >>>> On 21/01/16 10:01, Niels ten Oever wrote: >>>>> Hi all, >>>>> >>>>> Am enjoying this thread. Some replies inline: >>>>> >>>>> On 01/20/2016 11:27 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> The quoting below has gotten messed up and attributes text >>>>>> to me that I didn't write. >>>>> >>>>>> I do not consider that that rights language is even >>>>>> appropriate when discussing DDoS, which is always and only >>>>>> an attack. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I think we're getting to the core of the matter here. >>> >>>> Yes, DDoS is only an attack. >>> >>> Something in never only one thing imho. >=20 >> Disagree. DDoS is a pretty clearly defined technical term. >=20 > Yes, but a technical definition might not capture all dimensions of a > concept/phenomena/object. Yes, as humans, we are capable of endless chatter:-) >=20 >=20 >> It has nothing whatsoever to do with a million-person march as the >> origin of this thread wondered. That was IMO a simple=20 >> misunderstanding that has lead to this pointless analogising. >=20 >=20 > So you disregard these examples provided by Colin and Josh?: >=20 > Operation Ababil: > http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2012/09/dissecting-operation-ababil-osint.= h > tml > Green Movement DDoS: https://www.nartv.org/2009/06/16/iran-ddos/ >=20 > The use of LOIC by 4chan and Anonymous are probably the most > well-known examples that spring to mind. >=20 > The Wikipedia page ( > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_Orbit_Ion_Cannon#Notable_uses ) > notes "Project Chanology", "Operation Payback", and "Operation > Megaupload" as occasions in which LOIC was used for protest. Basically, yes. There are too few of those and they don't work as well as the 99.9ish% of DDoS attacks that do abuse botnets. That was all stated upthread I think. >=20 >>> >>>>> >>>>>> And FWIW, IMO anyone who claims that any DDoS can ever be=20 >>>>>> somthing other than an attack is as a side-effect damaging >>>>>> the work that we have been doing over the last few years to >>>>>> counter pervasive monitoring (PM). (And yes, that's why I'm >>>>>> so loud in this thread:-) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If I can try to translate what Stephen is saying in rights=20 >>>>> langauge: IETF is working on freedom of expression and access >>>>> to information (=3D connectivity), everything that hinders >>>>> that, even if that falls under the Right to Association / >>>>> Protest (some particular uses of DDoS), that is a inherent >>>>> violation. >>> >>>> FWIW, I think I disagree with every possible way in which I >>>> can read the above paragraph, while still being entirely >>>> unclear what it's meant to mean:-) >>> >>> We seem to have this problem more often ;) >=20 >> And that's fine for this group I reckon, given that (for me at >> least) a big part of the work here is figuring out useful=20 >> translations. (Unlike the above:-) >=20 >>> >>> >>>> It is certainly not something I can imagine as a translation >>>> of what I said. And what I said was that I don't think rights >>>> language is useful or appropriate when discussing DDoS, >>> >>> That is another argument, right? >=20 >> That's the main argument. (And was at the top of the mail to which >> you responded I think.) >=20 >>> Saying DDoS should not be a right, or DDoS is not a form of >>> digital protest or association is something else than saying >>> rights language is not useful or appropriate. Let me know which >>> of the above (or other) you deem correct. >>> >>>> so "translating" my actual statement into rights language >>>> should I think result in a NULL statement and not the above. >>> >>> OK, maybe it was indeed a summary of earlier point. Let me try >>> to summarize that para again: >>> >>> DDoS is strengthening the case for pervasive monitoring and >>> therefore DDoS is indirectly undermining the rights to privacy. >=20 >> No, that's not at all an accurate paraphrasing of the secondary=20 >> argument I made. Let me try state it again: >=20 >> - Statement X: 'A claim that DDoS is sometimes "ok" depending on=20 >> the attacker's motives' >=20 >> - Part of the argument against PM is that we don't consider the=20 >> attacker's motives (see 7258 for why) >=20 > Yes, but it also says: >=20 > PM is distinguished by being indiscriminate and very > large scale >=20 > That is not neccesarry the case with DDoS, right? Aren't we comparing > apples and oranges? No. DDoS usually is large scale and indiscriminate but that's not relevant. What is relevant is that the bogus argument here "for" DDoS as a supposed valid form of protest depends on contradicting one important part of the argument against PM. We do need to be consistent as to whether we consider attacker's motives or not, and "not" is the only good answer. S. >=20 > ~n., >=20 >=20 >> - Defending statement X calls into question that part of the=20 >> argument against PM and hence undermines that work >=20 >> S. >=20 >>> >>> My problem with this point would be: PM is the only way to react >>> to DDoS, right? >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Niels >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> S. >>> >>>>> >>>>> If this is a correct representation, I'm not sure if it is >>>>> in line with human rights law where human right should be >>>>> balanced. >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps we could also consider 'proportionality' (of DDoS) >>>>> here? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Effectively countering PM (to the extent we can) requires >>>>>> us to not consider the motives of the attacker. In the case >>>>>> of DDoS we should follow the same logic, and conclude DDoS >>>>>> is always an attack. The only alternative I see is to >>>>>> (stupidly) start to consider some attacks and attackers as >>>>>> "ok" and therefore lose the ability to make a cogent >>>>>> argument against PM. Let's not do the latter. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I don't think the IETF should consider the motive of the=20 >>>>> attacker, and I think one can still consider DDoS (in some >>>>> cases) as legitimate while still trying to make it much >>>>> harder (as Jeroen said for instance by implementing BCP38 and >>>>> 84). >>>>> >>>>>> I'd argue that the right thing to do here for us all to >>>>>> agree that there's no utility in ever talking about DDoS >>>>>> other than as an attack, and to declare victory for this >>>>>> topic with that result. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Am afraid we're not yet at this conclusion yet, but happy to=20 >>>>> continue to discuss. >>>>> >>>>> Cheers, >>>>> >>>>> Niels >>>>> >>>>>> S >>>>> >>>>>> On 20/01/16 08:23, Jeroen van der Ham wrote: >>>>>>>> On 20 Jan 2016, at 03:11, Mallory Knodel >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> first, it would require developing a method to >>>>>>>>> establish when a DDoS attack is a legitimate >>>>>>>>> expression of the right to freedom of speech, or >>>>>>>>> whether it impedes on it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably >>>>>>>> not. I mean, for the purposes of making the internet >>>>>>>> work better perhaps we should try. I don't think this >>>>>>>> will get in the way of activists using the internet in >>>>>>>> creative ways to make a point. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> One way to at least make it harder is universal adoption >>>>>>> of BCP38 and 84. This way you make performing DDoSes >>>>>>> harder, and certainly more attributable. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Making it harder for DDoS attackers to hide, may make it >>>>>>> more acceptable as a form of legitimate protest. Although >>>>>>> I completely agree that most DDoS attacks currently are >>>>>>> not in this category. Most attacks currently are either >>>>>>> extortion or disrupting technical services in schools. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Another form of protest on the Internet currently seem to >>>>>>> be defacements. However, these are currently more akin >>>>>>> to graffiti and less to blocking access to services. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jeroen. _______________________________________________ >>>>>>> hrpc mailing list hrpc@irtf.org=20 >>>>>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ hrpc >>>>>> mailing list hrpc@irtf.org >>>>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing=20 >>>>> list hrpc@irtf.org >>>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing >>> list hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>> >=20 >=20 > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >=20 --6BnA4ljCVunMaWFxowPORm5CxEPD3FvAB Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoNXcAAoJEC88hzaAX42iGzEH/AzUUSVKo+sEKz0K6IUAwWVs FC1j9YkGV8FS1VTovxO94OCIRuy64kkYSWYrNFgCPEMRMvd0AjE6xTFEctOhKfmA nmkEJFzfULWhXV4I7iIHxHu3a8RQ6VQ/6kGNmVQ7Mna1HQRKOaSzEEP/f99CjIVs ZP1rzX0Qc+XLH+RxYn7S1XwR/1fnzLiEmQ3X1rc3VIE64T78dRRR3VN3r0yekFPR RYQ6BrvT8meXBnE66Ag4nNt0tGxITr109ABpAfLrp9ge3IXaUWSbpilkoTb+G4hG M4mwS0TX0eixMgV2aNzRw+JWWld45DI/Km5tWLLbc4oRPhzYK/hgbkDt0txEdic= =CyAw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --6BnA4ljCVunMaWFxowPORm5CxEPD3FvAB-- From nobody Thu Jan 21 05:03:20 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B7A01B30DC for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 05:03:19 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.302 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.302 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id KFxJa32LJaQ2 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 05:03:13 -0800 (PST) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CEC611B30CD for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 05:03:12 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id 68AD6BE8B; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:03:11 +0000 (GMT) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ZcUocuBplu9D; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:03:10 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [10.87.48.95] (unknown [86.46.20.159]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B5085BE56; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:03:09 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1453381390; bh=yYUtei3noVI/wShCaukiw7SMKRky1mVTr5bsEEe6Vck=; h=Subject:To:References:Cc:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=zyy1sy6VMWicI1I+wl/ZFkQwp3KWykqy1k/FWljsAn7YOdVAXXu2x2N0vtoUHiPWt FjWDl2N1GEY8Mt3vY+xx2FgKN6JBy8RG59XKveLndvrGeqNwiyco331zexlzZWGofi oYynnVgzcQb9b1yIzMxke+14Bi5GDzNtiVrcKdsA= To: Joss Wright References: <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> <56A0C79A.2090500@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0CC07.4060809@article19.org> <56A0CFF9.9090100@cs.tcd.ie> <20160121124935.GO1956@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=D66EA7906F0B897FB2E97D582F3C8736805F8DA2; url= Message-ID: <56A0D708.8060309@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:03:04 +0000 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20160121124935.GO1956@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="sXXjMrnHrSUDlu95ppjHQCMRVM0utWM3q" Archived-At: Cc: Niels ten Oever , hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:03:19 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --sXXjMrnHrSUDlu95ppjHQCMRVM0utWM3q Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 21/01/16 12:49, Joss Wright wrote: > On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 12:32:57PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote: > =20 >> No, that's not at all an accurate paraphrasing of the secondary argume= nt I >> made. Let me try state it again: >> >> - Statement X: 'A claim that DDoS is sometimes "ok" depending on the >> attacker's motives' >=20 > This depends on scope. If you are only taking a pure 'attack or not' vi= ewpoint > then of course an attack is an attack is an attack, as you've stated. Correct. > The > purpose of these discussions, as I understand them, is explicitly to in= clude a > wider scope of human rights concerns.=20 A wider scope is fine. Bad argument is not. Arguing that DDoS is sometimes "ok" depends on the bad argument that one does consider the attacker's motives. > It's perfectly possible for it to be 'just > an attack' from a security perspective, and much more than 'just' an at= tack in a > broader context. Just as it would be feasible to say 'it's just packets= being > sent, why are you adding all this language about attacks'? >=20 > Half of the problem here seems to be a complete lack of agreement on th= e > appropriate level of abstraction for the problem, or even an acceptance= that > there are multiple possibly levels at which to view this.=20 No. My disagreement with this discussion is that it is based on faulty logic, if one accepts that PM is an attack on the basis set out in 7258. >=20 >> - Part of the argument against PM is that we don't consider the attack= er's >> motives (see 7258 for why) >=20 > You do, however, consider the 'intent' of the communicating parties in = your > definition of an attack. No, we recognise that there is some intent of the communicating parties, but don't depend on what that is, or whether it is good or bad or just between those or shared more widely. That isn't the same at all. >=20 >> - Defending statement X calls into question that part of the argument = against >> PM and hence undermines that work >=20 > Which is by no means a reason to stop the discussion. Apparently not, but that's a pity. Note that recognising that this particular thread is just worthless does not mean stopping discussion - there are many other things to discuss that are much more worthwhile I'm sure. And it's also important sometimes to recognise that yes, we went down a blind alley and that supposed analogy between DDos and million-person marches was just bogus and misleading and is just not worth following up on any more. S. >=20 --sXXjMrnHrSUDlu95ppjHQCMRVM0utWM3q Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoNcIAAoJEC88hzaAX42im1kH/RpPDgwaC6fFKFYXzUAcGulk pYWdP/3JE4z4aSgKW17QLVVxUnKcOOsbDwjqlFR3ZWz+ArRL5lu9z1K3tursYWRs 0vE8puUCLK5BwT31zEVcrJv3lAtvw9kyj+HuyD1qH5yDT5+frM9DannBExbBV9+W g/72foCMsA70kJXVjFZpo8PnNpPvsfbeGiYw3n5M1KCdliB2sLzhmJCd6y8ZJANE 0OuOvwhzZpTbBRhtYTRIrlTE9hihhC4sy4USk+jE3oiEjYe6IAySKNv/dEEwUS7R uzNWHW5fDJLY+ARZKmBhFcF6dkLdupa+Y/JJQDXilCAz0aNGpDaRhjetLJDdjLM= =PJIj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --sXXjMrnHrSUDlu95ppjHQCMRVM0utWM3q-- From nobody Thu Jan 21 05:12:51 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CE1681B30F8 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 05:12:45 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.424 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.424 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ewJ2-P5CPdoG for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 05:12:43 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (vps784.greenhost.nl [213.108.108.114]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5C3081B30F7 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 05:12:43 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2E9B916401B; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:12:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A03C164016; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:12:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.article19.io ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.article19.io [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id WWKjEF0LeF-o; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:12:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [145.18.161.216] (wcw-staff-145-18-161-216.wireless.uva.nl [145.18.161.216]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D679E164014; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:12:41 +0000 (UTC) To: Stephen Farrell , hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> <56A0C79A.2090500@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0CC07.4060809@article19.org> <56A0CFF9.9090100@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0D3DF.30603@article19.org> <56A0D5D8.3050803@cs.tcd.ie> From: Niels ten Oever X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 Message-ID: <56A0D949.7060007@article19.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:12:41 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <56A0D5D8.3050803@cs.tcd.ie> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:12:46 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 01/21/2016 01:58 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >=20 >=20 > On 21/01/16 12:49, Niels ten Oever wrote: >> Heya, >>=20 >> On 01/21/2016 01:32 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>=20 >>> Hiya, >>=20 >>> On 21/01/16 12:16, Niels ten Oever wrote: >>>> Hi Stephen, >>>>=20 >>>> On 01/21/2016 12:57 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>>=20 >>>>> Hi Niels, >>>>=20 >>>>> On 21/01/16 10:01, Niels ten Oever wrote: >>>>>> Hi all, >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Am enjoying this thread. Some replies inline: >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> On 01/20/2016 11:27 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>> The quoting below has gotten messed up and attributes >>>>>>> text to me that I didn't write. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>> I do not consider that that rights language is even=20 >>>>>>> appropriate when discussing DDoS, which is always and >>>>>>> only an attack. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> I think we're getting to the core of the matter here. >>>>=20 >>>>> Yes, DDoS is only an attack. >>>>=20 >>>> Something in never only one thing imho. >>=20 >>> Disagree. DDoS is a pretty clearly defined technical term. >>=20 >> Yes, but a technical definition might not capture all dimensions >> of a concept/phenomena/object. >=20 > Yes, as humans, we are capable of endless chatter:-) >=20 Apparently we are :) >>=20 >>=20 >>> It has nothing whatsoever to do with a million-person march as >>> the origin of this thread wondered. That was IMO a simple=20 >>> misunderstanding that has lead to this pointless analogising. >>=20 >>=20 >> So you disregard these examples provided by Colin and Josh?: >>=20 >> Operation Ababil:=20 >> http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2012/09/dissecting-operation-ababil-osin t.h >> >>=20 tml >> Green Movement DDoS: https://www.nartv.org/2009/06/16/iran-ddos/ >>=20 >> The use of LOIC by 4chan and Anonymous are probably the most=20 >> well-known examples that spring to mind. >>=20 >> The Wikipedia page (=20 >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Low_Orbit_Ion_Cannon#Notable_uses >> ) notes "Project Chanology", "Operation Payback", and "Operation=20 >> Megaupload" as occasions in which LOIC was used for protest. >=20 > Basically, yes. There are too few of those and they don't work as > well as the 99.9ish% of DDoS attacks that do abuse botnets. That > was all stated upthread I think. >=20 Could it perhaps the discussion if we would differentiate between: voluntary vs involuntary botnets? Because if we follow your argument, the voluntary botnets aren't as harmful as well. One could also make a strong argument about sovereignty and security here. Or if you're gonna reply that intent of the host doesn't matter, that also kind of defeats your argument about disregarding these examples, right? >>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>> And FWIW, IMO anyone who claims that any DDoS can ever >>>>>>> be somthing other than an attack is as a side-effect >>>>>>> damaging the work that we have been doing over the last >>>>>>> few years to counter pervasive monitoring (PM). (And >>>>>>> yes, that's why I'm so loud in this thread:-) >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> If I can try to translate what Stephen is saying in >>>>>> rights langauge: IETF is working on freedom of expression >>>>>> and access to information (=3D connectivity), everything >>>>>> that hinders that, even if that falls under the Right to >>>>>> Association / Protest (some particular uses of DDoS), >>>>>> that is a inherent violation. >>>>=20 >>>>> FWIW, I think I disagree with every possible way in which >>>>> I can read the above paragraph, while still being entirely=20 >>>>> unclear what it's meant to mean:-) >>>>=20 >>>> We seem to have this problem more often ;) >>=20 >>> And that's fine for this group I reckon, given that (for me at=20 >>> least) a big part of the work here is figuring out useful=20 >>> translations. (Unlike the above:-) >>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>> It is certainly not something I can imagine as a >>>>> translation of what I said. And what I said was that I >>>>> don't think rights language is useful or appropriate when >>>>> discussing DDoS, >>>>=20 >>>> That is another argument, right? >>=20 >>> That's the main argument. (And was at the top of the mail to >>> which you responded I think.) >>=20 >>>> Saying DDoS should not be a right, or DDoS is not a form of=20 >>>> digital protest or association is something else than saying=20 >>>> rights language is not useful or appropriate. Let me know >>>> which of the above (or other) you deem correct. >>>>=20 >>>>> so "translating" my actual statement into rights language=20 >>>>> should I think result in a NULL statement and not the >>>>> above. >>>>=20 >>>> OK, maybe it was indeed a summary of earlier point. Let me >>>> try to summarize that para again: >>>>=20 >>>> DDoS is strengthening the case for pervasive monitoring and=20 >>>> therefore DDoS is indirectly undermining the rights to >>>> privacy. >>=20 >>> No, that's not at all an accurate paraphrasing of the secondary >>> argument I made. Let me try state it again: >>=20 >>> - Statement X: 'A claim that DDoS is sometimes "ok" depending >>> on the attacker's motives' >>=20 >>> - Part of the argument against PM is that we don't consider the >>> attacker's motives (see 7258 for why) >>=20 >> Yes, but it also says: >>=20 >> PM is distinguished by being indiscriminate and very large scale >>=20 >> That is not neccesarry the case with DDoS, right? Aren't we >> comparing apples and oranges? >=20 > No. DDoS usually is large scale and indiscriminate but that's not > relevant. >=20 > What is relevant is that the bogus argument here "for" DDoS as a > supposed valid form of protest depends on contradicting one=20 > important part of the argument against PM. >=20 > We do need to be consistent as to whether we consider attacker's=20 > motives or not, and "not" is the only good answer. >=20 > S. >=20 >=20 >>=20 >> ~n., >>=20 >>=20 >>> - Defending statement X calls into question that part of the=20 >>> argument against PM and hence undermines that work >>=20 >>> S. >>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> My problem with this point would be: PM is the only way to >>>> react to DDoS, right? >>>>=20 >>>> Best, >>>>=20 >>>> Niels >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>> S. >>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> If this is a correct representation, I'm not sure if it >>>>>> is in line with human rights law where human right should >>>>>> be balanced. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Perhaps we could also consider 'proportionality' (of >>>>>> DDoS) here? >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>> Effectively countering PM (to the extent we can) >>>>>>> requires us to not consider the motives of the >>>>>>> attacker. In the case of DDoS we should follow the same >>>>>>> logic, and conclude DDoS is always an attack. The only >>>>>>> alternative I see is to (stupidly) start to consider >>>>>>> some attacks and attackers as "ok" and therefore lose >>>>>>> the ability to make a cogent argument against PM. Let's >>>>>>> not do the latter. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> I don't think the IETF should consider the motive of the >>>>>> attacker, and I think one can still consider DDoS (in >>>>>> some cases) as legitimate while still trying to make it >>>>>> much harder (as Jeroen said for instance by implementing >>>>>> BCP38 and 84). >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>> I'd argue that the right thing to do here for us all >>>>>>> to agree that there's no utility in ever talking about >>>>>>> DDoS other than as an attack, and to declare victory >>>>>>> for this topic with that result. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Am afraid we're not yet at this conclusion yet, but happy >>>>>> to continue to discuss. >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Cheers, >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> Niels >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>> S >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>> On 20/01/16 08:23, Jeroen van der Ham wrote: >>>>>>>>> On 20 Jan 2016, at 03:11, Mallory Knodel=20 >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>=20 >>>>>>>>>> On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>>>>>>>=20 >>>>>>>>>> first, it would require developing a method to=20 >>>>>>>>>> establish when a DDoS attack is a legitimate=20 >>>>>>>>>> expression of the right to freedom of speech, or=20 >>>>>>>>>> whether it impedes on it. >>>>>>>>>=20 >>>>>>>>> Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? >>>>>>>>> Probably not. I mean, for the purposes of making >>>>>>>>> the internet work better perhaps we should try. I >>>>>>>>> don't think this will get in the way of activists >>>>>>>>> using the internet in creative ways to make a >>>>>>>>> point. >>>>>>>>=20 >>>>>>>> One way to at least make it harder is universal >>>>>>>> adoption of BCP38 and 84. This way you make >>>>>>>> performing DDoSes harder, and certainly more >>>>>>>> attributable. >>>>>>>>=20 >>>>>>>> Making it harder for DDoS attackers to hide, may make >>>>>>>> it more acceptable as a form of legitimate protest. >>>>>>>> Although I completely agree that most DDoS attacks >>>>>>>> currently are not in this category. Most attacks >>>>>>>> currently are either extortion or disrupting >>>>>>>> technical services in schools. >>>>>>>>=20 >>>>>>>> Another form of protest on the Internet currently >>>>>>>> seem to be defacements. However, these are currently >>>>>>>> more akin to graffiti and less to blocking access to >>>>>>>> services. >>>>>>>>=20 >>>>>>>> Jeroen. >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ hrpc >>>>>>>> mailing list hrpc@irtf.org=20 >>>>>>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>>>>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>> _______________________________________________ hrpc=20 >>>>>>> mailing list hrpc@irtf.org=20 >>>>>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>>>>=20 >>>>>>=20 >>>>>> _______________________________________________ hrpc >>>>>> mailing list hrpc@irtf.org=20 >>>>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>>=20 >>>> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing=20 >>>> list hrpc@irtf.org >>>> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing >> list hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>=20 >=20 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoNlJAAoJEAi1oPJjbWjpOuMH/3cNLT4Pl/1EzbiZIkpyW101 95M4eEKmz5gvlqwLInHDhzXpu5dwdPgYijBvRnGZzipQog3f1oT4VdhND9gQahCY ZtcE3pYONGgTenbhy/f3MJ57H5bIdJx42GNz/T35ZAlskkcL8eNURxox2+tvjzuU /uAm4as+2koajbVT6LfZZi4hhUyO27T2++JMv9ZEXtkIxu7tGRei9E6rJaPj+Z0B ZdCqOh2BX/XzCZrstUOjNZ5C7CVztsXcYBMtChs+oMt030mQsWzW2lNqE8bS1Tg8 XONQTOK+zIgsBbM5rgo36xsBpY0h+lSGfWQGqLqA+ql6m5AWVK6MbBC+9P2uCq0=3D =3DJH46 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Thu Jan 21 05:38:00 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 095341A8718 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 05:37:59 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.201 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.201 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 5gRfFk7EJRBW for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 05:37:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from relay15.mail.ox.ac.uk (relay15.mail.ox.ac.uk [163.1.2.163]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0736D1A871E for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 05:37:55 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp6.mail.ox.ac.uk ([163.1.2.206]) by relay15.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aMFQv-0007R8-nN; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:37:53 +0000 Received: from client-8-39.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk ([192.76.8.39] helo=localhost) by smtp6.mail.ox.ac.uk with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:128) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1aMFQv-000CbY-KC; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:37:53 +0000 Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:37:29 +0000 From: Joss Wright To: Stephen Farrell Message-ID: <20160121133729.GP1956@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> References: <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> <56A0C79A.2090500@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0CC07.4060809@article19.org> <56A0CFF9.9090100@cs.tcd.ie> <20160121124935.GO1956@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <56A0D708.8060309@cs.tcd.ie> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="/unnNtmY43mpUSKx" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <56A0D708.8060309@cs.tcd.ie> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) X-Oxford-Username: inet0123 Archived-At: Cc: Niels ten Oever , hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:37:59 -0000 --/unnNtmY43mpUSKx Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 01:03:04PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote: >=20 >=20 > On 21/01/16 12:49, Joss Wright wrote: > > On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 12:32:57PM +0000, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > =20 > >> No, that's not at all an accurate paraphrasing of the secondary argume= nt I > >> made. Let me try state it again: > >> > >> - Statement X: 'A claim that DDoS is sometimes "ok" depending on the > >> attacker's motives' > >=20 > > This depends on scope. If you are only taking a pure 'attack or not' > > viewpoint then of course an attack is an attack is an attack, as you've > > stated. >=20 > Correct. >=20 > > The purpose of these discussions, as I understand them, is explicitly to > > include a wider scope of human rights concerns.=20 >=20 > A wider scope is fine. Bad argument is not. Arguing that DDoS is sometimes > "ok" depends on the bad argument that one does consider the attacker's > motives. Why is it inherently a bad argument? I've read 7258, but my understanding is that the argument against considering motivation is this: "The same techniques to achieve PM can be used regardless of motivation. T= hus, we cannot defend against the most nefarious actors while allowing monitorin= g by other actors no matter how benevolent some might consider them to be, since= the actions required of the attacker are indistinguishable from other attacks. = The motivation for PM is, therefore, not relevant for how PM is mitigated in IE= TF protocols." Which isn't an argument that considering motivation is inherently wrong in = all contexts, it's an argument that we can't build technical systems to prevent "bad" PM that don't also prevent "good" PM. So it's perfectly reasonable, w= hen designing systems, to take the view that preventing all PM is the only feas= ible goal. Extending that argument to some kind of universal truth would be sill= y. Even in its simplest form, you have to make an argument that the definition= as you apply it to PM is necessarily equivalent to its application in DDoS. I haven't seen that argument made either. Again, and as I've argued before here, I see no problem with taking the same view in DDoS from a design perspective -- that it's an attack and that mitigation against it is broadly correct. That still doesn't address the wi= der scope, though, and I completely reject that it ties into some kind of unive= rsal 'attacker motivations never matter, regardless of context' statement. > > It's perfectly possible for it to be 'just an attack' from a security > > perspective, and much more than 'just' an attack in a broader context. = Just > > as it would be feasible to say 'it's just packets being sent, why are y= ou > > adding all this language about attacks'? > >=20 > > Half of the problem here seems to be a complete lack of agreement on the > > appropriate level of abstraction for the problem, or even an acceptance= that > > there are multiple possibly levels at which to view this.=20 >=20 > No. My disagreement with this discussion is that it is based on faulty lo= gic, > if one accepts that PM is an attack on the basis set out in 7258. Which, it is clear from the discussion, that some people don't. 7258 is sti= ll open to debate, and as I've pointed out above I disagree that the argument = made there holds in this discussion. > >> - Part of the argument against PM is that we don't consider the attack= er's > >> motives (see 7258 for why) > >=20 > > You do, however, consider the 'intent' of the communicating parties in = your > > definition of an attack. >=20 > No, we recognise that there is some intent of the communicating parties, = but > don't depend on what that is, or whether it is good or bad or just between > those or shared more widely. That isn't the same at all. No, it's not. There is clearly intent in a DDoS, though, when a person acti= vely participates. I would still want it defined as an attack, though, even thou= gh your definition in 7258 leaves room for interpretation there. > >> - Defending statement X calls into question that part of the argument > >> against PM and hence undermines that work > >=20 > > Which is by no means a reason to stop the discussion. >=20 > Apparently not, but that's a pity.=20 Questioning a (potentially) flawed argument being applied in a new context = is a way to improve it. Arguing that you shouldn't do that because it might unde= rmine some other arguments is a pity. > Note that recognising that this particular thread is just worthless does = not > mean stopping discussion - there are many other things to discuss that are > much more worthwhile I'm sure. And it's also important sometimes to recog= nise > that yes, we went down a blind alley and that supposed analogy between DD= os > and million-person marches was just bogus and misleading and is just not = worth > following up on any more. It's also worth working out what aspects, if any, of an analogy are meaning= ful, rather than taking it to its logical extreme and then discarding the entire thing.=20 --=20 Dr. Joss Wright | Research Fellow=20 Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/?id=3D176 --/unnNtmY43mpUSKx Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iEYEABECAAYFAlag3xYACgkQLCkMByTrb38fJQCfXcB5WxwpzH9Cnx4/K1ExD5E0 h80AniSgeOQamCszqLaPdMLfuCidTMHq =9S6I -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --/unnNtmY43mpUSKx-- From nobody Thu Jan 21 06:00:10 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F1531A87CC for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:00:09 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id M9DbZ6y3t3Ks for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:00:03 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (mx2.yitter.info [IPv6:2600:3c03::f03c:91ff:fedf:cfab]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1559C1A87CB for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:00:03 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4A0D6108C4 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:00:02 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at crankycanuck.ca Received: from mx2.yitter.info ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mx2.yitter.info [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id fJYqS-2UrDPk for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:59:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (c-73-142-157-135.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.142.157.135]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D124410875 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:59:59 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 08:59:57 -0500 From: Andrew Sullivan To: hrpc@irtf.org Message-ID: <20160121135957.GA7446@mx2.yitter.info> References: <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:00:09 -0000 On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 11:01:04AM +0100, Niels ten Oever wrote: > If this is a correct representation, I'm not sure if it is in line > with human rights law where human right should be balanced. A postulated right which is in its nature an attack on the foundation of other rights is no right at all. You cannot balance such a right against any other, because it attacks its own claims to a right. A DDoS attacks, by its nature, the open protocols of the Internet and works by undermining the Internet infrastructure itself. If every Internet participant engaged in DDoS, then the supposed right here (which I guess is claimed as a right by analogy with speech-acts) would in fact be impossible, because the infrastructure to support the right would no longer function. By reductio, then, there can be no right to perform a DDoS. > Perhaps we could also consider 'proportionality' (of DDoS) here? There is no possible proportion without absurdity. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com From nobody Thu Jan 21 06:05:03 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C52811A87B8 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:05:01 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 5O2WJlE5ZFIe for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:05:00 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (mx2.yitter.info [50.116.54.116]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5639B1A87A5 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:05:00 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0E946108C9 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:05:00 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at crankycanuck.ca Received: from mx2.yitter.info ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mx2.yitter.info [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hXtYYWrVvkmb for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:04:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (c-73-142-157-135.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.142.157.135]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 31DAE10875 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:04:59 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 09:04:57 -0500 From: Andrew Sullivan To: hrpc@irtf.org Message-ID: <20160121140457.GB7446@mx2.yitter.info> References: <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> <56A0C79A.2090500@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0CC07.4060809@article19.org> <56A0CFF9.9090100@cs.tcd.ie> <20160121124935.GO1956@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <56A0D708.8060309@cs.tcd.ie> <20160121133729.GP1956@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20160121133729.GP1956@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:05:01 -0000 On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 01:37:29PM +0000, Joss Wright wrote: > contexts, it's an argument that we can't build technical systems to prevent > "bad" PM that don't also prevent "good" PM. So it's perfectly reasonable, when > designing systems, to take the view that preventing all PM is the only feasible > goal. Extending that argument to some kind of universal truth would be silly. But it would not be silly to extend it to DDoS, which suffers from the very same problem, since there is no technical difference. There is only difference of motivation, and there's no way to detect that reliably. (We could use the evil bit, of course, but I think we all understand why that won't work.) If the work of this RG is to be meaningful, it must be about HR considerations _for protocols_. So even if there is a right to perform DDoS (which I reject, see upthread), there can be no relevant considerations for protocols. DDoS must be treated as an attack in all cases, and dealt with the same way. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com From nobody Thu Jan 21 06:11:40 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B4D81A8835 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:11:39 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.424 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.424 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id O1CC0z_z0KbV for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:11:37 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (vps784.greenhost.nl [213.108.108.114]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B395A1A882E for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:11:37 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BAD7C180019 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:11:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTP id A3D1B18001A for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:11:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.article19.io ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.article19.io [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id D3KEWsVRU-Pw for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:11:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [145.18.161.216] (wcw-staff-145-18-161-216.wireless.uva.nl [145.18.161.216]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6906D180019 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:11:35 +0000 (UTC) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> <56A0C79A.2090500@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0CC07.4060809@article19.org> <56A0CFF9.9090100@cs.tcd.ie> <20160121124935.GO1956@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <56A0D708.8060309@cs.tcd.ie> <20160121133729.GP1956@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <20160121140457.GB7446@mx2.yitter.info> From: Niels ten Oever Message-ID: <56A0E717.80305@article19.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:11:35 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20160121140457.GB7446@mx2.yitter.info> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:11:39 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 01/21/2016 03:04 PM, Andrew Sullivan wrote: > If the work of this RG is to be meaningful, it must be about HR > considerations _for protocols_. So even if there is a right to > perform DDoS (which I reject, see upthread), there can be no > relevant considerations for protocols. I agree with this, but this discussion will help us to understand the relation between human rights and protocols and help us with coming up with (a framework for) protocol transcending considerations. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoOcWAAoJEAi1oPJjbWjp2QcH/Rn2hUPzsKXpUJFSw2J6IdeN YYHaZHBvrTwGaFJzKZyDRnnwAboDdo0RQnSDVLLv7WPYOxk1cgCdkf7uifF1yHVh prBdmY1a2V2fzA60eYOhyhTy0AmenJnZqA8tqJN5646tyBVcsSeTHC6jhVkpBm/M VHJAgj/90n1epie+prihVAxbDWauwgFlnPcbht78SF5AKgaftufTkIlOvMNUHpx1 QCcgMfHEJYJTR0RiAZ1f3eUpZby5zGMHPu8L5Ui5QUtW595lQ5W/Z853Uz/kOhGl RFHqyUV00p93CzqIkCaGq2duiUhFU5O0tvd10j9s8wq47qViQpsr2csBl3yWB1s= =CsWG -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Thu Jan 21 06:23:29 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8E4A71A8864 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:23:28 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.424 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.424 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id N_L-Vgo19jsY for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:23:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (vps784.greenhost.nl [213.108.108.114]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4C4CE1A8861 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:23:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2B580180031 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:23:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1C4E218002F for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:23:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.article19.io ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.article19.io [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id Db6KmqxvhUqt for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:23:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [145.18.161.216] (wcw-staff-145-18-161-216.wireless.uva.nl [145.18.161.216]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CD846180019 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:23:25 +0000 (UTC) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> <20160121135957.GA7446@mx2.yitter.info> From: Niels ten Oever X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 Message-ID: <56A0E9DD.8070303@article19.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:23:25 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20160121135957.GA7446@mx2.yitter.info> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:23:28 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 01/21/2016 02:59 PM, Andrew Sullivan wrote: > On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 11:01:04AM +0100, Niels ten Oever wrote: >> If this is a correct representation, I'm not sure if it is in >> line with human rights law where human right should be balanced. >=20 > A postulated right which is in its nature an attack on the > foundation of other rights is no right at all. You cannot balance > such a right against any other, because it attacks its own claims > to a right. >=20 Do you mean that rights cannot be on conflict with each other? It happens all the time. We'll need to think of a framework for how to balance them. > A DDoS attacks, by its nature, the open protocols of the Internet > and works by undermining the Internet infrastructure itself. If > every Internet participant engaged in DDoS, then the supposed right > here (which I guess is claimed as a right by analogy with > speech-acts) would in fact be impossible, because the > infrastructure to support the right would no longer function. That everyone has a specific right doesn't necessarily mean everyone should be able to exercise that right at the same time. > By reductio, then, there can be no right to perform a DDoS. >=20 Disagree. >> Perhaps we could also consider 'proportionality' (of DDoS) here? >=20 > There is no possible proportion without absurdity. >=20 In general or this specific case? > Best regards, >=20 > A >=20 Cheers, Niels -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoOndAAoJEAi1oPJjbWjp8fAH/2brDY9AVuYk+f3Ubni7Ke61 coCEgt0aD7+cVhXq8SRDGH8zJojCqH/mRV0yzMl0kN7wpMu21hn5eCCE7ERfILaB pSbzsYw4QeeWOw7lsCLjLCwQ322ruVSBJhO4BMkB5rh+cpE/o+177VjrBfgZ2Jdr +0XeEHz+nMxebbn+6vwbW6mpXnJDqglm4qTSJCs2OQiUpLyESADDwA4vdToawGmm XwTt6rym+8b8X6iqu4OToMBxU8KmGP3uqakIBPCVXrNxIUWcIYBeSs9RsSCoF8sn vHxuyZr1vD2wdDQ50gz18p3uHW/GyoTEcz7FutOvG271FehWqGtEmIoPL/9ToRY=3D =3Dpbdw -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Thu Jan 21 06:30:54 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D9EED1A882D for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:30:51 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id QZ8ZicvEYdik for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:30:49 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (mx2.yitter.info [IPv6:2600:3c03::f03c:91ff:fedf:cfab]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 785A81A886C for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:30:49 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTP id EA9A3108C9 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:30:48 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at crankycanuck.ca Received: from mx2.yitter.info ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mx2.yitter.info [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 5zc6lr7SintG for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:30:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (unknown [IPv6:2601:18d:8600:87d9:d5f9:9d77:c7aa:c32b]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4FBBF10875 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:30:48 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 09:30:46 -0500 From: Andrew Sullivan To: hrpc@irtf.org Message-ID: <20160121143046.GE7446@mx2.yitter.info> References: <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> <20160121135957.GA7446@mx2.yitter.info> <56A0E9DD.8070303@article19.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <56A0E9DD.8070303@article19.org> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:30:52 -0000 On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 03:23:25PM +0100, Niels ten Oever wrote: > > Do you mean that rights cannot be on conflict with each other? It > happens all the time. We'll need to think of a framework for how to > balance them. No, I mean that a right cannot attack itself. DDoS is an attack on the network infrastructure required to express anything on the network, including the DDoS itself. A right to do something that defeats the doing of it is absurd. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com From nobody Thu Jan 21 06:35:05 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 915F21A8888 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:35:02 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.424 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.424 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id aJTmUvSO6NFL for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:35:01 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (vps784.greenhost.nl [213.108.108.114]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 55F561A8887 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:35:01 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 00EE317C061 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:34:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTP id E355017C05E for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:34:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.article19.io ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.article19.io [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id PolMKp-Vk64y for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:34:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [145.18.161.216] (wcw-staff-145-18-161-216.wireless.uva.nl [145.18.161.216]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AE45E174030 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:34:59 +0000 (UTC) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> <20160121135957.GA7446@mx2.yitter.info> <56A0E9DD.8070303@article19.org> <20160121143046.GE7446@mx2.yitter.info> From: Niels ten Oever Message-ID: <56A0EC93.1090206@article19.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:34:59 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20160121143046.GE7446@mx2.yitter.info> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:35:02 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 01/21/2016 03:30 PM, Andrew Sullivan wrote: > On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 03:23:25PM +0100, Niels ten Oever wrote: >> >> Do you mean that rights cannot be on conflict with each other? >> It happens all the time. We'll need to think of a framework for >> how to balance them. > > No, I mean that a right cannot attack itself. DDoS is an attack > on the network infrastructure required to express anything on the > network, including the DDoS itself. A right to do something that > defeats the doing of it is absurd. > It's not an attack on the whole network. It is targeted, even though on can indeed argue that there can be collateral damage, but hardly the whole network. Best, Niels -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoOyTAAoJEAi1oPJjbWjpfE0H/jejtp34x/rO0nXX+Sd8/mwv jF8EjKjWgMgrzwOHc7pVrsXiBmYxNhrI4DlyUNsTsdnV9LnxT2+k46EoRShhboHZ Fi+zG6wIbXlilBdOE28G8mN1dwuGtdaZV7im2QNg7quVR2Y1VGTZsKlsNibyURUL X6RBlvL/g6GhjG9dunLhTcIdlo465f1wWlGGC7PhvabfxjexC1na+1U2xXFTeiX9 nTYvRVcHeSSZ35nIf9Hv43CHU6C7a6H/71w6huw1T5mTkh09ZgkgGspGsdklgVby gS/dz6FdEtdrgVjYCh2zLt/XC2N03xA6hXTPs4enNCvGjuFsi5Fos1a6ay06EnI= =XS6V -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Thu Jan 21 06:53:55 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 851871B311B for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:53:54 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id qKLupJj0D-Aw for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:53:53 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (mx2.yitter.info [IPv6:2600:3c03::f03c:91ff:fedf:cfab]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 312BA1B30C6 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 06:53:53 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTP id D1E4E108CA for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:53:52 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at crankycanuck.ca Received: from mx2.yitter.info ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mx2.yitter.info [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id YF2ph002oQVR for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:53:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (c-73-142-157-135.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.142.157.135]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8DF5F10875 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:53:47 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 09:53:46 -0500 From: Andrew Sullivan To: hrpc@irtf.org Message-ID: <20160121145346.GH7446@mx2.yitter.info> References: <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> <20160121135957.GA7446@mx2.yitter.info> <56A0E9DD.8070303@article19.org> <20160121143046.GE7446@mx2.yitter.info> <56A0EC93.1090206@article19.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <56A0EC93.1090206@article19.org> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:53:54 -0000 On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 03:34:59PM +0100, Niels ten Oever wrote: > It's not an attack on the whole network. It is targeted, even though on > can indeed argue that there can be collateral damage, but hardly the > whole network. Any particular DDoS is aimed at some part of the network, yes, but the very activity contains a mechanism to foil the mechanism being able to be used, in case someone else engaged in the same behaviour at the same time. I can think of no right worthy of the name my exercise of which _by nature_ deprives another of the ability to exercise the same right. For instance, to take an uncontroversial one, if I exercise a right to live that does not by its nature deprive another of that right (except in perverse pholosophy class cases where there is a trolley and so on). Perhaps I'm missing a case (though I confess I think such a right would need rather a better defence than "someone considers it a right now"). In any case, as I argued elsewhere in the thread, even if there is a right to DDoS (which I do not concede, but set that aside), there can be no protocol considerations for that anyway. So the purported right is not a useful topic of discussion here regardless, unless it is to say that it is logically possible that there be rights for which there can be no protocol considerations. I'm willing to concede that claim _a priori_, though. A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com From nobody Thu Jan 21 07:04:36 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A750D1B31B0 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 07:04:34 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.102 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.102 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_20=-0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, J_CHICKENPOX_12=0.6, J_CHICKENPOX_21=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id F9l3a5k--bUj for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 07:04:30 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.gn.apc.org (mail.gn.apc.org [37.220.108.136]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F28E61B31AD for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 07:04:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.gn.apc.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B03D0201EF4C for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:04:25 +0000 (GMT) X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at mail.gn.apc.org Received: from mail.gn.apc.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.gn.apc.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 2FZjXpwcL+g5 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:04:22 +0000 (GMT) Received: from anonymous ([10.254.254.3]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: mallory) by mail.gn.apc.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2701F201EF2E for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:04:22 +0000 (GMT) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> From: Mallory Knodel Message-ID: <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:04:49 -0500 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="aNHaAbpoXFfpPpjpdbvk07ElTbMKaevjW" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:04:34 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --aNHaAbpoXFfpPpjpdbvk07ElTbMKaevjW Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------080507010902070505060608" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------080507010902070505060608 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Niels, On 21/01/16 05:07 AM, Niels ten Oever wrote: > Hi Mallory, > > On 01/20/2016 03:11 AM, Mallory Knodel wrote: > > > > On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > >> > >> On 20/01/16 00:17, Andrew Sullivan wrote: > >>> I prefer to deny the premise that we can even contemplate a > >>> right here. I think the reason DDoS isn't an acceptable > >>> political act or a protected right is precisely because it is > >>> an attack on the Internetworking infrastructure itself. It is > >>> therefore an attack on the very means of expression of any > >>> possible online right, and consequently it is absurd. If any > >>> argument about rights is to be coherent, it cannot rely on the > >>> absurdity of those rights. So there cannot be this right. > >> I agree that there is no such "right to DDoS" and that DDoS is > >> unacceptable and ought always be treated as an attack regardless > >> of anyone's real or claimed motivation. > > > I agree; expressing this as a right is literally nonsense. What is > > civil disobedience without the "disobedience" part? As a supporter > > of activists who use DDoS, I think it's fine, if not great, that > > most people hate it. It's that discomfort that makes it work. > > > I have a hard time understanding your argument here Mallory. Do you > think everyone who used DDoS should be exposed to legal cases because > else it would not be an effective tool and it is the risk of the game? > It's not the realm of the IETF to determine if people using DDoS for political reasons be exposes to legal action. But yes, I recognise that activists break the law for political reasons, meaning that they sometimes get arrested. And then released once it's determined that theirs were crimes of conscience. Of course I don't hope to see people arrested for DDoS, no. I don't think Anonymous or other groups who perform DDoS as a kind of online civil disobedience are really counting on us in the IETF to officially sanction their actions as legitimate. They will do them regardless of whether or not someone tells them it's okay. -Mallory > > But more to the original point: > > >> first, it would require developing a method to establish when a > >> DDoS attack is a legitimate expression of the right to freedom of > >> speech, or whether it impedes on it. > > > Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I mean, > > for the purposes of making the internet work better perhaps we > > should try. I don't think this will get in the way of activists > > using the internet in creative ways to make a point. > > >> Second, it asks the IETF to reflect upon its role in creating a > >> commercialized Internet that has no defacto public space of > >> inherent protections for freedom of speech. One of the founding > >> fathers of the Internet, David Clark, recently published a paper > >> warning that the future of the Internet is in danger. He argues > >> that the private sector control over the Internet is too strong, > >> limiting the myriad of ways in which it can be used (Daedalus > >> 2016), including for freedom of speech. > > > This is very important. I want to think more about how to make all > > conversations this conversation. > > >> As such, it is important for the IETF to consider the fact that > >> DDoS attacks are inherently dual-use and not take immediate sides > >> on this discussion. > > > Yes, DDoS is dual use. But again, even *if* we could get everyone > > to agree that DDoS is not a denial of free expression, not to > > mention an act that is widely condoned, then the action simply > > loses its teeth. The last thing we want is the online equivalent of > > "free speech zones"[0] sanctioned by IETF or anyone for that > > matter. > > > Here you seem to say that legal / accepted protest is ineffective. Am > I right? #confused. > > > Best, > > Niels > > > -Mallory > > > [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_speech_zone -- Mallory > > Knodel Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org > > gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 > > 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 > > > > _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list > > hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc > > > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list >= hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc > > --=20 Mallory Knodel Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 --------------080507010902070505060608 Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Niels,

On 21/01/16 05:07 AM, Niels ten Oever wrote:

Hi Mallory,

On 01/20/2016 03:11 AM, Mallory Knodel wrote:

> On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>
>> On 20/01/16 00:17, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
>>> I prefer to deny the premise that we can even contemplate a
>>> right here.=A0 I think the reason DDoS isn't an acceptable
>>> political act or a protected right is precisely because it is
>>> an attack on the Internetworking infrastructure itself.=A0 It is
>>> therefore an attack on the very means of expression of any
>>> possible online right, and consequently it is absurd.=A0 If any
>>> argument about rights is to be coherent, it cannot rely on the
>>> absurdity of those rights.=A0 So there cannot be this right.
>> I agree that there is no such "right to DDoS" and that DDoS is
>> unacceptable and ought always be treated as an attack regardless
>> of anyone's real or claimed motivation.

> I agree; expressing this as a right is literally nonsense. What is
> civil disobedience without the "disobedience" part? As a supporter
> of activists who use DDoS, I think it's fine, if not great, that
> most people hate it. It's that discomfort that makes it work.<= br>

I have a hard time understanding your argument here Mallory. Do you
think everyone who used DDoS should be exposed to legal cases because
else it would not be an effective tool and it is the risk of the game?

It's not the realm of the IETF to determine if people using DDoS for political reasons be exposes to legal action. But yes, I recognise that activists break the law for political reasons, meaning that they sometimes get arrested. And then released once it's determined that theirs were crimes of conscience.

Of course I don't hope to see people arrested for DDoS, no. I don't think Anonymous or other groups who perform DDoS as a kind of online civil disobedience are really counting on us in the IETF to officially sanction their actions as legitimate. They will do them regardless of whether or not someone tells them it's okay.

-Mallory

> But more to the original point:

>> first, it would require developing a method to establish when a
>> DDoS attack is a legitimate expression of the right to freedom of
>> speech, or whether it impedes on it.

> Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I mean,
> for the purposes of making the internet work better perhaps we
> should try. I don't think this will get in the way of activists
> using the internet in creative ways to make a point.

>> Second, it asks the IETF to reflect upon its role in creating a
>> commercialized Internet that has no defacto public space of
>> inherent protections for freedom of speech. One of the founding
>> fathers of the Internet, David Clark, recently published a paper
>> warning that the future of the Internet is in danger. He argues
>> that the private sector control over the Internet is too strong,
>> limiting the myriad of ways in which it can be used (Daedalus
>> 2016), including for freedom of speech.

> This is very important. I want to think more about how to make all
> conversations this conversation.

>> As such, it is important for the IETF to consider the fact that
>> DDoS attacks are inherently dual-use and not take immediate sides
>> on this discussion.

> Yes, DDoS is dual use. But again, even *if* we could get everyone
> to agree that DDoS is not a denial of free expression, not to<= br> > mention an act that is widely condoned, then the action simply
> loses its teeth. The last thing we want is the online equivalent of
> "free speech zones"[0] sanctioned by IETF or anyone for that > matter.

Here you seem to say that legal / accepted protest is ineffective. Am
I right? #confused.

Best,

Niels

> -Mallory

> [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_speec= h_zone -- Mallory
> Knodel Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org > &l= t;https://apc.org> gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071
> 0C32 A271 BD3C C780

> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list
> hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/list= info/hrpc

> > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list > = hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc > >

--
Mallory Knodel
Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org <https= ://apc.org>
gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780<= br>

--------------080507010902070505060608-- --aNHaAbpoXFfpPpjpdbvk07ElTbMKaevjW Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoPORAAoJEAwyonG9PMeAfeQH/ipsRUA6eTUR/AhqeUXSkaQD QpyfZknhsJUwMV3qsB0ss5d3sWwi2P0LkFgzx61jEthz0sTMjlIwMCVdiFTpOSUx Gqj+CrgDP4KZV74UvZaKDsdJuYZJRVyfLtDv5ubYAdY9gEQ833olszrJ7Qxwcttj TWsoFoMi9jfMxCx79M9K5YkbcCCu6DUovAiG3zAfovcqS8bmlaA3d6flFzmR+G1G RlSVV2yjwpLWtqhyeHJ2uDO/xkNujNLS7a48KpfCQ0ZTekvHQy1YNUuz6tatL1wz yVkFuwIrfFovLbyBCtaxB9ugx0LGwr715VS+atNqyqKYTHa1kRhxNe3O48TngrI= =LiUL -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --aNHaAbpoXFfpPpjpdbvk07ElTbMKaevjW-- From nobody Thu Jan 21 07:25:38 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A90241B31FD for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 07:25:37 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 1.624 X-Spam-Level: * X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.624 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545, J_CHICKENPOX_12=0.6, J_CHICKENPOX_21=0.6, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id GbZctEKlVt0v for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 07:25:35 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (vps784.greenhost.nl [213.108.108.114]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 115F11B31FB for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 07:25:34 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B64C618002F for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:25:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTP id A541818002D for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:25:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.article19.io ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.article19.io [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id 1aMJE290wJ38 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:25:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [145.18.161.216] (wcw-staff-145-18-161-216.wireless.uva.nl [145.18.161.216]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 665FD180019 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:25:32 +0000 (UTC) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> From: Niels ten Oever X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 Message-ID: <56A0F86C.8080009@article19.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 16:25:32 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:25:37 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On 01/21/2016 04:04 PM, Mallory Knodel wrote: > Hi Niels, >=20 > On 21/01/16 05:07 AM, Niels ten Oever wrote: >> Hi Mallory, >>=20 >> On 01/20/2016 03:11 AM, Mallory Knodel wrote: >>=20 >>=20 >>> On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>>=20 >>>> On 20/01/16 00:17, Andrew Sullivan wrote: >>>>> I prefer to deny the premise that we can even contemplate >>>>> a right here. I think the reason DDoS isn't an acceptable=20 >>>>> political act or a protected right is precisely because it >>>>> is an attack on the Internetworking infrastructure itself. >>>>> It is therefore an attack on the very means of expression >>>>> of any possible online right, and consequently it is >>>>> absurd. If any argument about rights is to be coherent, it >>>>> cannot rely on the absurdity of those rights. So there >>>>> cannot be this right. >>>> I agree that there is no such "right to DDoS" and that DDoS >>>> is unacceptable and ought always be treated as an attack >>>> regardless of anyone's real or claimed motivation. >>=20 >>> I agree; expressing this as a right is literally nonsense. What >>> is civil disobedience without the "disobedience" part? As a >>> supporter of activists who use DDoS, I think it's fine, if not >>> great, that most people hate it. It's that discomfort that >>> makes it work. >>=20 >>=20 >> I have a hard time understanding your argument here Mallory. Do >> you think everyone who used DDoS should be exposed to legal cases >> because else it would not be an effective tool and it is the risk >> of the game? >>=20 >=20 > It's not the realm of the IETF to determine if people using DDoS > for political reasons be exposes to legal action. Agree. But we are discussing the issue whether DDoS can be part of the right to association & protest, which could have impact on human rights considerations for protocols. > But yes, I recognise that activists break the law for political > reasons, meaning that they sometimes get arrested. For something to be a protest or political action it doesn't need to be illegal, right? Not sure if I understand your argument. > And then released once it's determined that theirs were crimes of > conscience. That is very dependent on the legal framework of the country where the individual is arrested. >=20 > Of course I don't hope to see people arrested for DDoS, no. I > don't think Anonymous or other groups who perform DDoS as a kind of > online civil disobedience are really counting on us in the IETF to > officially sanction their actions as legitimate. That was also not the intention of the thread. It's trying to understand the relations between human rights and protocols. ~n., > They will do them regardless of whether or not someone tells them > it's okay. >=20 > -Mallory >=20 >>> But more to the original point: >>=20 >>>> first, it would require developing a method to establish when >>>> a DDoS attack is a legitimate expression of the right to >>>> freedom of speech, or whether it impedes on it. >>=20 >>> Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I >>> mean, for the purposes of making the internet work better >>> perhaps we should try. I don't think this will get in the way >>> of activists using the internet in creative ways to make a >>> point. >>=20 >>>> Second, it asks the IETF to reflect upon its role in creating >>>> a commercialized Internet that has no defacto public space >>>> of inherent protections for freedom of speech. One of the >>>> founding fathers of the Internet, David Clark, recently >>>> published a paper warning that the future of the Internet is >>>> in danger. He argues that the private sector control over the >>>> Internet is too strong, limiting the myriad of ways in which >>>> it can be used (Daedalus 2016), including for freedom of >>>> speech. >>=20 >>> This is very important. I want to think more about how to make >>> all conversations this conversation. >>=20 >>>> As such, it is important for the IETF to consider the fact >>>> that DDoS attacks are inherently dual-use and not take >>>> immediate sides on this discussion. >>=20 >>> Yes, DDoS is dual use. But again, even *if* we could get >>> everyone to agree that DDoS is not a denial of free expression, >>> not to mention an act that is widely condoned, then the action >>> simply loses its teeth. The last thing we want is the online >>> equivalent of "free speech zones"[0] sanctioned by IETF or >>> anyone for that matter. >>=20 >>=20 >> Here you seem to say that legal / accepted protest is >> ineffective. Am I right? #confused. >>=20 >>=20 >> Best, >>=20 >> Niels >>=20 >>> -Mallory >>=20 >>> [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_speech_zone -- Mallory=20 >>> Knodel Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org=20 >>> gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 >>> B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 >>=20 >>=20 >>> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing >>> list hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>=20 >>> _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing >>> list > > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc > > >=20 > -- Mallory Knodel Association for Progressive Communications :: > apc.org gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 > BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 >=20 >=20 >=20 > _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list=20 > hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >=20 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoPhrAAoJEAi1oPJjbWjpX9sH/3HbJIBqHj3QxrrBlcaub5Se 4GdzgCy6mNXHv2C2QlCURaQF7r3JwQDxjBpbaVck0ZE0D73Ei+TzuIqcpTrUVpsq 7gubjW3k4IcNQBVxMHz5c8AUsZzOuGukaGSaV5d12dfrL5UwmT51LdtqLdBLG/XW M0aOSwr1Wp9EwWpbX8TmOYoImkhFvarolQ0qlLWL32jZBVIUe02MXJyZCJgIzcQo NtMR8Zi3hr+7rgJJ7/x5bGG0CwOJGBprnDKY9strTGBIBRZbFqs8TIKjsgiKYCOW Nlt9TCpFNGg0CBxkIQAL+Db73q+dJrjnWmmAXM06XCGytzolWfR8GutxVo2iHTg=3D =3Di2uS -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Thu Jan 21 07:41:54 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 554951B3205 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 07:41:52 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -3.001 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.001 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, J_CHICKENPOX_12=0.6, J_CHICKENPOX_21=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id UKjamvi4yJgX for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 07:41:49 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.gn.apc.org (mail.gn.apc.org [37.220.108.136]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 582D41A8A91 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 07:41:49 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.gn.apc.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EC4F7201D2E3 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:41:47 +0000 (GMT) X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at mail.gn.apc.org Received: from mail.gn.apc.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.gn.apc.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id fBvCT8HF4J-H for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:41:45 +0000 (GMT) Received: from anonymous ([10.254.254.3]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: mallory) by mail.gn.apc.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AAE3D201B68C for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:41:44 +0000 (GMT) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> From: Mallory Knodel X-Enigmail-Draft-Status: N1110 Message-ID: <56A0FC53.4010402@apc.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:42:11 -0500 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="NVQqMKgknNtrt8fjHf5xWKAsL100V6j54" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:41:52 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --NVQqMKgknNtrt8fjHf5xWKAsL100V6j54 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------010501090609060500000908" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------010501090609060500000908 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi again, As per the below, I should have moved forward the discussion as it relates to hrpc. I think it is important to acknowledge DDoS as a tool for direct action online that exploits weaknesses in internet protocols. We can elaborate a lot on this because it's interesting, but ultimately I do not think that political DDoS should be expressed as a right, or included in the rights formulation of the work, because this really bends rights language beyond its usefulness. -Mallory On 21/01/16 10:04 AM, Mallory Knodel wrote: > Hi Niels, > > On 21/01/16 05:07 AM, Niels ten Oever wrote: >> Hi Mallory, >> >> On 01/20/2016 03:11 AM, Mallory Knodel wrote: >> >> >> > On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >> >> >> >> On 20/01/16 00:17, Andrew Sullivan wrote: >> >>> I prefer to deny the premise that we can even contemplate a >> >>> right here. I think the reason DDoS isn't an acceptable >> >>> political act or a protected right is precisely because it is >> >>> an attack on the Internetworking infrastructure itself. It is >> >>> therefore an attack on the very means of expression of any >> >>> possible online right, and consequently it is absurd. If any >> >>> argument about rights is to be coherent, it cannot rely on the >> >>> absurdity of those rights. So there cannot be this right. >> >> I agree that there is no such "right to DDoS" and that DDoS is >> >> unacceptable and ought always be treated as an attack regardless >> >> of anyone's real or claimed motivation. >> >> > I agree; expressing this as a right is literally nonsense. What is >> > civil disobedience without the "disobedience" part? As a supporter >> > of activists who use DDoS, I think it's fine, if not great, that >> > most people hate it. It's that discomfort that makes it work. >> >> >> I have a hard time understanding your argument here Mallory. Do you >> think everyone who used DDoS should be exposed to legal cases because >> else it would not be an effective tool and it is the risk of the game?= >> > > It's not the realm of the IETF to determine if people using DDoS for > political reasons be exposes to legal action. But yes, I recognise > that activists break the law for political reasons, meaning that they > sometimes get arrested. And then released once it's determined that > theirs were crimes of conscience. > > Of course I don't hope to see people arrested for DDoS, no. I don't > think Anonymous or other groups who perform DDoS as a kind of online > civil disobedience are really counting on us in the IETF to officially > sanction their actions as legitimate. They will do them regardless of > whether or not someone tells them it's okay. > > -Mallory > >> > But more to the original point: >> >> >> first, it would require developing a method to establish when a >> >> DDoS attack is a legitimate expression of the right to freedom of >> >> speech, or whether it impedes on it. >> >> > Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I mean, >> > for the purposes of making the internet work better perhaps we >> > should try. I don't think this will get in the way of activists >> > using the internet in creative ways to make a point. >> >> >> Second, it asks the IETF to reflect upon its role in creating a >> >> commercialized Internet that has no defacto public space of >> >> inherent protections for freedom of speech. One of the founding >> >> fathers of the Internet, David Clark, recently published a paper >> >> warning that the future of the Internet is in danger. He argues >> >> that the private sector control over the Internet is too strong, >> >> limiting the myriad of ways in which it can be used (Daedalus >> >> 2016), including for freedom of speech. >> >> > This is very important. I want to think more about how to make all >> > conversations this conversation. >> >> >> As such, it is important for the IETF to consider the fact that >> >> DDoS attacks are inherently dual-use and not take immediate sides >> >> on this discussion. >> >> > Yes, DDoS is dual use. But again, even *if* we could get everyone >> > to agree that DDoS is not a denial of free expression, not to >> > mention an act that is widely condoned, then the action simply >> > loses its teeth. The last thing we want is the online equivalent of >> > "free speech zones"[0] sanctioned by IETF or anyone for that >> > matter. >> >> >> Here you seem to say that legal / accepted protest is ineffective. Am >> I right? #confused. >> >> >> Best, >> >> Niels >> >> > -Mallory >> >> > [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_speech_zone -- Mallory >> > Knodel Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org >> > gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 >> > 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 >> >> >> > _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list >> > hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >> > > > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list= > > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc > > > > --=20 > Mallory Knodel > Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org = > gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 > > > > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc --=20 Mallory Knodel Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 --------------010501090609060500000908 Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi again,

As per the below, I should have moved forward the discussion as it relates to hrpc. I think it is important to acknowledge DDoS as a tool for direct action online that exploits weaknesses in internet protocols. We can elaborate a lot on this because it's interesting, but ultimately I do not think that political DDoS should be expressed as a right, or included in the rights formulation of the work, because this really bends rights language beyond its usefulness.

-Mallory

On 21/01/16 10:04 AM, Mallory Knodel wrote:

Hi Niels,

On 21/01/16 05:07 AM, Niels ten Oever wrote:

Hi Mallory,

On 01/20/2016 03:11 AM, Mallory Knodel wrote:

> On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>>
>> On 20/01/16 00:17, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
>>> I prefer to deny the premise that we can even contemplate a
>>> right here.=A0 I think the reason DDoS isn't an acceptable
>>> political act or a protected right is precisely because it is
>>> an attack on the Internetworking infrastructure itself.=A0 It is
>>> therefore an attack on the very means of expression of any
>>> possible online right, and consequently it is absurd.=A0 If any
>>> argument about rights is to be coherent, it cannot rely on the
>>> absurdity of those rights.=A0 So there cannot be thi= s right.
>> I agree that there is no such "right to DDoS" and that DDoS is
>> unacceptable and ought always be treated as an attack regardless
>> of anyone's real or claimed motivation.

> I agree; expressing this as a right is literally nonsense. What is
> civil disobedience without the "disobedience" part? As a supporter
> of activists who use DDoS, I think it's fine, if not great, that
> most people hate it. It's that discomfort that makes it work.

I have a hard time understanding your argument here Mallory. Do you
think everyone who used DDoS should be exposed to legal cases because
else it would not be an effective tool and it is the risk of the game?

It's not the realm of the IETF to determine if people using DDoS for political reasons be exposes to legal action. But yes, I recognise that activists break the law for political reasons, meaning that they sometimes get arrested. And then released once it's determined that theirs were crimes of conscience.

Of course I don't hope to see people arrested for DDoS, no. I don't think Anonymous or other groups who perform DDoS as a kind of online civil disobedience are really counting on us in the IETF to officially sanction their actions as legitimate. They will do them regardless of whether or not someone tells them it's okay.
=
-Mallory

> But more to the original point:

>> first, it would require developing a method to establish when a
>> DDoS attack is a legitimate expression of the right to freedom of
>> speech, or whether it impedes on it.

> Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I mean,
> for the purposes of making the internet work better perhaps we
> should try. I don't think this will get in the way of activists
> using the internet in creative ways to make a point.

>> Second, it asks the IETF to reflect upon its role in creating a
>> commercialized Internet that has no defacto public space of
>> inherent protections for freedom of speech. One of the founding
>> fathers of the Internet, David Clark, recently published a paper
>> warning that the future of the Internet is in danger. He argues
>> that the private sector control over the Internet is too strong,
>> limiting the myriad of ways in which it can be used (Daedalus
>> 2016), including for freedom of speech.

> This is very important. I want to think more about how to make all
> conversations this conversation.

>> As such, it is important for the IETF to consider the fact that
>> DDoS attacks are inherently dual-use and not take immediate sides
>> on this discussion.

> Yes, DDoS is dual use. But again, even *if* we could get everyone
> to agree that DDoS is not a denial of free expression, not to
> mention an act that is widely condoned, then the action simply
> loses its teeth. The last thing we want is the online equivalent of
> "free speech zones"[0] sanctioned by IETF or anyone for that
> matter.

Here you seem to say that legal / accepted protest is ineffective. Am
I right? #confused.

Best,

Niels

> -Mallory

> [0] https:/= /en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_speech_zone -- Mallory
> Knodel Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org
> <https://apc.org> gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071
> 0C32 A271 BD3C C780

> _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list
> hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc

> > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/= listinfo/hrpc > >

--
Mallory Knodel
Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org <https://apc.org>
gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780

_______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list hrpc@= irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc

--
Mallory Knodel
Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org
gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780
--------------010501090609060500000908-- --NVQqMKgknNtrt8fjHf5xWKAsL100V6j54 Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoPxTAAoJEAwyonG9PMeAS8oH/jf+OXRlkukfBt1lL20/W9RR oHmvdEef7ShfXYsQblnIv84l1V2wghnBkNoZO+O90S/KXAPJxzoRPG2B4DJggIlD xiR6n8GHvPw8MNcxe4ce0tMHQAKGdEVFaFxAwZxHKTsXQA6hVzNqJm8j68DAQucO DL3Pz4ZrCBRyQ96hMuKvyYdglDr3kyWhLoPdcPApApxfOAKpjcr4/55gwOuUI5Nw IqCGGA05QZQufod1goHNv9uuBZ5PYp/xQl5iKTtiitlJSGjn6V4KQODfQ/KjEE+O SQcwFIt3xxW/yRrBNI/aQTX5SdPxmXGBOfXtQcNCou7TLiZBSY6A6bamFR3CtfU= =LWlb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --NVQqMKgknNtrt8fjHf5xWKAsL100V6j54-- From nobody Thu Jan 21 10:09:15 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 889421A892A for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:09:13 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.701 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.701 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, J_CHICKENPOX_12=0.6, J_CHICKENPOX_21=0.6, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id qzPh7yQUDrWs for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:09:11 -0800 (PST) Received: from na01-by2-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-by2on0065.outbound.protection.outlook.com [207.46.100.65]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 45EAA1A8940 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:09:11 -0800 (PST) Received: from BY1PR0601MB1419.namprd06.prod.outlook.com (10.162.111.18) by BY1PR0601MB1418.namprd06.prod.outlook.com (10.162.111.17) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.1.365.19; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:09:08 +0000 Received: from BY1PR0601MB1419.namprd06.prod.outlook.com ([10.162.111.18]) by BY1PR0601MB1419.namprd06.prod.outlook.com ([10.162.111.18]) with mapi id 15.01.0365.024; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:09:08 +0000 From: Christine Runnegar To: "hrpc@irtf.org" Thread-Topic: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS Thread-Index: AQHRVF0S7aF3swbqCk6HZUuqa/bHXZ8GG9uAgAApDoA= Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:09:08 +0000 Message-ID: References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> <56A0FC53.4010402@apc.org> In-Reply-To: <56A0FC53.4010402@apc.org> Accept-Language: en-AU, en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: authentication-results: spf=none (sender IP is ) smtp.mailfrom=runnegar@isoc.org; 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DIR:OUT; SFP:1101; SCL:1; SRVR:BY1PR0601MB1418; H:BY1PR0601MB1419.namprd06.prod.outlook.com; FPR:; SPF:None; PTR:InfoNoRecords; MX:1; A:1; LANG:en; received-spf: None (protection.outlook.com: isoc.org does not designate permitted sender hosts) spamdiagnosticoutput: 1:23 spamdiagnosticmetadata: NSPM Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252" Content-ID: <8F3A7DC24C9B2245B979E133090D1842@namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginatorOrg: isoc.org X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: 21 Jan 2016 18:09:08.3299 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: Hosted X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id: 89f84dfb-7285-4810-bc4d-8b9b5794554f X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: BY1PR0601MB1418 Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:09:13 -0000 Joining the email thread =85 I strongly support the view of others that the IETF community should regard= DDoS as an attack on Internet infrastructure regardless of the motivation = for the attack. But, for those who may not be very familiar with IETF threa= t analysis, it is helpful to understand that the terminology =93attack=94 h= as a particularly technical meaning, which may be different from the common= understanding of attack. Specifically, the notion of an =93attack=94 in IE= TF parlance does not consider the attacker=92s motivation. If individuals or groups assert that they are exercising their right to fre= edom of expression through a DDoS attack, this is =93their motivation=94. I= n my view, whether or not their motivation is justified, in any given case,= is not a matter for the IETF, but rather a policy or legal question. Perha= ps the solution for the HRPC=92s work is simply to note the claims that som= e entities engaging in DDoS attacks do so for the purpose of civil activism= without going into whether or not such motivations are legitimate, or whet= her such action is appropriate and/or justified. Christine Runnegar > On 21 Jan 2016, at 4:42 PM, Mallory Knodel wrote: >=20 > Hi again, >=20 > As per the below, I should have moved forward the discussion as it relate= s to hrpc. I think it is important to acknowledge DDoS as a tool for direct= action online that exploits weaknesses in internet protocols. We can elabo= rate a lot on this because it's interesting, but ultimately I do not think = that political DDoS should be expressed as a right, or included in the righ= ts formulation of the work, because this really bends rights language beyon= d its usefulness. >=20 > -Mallory >=20 > On 21/01/16 10:04 AM, Mallory Knodel wrote: >> Hi Niels, >>=20 >> On 21/01/16 05:07 AM, Niels ten Oever wrote: >>> Hi Mallory, >>>=20 >>> On 01/20/2016 03:11 AM, Mallory Knodel wrote: >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> > On 19/01/16 07:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>> >> >>> >> On 20/01/16 00:17, Andrew Sullivan wrote: >>> >>> I prefer to deny the premise that we can even contemplate a >>> >>> right here. I think the reason DDoS isn't an acceptable >>> >>> political act or a protected right is precisely because it is >>> >>> an attack on the Internetworking infrastructure itself. It is >>> >>> therefore an attack on the very means of expression of any >>> >>> possible online right, and consequently it is absurd. If any >>> >>> argument about rights is to be coherent, it cannot rely on the >>> >>> absurdity of those rights. So there cannot be this right. >>> >> I agree that there is no such "right to DDoS" and that DDoS is >>> >> unacceptable and ought always be treated as an attack regardless >>> >> of anyone's real or claimed motivation. >>>=20 >>> > I agree; expressing this as a right is literally nonsense. What is >>> > civil disobedience without the "disobedience" part? As a supporter >>> > of activists who use DDoS, I think it's fine, if not great, that >>> > most people hate it. It's that discomfort that makes it work. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> I have a hard time understanding your argument here Mallory. Do you >>> think everyone who used DDoS should be exposed to legal cases because >>> else it would not be an effective tool and it is the risk of the game? >>>=20 >>=20 >> It's not the realm of the IETF to determine if people using DDoS for pol= itical reasons be exposes to legal action. But yes, I recognise that activi= sts break the law for political reasons, meaning that they sometimes get ar= rested. And then released once it's determined that theirs were crimes of c= onscience. >>=20 >> Of course I don't hope to see people arrested for DDoS, no. I don't thin= k Anonymous or other groups who perform DDoS as a kind of online civil diso= bedience are really counting on us in the IETF to officially sanction their= actions as legitimate. They will do them regardless of whether or not some= one tells them it's okay. >>=20 >> -Mallory >>=20 >>> > But more to the original point: >>>=20 >>> >> first, it would require developing a method to establish when a >>> >> DDoS attack is a legitimate expression of the right to freedom of >>> >> speech, or whether it impedes on it. >>>=20 >>> > Is there a way to completely eradicate DoS? Probably not. I mean, >>> > for the purposes of making the internet work better perhaps we >>> > should try. I don't think this will get in the way of activists >>> > using the internet in creative ways to make a point. >>>=20 >>> >> Second, it asks the IETF to reflect upon its role in creating a=20 >>> >> commercialized Internet that has no defacto public space of >>> >> inherent protections for freedom of speech. One of the founding >>> >> fathers of the Internet, David Clark, recently published a paper >>> >> warning that the future of the Internet is in danger. He argues >>> >> that the private sector control over the Internet is too strong, >>> >> limiting the myriad of ways in which it can be used (Daedalus >>> >> 2016), including for freedom of speech. >>>=20 >>> > This is very important. I want to think more about how to make all=20 >>> > conversations this conversation. >>>=20 >>> >> As such, it is important for the IETF to consider the fact that >>> >> DDoS attacks are inherently dual-use and not take immediate sides >>> >> on this discussion. >>>=20 >>> > Yes, DDoS is dual use. But again, even *if* we could get everyone >>> > to agree that DDoS is not a denial of free expression, not to >>> > mention an act that is widely condoned, then the action simply >>> > loses its teeth. The last thing we want is the online equivalent of >>> > "free speech zones"[0] sanctioned by IETF or anyone for that >>> > matter. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> Here you seem to say that legal / accepted protest is ineffective. Am >>> I right? #confused. >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> Best, >>>=20 >>> Niels >>>=20 >>> > -Mallory >>>=20 >>> > [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_speech_zone -- Mallory >>> > Knodel Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org >>> > gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 >>> > 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 >>>=20 >>>=20 >>> > _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list=20 >>> > hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>>=20 >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > hrpc mailing list >> >=20 >> hrpc@irtf.org >>=20 >> >=20 >> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >>=20 >> > >> > >>=20 >>=20 >> --=20 >> Mallory Knodel >> Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org >> gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >> _______________________________________________ >> hrpc mailing list >>=20 >> hrpc@irtf.org >> https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >=20 > --=20 > Mallory Knodel > Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org > gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc From nobody Thu Jan 21 10:24:02 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C1B981A896F for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:24:00 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.302 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.302 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hUfbdbKkwPyi for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:23:59 -0800 (PST) Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [134.226.56.6]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 588F91A896A for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:23:59 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTP id A3166BE53; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:23:57 +0000 (GMT) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at scss.tcd.ie Received: from mercury.scss.tcd.ie ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mercury.scss.tcd.ie [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 9ZvVeKuOMig7; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:23:56 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [10.87.48.95] (unknown [86.46.20.159]) by mercury.scss.tcd.ie (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BA59ABE4C; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:23:55 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cs.tcd.ie; s=mail; t=1453400636; bh=p10TBL4cnm1z07Y6Q3nDaGUWSqD6C5M7SDhOyvYZYs8=; h=Subject:To:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=z76zAcD8hr75Ef66tBYlWIzrbLIuJVCIGTrTq0kaDUztNWC/DN61aB0jEsNQRpslq /wfHEXPshibwN8PayTP1VFesOqFyXLBKNHxN4Vwee95992s52EVydt2JWUfdsAtPAB 1xVz3xKULuzCeRNQ9+83ynUjDN2Cn/9jKYNQKNec= To: Christine Runnegar , "hrpc@irtf.org" References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> <56A0FC53.4010402@apc.org> From: Stephen Farrell Openpgp: id=D66EA7906F0B897FB2E97D582F3C8736805F8DA2; url= Message-ID: <56A1223B.8090700@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:23:55 +0000 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/38.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:24:00 -0000 Hi Christine, On 21/01/16 18:09, Christine Runnegar wrote: > note the claims that some entities engaging in DDoS attacks do so for > the purpose of civil activism Personally, I think that would be misleading unless one really emphasises that there are only a handful of known cases of that kind of thing versus perhaps O(10^6) cases of DDoS attacks for purely nefarious purposes. (*) It'd not be a good plan to ignore many orders of magnitude of difference like that. Cheers, S. (*) I've no idea what the overall total number DDoS attacks ever seen might be. I picked O(10^6) conservatively based on a quick search that turned up the a claim that there were 143,410 attacks observed in Q4 2014 [1] [1] http://betanews.com/2015/03/24/ddos-attacks-reduce-in-frequency-but-grow-in-volume/ From nobody Thu Jan 21 10:32:13 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3E34B1A8996 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:32:11 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.901 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.901 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id A0KN7et2Z0Dc for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:32:09 -0800 (PST) Received: from na01-bl2-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-bl2on0090.outbound.protection.outlook.com [65.55.169.90]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 460CF1A8993 for ; 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DIR:OUT; SFP:1101; SCL:1; SRVR:BY1PR0601MB1420; H:BY1PR0601MB1419.namprd06.prod.outlook.com; FPR:; SPF:None; PTR:InfoNoRecords; A:1; MX:1; LANG:en; received-spf: None (protection.outlook.com: isoc.org does not designate permitted sender hosts) spamdiagnosticoutput: 1:23 spamdiagnosticmetadata: NSPM Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-ID: Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginatorOrg: isoc.org X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: 21 Jan 2016 18:32:05.5203 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: Hosted X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id: 89f84dfb-7285-4810-bc4d-8b9b5794554f X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: BY1PR0601MB1420 Archived-At: Cc: "hrpc@irtf.org" Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:32:11 -0000 DQo+IE9uIDIxIEphbiAyMDE2LCBhdCA3OjIzIFBNLCBTdGVwaGVuIEZhcnJlbGwgPHN0ZXBoZW4u ZmFycmVsbEBjcy50Y2QuaWU+IHdyb3RlOg0KPiANCj4gDQo+IEhpIENocmlzdGluZSwNCj4gDQo+ IE9uIDIxLzAxLzE2IDE4OjA5LCBDaHJpc3RpbmUgUnVubmVnYXIgd3JvdGU6DQo+PiBub3RlIHRo ZSBjbGFpbXMgdGhhdCBzb21lIGVudGl0aWVzIGVuZ2FnaW5nIGluIEREb1MgYXR0YWNrcyBkbyBz byBmb3INCj4+IHRoZSBwdXJwb3NlIG9mIGNpdmlsIGFjdGl2aXNtDQo+IA0KPiBQZXJzb25hbGx5 LCBJIHRoaW5rIHRoYXQgd291bGQgYmUgbWlzbGVhZGluZyB1bmxlc3Mgb25lIHJlYWxseQ0KPiBl bXBoYXNpc2VzIHRoYXQgdGhlcmUgYXJlIG9ubHkgYSBoYW5kZnVsIG9mIGtub3duIGNhc2VzIG9m IHRoYXQNCj4ga2luZCBvZiB0aGluZyB2ZXJzdXMgcGVyaGFwcyBPKDEwXjYpIGNhc2VzIG9mIERE b1MgYXR0YWNrcyBmb3INCj4gcHVyZWx5IG5lZmFyaW91cyBwdXJwb3Nlcy4gKCopDQo+IA0KPiBJ dCdkIG5vdCBiZSBhIGdvb2QgcGxhbiB0byBpZ25vcmUgbWFueSBvcmRlcnMgb2YgbWFnbml0dWRl IG9mDQo+IGRpZmZlcmVuY2UgbGlrZSB0aGF0Lg0KDQpUb3RhbGx5IGFncmVlLiBBbmQsIGp1c3Qg dG8gYmUgY2xlYXIsIHRoZSB1c2Ugb2Yg4oCcY2xhaW1z4oCdIHdhcyBkZWxpYmVyYXRlLg0KPiAN Cj4gQ2hlZXJzLA0KPiBTLg0KPiANCj4gKCopIEkndmUgbm8gaWRlYSB3aGF0IHRoZSBvdmVyYWxs IHRvdGFsIG51bWJlciBERG9TIGF0dGFja3MNCj4gZXZlciBzZWVuIG1pZ2h0IGJlLiBJIHBpY2tl ZCBPKDEwXjYpIGNvbnNlcnZhdGl2ZWx5IGJhc2VkIG9uDQo+IGEgcXVpY2sgc2VhcmNoIHRoYXQg dHVybmVkIHVwIHRoZSBhIGNsYWltIHRoYXQgdGhlcmUgd2VyZQ0KPiAxNDMsNDEwIGF0dGFja3Mg b2JzZXJ2ZWQgaW4gUTQgMjAxNCBbMV0NCj4gDQo+IFsxXQ0KPiBodHRwOi8vYmV0YW5ld3MuY29t LzIwMTUvMDMvMjQvZGRvcy1hdHRhY2tzLXJlZHVjZS1pbi1mcmVxdWVuY3ktYnV0LWdyb3ctaW4t dm9sdW1lLw0KDQo= From nobody Thu Jan 21 10:57:35 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 038651A8A7D for ; 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Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:57:26 +0000 (GMT) Received: from anonymous ([10.254.254.3]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: mallory) by mail.gn.apc.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C98A3201EE76 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:57:25 +0000 (GMT) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> <56A0FC53.4010402@apc.org> <56A1223B.8090700@cs.tcd.ie> <2CC7B50F-B552-4477-B774-E15DDA05E18A@isoc.org> From: Mallory Knodel Message-ID: <56A12A30.2070805@apc.org> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 13:57:52 -0500 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <2CC7B50F-B552-4477-B774-E15DDA05E18A@isoc.org> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="aOHuodUVED3O2gpBqunM0gjiGOHrHpsxi" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:57:33 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --aOHuodUVED3O2gpBqunM0gjiGOHrHpsxi Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------010003030604080408070600" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------010003030604080408070600 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi I like where this thread is going. I agree. This is something I posted to Niels off-list, which he then asked me to share here: > I get that the right to peaceful protest is clear, and I also > understand and support the argument that DDoS is a form of political > action, if not also very much like protest. I do also recognize that > it rubs up against freedom of expression, which is not a problem > because sometimes rights conflict, as you've mentioned. > > Why I don't think hrpc needs to worry about it so much is that Article > 11 focuses on freedom of association, which I think is perhaps more > important of a focus in terms of the way activists use the internet to > organise. I feel like this discussion on DDoS is a bit of a > distraction from that larger issue. > > If we say that DDoS is protected under the right to peaceful protest, > then we would have to say that the IETF acts against this right simply > because they are trying to solve a very easy-to-fix and obvious > weakness of the internet. But it is obviously not a direct or even > indirect threat to civil disobedience online. *I think even Anonymous > would rather have a better internet than the ability to DDoS*. So it > just seems counter productive to make a claim that certain IETF > initiatives are falling on the pro- or anti- side of rights. > > BUT I do definitely think it merits treatment in our work, just not in > the same way that we direct attention towards anonymity for privacy, > for example. -Mallory On 21/01/16 01:32 PM, Christine Runnegar wrote: >> On 21 Jan 2016, at 7:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >> >> >> Hi Christine, >> >> On 21/01/16 18:09, Christine Runnegar wrote: >>> note the claims that some entities engaging in DDoS attacks do so for= >>> the purpose of civil activism >> Personally, I think that would be misleading unless one really >> emphasises that there are only a handful of known cases of that >> kind of thing versus perhaps O(10^6) cases of DDoS attacks for >> purely nefarious purposes. (*) >> >> It'd not be a good plan to ignore many orders of magnitude of >> difference like that. > Totally agree. And, just to be clear, the use of =E2=80=9Cclaims=E2=80=9D= was deliberate. >> Cheers, >> S. >> >> (*) I've no idea what the overall total number DDoS attacks >> ever seen might be. I picked O(10^6) conservatively based on >> a quick search that turned up the a claim that there were >> 143,410 attacks observed in Q4 2014 [1] >> >> [1] >> http://betanews.com/2015/03/24/ddos-attacks-reduce-in-frequency-but-gr= ow-in-volume/ > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc --=20 Mallory Knodel Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780 --------------010003030604080408070600 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi

I like where this thread is going. I agree.

This is something I posted to Niels off-list, which he then asked me to share here:

I get that the right to peaceful protest is= clear, and I also understand and support the argument that DDoS is a form of political action, if not also very much like protest. I do also recognize that it rubs up against freedom of expression, which is not a problem because sometimes rights conflict, as you've mentioned.

Why I don't think hrpc needs to worry about it so much is that Article 11 focuses on freedom of association, which I think is perhaps more important of a focus in terms of the way activists use the internet to organise. I feel like this discussion on DDoS is a bit of a distraction from that larger issue.

If we say that DDoS is protected under the right to peaceful protest, then we would have to say that the IETF acts against this right simply because they are trying to solve a very easy-to-fix and obvious weakness of the internet. But it is obviously not a direct or even indirect threat to civil disobedience online. I think even Anonymous would rather have a better internet than the ability to DDoS. So it just seems counter productive to make a claim that certain IETF initiatives are falling on the pro- or anti- side of rights.

BUT I do definitely think it merits treatment in our work, just not in the same way that we direct attention towards anonymity for privacy, for example.

-Mallory

On 21/01/16 01:32 PM, Christine Runnegar wrote:

On 21 Jan 2016, at 7:23 PM, Stephen Farrell &l= t;stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote: Hi Christine, On 21/01/16 18:09, Christine Runnegar wrote:

note the claims that some entities engaging in D= DoS attacks do so for the purpose of civil activism

Personally, I think that would be misleading unless one really emphasises that there are only a handful of known cases of that kind of thing versus perhaps O(10^6) cases of DDoS attacks for purely nefarious purposes. (*) It'd not be a good plan to ignore many orders of magnitude of difference like that.

Totally agree. And, just to be clear, the use of =E2=80=9Cclaims=E2=80=9D= was deliberate.

Cheers, S. (*) I've no idea what the overall total number DDoS attacks ever seen might be. I picked O(10^6) conservatively based on a quick search that turned up the a claim that there were 143,410 attacks observed in Q4 2014 [1] [1] http://betanews.co= m/2015/03/24/ddos-attacks-reduce-in-frequency-but-grow-in-volume/

_______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list hrpc@= irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc

--
Mallory Knodel
Association for Progressive Communications :: apc.org
gpg fingerprint :: E3EB 63E0 65A3 B240 BCD9 B071 0C32 A271 BD3C C780
--------------010003030604080408070600-- --aOHuodUVED3O2gpBqunM0gjiGOHrHpsxi Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWoSowAAoJEAwyonG9PMeAQXoH/35Wvsb1c7lBU1ilxFStO+DJ yl7lpzkzzi/8jASgVXJJ2xD3V59Ai5KDMEA6UOqJAbdLdCiWAcpzYfRqHPVnXEn0 FLQz0wW+U9dJSmB85Om+sVX0MQq6yofX/XArfe1gtFqOqXi4LbseNoHyZy9sW+7t oSSgPvrcSX+t1ftXMG/ZqXRz5kM0upnAoTe62NX5P+uKgTAGYhtG9kOgGLY5WtAU reUS+aGKgrNICm8cyakHhndtGZRkwAGuaESJ+Tex2jZFIGYgRLAuhEcfwwORH6Te UiMioKlYJ7qVjPZ3rrxK0D122LnLEMeZJfRbu/+jSgFwJsrH5PmbXDBQgarXlSo= =iw6W -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --aOHuodUVED3O2gpBqunM0gjiGOHrHpsxi-- From nobody Thu Jan 21 10:58:43 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 02CAA1A8A7A for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:58:43 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.333 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.333 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_20=-0.001, IP_NOT_FRIENDLY=0.334] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ujNBkhoII7W7 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:58:42 -0800 (PST) Received: from abenaki.wabanaki.net (nike.wampumpeag.net [67.42.198.81]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E2A471A8A74 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:58:41 -0800 (PST) Received: from abenaki.wabanaki.net (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by abenaki.wabanaki.net (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id u0LIvmga011770; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:57:48 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net) Message-Id: <201601211857.u0LIvmga011770@abenaki.wabanaki.net> From: "Eric (Maule) Brunner-Williams" To: Corinne Cath In-reply-to: References: Comments: In-reply-to Corinne Cath message dated "Tue, 19 Jan 2016 21:08:42 +0000." MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-ID: <11768.1453402668.1@abenaki.wabanaki.net> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 10:57:48 -0800 Archived-At: Cc: "Eric $Maule$ Brunner-Williams" , hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 18:58:43 -0000 Corinne, A few years ago I took part in an activity intended to deny service. The activity was undertaken by many more people, using their access to general purpose network attached programmable devices, and so "distributed", and as I mentioned, intended to deny service, and so a distributed denial of service attack. The system under attack utilized rendezvous points for reconstitution, and our work was to discover the algorithm(s) for the selection of rendezvous points, and prevent the system from using these. The rendezvous point were domain names in several namespaces, and the system under attack the .C variant of the Conficker worm, which had obtained access to a low multiple of 10^^7 (MS Windows) edge devices at the time of our work to "DDos" that application. I suggest that the framing you've provided is non-exhaustive of the fact patterns likely in distributed responses stimuli originating from distributed systems. Cheers, Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon From nobody Thu Jan 21 11:27:13 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4844A1A8AFB for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 11:27:10 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.999 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_40=-0.001, GB_AFFORDABLE=1] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id V87Gcq-2jpOn for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 11:27:09 -0800 (PST) Received: from che.mayfirst.org (che.mayfirst.org [209.234.253.108]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 12E3E1A039F for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 11:27:08 -0800 (PST) Received: from fifthhorseman.net (unknown [38.109.115.130]) by che.mayfirst.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E3137F984; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:27:05 -0500 (EST) Received: by fifthhorseman.net (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 9C97F20085; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:27:05 -0500 (EST) From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor To: Niels ten Oever , hrpc@irtf.org In-Reply-To: <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <569F60FB.1050808@cs.tcd.ie> <56A0AC60.6060705@article19.org> User-Agent: Notmuch/0.21+67~g41ad7ff (http://notmuchmail.org) Emacs/24.5.1 (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:27:05 -0500 Message-ID: <87powuvily.fsf@alice.fifthhorseman.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 19:27:10 -0000 On Thu 2016-01-21 05:01:04 -0500, Niels ten Oever wrote: > If I can try to translate what Stephen is saying in rights langauge: > IETF is working on freedom of expression and access to information (= > connectivity), everything that hinders that, even if that falls under > the Right to Association / Protest (some particular uses of DDoS), > that is a inherent violation. [ i understand that this was not what Stephen was trying to say, but i want to clarify why i think this framing is troubling anyway ] >From what i've seen, the most DDoS are not violations of freedom of expression, whether they're caused by activists or not. They are also violations of any sort of right to association and even rights to protest. Consider a small group that is effectively harrassed by DDoS out of having any online community forums -- their freedom of association is violated as much as their freedom of expression. They cannot associate with each other because of the DDoS. If the group is itself attempting to coordinate protests or petitions, their ability to do so is also harmed. Similarly, consider an organization that is forced by DDoS (or even threat of DDoS) to move their infrastructure behind a DDoS mitigation service, effectively inviting the DDoS mitigation service into their circle of association. There are very few effective and affordable DDoS mitigation services in existence, and it's entirely conceivable that none exist who are politically aligned with any given target of a DDoS. Here, the freedom to *not* associate with parties that you wish to avoid is abrogated due to DDoS. The overwhelming majority of DDoS situations i've read about or seen fall into a few categories: * extortion attempts * retribution against minority viewpoints or populations * DDoS for competitive advantage The fact that there may be some instances where DDoS is used by "people we like" and against "people we don't like" doesn't change that as a mechanism (whose intent the network cannot determine, as others in this thread have pointed out), it is an unambiguous attack on many different human rights, including the rights of free association and the right to protest. Arguing in favor of DDoS as an acceptable mechanism on the basis of a small handful of successful politically-justified DDoS actions seems no different than arguing in favor of pervasive surveillance as an acceptable mechanism on the basis of a small handful of law-enforcement victories where pervasive surveillance resolves clear-cut rapes and murders. Both mechanisms can certainly made to achieve both narrowly-stated ends, but not without broader consequences that come along for the ride. And the broader consequences to society (or to "the network" if you like) of adopting or accepting either of these mechanisms are unambiguously terrible. --dkg From nobody Thu Jan 21 12:47:08 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F2CC1A912F for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:47:07 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.098 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ggDnTGtL0q_4 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:47:05 -0800 (PST) Received: from TheWorld.com (pcls5.std.com [192.74.137.145]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4EDCD1A912A for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 12:47:05 -0800 (PST) Received: from pcls8.std.com (pcls8.std.com [192.74.137.148]) by TheWorld.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id u0LKkk0e023445; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:46:48 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-ID: <22177.17263.667811.342065@pcls8.std.com> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 15:45:35 -0500 From: bzs@theworld.com To: Niels ten Oever In-Reply-To: <56A0F86C.8080009@article19.org> References: <569EA9FD.3010401@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119213449.GA1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB0C5.5080907@cs.tcd.ie> <20160119221543.GD1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB720.6000308@mykolab.com> <20160119223250.GN53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> <56A0F86C.8080009@article19.org> X-Mailer: VM 8.2.0b under 24.3.1 (x86_64-suse-linux-gnu) Archived-At: Cc: hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case three: DDoS X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 20:47:07 -0000 Interesting thread, good cases. My view is that even in warfare of the worst sort there are human rights issues. The premise being put forth is unnecessarily binary: That either DDoS is right, or it's wrong, and if we can agree on which then the issue is settled. That's overly judgemental and tries to predict, as this thread is trying to do, every possible way DDoS can arise. What about in the course of cyber-warfare? If one country were cyber-attacking another one could imagine the target's first response, assuming just blocking the source was not an option, to DDoS the source if possible. Or it could be on their list of engagements. Or maybe not? Maybe that's a cyber-war crime? Who is to say if no one writes this all down with definitions etc? Something very similar just went on on NANOG recently. Someone suggested de-peering ASNs entirely which did not respond to complaints of DDoS and other misbehavior. I asked if there were any contracts, any agreements, anything written down which they have agreed to or can be generally cited to identify this behavior? Was there any process in place for this de-peering? Any way for a misidentified or misunderstood or even just disagreeing ("that's not our responsibility, who says it is?") accused to be heard? I suggested that right now it's "Justice By Router Commands" which seems primitive and error-prone at best, vigilantism basically. We can lay out hypothetical scenarios ad infinitum and try to use them to adduce the worthiness of the topic but I'll assert that's an error. All one really should be discussing are the boundaries of DDoS and the implications for human rights issues. To adjudicate DDoS per se is misguided just as adjudicating whether kinetic warfare is right or wrong as a pre-requisite to any discussion of human rights in that warfare context. Some things are bad, some very bad, but human rights issues remain even within very, very distasteful contexts. Even the worst criminals have human rights. -- -Barry Shein Software Tool & Die | bzs@TheWorld.com | http://www.TheWorld.com Purveyors to the Trade | Voice: +1 617-STD-WRLD | 800-THE-WRLD The World: Since 1989 | A Public Information Utility | *oo* From nobody Thu Jan 21 14:38:25 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9A3401AD1DB for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:38:23 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id S9plvqlp-PNz for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:38:22 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (mx2.yitter.info [IPv6:2600:3c03::f03c:91ff:fedf:cfab]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 36C201AD1D5 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 14:38:22 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTP id BADA0108CB for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 22:38:21 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at crankycanuck.ca Received: from mx2.yitter.info ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mx2.yitter.info [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id jAKwdFr1-JqW for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 22:38:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (c-73-142-157-135.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.142.157.135]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A4840105E5 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 22:38:20 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 17:38:19 -0500 From: Andrew Sullivan To: hrpc@irtf.org Message-ID: <20160121223819.GT7446@mx2.yitter.info> References: <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> <56A0F86C.8080009@article19.org> <22177.17263.667811.342065@pcls8.std.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <22177.17263.667811.342065@pcls8.std.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Archived-At: Subject: [hrpc] Against rules for de-peering (was Re: Case three: DDoS) X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 22:38:23 -0000 On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 03:45:35PM -0500, bzs@theworld.com wrote: > > Someone suggested de-peering ASNs entirely which did not respond to > complaints of DDoS and other misbehavior. > > I asked if there were any contracts, any agreements, anything written > down which they have agreed to or can be generally cited to identify > this behavior? > > Was there any process in place for this de-peering? I think this is a terrible mischaracterisation of the way the Internet works. Unfortunately it's of a piece with similar lines of thought that I see all over the place lately, so I think I must respond to it. By definition, the Internet is a network of networks [of networks &c.]. Each participating network makes its own rules, including the rules about how to interconnect. This means that there is no duty whatsoever to route someone else's packets. There is no duty at all to peer, and therefore there needn't be any contract or any "process in place for … de-peering". This non-contractual basis for collaborative growth is in fact what makes the Internet grow the way it does. As a consequence, if all the other networks decide you play badly, and de-peer you, then your traffic won't flow. That is not a violation of your rights, any more than the fact that nobody is listening to someone's views is a violation of that person's right to speak. It does mean, however, that for us all to get the benefits of the Internet, we each need to be conservative in what we send and liberal in what we accept. The complaints of misbehaviour are, in effect, complaints that the sender is failing in the social contract to be conservative in what it sends. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com From nobody Thu Jan 21 17:57:54 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EFFAE1B309B for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 17:57:52 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.602 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.602 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, GB_I_LETTER=-2, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id GE-8J6bo7deq for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 17:57:51 -0800 (PST) Received: from TheWorld.com (pcls5.std.com [192.74.137.145]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7907E1B2CCD for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 17:57:50 -0800 (PST) Received: from pcls8.std.com (pcls8.std.com [192.74.137.148]) by TheWorld.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id u0M1vJ3I007732; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 20:57:21 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-ID: <22177.35895.894925.83345@pcls8.std.com> Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 20:56:07 -0500 From: bzs@theworld.com To: Andrew Sullivan In-Reply-To: <20160121223819.GT7446@mx2.yitter.info> References: <569EBC9B.2090606@mykolab.com> <20160119234514.GR53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> <56A0F86C.8080009@article19.org> <22177.17263.667811.342065@pcls8.std.com> <20160121223819.GT7446@mx2.yitter.info> X-Mailer: VM 8.2.0b under 24.3.1 (x86_64-suse-linux-gnu) Archived-At: Cc: hrpc@irtf.org Subject: [hrpc] Against rules for de-peering (was Re: Case three: DDoS) X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 01:57:53 -0000 This was not an individual (person or company) deciding to not route certain networks. This was a broad call for a boycott, a call for everyone sympathetic on the huge NANOG list (thousands of network administrators) to refuse to route all of Russia and/or China or whatever networks they had in mind specifically due to some aggrieved misbehavior which was never even clearly characterized. IANAL but I dare say that in the US that rises to the level of an illegal business boycott. See for example: https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-= laws/dealings-competitors/group-boycotts or http://tinyurl.com/hl2lznf Which starts: "Any company may, on its own, refuse to do business with another firm, but an agreement among competitors not to do business with targeted individuals or businesses may be an illegal boycott, especially if the group of competitors working together has market power..." I daresay the NANOG list addresses almost exclusively competitors. Tho some might be recused on a case by case basis it would seem to be prima facie evidence of being in the same business as those targeted, it's the North American Network Operators Group. And working together I think it's safe to say they have market power. Which of course is the only reason any believe such a boycott might be effective and the only reason such a list would be addressed for this purpose. Their defense might be that the target was doing them harm but that brings me back to my original point: Where is this harm written down=3F What agreement has been violated=3F What process was taken to cure=3F Where is any of that documented=3F It isn't, or only in the most casual manner. But that wasn't even my point here. I never said a word about legalities but since you seemed to express the situation as if there were an unassailable right involved I thought I would point this legality out. My point was that whatever it is that is motivating this boycott should be clearly defined and characterized, written down, and agreed upon, and a process and cure established. Mob rule and vigilantism is ugly. Even when one imagines they are the harmed party and in their rights. I would hope that one high purpose of this list is to rise above that sort of mob rule. Which was my point to this list: That whatever one's feelings about the four letters "DDoS" in the context of human rights etc this needs to be documented and agreed upon in clear language with transparent process and cure. And further, that I believe any attempt to do so responsibly would raise issues of doubt about its simplicity or self-evidentiary nature as some are presenting here. Finally, as I said in the previous note, even if a clear violation were shown, that doesn't by itself preclude concerns for human rights. Even of the accused, even of those found fully culpable. Again, criminals also have human rights. And there would also remain issues of collateral damage to the innocent, and proportionality. On January 21, 2016 at 17:38 ajs@anvilwalrusden.com (Andrew Sullivan) w= rote: > On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 03:45:35PM -0500, bzs@theworld.com wrote: > >=20 > > Someone suggested de-peering ASNs entirely which did not respond t= o > > complaints of DDoS and other misbehavior. > >=20 > > I asked if there were any contracts, any agreements, anything writ= ten > > down which they have agreed to or can be generally cited to identi= fy > > this behavior=3F > >=20 > > Was there any process in place for this de-peering=3F >=20 > I think this is a terrible mischaracterisation of the way the Intern= et > works. Unfortunately it's of a piece with similar lines of thought > that I see all over the place lately, so I think I must respond to i= t. >=20 > By definition, the Internet is a network of networks [of networks > &c.]. Each participating network makes its own rules, including the= > rules about how to interconnect. >=20 > This means that there is no duty whatsoever to route someone else's > packets. There is no duty at all to peer, and therefore there needn= 't > be any contract or any "process in place for =E2=80=A6 de-peering". = This > non-contractual basis for collaborative growth is in fact what makes= > the Internet grow the way it does. >=20 > As a consequence, if all the other networks decide you play badly, a= nd > de-peer you, then your traffic won't flow. That is not a violation = of > your rights, any more than the fact that nobody is listening to > someone's views is a violation of that person's right to speak. >=20 > It does mean, however, that for us all to get the benefits of the > Internet, we each need to be conservative in what we send and libera= l > in what we accept. The complaints of misbehaviour are, in effect, > complaints that the sender is failing in the social contract to be > conservative in what it sends. >=20 > Best regards, >=20 > A >=20 > --=20 > Andrew Sullivan > ajs@anvilwalrusden.com >=20 > =5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F= =5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F=5F= > hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc --=20 -Barry Shein Software Tool & Die | bzs@TheWorld.com | http://www.TheW= orld.com Purveyors to the Trade | Voice: +1 617-STD-WRLD | 800-THE-WRLD The World: Since 1989 | A Public Information Utility | *oo* From nobody Thu Jan 21 20:43:13 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B61341B37FF for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 20:43:12 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.5 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.5 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_05=-0.5] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id UDvjPdfM3szN for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 20:43:11 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (mx2.yitter.info [50.116.54.116]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 31E581B37FE for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 20:43:10 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTP id E6E35108C9 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 04:43:09 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at crankycanuck.ca Received: from mx2.yitter.info ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mx2.yitter.info [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Ey1nqC0HnaAa for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 04:43:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (c-73-142-157-135.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.142.157.135]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E1A3610718 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 04:43:08 +0000 (UTC) Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 23:43:06 -0500 From: Andrew Sullivan To: hrpc@irtf.org Message-ID: <20160122044306.GL7446@mx2.yitter.info> References: <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> <56A0F86C.8080009@article19.org> <22177.17263.667811.342065@pcls8.std.com> <20160121223819.GT7446@mx2.yitter.info> <22177.35895.894925.83345@pcls8.std.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <22177.35895.894925.83345@pcls8.std.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Against rules for de-peering (was Re: Case three: DDoS) X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 04:43:12 -0000 On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 08:56:07PM -0500, bzs@theworld.com wrote: > This was a broad call for a boycott, a call for everyone sympathetic > on the huge NANOG list (thousands of network administrators) to refuse > to route all of Russia and/or China or whatever networks they had in > mind specifically due to some aggrieved misbehavior which was never > even clearly characterized. Sure. And the manifest fact that neither "Russia" nor "China" (whatever that means on the Internet) has disappeared from the Internet suggests that such a broad call has so far resulted in no failure. We don't need de-peering rules for that. We already have the relevant pressure: internetworking increases the value at both ends of the internetworked networks. In my opinion (and, to be clear, speaking only as an individual), this is why various statements by the government of a particularly populous and influential country about "national priorities" and so on are self-defeating. On the real Internet, you don't get to plan where the network grows, because if you try you will strangle it at the wrong time or (network-topological) place. And by "strangle it", I mean, "you won't get the benefits". The benefits won't disappear. They'll just flow elsewhere. > And working together I think it's safe to say they have market power. But this isn't "working together". This is working independently, and using judgement. And so far, no such effort -- the one of which you speak isn't the first, I know you know -- has been effective. Internetworking is just too valuable. > My point was that whatever it is that is motivating this boycott > should be clearly defined and characterized, written down, and agreed > upon, and a process and cure established. Yes, I know. And that is precisely the claim I think it wrong. For it would involve a treaty of all with all. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com From nobody Thu Jan 21 23:02:54 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AC4C11A8991 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 23:02:52 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.602 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.602 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hnWuICt1TPIE for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 23:02:50 -0800 (PST) Received: from TheWorld.com (pcls5.std.com [192.74.137.145]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6F8981A8935 for ; Thu, 21 Jan 2016 23:02:50 -0800 (PST) Received: from pcls8.std.com (pcls8.std.com [192.74.137.148]) by TheWorld.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id u0M72TZ9027430; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 02:02:31 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-ID: <22177.54205.437290.666812@pcls8.std.com> Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 02:01:17 -0500 From: bzs@theworld.com To: Andrew Sullivan In-Reply-To: <20160122044306.GL7446@mx2.yitter.info> References: <569ECE39.9040603@cs.tcd.ie> <20160120001714.GS53252@mx2.yitter.info> <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> <56A0F86C.8080009@article19.org> <22177.17263.667811.342065@pcls8.std.com> <20160121223819.GT7446@mx2.yitter.info> <22177.35895.894925.83345@pcls8.std.com> <20160122044306.GL7446@mx2.yitter.info> X-Mailer: VM 8.2.0b under 24.3.1 (x86_64-suse-linux-gnu) Archived-At: Cc: hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Against rules for de-peering (was Re: Case three: DDoS) X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 07:02:52 -0000 I don't know if this is a good use of this list, I tend to doubt it. I brought up this de-peering example to illustrate that it's worthwhile having agreed upon definitions of terms and some study of how they might interact with human rights without rejecting the idea out of hand. THAT SAID... On January 21, 2016 at 23:43 ajs@anvilwalrusden.com (Andrew Sullivan) wrote: > On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 08:56:07PM -0500, bzs@theworld.com wrote: > > This was a broad call for a boycott, a call for everyone sympathetic > > on the huge NANOG list (thousands of network administrators) to refuse > > to route all of Russia and/or China or whatever networks they had in > > mind specifically due to some aggrieved misbehavior which was never > > even clearly characterized. > > Sure. And the manifest fact that neither "Russia" nor "China" > (whatever that means on the Internet) has disappeared from the > Internet suggests that such a broad call has so far resulted in no > failure. We don't need de-peering rules for that. We already have > the relevant pressure: internetworking increases the value at both > ends of the internetworked networks. This particular event only happened this month more or less, I don't know that it's fair to claim "see! and nothing happened!" I don't know where it's going and I suspect neither do you. Maybe it was my interjection into that discussion that they needed to define DDoS and develop some documentation, process, and cures which gave some pause. At least I'd like to think so. I was the one who suggested that "Russia" and "China" were ill-defined in the message you're responding to tho I suspect those suggesting de-peering could work up a list of ASNs if asked. If not then what are they planning to de-peer? If they are complaining that these ASNs are unresponsive to complaints of DDoS etc they probably have some idea who those ignored complaints were sent to. They meant Russian and Chinese (and probably other) ASN's from which bad behavior was chronically arising and were chronically non-responsive where all that is of course poorly documented as far as I could see. I also suggested there might be language difficulties vis a vis unresponsiveness and asked if they had made any effort to send their complaints in Russian or Chinese as appropriate? What do I do with complaints sent to me in Russian or Chinese? I don't know, I don't think I've ever recognized one. > In my opinion (and, to be clear, speaking only as an individual), this > is why various statements by the government of a particularly populous > and influential country about "national priorities" and so on are > self-defeating. On the real Internet, you don't get to plan where the > network grows, because if you try you will strangle it at the wrong > time or (network-topological) place. And by "strangle it", I mean, > "you won't get the benefits". The benefits won't disappear. They'll > just flow elsewhere. ok > > > And working together I think it's safe to say they have market power. > > But this isn't "working together". This is working independently, and > using judgement. And so far, no such effort -- the one of which you > speak isn't the first, I know you know -- has been effective. > Internetworking is just too valuable. I quoted a legal statement from the US Federal Trade Commission suggesting that one test for an illegal boycott was that those involved had "market power". And that -- my comment above -- taken as a group the subscribers of NANOG would probably be identified as collectively having market power if they should act on the proposal put forth to the group, to collectively de-peer some set (by some definition) of misbehaving (by some definition) of ASNs. And if they behaved in concert, blocked a common set of ASNs, as a result of publicly accessible discussion it would be a damned fool of a court which would accept that they each did so purely as individual acts. But yes, I wasn't ordering the tide not to come in. I was offering commentary on the idea being put forth that these ASN's be de-peered as a reaction to their (claimed) bad behavior and suggesting a possibly more productive path, formalize the complaints, process, etc in writing. > > > My point was that whatever it is that is motivating this boycott > > should be clearly defined and characterized, written down, and agreed > > upon, and a process and cure established. > > Yes, I know. And that is precisely the claim I think it wrong. For > it would involve a treaty of all with all. So why do we write RFCs? Or BCPs? Why are we here if not to produce some sort of written document with some sort of standing? I never suggested a "treaty", multilateral, polylateral, forward lateral, or otherwise. I did suggest that a set of documents defining disruptive behavior and minimal expectations of responsiveness etc could be written up and even signed by parties as pre-requisite to obtaining resources such as ASNs etc. as an alternative to instituting wildcat business boycotts or as a few suggested in that discussion: lawsuits (w/in what jurisidiction?) And that might be preferable and actually have some effect since people have been spouting this sort of "Governance by Router Commands" for about 20 years now, at least, with little success judging from the continued complaints. I think their complaints are real and substantial, and I'm suggesting they need to better focus their response. But for the purpose of this list terms need to be defined, researched, and more, and not just dismissed out hand as "DDoS is always evil so end of discussion". -- -Barry Shein Software Tool & Die | bzs@TheWorld.com | http://www.TheWorld.com Purveyors to the Trade | Voice: +1 617-STD-WRLD | 800-THE-WRLD The World: Since 1989 | A Public Information Utility | *oo* From nobody Fri Jan 22 02:17:34 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F09C31A00E8 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 02:17:32 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.998 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.998 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DC_PNG_UNO_LARGO=0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id KQmNvr2gHhfS for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 02:17:29 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-wm0-x22e.google.com (mail-wm0-x22e.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c09::22e]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 93B551A00E6 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 02:17:28 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-wm0-x22e.google.com with SMTP id r129so206859462wmr.0 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 02:17:28 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=IpZpi412BwAicYBeDs8KqnWqfBoSaoFFBk13Rp9h7A0=; b=eWE3K8jSlpzud7H0DyeSWH7obgERpqnlGX3miW0mX8TCmOobqDBgGVWVTN7/1ni8tV jqI5qw+iqRYRQzfsXLJKQgPM4TQG94mM9qVCxm5Tqc058mYaxFOqerV1+iWYPMKL6/Ot y21qJKbBbnfS67n7IA94EsOVHJ7ML2MqBvqhcvQ6mEtNWTqEGp0X6XSR1X2FCrCbai3H tXLKPvBcTmbpXJsfa1mfgODm4U4h5TiNRmQchqK3gbGaYzCDk+La/MHHXqWoQQIlGn3V ngZ1+BoXk3Rrs38OUaxZqNLrscU+etYJdX/P9ISEtcpvVeC4lUdPms/VEf3kDfkJWv/8 QnYA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=IpZpi412BwAicYBeDs8KqnWqfBoSaoFFBk13Rp9h7A0=; b=QkVfUuLZNuBPqxBECoT/8Trn9Y7JaXaSqNSa5NWlAD6kWw7V1p9Fky69qxQ5Dnr+6B hN6yz+I1SzJ0rKan7rmSvjezswV2q4kRg5ZpDpDL7p6ew559oDYKAMeuJL5lGNCqOC+4 qkSadw98VYX1AUkwU1PwvTa7jk6d+j/rh2LIhbDbMUUEyFN6Vi6Sj1+m+66NW4rfvhm2 AQNyk4aeVzWJ8XgprfyYHCyUqwk4VpEWoCXrG27R0lk9NPmuPKzj7LJNfaAc9Tk5NaJl XiR059KMnXD8KIMI7NjiJLjyvhsWWQ1eDsSRacKc09wnnc5bKTgr6OPAXDiyeWyE3lfi z30w== X-Gm-Message-State: AG10YORtQec4TtZmJy+QUjqK4SbgIk/qC4yzjrIRxLvKNhIh5PMx6E8mqhPjiCcdvPeJKikSKCpPPhMZmgAliQ== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.28.97.135 with SMTP id v129mr2678419wmb.78.1453457847098; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 02:17:27 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.194.7.201 with HTTP; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 02:17:26 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: <20160121105958.GN1956@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> References: <20160119215059.GC1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB359.3050405@cs.tcd.ie> <20160121105958.GN1956@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 10:17:26 +0000 Message-ID: From: Corinne Cath To: Joss Wright Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary=001a1148fd70ac62620529e986c0 Archived-At: Cc: Jeroen van der Ham , hrpc@irtf.org, Stephen Farrell Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case one: Status code 451 X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 10:17:33 -0000 --001a1148fd70ac62620529e986c0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a1148fd70ac625d0529e986bf --001a1148fd70ac625d0529e986bf Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Dear all, Thank you for your thoughtful comments and input. I have bunched them together and added them to the original text. see below. HRPC =E2=80=93 work on 451, Middleboxes, DDoS Status Code 451 Every Internet user has run into the =E2=80=98404 Not Found=E2=80=99 Hypert= ext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) status code when trying, and failing, to access a particular website. It is a response status that the server sends to the browser, when the server cannot locate the URL. =E2=80=98403 Forbidden=E2= =80=99 is another example of this class of code signals that gives users information about what is going on. In the =E2=80=98403=E2=80=99 case the server can be reach= ed, but is blocking the request because the user is trying to access content forbidden to them. This can be because the specific user is not allowed access to the content (like a government employee trying to access pornography on a work-computer) or because access is restricted to all users (like social network sites in certain countries). As surveillance and censorship of the Internet is becoming more commonplace, voices were raised at the IETF to introduce a new status code that indicates when something is not available for =E2=80=98legal reasons= =E2=80=99 (like censorship): The [451 status] code would allow server operators to operate with greater transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public policy affect their operation. This transparency may be beneficial both to these operators and to end-users (Bray 2012:3). The status code would be named =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99, a reference to Bradbu= ry=E2=80=99s famous novel on censorship. In practice the code would look like this: [image: Inline image 1] Figure 5. Status code 451 (Source: Website Bray, author of the 451-status code ID) During the IETF meeting in Dallas, there was discussion about the usefulness of =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99. The main tension revolved around the l= ack of an apparent machine-readable technical use of the information. The extent to which =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99 is just =E2=80=98political theatre=E2=80=99 or = whether it has a concrete technical use was heatedly debated. Some argued that =E2=80=98the 451 statu= s code is just a status code with a response body=E2=80=99 others said it was prob= lematic because =E2=80=98it brings law into the picture=E2=80=99 . Again others arg= ued that it would be useful for individuals, or organizations like the =E2=80=98Chillin= g Effects=E2=80=99 project, crawling the web to get an indication of censorsh= ip (IETF discussion on =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99 =E2=80=93 author=E2=80=99s field notes = March 2015). There was no outright objection during the Dallas meeting against moving forward on status code =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99, and on December 18, 2015 the Internet En= gineering Steering Group approved publication of =E2=80=98An HTTP Status Code to Repo= rt Legal Obstacles=E2=80=99. It is still in the process of becoming an RFC, but coul= d effectively be used from the day of approval. What is interesting about this particular case is that not only technical arguments but also the status code=E2=80=99s outright potential political u= se for civil society played a substantial role in shaping the discussion, and the decision to move forward with this technology. =E2=80=8B[new text]:=E2=80=8B =E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B It is however important to note that 451 is not a solution to detect all occasions of censorship. A large swath of Internet filtering occurs in the network rather than the server itself. For these forms of censorship 451 plays a limited role, as the servers will not be able to send the code, because they haven=E2=80=99t received the requests (as is the case with ser= vers with resources blocked by the Chinese Golden shield). Such filtering regimes are unlikely to voluntarily inject a 451 status code. The use of 451 is most likely to apply in the case of cooperative, legal versions of content removal resulting from requests to providers. One can think of content that is removed or blocked for legal reasons, like copyright infringement, gambling laws, child abuse, et cetera. The major use case is thus clearly on the Web server itself, not the network. Large Internet companies and search engines are constantly asked to censor content in various jurisdictions. 451 allows this to be easily discovered, for instance by initiatives like the Lumen Database. In the case of adversarial blocking done by a filtering entity on the network 451 is less useful. Overall, the strength of 451 lies in its ability to provide transparency by giving the reason for blocking, and giving the end-user the ability to file a complaint. It allows organizations to easily measure censorship in an automated way, and prompts the user to access the content via another path (e.g. TOR, VPNs) when (s)he encounters the 451 status code. On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 10:59 AM, Joss Wright wrote: > On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 11:44:57AM +0100, Jeroen van der Ham wrote: > > Hi, > > > > > On 19 Jan 2016, at 23:06, Stephen Farrell > wrote: > > > > > > I wasn't very active in this myself but some people with whom I > chatted were > > > convinced by the fact that 451 allowed for automation. For example i= f > you > > > get a 451 response a UA might be able to re-try the request via some > other > > > n/w path. Similarly, a crawler might be able to correlate the places = in > > > which one gets a 451 and produce e.g. useful statistics or maps. > > > > > > > To me this seems entirely the wrong argument to convince operators to > use this > > status code. > > > > My impression is that this would be used for content that is removed or > > blocked for legal reasons, for instance copyright infringement, gamblin= g > laws, > > child abuse, et cetera. > > > > It then informs the user about the reason that content is no longer > available, > > and perhaps also informs. It should also enlighten them about possible > actions > > that could be taken, such as filing a complaint with the authorities. I= n > any > > case it at least informs the user that this is not a technical problem. > > > > Jeroen. > > That makes a lot of sense. Mainly because the use of the 451 only seems t= o > apply > in the more cooperative, legal version of content removal achieved throug= h > requests to providers, rather than the adversarial blocking achieved by a > filtering entity on the network. Using it as a mechanism to provide > automated > means to route around such legally-requested filtering seems like it woul= d > be > counterproductive. > > Joss > -- > Dr. Joss Wright | Research Fellow > Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford > http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/?id=3D176 > > --=20 'The management of normality is hard work' --001a1148fd70ac625d0529e986bf Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Dear all,

Thank you for your thoughtful comments an= d input. I have bunched them together and added them to the original text. = see below.

HRPC =E2=80=93 work on 451, Middleboxes, DDoS
Status Code 451
Every Internet user has run into the =E2=80=98404 Not F= ound=E2=80=99 Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) status code when trying, a= nd failing, to access a particular website. It is a response status that th= e server sends to the browser, when the server cannot locate the URL. =E2= =80=98403 Forbidden=E2=80=99 is another example of this class of code signa= ls that gives users information about what is going on. In the =E2=80=98403= =E2=80=99 case the server can be reached, but is blocking the request becau= se the user is trying to access content forbidden to them. This can be beca= use the specific user is not allowed access to the content (like a governme= nt employee trying to access pornography on a work-computer) or because acc= ess is restricted to all users (like social network sites in certain countr= ies). =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
As surveillance and censors= hip of the Internet is becoming more commonplace, voices were raised at the= IETF to introduce a new status code that indicates when something is not a= vailable for =E2=80=98legal reasons=E2=80=99 (like censorship):
=C2=A0The [451 status] code would allow server operators to operate with greate= r transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public policy affect= their operation. This transparency may be beneficial both to these operato= rs and to end-users=C2=A0 (Bray 2012:3).

The status code would be na= med =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99, a reference to Bradbury=E2=80=99s famous novel o= n censorship. In practice the code would look like this:

=C2=A0
Figure 5. Status code 451 (Source: Website Bray,= author of the 451-status code ID)
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
During the IET= F meeting in Dallas, there was discussion about the usefulness of =E2=80=98= 451=E2=80=99. The main tension revolved around the lack of an apparent mach= ine-readable technical use of the information. The extent to which =E2=80= =98451=E2=80=99 is just =E2=80=98political theatre=E2=80=99 or whether it h= as a concrete technical use was heatedly debated. Some argued that =E2=80= =98the 451 status code is just a status code with a response body=E2=80=99 = others said it was problematic because =E2=80=98it brings law into the pict= ure=E2=80=99 . Again others argued that it would be useful for individuals,= or organizations like the =E2=80=98Chilling Effects=E2=80=99 project, craw= ling the web to get an indication of censorship (IETF discussion on =E2=80= =98451=E2=80=99 =E2=80=93 author=E2=80=99s field notes March 2015). There w= as no outright objection during the Dallas meeting against moving forward o= n status code =E2=80=98451=E2=80=99, and on December 18, 2015 the Internet = Engineering Steering Group approved publication of =E2=80=98An HTTP Status = Code to Report Legal Obstacles=E2=80=99. It is still in the process of beco= ming an RFC, but could effectively be used from the day of approval.
What is interesting about this particular case is that not only technical= arguments but also the status code=E2=80=99s outright potential political = use for civil society played a substantial role in shaping the discussion, = and the decision to move forward with this technology.

=E2=80=8B[new text]:= =E2=80=8B

=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B
It is however important to = note that 451 is not a solution to detect all occasions of censorship. A la= rge swath of Internet filtering occurs in the network rather than the serve= r itself. For these forms of censorship 451 plays a limited role, as the se= rvers will not be able to send the code, because they haven=E2=80=99t recei= ved the requests (as is the case with servers with resources blocked by the= Chinese Golden shield). Such filtering regimes are unlikely to voluntarily= inject a 451 status code. The use of 451 is most likely to apply in the ca= se of cooperative, legal versions of content removal resulting from request= s to providers. One can think of content that is removed or blocked for leg= al reasons, like copyright infringement, gambling laws, child abuse, et cet= era. The major use case is thus clearly on the Web server itself, not the n= etwork. Large Internet companies and search engines are constantly asked to= censor content in various jurisdictions. 451 allows this to be easily disc= overed, for instance by initiatives like the Lumen Database. In the case of= adversarial blocking done by a filtering entity on the network 451 is less= useful.

Overall, the strength of 451 lies in its ability to provide= transparency by giving the reason for blocking, and giving the end-user th= e ability to file a complaint. It allows organizations to easily measure ce= nsorship in an automated way, and prompts the user to access the content vi= a another path (e.g. TOR, VPNs) when (s)he encounters the 451 status code.<= br>

On T= hu, Jan 21, 2016 at 10:59 AM, Joss Wright <joss.wright@oii.ox.ac.uk= > wrote:
On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 11:44:57AM +0100, Jeroen van = der Ham wrote:
> Hi,
>
> > On 19 Jan 2016, at 23:06, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> >
> > I wasn't very active in this myself but some people with whom= I chatted were
> > convinced by the fact that 451 allowed for automation.=C2=A0 For = example if you
> > get a 451 response a UA might be able to re-try the request via s= ome other
> > n/w path. Similarly, a crawler might be able to correlate the pla= ces in
> > which one gets a 451 and produce e.g. useful statistics or maps.<= br> > >
>
> To me this seems entirely the wrong argument to convince operators to = use this
> status code.
>
> My impression is that this would be used for content that is removed o= r
> blocked for legal reasons, for instance copyright infringement, gambli= ng laws,
> child abuse, et cetera.
>
> It then informs the user about the reason that content is no longer av= ailable,
> and perhaps also informs. It should also enlighten them about possible= actions
> that could be taken, such as filing a complaint with the authorities. = In any
> case it at least informs the user that this is not a technical problem= .
>
> Jeroen.

That makes a lot of sense. Mainly because the use of the 451 on= ly seems to apply
in the more cooperative, legal version of content removal achieved through<= br> requests to providers, rather than the adversarial blocking achieved by a filtering entity on the network. Using it as a mechanism to provide automat= ed
means to route around such legally-requested filtering seems like it would = be
counterproductive.

Joss

--
Dr. Joss Wright | Research Fellow
Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford
http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/people/?id=3D176

--

'The management of normality is hard work&= #39;

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localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B46621AD0BA for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 07:58:11 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 2.2 X-Spam-Level: ** X-Spam-Status: No, score=2.2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_20=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, MANGLED_AVOID=2.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id fDoGdzGva59c for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 07:58:08 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-wm0-x22a.google.com (mail-wm0-x22a.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c09::22a]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4F9CD1AD0B7 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 07:58:07 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-wm0-x22a.google.com with SMTP id r129so218852012wmr.0 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 07:58:07 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :content-type; bh=RMzJeWHYAN9no+GGsmvbiC2rHnDY4RvbjD5ndp778e0=; b=BeFgrGc4LCWQeEloskfTlb41mSz0J4C5g+Gx6UURj0zcXitBXnfMSuv4uhm+hh3bVd dUrWDdoOxCbfsiMP8IrWWqdv4ol5EDLtvjAN6PoqLvAa5u1IsOLThcdNE8kVmrjKWMRB w9laCixvSedHPIgaZMh71gX0Cy0xHIbd0d021rYvA6uwaOUiWASdLdtG6LKzx4Xx2bkn toPlM799MAGOJcc1Qghv0+wnLoN4nXF5ZjZl/PsnmJkWSsQOfC2zXcy70vgc3MxUKK4S vTIgVTP0izGol4SiWsEcdj+7shmNaQH6r9A0vhaJhmO3dtCUAn9vvSxCWdaRcb43njde WKBw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:content-type; bh=RMzJeWHYAN9no+GGsmvbiC2rHnDY4RvbjD5ndp778e0=; b=fy0fXBeAzxT5BRWZ8OQiy8n2CTH99Osxqf0szXGF7LTp7AKxzo+GVm/5zWfKKlamsD 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Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 15:58:11 -0000 --089e013c656ae98fed0529ee48e6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable =E2=80=8BUnder the heading: better late than never. =E2=80=8B ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Corinne Cath Date: Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 2:23 PM Subject: Re: [hrpc] Continuing discussion and questions on Corinne's thesis - A Case Study of Coding Rights To: Niels ten Oever Dear all, Apologies for the delay in answering. I gave my replies in text. I hope this covers some of the questions raised by Niels. Please reach out if anything is unclear. Best, Corinne On Fri, Dec 4, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Niels ten Oever wrote= : > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA256 > > Hi all, > > We had to cut off the questions and discussion on Corinne's thesis - A > Case Study of Coding Rights [0] in Yokohama. I wanted to create one > more opportunity to discuss the thesis. Mostly because I think the > thesis is a great piece of work and very constructive overview of > different issues we're working on and because it could also lead us > forward. Also because I still have a few questions left. Of course > other peoples questions and comments are also very much encouraged. > > 1. > You define 'openness' as 'the absence of centralised points of > control' (p17). Do you think this is the mainly used definition of > openness? Or are there others? If this is the main one, should we > perhaps add it to the glossary? Openess is currently defined in the > glossary as: > The quality of the unfiltered Internet that allows for free > access to other hosts > Which is quite a different definition. Could you please elaborate on > your rationale / choice for this definitions > > > I do not think that is the main definition of openness. I think openness means different things looking at different layers of the Internet, or perhaps even within different discussions on Internet related issues. I think openness in the net neutrality discussions takes on a different meaning than in the encryption discussions. There are thus many definitions of =E2=80=98openness=E2=80=99. The advantage of this is that it allows for = a tailored discussion that is sensitive to the (technical) context. The danger is that the concept for =E2=80=98openness=E2=80=99 becomes a void-catch-all. I use the definition of Brown and Ziewitz of openness as it builds upon the work of Zittrain (2008) =E2=80=93 who argues that the fundamental strength = of the Internet is the fact that it is open in the sense that people don=E2=80=99t= need anybody=E2=80=99s authority to build upon it. I believe this view of openne= ss encompasses some of the fundamental strengths of the Internet that need to be preserved (like for instance permissionless innovation). I prefer this definition over the one in the glossary for several reasons: a. it takes a broader view of openness, b. I find the terms =E2=80=98unfilt= ered=E2=80=99 and =E2=80=98free=E2=80=99 in the glossary ambiguous (we all know that filt= ering happens almost everywhere =E2=80=93 and s for legitimate reasons in some casa). I a= m equally interested in the rational behind the decision to incorporate your specific definition of openness into the glossary. > 2. > You connect 'content agnosticism' with 'all packets are equal'. I am > not sure if that is correct. I think content agnosticism means: > packets are not treated differently based on their content. Would you > agree? > Glossary definition: > Treating network traffic identically regardless of content. > > Agreed, in the sense that perhaps I have taken too positive a view of content agnosticism and should have been more nuanced in my definition =E2=80=8B. =E2=80=8B I am aware of the fact that not all packets are (treated) equal (nor should/can they be, see previous answer). > > 3. On p.20 you seem to use distributed and decentralized > interchangeably, is this intentional? > > > no, mindfart. Although I do see them as very closely related. But perhaps I am mistaken =E2=80=93 so any input or =E2=80=8B =E2=80=8B explanation on the precise difference between distributed and decentralized is very welcome. 4. I like the conclusion on page 23, this quote from RFC3935 could > make it even stronger: > The Internet isn't value-neutral, and neither is the IETF. We want > the Internet to be useful for communities that share our commitment > to openness and fairness. We embrace technical concepts such as > decentralized control, edge-user empowerment and sharing of > resources, because those concepts resonate with the core values of > the IETF community. These concepts have little to do with the > technology that's possible, and much to do with the technology that > we choose to create. > =E2=80=8B> =E2=80=8B thanks! Will add it to the next iteration of this research. > > 5. You use different ways of describing the relationship between > protocol developers and human rights. Sometimes you talk about > encoding human rights (which you put on the same level with > 'protecting human rights') p.42, sometimes you also talk about > 'instantiating human rights in protocols p.47, sometimes also > 'directly instantiating the right ....' p.53 > Later on you make the clear difference between 'protocol development > [that is] guided by human rights principles' and 'instantiating [human > rights] in protocols' p. 53. Could you give definitions of the > different processes or explain the differences among them? > > > Sure, great question! I think the thesis really shows the academic roller =E2=80=8B =E2=80=8B coaster I went through trying to figure what it means to develop human rights protocol considerations (hence the slightly vague terminology in the beginning of my work). However, eventually I make a difference between 2 potential paths I see this work going down: 1. Developing human rights=E2=80=99 protocol considerations that are meant = to guide and inform the protocol creation process (much like privacy and security considerations do). This road would not automatically ensure that protocols are in line with human rights principles as it leaves space for engineers to simply =E2=80=98check the box=E2=80=99 that they considered the potentia= l implications of their work (which we all know never-ever-ever happens *ahum*) or for =E2=80=8Bthose who implement=E2=80=8B to just ignore that part of the protocol. 2. Translating human rights to technical concepts and instantiating them into protocols by ensuring a minimum number of technical properties are present in the protocol ensuring certain human rights (in a Lessig code =3D law kind of way). This would leave much less room for =E2=80=98tussle=E2=80= =99 as Clark calls it, or for faulty development/implementation of the protocol. It is in my opinion a much harsher and thus also undesirable way to ensure protocols are in line with human rights principles. > 6. Sometimes you seem to argue there is a relative homogeneous > normative conceptualization of the Internet among engineers at the > IETF and sometimes you seem to argue that there is much diversity > (which stimulates a tussle). Could you elaborate on this? > > Agreed =E2=80=93 although I do not feel that a relatively homogeneous conceptualization of the Internet among engineers and diversity and tussle on certain issues are mutually exclusive. Short summary of my argument on the shared normative conceptualization of the Internet: The IETF strives to create an Internet that provides continuous connectivity for all its users at all times, and for any content. Although the four main architectural design principles =E2=80=93 o= penness, interoperability, redundancy and end-to-end =E2=80=93 are presented as stri= ctly technical, it was illustrated (through examples of RFCs and the interviews) that these principles represent a socio-political conceptualization of what technical engineers view the Internet to be: a medium for connectivity and by extension freedom of speech. This underlying normative framework drives technological design decisions by IETF engineers, and is reinforced by the particular make-up of the IETF participant base. The tussles I identify come from various sources: 1. The participant base of the IETF is diversifying and includes more individuals who are sent by political (instead of technical) organizations to participate in the IETF. 2. Economic pressure and larger market developments that have led many companies to favor =E2=80=98walled garden models=E2=80=99 of the Internet. = Although I argue that many engineers push back against such commercial developments they perceive to threaten their definition of the Internet, in the end they=E2= =80=99re beholden to the economic interest of the organizations they work for. These economic and market developments create a situation in which engineers on the one hand have a certain vision of what the Internet is meant for, but on the other hand are tasked with developing protocols that don=E2=80=99t necessarily align with that vision. 3. Increased participation of civil society representatives and explicit discussions of social values are increasing. This might seem counter intuitive =E2=80=93 but the fact that there is more discussion about the po= tential societal impact of protocols has also increased the tussle within the IETF. Although many engineers share the aforementioned view of the Internet there is less consensus on their professional role, or responsibility, to ensure the Internet as such remains a human rights enabling medium. 7. Which parts of your paper do you think could / would fit well inthe methodology draft [1], glossary draft [2] and/or report draft [3] =E2=80=8B?=E2=80=8B > methodology draft [1]: I think a large part of the methodology section I wrote could be transplanted to our methodology. > Glossary draft: not sure, perhaps some parts that reemphasize the importance of openness, redundancy, end-to-end etc? > Report draft: conclusions + perhaps even part of the policy recommendations? > Greatly looking forward to your response. > =E2=80=8B> Let me know if I left any questions unanswered.=E2=80=8B > > Best, > > > Niels > > > [0] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/attach/hrpc/pdfbyB1Dp.pdf > [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-varon-hrpc-methodology-02 > [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-dkg-hrpc-glossary-01 > [3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-doria-hrpc-report-00 > - -- > Niels ten Oever > Head of Digital > > Article 19 > www.article19.org > > PGP fingerprint 8D9F C567 BEE4 A431 56C4 > 678B 08B5 A0F2 636D 68E9 > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v2 > > iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWYdGhAAoJEAi1oPJjbWjpXr0H/32trYS3LnudUKznT3fX7aDz > Q5NJLGACVsQUcPjF2uBl0I67LaBZy/yu6PcMeUmPdP6Q2IX5mX+T1Lo5/SwtAb9W > NQHhGd0h/zhy/+JSDU/YX5YYD22d3aXhm2hcBHSP+Bm/sPTbwZ2GRsXkwqBoSIky > 1BJy8ZUSrnTNx2a0Hgel1oe6jpvCbffFeMERQJQCb4GDPBDYRyOYhlj1bVqGEra7 > Z4dK1t3+cUl7FqbvBRD1e5GtY/FYGFdv1GqKdEP6T/i6Cj2qDq6OHRrFfUDHV1QQ > lgVGcEcSKJQlXyb0qGaQvTndaehs7CEBui2ZKYhjSQK/3WKCi5i1R5koPLQ1LTM=3D > =3Diwyg > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > _______________________________________________ > hrpc mailing list > hrpc@irtf.org > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc > --=20 'The management of normality is hard work' --=20 'The management of normality is hard work' --089e013c656ae98fed0529ee48e6 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
=E2=80=8BUnder the heading: better late t= han never. =E2=80=8B

---------- Forwarded message ----------From: Corinne Cath &l= t;cattekwaad@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 2:23 PM
Subject: Re: [hrpc] Continuing = discussion and questions on Corinne's thesis - A Case Study of Coding R= ights
To: Niels ten Oever <nie= ls@article19.org>

= Dear all,

Apologies for the delay in answering. I gave my replies= in text. I hope this covers some of the questions raised by Niels. Please = reach out if anything is unclear.

Best,
Corinne

On Fri, Dec = 4, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Niels ten Oever <niels@article19.org> = wrote:
<= font size=3D"2">----= -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
Hi all,
We had to cut off the questions and discussion on Corinne's thesis - A<= br> Case Study of Coding Rights [0] in Yokohama. I wanted to create one
more opportunity to discuss the thesis. Mostly because I think the
thesis is a great piece of work and very constructive overview of
different issues we're working on and because it could also lead us
forward. Also because I still have a few questions left. Of course
other peoples questions and comments are also very much encouraged.
1.
You define 'openness' as 'the absence of centralised points of<= br> control' (p17). Do you think this is the mainly used definition of
openness? Or are there others? If this is the main one, should we
perhaps add it to the glossary? Openess is currently defined in the
glossary as:
=C2=A0The quality of the unfiltered Internet that allows for free
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 access to other hosts
Which is quite a different definition. Could you please elaborate on
your rationale / choice for this definitions

=C2=A0

> I do not think that is the= main definition of openness. I think openness means different things looking at different layers of the Internet, or perhaps even within different discussi= ons on Internet related issues. I think openness in the net neutrality discussi= ons takes on a different meaning than in the encryption discussions. There are = thus many definitions of =E2=80=98openness=E2=80=99. The advantage of this is th= at it allows for a tailored discussion that is sensitive to the (technical) context. The dange= r is that the concept for =E2=80=98openness=E2=80=99 becomes a void-catch-all. <= br>
<= span>

I use the definition of Brown and Ziewitz of openness as it builds upon the work of Zittrain (20= 08) =E2=80=93 who argues that the fundamental strength of the Internet is the f= act that it is open in the sense that people don=E2=80=99t need anybody=E2=80=99s autho= rity to build upon it. I believe this view of openness encompasses some of the fundamental strengths of the Internet that need to be preserved (like for instance permissionless innovation).

I prefer this definition over the one in the glossary for several reasons: a. it takes a broader view of openness, b. I find the terms =E2=80=98unfiltered=E2=80=99 = and =E2=80=98free=E2=80=99 in the glossary ambiguous (we all know that filtering happens almost everywhere = =E2=80=93 and s for legitimate reasons in some casa). I am equally interested in the rati= onal behind the decision to incorporate your specific definition of openness int= o the glossary.
=C2=A0
2.
You connect 'content agnosticism' with 'all packets are equal&#= 39;. I am
not sure if that is correct. I think content agnosticism means:
packets are not treated differently based on their content. Would you
agree?
Glossary definition:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Treating network traffic identically regardless= of content.

> Agreed, in the sense that perhaps I have taken too positive a view of conte= nt agnosticism and should have been more nuanced in my definition
=E2=80=8B. =E2=80=8BI am aware of the fact that not all packets are (treated) equal (nor should/can they be, see previous answer).
=C2=A0
3. On p.20 you seem to use distributed and decentralized
interchangeably, is this intentional?

> no, mindfart. Although I do see them as very closely related. But perhaps I am mistaken = =E2=80=93 so any input or
=E2=80=8B =E2=80=8B
explanat= ion on the precise difference between distributed and decentralized is very welcome.=C2=A0

4. I like the conclusion on page 23, this quote from RFC3935 could
make it even stronger:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The Internet isn't value-neutral, and neither is the IETF.= =C2=A0 We want
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the Internet to be useful for communities that share our commi= tment
=C2=A0 =C2=A0to openness and fairness.=C2=A0 We embrace technical concepts = such as
=C2=A0 =C2=A0decentralized control, edge-user empowerment and sharing of =C2=A0 =C2=A0resources, because those concepts resonate with the core value= s of
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the IETF community.=C2=A0 These concepts have little to do wit= h the
=C2=A0 =C2=A0technology that's possible, and much to do with the techno= logy that
=C2=A0 =C2=A0we choose to create.

=E2=80=8B> = =E2=80=8B
thanks! Will add it to the next iteration of this research.=C2=A0
5. You use different ways of describing the relationship between
protocol developers and human rights. Sometimes you talk about
encoding human rights (which you put on the same level with
'protecting human rights') p.42, sometimes you also talk about
'instantiating human rights in protocols p.47, sometimes also
'directly instantiating the right ....' p.53
Later on you make the clear difference between 'protocol development [that is] guided by human rights principles' and 'instantiating [hu= man
rights] in protocols' p. 53. Could you give definitions of the
different processes or explain the differences among them?

=C2=A0
> Sure, great question! I think the thesis really shows the academic roller
=E2=80=8B =E2=80=8B
coaster I went through = trying to figure what it means to develop human rights protocol considerations (hence the slightly vague terminology in the beginning of my work). However, eventually I make a difference between 2 potential paths I see this work going down:

1. Developing human rights=E2=80=99 protocol considerations that are meant to = guide and inform the protocol creation process (much like privacy and security considerations do). This road would not automatically ensure that protocols= are in line with human rights principles as it leaves space for engineers to si= mply =E2=80=98check the box=E2=80=99 that they considered the potential implicat= ions of their work (which we all know never-ever-ever happens *ahum*) or for=C2=A0
=E2=80=8Bthose = who implement=E2=80=8B
to just ignore that part of the protocol.

=C2=A0
2. Translating human rights to technical concepts and instantiating them into protocols by ensuring a minimum number= of technical properties are present in the protocol ensuring certain human rig= hts (in a Lessig code =3D law kind of way). This would leave much less room for =E2=80=98tussle=E2=80=99 as Clark calls it, or for faulty development/imple= mentation of the protocol. It is in my opinion a much harsher and thus also undesirable way = to ensure protocols are in line with human rights principles.

6. Sometimes you seem to argue there is a relative homogeneous
normative conceptualization of the Internet among engineers at the
IETF and sometimes you seem to argue that there is much diversity
(which stimulates a tussle). Could you elaborate on this?
=

> Agreed =E2=80=93 although I do not feel that a relatively homogeneous conce= ptualization of the Internet among engineers and diversity and tussle on certain issues are mutually exclusive.

<= /font>

Short summary of my argument on the shared normative conceptualization of the Internet: The IETF strives to create an Internet that provides continuous connectivity for all its users at all times, and for any content. Although = the four main architectural design principles =E2=80=93 openness, interoperabil= ity, redundancy and end-to-end =E2=80=93 are presented as strictly technical, it= was illustrated (through examples of RFCs and the interviews) that these princi= ples represent a socio-political conceptualization of what technical engineers v= iew the Internet to be: a medium for connectivity and by extension freedom of speech. This underlying normative framework drives technological design decisions by IETF engineers, and is reinforced by the particular make-up of= the IETF participant base.

The tussles I identify come from various sources:
=

1. The participant base of the IETF is diversifying and includes more individu= als who are sent by political (instead of technical) organizations to participa= te in the IETF.

2. Economic pressure and larger market developments that have led many compani= es to favor =E2=80=98walled garden models=E2=80=99 of the Internet. Although I= argue that many engineers push back against such commercial developments they perceive to threaten their definition of the Internet, in the end they=E2=80=99re behol= den to the economic interest of the organizations they work for. These economic and ma= rket developments create a situation in which engineers on the one hand have a certain vision of what the Internet is meant for, but on the other hand are tasked with developing protocols that don=E2=80=99t necessarily align with = that vision.

3. Increased participation of civil society representatives and explicit discussions of social values are increasing. This might seem counter intuit= ive =E2=80=93 but the fact that there is more discussion about the potential societal imp= act of protocols has also increased the tussle within the IETF. Although many engineers share the aforementioned view of the Internet there is less conse= nsus on their professional role, or responsibility, to ensure the Internet as su= ch remains a human rights enabling medium.
<= font size=3D"2">
=

7. Which parts of your paper do you think could / would fit well int= he methodology draft [1], glossary draft [2] and/or report draft [3]=
=E2=80=8B?=E2=80=8B

> methodology draft [1]: I think a large part of the methodology section I wr= ote could be transplanted to our methodology.

> Glossary draft: not sure, perhaps some parts that reemphasize the importanc= e of openness, redundancy, end-to-end etc?

> Report draft: conclusions + perhaps even part of the policy recommendations= ?

Greatly looking forward to your response.
= =C2=A0
=E2=80=8B&= gt; Let me know if I left any questions unanswered.=E2=80=8B<= /div>=C2=A0

Best,
Niels
[0] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/att= ach/hrpc/pdfbyB1Dp.pdf
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-var= on-hrpc-methodology-02
[2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-dkg-hrp= c-glossary-01
[3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-doria-h= rpc-report-00
- --
Niels ten Oever
Head of Digital
Article 19
www.= article19.org
PGP fingerprint=C2=A0 =C2=A0 8D9F C567 BEE4 A431 56C4
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_______________________________________________
hrpc mailing list
hrpc@irtf.org
https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc

=

--

'The managemen= t of normality is hard work'

--

<= br>'The management of normality is hard work'

--089e013c656ae98fed0529ee48e6-- From nobody Fri Jan 22 09:56:36 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 416E41B2B19 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 09:56:34 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0csn7fT6xf98 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 09:56:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (mx2.yitter.info [50.116.54.116]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CDC001B2B18 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 09:56:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8A2FE108D9 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 17:56:31 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at crankycanuck.ca Received: from mx2.yitter.info ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mx2.yitter.info [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id hFPDrwhDKd_o for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 17:56:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mx2.yitter.info (c-73-142-157-135.hsd1.nh.comcast.net [73.142.157.135]) by mx2.yitter.info (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0DD1D105E5 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 17:56:21 +0000 (UTC) Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 12:56:19 -0500 From: Andrew Sullivan To: hrpc@irtf.org Message-ID: <20160122175619.GP7446@mx2.yitter.info> References: <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> <56A0F86C.8080009@article19.org> <22177.17263.667811.342065@pcls8.std.com> <20160121223819.GT7446@mx2.yitter.info> <22177.35895.894925.83345@pcls8.std.com> <20160122044306.GL7446@mx2.yitter.info> <22177.54205.437290.666812@pcls8.std.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <22177.54205.437290.666812@pcls8.std.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Against rules for de-peering (was Re: Case three: DDoS) X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 17:56:34 -0000 Hi, On Fri, Jan 22, 2016 at 02:01:17AM -0500, bzs@theworld.com wrote: > > I don't know if this is a good use of this list, I tend to doubt it. The reason I think this belongs on this list is because it is a foundational error in the discussion of any rights and the Internet. > So why do we write RFCs? Or BCPs? Why are we here if not to produce > some sort of written document with some sort of standing? We write them _not_ because they have some sort of "standing", but because we need conventions. Getting the benefit of the Internet relies on interoperation without explicit agreements among the various parties. RFCs are, basically, advice for interoperation. "If you do it this way, then you'll interoperate. If you don't, you might not." The IETF is notable for its total lack of a protocol police force, and that's because we're not writing law. We're writing guides for how to interoperate. It's still your network; you can make your own rules if you want. You just won't get the benefits of interoperation. So, the only part of rights claims that can be relevant for this RG are those where there are choices in protcol design that could have an effect on whether a right can be expressed. Routing is designed in such a way that people are free to choose not to route some ASN's traffic. In principle, a routing system could have been designed that didn't give internetworkers that freedom. In my view, the designers made the right choice here in respect of human rights considerations, for they maximised the freedom of a router operator to make choices. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com From nobody Fri Jan 22 10:53:36 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B173E1B2BEA for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 10:53:33 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.602 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.602 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id OrzjnNn3LI2x for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 10:53:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from TheWorld.com (pcls5.std.com [192.74.137.145]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60BD41B2BE7 for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 10:53:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from pcls8.std.com (pcls8.std.com [192.74.137.148]) by TheWorld.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id u0MIqXeE010872; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 13:52:36 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-ID: <22178.31272.257208.414002@pcls8.std.com> Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 13:51:20 -0500 From: bzs@theworld.com To: Corinne Cath In-Reply-To: References: <20160119215059.GC1155@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> <569EB359.3050405@cs.tcd.ie> <20160121105958.GN1956@kafka.eduroam.oxuni.org.uk> X-Mailer: VM 8.2.0b under 24.3.1 (x86_64-suse-linux-gnu) Archived-At: Cc: Jeroen van der Ham , Joss Wright , hrpc@irtf.org, Stephen Farrell Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case one: Status code 451 X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 18:53:33 -0000 Isn't there also the possibility of use of 451 by proxy? Much content is accessed on the web via search engines, indexes, web page links, etc. If, e.g., someone not subject to the censorship directly found one of their link targets censored then rather than retain it as an unresolvable link or remove it they could return a 451 on behalf of the target. One would hope with a message indicating this. This offers the possibility of quite a bit more use of 451 than by those subject to censorship directly, usefully. Obviously this could also be used misleadingly or even fraudulently but "such is the web" as Abraham Lincoln is often quoted. -- -Barry Shein Software Tool & Die | bzs@TheWorld.com | http://www.TheWorld.com Purveyors to the Trade | Voice: +1 617-STD-WRLD | 800-THE-WRLD The World: Since 1989 | A Public Information Utility | *oo* From nobody Fri Jan 22 12:00:43 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4856E1B2CFF for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 12:00:42 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.602 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.602 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id APOO8Z31rK2r for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 12:00:40 -0800 (PST) Received: from TheWorld.com (pcls5.std.com [192.74.137.145]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E4201B2D0C for ; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 12:00:32 -0800 (PST) Received: from pcls8.std.com (pcls8.std.com [192.74.137.148]) by TheWorld.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id u0MK0O3v017523; Fri, 22 Jan 2016 15:00:26 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-ID: <22178.35342.871228.480541@pcls8.std.com> Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 14:59:10 -0500 From: bzs@theworld.com To: Andrew Sullivan In-Reply-To: <20160122175619.GP7446@mx2.yitter.info> References: <569ED37C.8020705@cs.tcd.ie> <569EECBB.2010602@apc.org> <56A0ADF0.1090705@article19.org> <56A0F391.7010502@apc.org> <56A0F86C.8080009@article19.org> <22177.17263.667811.342065@pcls8.std.com> <20160121223819.GT7446@mx2.yitter.info> <22177.35895.894925.83345@pcls8.std.com> <20160122044306.GL7446@mx2.yitter.info> <22177.54205.437290.666812@pcls8.std.com> <20160122175619.GP7446@mx2.yitter.info> X-Mailer: VM 8.2.0b under 24.3.1 (x86_64-suse-linux-gnu) Archived-At: Cc: hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Against rules for de-peering (was Re: Case three: DDoS) X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 20:00:42 -0000 On January 22, 2016 at 12:56 ajs@anvilwalrusden.com (Andrew Sullivan) wrote: > Hi, > > On Fri, Jan 22, 2016 at 02:01:17AM -0500, bzs@theworld.com wrote: > > > > I don't know if this is a good use of this list, I tend to doubt it. > > The reason I think this belongs on this list is because it is a > foundational error in the discussion of any rights and the Internet. > > > So why do we write RFCs? Or BCPs? Why are we here if not to produce > > some sort of written document with some sort of standing? > > We write them _not_ because they have some sort of "standing", but > because we need conventions. I think you're mincing words, "standing" includes being blessed (labelled and published) by the IETF as an official RFC. I chose that word carefully. At any rate sometimes these various written policies have some force, sometimes they don't. For example if one applies for resources from an RIR they will be required to present the requisite need for those resources or they will not get them. ICANN has a rather developed mechanism for judging domain disputes (UDRP, URS) which can include ordering the registrar to change or cancel ownership. So your characterization has increasingly become a bit of a fiction, or at least in its full generalization. I suppose one could call all that a free individual choice to participate...whether I take my next breath is a free choice. At any rate resolving damaging behavior (DDoS) to others is a bit outside of voluntarily adhering to protocol standards alone. And human rights has a similar aspect. How else to characterize denial or impedence of human rights? It's certainly different than choosing not to implement the QoS field in IP packets, etc. except where it has such implications (I suppose any example could be beaten to death, but not ordinarily.) As to this list all that still leaves the interesting area of where do protocol standards perhaps inadvertantly intersect with human rights issues. Or advertantly, I think the adoption of the 451 status code would be an advertant case though is mostly mechanism rather than policy, a way to annotate a result. Onwards. -- -Barry Shein Software Tool & Die | bzs@TheWorld.com | http://www.TheWorld.com Purveyors to the Trade | Voice: +1 617-STD-WRLD | 800-THE-WRLD The World: Since 1989 | A Public Information Utility | *oo* From nobody Tue Jan 26 10:10:46 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C780B1ACD5E for ; Tue, 26 Jan 2016 10:10:44 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.999 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8YshshN0AbLe for ; Tue, 26 Jan 2016 10:10:42 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-wm0-x233.google.com (mail-wm0-x233.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c09::233]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 57D6E1A92F8 for ; Tue, 26 Jan 2016 10:10:42 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-wm0-x233.google.com with SMTP id b14so144610415wmb.1 for ; Tue, 26 Jan 2016 10:10:42 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject :from:to:content-type; bh=F/6LOY1WXfkG5nku43pjv1uU6jsrtc2SwmpqFSgSDvo=; b=q0xnIbsugPuqBDUAFTSnOBi3F1tOCuSCeubpcrVcKD74YL9qOoim0BIP1BVad/qRGI pcrP3YUky/SiQ0R0EXPdp9SDlDOadBuvPXKsPF3Gfz1jmj44IUfaPr14kqDaUWwD8zgM K2RTamM3iGLNgRfohCzlLm+eU/I7mi3L2QR7y9lIoeConbH+/uGYS26WJWndgohLiwSk NVGlinNnBy2zBjNfZ1r1gvZS26FloEz/VxdTTGOX1NIFH/BFMc5MtlgEPESCauYQ3QPy oDta3ibfCgH6LuJIDfmXjO4dBqcTec28Xuyn7almNMuQwBB6Od+3kdiG/xChK4LFEtOi 89Jg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:content-type; bh=F/6LOY1WXfkG5nku43pjv1uU6jsrtc2SwmpqFSgSDvo=; b=moq7NmQNnLcTkT41uvz2NWzic11mv6KdCRraVON5GYduLYl8ctVYHV2e6dvJ5qOf/C i/VOVFPtMZMg5M/tvIwy95N0WfMbv+9m0Ex/vKy94DlNTedqJOks9AxYLCeC33kRaQE4 3BUDHKtVbyUogwQgfkBJlnayk+1xXVq9zs+55Fe9cmUZ3m0/ZQObNNRDLhg7+NoSMJ7V 0Y/IeWK7hzS6ee9GaRYoY5b0AIOBld3FdGMwn1+J7rmlPMfQGfL7ek1PcbSTkO/3VhKM XctUtSJVddHZEPmkxt119xWzaEljEji/pQ3NeQgM7F73J2t4F+Z4sNZnCVgpOHqRMvat hCPA== X-Gm-Message-State: AG10YOSbSiNhi+IAWq0bopcDnbcLf8fYX5JpJg80RntTdj+JMu9qZeAFXr5HIGY8sNPEKA+CTeAeTls4SANpJg== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.28.189.11 with SMTP id n11mr26962703wmf.3.1453831840855; Tue, 26 Jan 2016 10:10:40 -0800 (PST) Sender: cattekwaad@gmail.com Received: by 10.194.7.201 with HTTP; Tue, 26 Jan 2016 10:10:40 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2016 18:10:40 +0000 X-Google-Sender-Auth: CjQkEA_GKZDPxWiDaGp8MbZ7WEI Message-ID: From: Corinne Cath To: hrpc@irtf.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a114b15dc700323052a409afb Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case two: Middleboxes X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2016 18:10:44 -0000 --001a114b15dc700323052a409afb Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Dear all, The debate on DDoS and status code 451 has been very active and fruitful. It would be greatly appreciated if people would comment on this case as well, as I am sure it can be picked apart and improved in many ways. Best, Corinne On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 9:05 PM, Corinne Cath wrote= : > > *Middleboxes* > > On the current Internet, transparency on how packets reach a destination > is no longer a given. This is due to the increased presence of firewalls, > spam filters, and network address translators networks (NATs) =E2=80=93 o= r > middleboxes as these hosts are often called =E2=80=93 that make use of hi= gher-layer > fields to function (Walfish et al. 2004). > > This development is contentious. The debate also unfolded at the IETF, > specifically at the Session Protocol Underneath Datagrams (SPUD) Birds of= a > Feather (BOF) [2] meeting held at the IETF conference in March 2015. The > discussion at the BOF focused on questions about adding meta-data, or oth= er > information to traffic flows, to enable the sharing of information with > middleboxes in that flow. During the sessions two competing arguments wer= e > distilled. On the one hand adding additional data would allow for network > optimization, and hence improve traffic carriage. On the other hand, ther= e > are risks of information leakage and other privacy and security concerns. > > Middleboxes, and the protocols guiding them, influence individuals=E2=80= =99 > ability to communicate online freely and privately. Repeatedly mentioned = in > the discussion was the danger of censorship that comes with middleboxes, > and the IETF=E2=80=99s role to prevent such censorship from happening. Mi= ddleboxes > are becoming a proxy for the debate on the extent to which commercial > interests are a valid reason to undermine the end-to-end principle. The > potential for abuse and censoring, and thus ultimately the impact of > middleboxes on the Internet as a place of unfiltered, unmonitored freedom > of speech, is real. > > It is impossible to make any definitive statements about the direction th= e > debate on middleboxes will take at the IETF. The opinions expressed in th= e > SPUD BOF and by the various interviewees indicate that a majority of > engineers are trying to mitigate the negative effects of middleboxes on > freedom of speech, but their ability to act is limited by their larger > commercial context that is expanding the use of middleboxes. > > [2] See https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/spud.html for the proceedings > --001a114b15dc700323052a409afb Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Dear all,

The debate on DDoS and status code 451 has been very ac= tive and fruitful. It would be greatly appreciated if people would comment = on this case as well, as I am sure it can be picked apart and improved in m= any ways.

Best,

Corinne
On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 9:05 PM, Corinne Cath = <corinnecath@gmail.com> wrote:

Middleboxes

On the current Internet, tran= sparency on how packets reach a destination is no longer a given. This is d= ue to the increased presence of firewalls, spam filters, and network addres= s translators networks (NATs) =E2=80=93 or middleboxes as these hosts are o= ften called =E2=80=93 that make use of higher-layer fields to function (Wal= fish et al. 2004). =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0

This development is contentio= us. The debate also unfolded at the IETF, specifically at the Session Proto= col Underneath Datagrams (SPUD) Birds of a Feather (BOF) [2] meeting held a= t the IETF conference in March 2015. The discussion at the BOF focused on q= uestions about adding meta-data, or other information to traffic flows, to = enable the sharing of information with middleboxes in that flow. During the= sessions two competing arguments were distilled. On the one hand adding ad= ditional data would allow for network optimization, and hence improve traff= ic carriage. On the other hand, there are risks of information leakage and = other privacy and security concerns.

Middleboxes, and the protocols= guiding them, influence individuals=E2=80=99 ability to communicate online= freely and privately. Repeatedly mentioned in the discussion was the dange= r of censorship that comes with middleboxes, and the IETF=E2=80=99s role to= prevent such censorship from happening. Middleboxes are becoming a proxy f= or the debate on the extent to which commercial interests are a valid reaso= n to undermine the end-to-end principle. The potential for abuse and censor= ing, and thus ultimately the impact of middleboxes on the Internet as a pla= ce of unfiltered, unmonitored freedom of speech, is real.

It is imp= ossible to make any definitive statements about the direction the debate on= middleboxes will take at the IETF. The opinions expressed in the SPUD BOF = and by the various interviewees indicate that a majority of engineers are t= rying to mitigate the negative effects of middleboxes on freedom of speech,= but their ability to act is limited by their larger commercial context tha= t is expanding the use of middleboxes.

[2] See https://www.ietf.org= /proceedings/92/spud.html for the proceedings

--001a114b15dc700323052a409afb-- From nobody Wed Jan 27 05:25:25 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EEDD71B2DA3 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 05:25:23 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 1.824 X-Spam-Level: * X-Spam-Status: No, score=1.824 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_05=-0.5, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id eJoq12UTOL7V for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 05:25:21 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (vps784.greenhost.nl [213.108.108.114]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9DBB51B2DA1 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 05:25:21 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4EA3517C052 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 13:25:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4008017C051 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 13:25:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.article19.io ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.article19.io [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id JWeW0eidvBGP for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 13:25:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [6.6.13.89] (94-225-174-165.access.telenet.be [94.225.174.165]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E7D1017C04E for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 13:25:18 +0000 (UTC) To: hrpc@irtf.org References: From: Niels ten Oever Message-ID: <56A8C53D.40805@article19.org> Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 14:25:17 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case two: Middleboxes X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 13:25:24 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Thanks for this Corinne, I think we will need to make this more relevant for human rights. Perhaps we could illustrate this better by examples. For instance the use of CDNs (security and privacy, but also availability, connectivity) and firewalls (security, privacy, anonymity). This might make the discussion a bit less abstract. Best, Niels Niels ten Oever Head of Digital Article 19 www.article19.org PGP fingerprint 8D9F C567 BEE4 A431 56C4 678B 08B5 A0F2 636D 68E9 On 01/26/2016 07:10 PM, Corinne Cath wrote: > Dear all, >=20 > The debate on DDoS and status code 451 has been very active and=20 > fruitful. It would be greatly appreciated if people would comment > on this case as well, as I am sure it can be picked apart and > improved in many ways. >=20 > Best, >=20 > Corinne >=20 > On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 9:05 PM, Corinne Cath > > wrote: >=20 > * Middleboxes* >=20 > On the current Internet, transparency on how packets reach a=20 > destination is no longer a given. This is due to the increased=20 > presence of firewalls, spam filters, and network address > translators networks (NATs) =96 or middleboxes as these hosts are > often called =96 that make use of higher-layer fields to function > (Walfish et al. 2004). >=20 > This development is contentious. The debate also unfolded at the=20 > IETF, specifically at the Session Protocol Underneath Datagrams=20 > (SPUD) Birds of a Feather (BOF) [2] meeting held at the IETF=20 > conference in March 2015. The discussion at the BOF focused on=20 > questions about adding meta-data, or other information to traffic=20 > flows, to enable the sharing of information with middleboxes in > that flow. During the sessions two competing arguments were > distilled. On the one hand adding additional data would allow for > network optimization, and hence improve traffic carriage. On the > other hand, there are risks of information leakage and other > privacy and security concerns. >=20 > Middleboxes, and the protocols guiding them, influence > individuals=92 ability to communicate online freely and privately. > Repeatedly mentioned in the discussion was the danger of censorship > that comes with middleboxes, and the IETF=92s role to prevent such > censorship from happening. Middleboxes are becoming a proxy for the > debate on the extent to which commercial interests are a valid > reason to undermine the end-to-end principle. The potential for > abuse and censoring, and thus ultimately the impact of middleboxes > on the Internet as a place of unfiltered, unmonitored freedom of > speech, is real. >=20 > It is impossible to make any definitive statements about the=20 > direction the debate on middleboxes will take at the IETF. The=20 > opinions expressed in the SPUD BOF and by the various interviewees=20 > indicate that a majority of engineers are trying to mitigate the=20 > negative effects of middleboxes on freedom of speech, but their=20 > ability to act is limited by their larger commercial context that > is expanding the use of middleboxes. >=20 > [2] See https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/spud.html for the=20 > proceedings >=20 >=20 >=20 >=20 > _______________________________________________ hrpc mailing list=20 > hrpc@irtf.org https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc >=20 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWqMU9AAoJEAi1oPJjbWjpsmoH/27KlNXjRBjcma09mVQcX9wW DrHKB3Qopt2YWfP1wiaPW3JIe/N9PQIvjRwnicd57uPK3RUKPbdZvoOKi8/Zi1ah PHHYSSReU7Zui0e3DS7G7id49vw7BJEGuK/RwIkfMVbgqXlz04EHC5hKw8waYgy6 j+pR1idss2KU6v8Kc9g/g0rE/dSYF0/WNj+LP9iofRUbh6pS6yaM8tdxdcMhULxq 4Zc45ecC0hDU6YqQQWqDOzHD5K2ymy0Ys+3AUbvwUFVq5sVB4NovsVMxCmCPQAeO KZ/rGp2k+koqUsJapEMrz7CaQW/sVQKF33PCRizU4xjRDwhL3rM61QmU9lA/nzU=3D =3Dp/CX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Wed Jan 27 06:05:53 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 327251B2E5D for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 06:05:52 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.424 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.424 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HOST_EQ_NL=1.545, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id uSUGdAL6dEi5 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 06:05:51 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (vps784.greenhost.nl [213.108.108.114]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D30301B2E45 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 06:05:50 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.article19.io (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 802FB17C063 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 14:05:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7148A17C062 for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 14:05:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.article19.io ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.article19.io [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10026) with ESMTP id YlzoS7kKevzg for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 14:05:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [6.6.13.89] (94-225-174-165.access.telenet.be [94.225.174.165]) by mail.article19.io (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2BA1317C04C for ; Wed, 27 Jan 2016 14:05:49 +0000 (UTC) To: "hrpc@irtf.org" From: Niels ten Oever Message-ID: <56A8CEBB.1010908@article19.org> Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 15:05:47 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/38.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Archived-At: Subject: [hrpc] New version of methodology draft X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 14:05:52 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hi all, With all discussions and contributions I thought it would make sense to pull everything together in a new version of the methodology draft. You can find it here: Name: draft-varon-hrpc-methodology Revision: 03 Title: Human Rights Protocol Considerations Methodology Document date: 2016-01-27 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 40 URL: https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-varon-hrpc-methodology-03.txt Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-varon-hrpc-methodology/ Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-varon-hrpc-methodology-03 Diff: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-varon-hrpc-methodology-03 Looking forward to discuss. Best, Niels - -- Niels ten Oever Head of Digital Article 19 www.article19.org PGP fingerprint 8D9F C567 BEE4 A431 56C4 678B 08B5 A0F2 636D 68E9 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJWqM67AAoJEAi1oPJjbWjppCgH/jCraJfVPWXnDOLLWMnzHISU 7k9kQabrzJ7Oo8vOdulN3sWeR01E0bXF8Y99OIORdih9ciuLVpZ1luY5021vBV4K W+N3k1bOgddSZRlva463t95SY121L943GOoTp433p6tZeAJuzxLgqHHuJKg2wWYU FrTI+tGfs2ZQy5rZKmVXHfbF5mdtj+v9R6bmENqjsVFMI35lBEeux6/xvgEssD1T q6/X2NOv2c5PBZWYx3CH/gRfAVKFYVv6IThF+mELBNB9VcmSdNjjibwv0mXUECAW QzXPwu+pDR8AVuZV4gRrvB6P+fRKOSXs4VaXgFnSFuVa3c90r54nBV6rqKIwJnk= =p0JN -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- From nobody Sat Jan 30 11:34:04 2016 Return-Path: X-Original-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: hrpc@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BCA3A1A883D for ; Sat, 30 Jan 2016 11:34:03 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.098 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id UruWDy2XXvkz for ; Sat, 30 Jan 2016 11:34:02 -0800 (PST) Received: from TheWorld.com (pcls5.std.com [192.74.137.145]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D0FBA1A8837 for ; Sat, 30 Jan 2016 11:34:01 -0800 (PST) Received: from pcls8.std.com (pcls8.std.com [192.74.137.148]) by TheWorld.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id u0UJXCuk018369; Sat, 30 Jan 2016 14:33:14 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-ID: <22189.3987.168880.698539@pcls8.std.com> Date: Sat, 30 Jan 2016 14:31:31 -0500 From: bzs@theworld.com To: Corinne Cath In-Reply-To: References: X-Mailer: VM 8.2.0b under 24.3.1 (x86_64-suse-linux-gnu) Archived-At: Cc: hrpc@irtf.org Subject: Re: [hrpc] Case two: Middleboxes X-BeenThere: hrpc@irtf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "niels@article19.org" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 30 Jan 2016 19:34:03 -0000 Perhaps I missed it but should CDNs (Content Distribution Networks) be mentioned in Case Two? Essentially they're caching services to try to serve, really most anything but web pages are an example, closer (by some measure) to the requester. Akamai is a major player in CDNs. I assume everyone knows about this but just as an example if you fetch, say, CNN's home page it likely doesn't come from CNN's site directly but rather from some box closer network-wise to you which is caching it from a previous request (or perhaps CNN pushes new versions, whatever.) If you try you can generally tell this has occurred without too much trouble if you follow the interaction (source IPs) as the page (or pieces of the page) come from CDN providers not the content's originating site. I suppose two obvious thoughts are: 1. Should there be an indicator that this page was fed from a CDN and not the originating site directly? 2. Should there be some indicator if the page was changed by the CDN. It's not difficult to imagine an "active" CDN which acts as a content firewall perhaps not serving, or modifying, content based on a policy. Not necessarily imposed by the CDN (other than mechanism) but perhaps the CDN ordered to apply certain filters which could arise from govt or commercial or other interests. Since almost by definition a CDN would be more local to the requester it would seem it's more likely to be within the loci of the requester's political or commercial (&c) domain and hence out of the practical control of the originating site whose content is being removed and/or modified. One could perhaps characterize this as: CDN's as firewalls. -- -Barry Shein Software Tool & Die | bzs@TheWorld.com | http://www.TheWorld.com Purveyors to the Trade | Voice: +1 617-STD-WRLD | 800-THE-WRLD The World: Since 1989 | A Public Information Utility | *oo*