Subject: [Ipsec] Fw: I-D ACTION:draft-kelly-saag-des-implications-00.txt

From: "Scott G. Kelly" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2006 13:47:22 -0800 (GMT-08:00)

Some time ago, Russ Housley asked if someone would write a note for implementers regarding the security implications of using DES. This request derived from a recommendation in 

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-newtrk-decruft-experiment-03.txt.

Anyway, here's the first cut at the draft. I intend to add an appendix explaining why 3DES is still okay, and someone suggested that maybe DESX should be discussed as well.  If you have suggestions or comments, I'm all ears...

-----Forwarded Message-----
>From: [email-masked]
>Sent: Jan 30, 2006 12:50 PM
>To: [email-masked]
>Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-kelly-saag-des-implications-00.txt 
>
>A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
>
>
>	Title		: draft-kelly-saag-des-implications
>	Author(s)	: S. Kelly
>	Filename	: draft-kelly-saag-des-implications-00.txt
>	Pages		: 24
>	Date		: 2006-1-30
>	
>   The Data Encryption Standard [DES] is susceptible to brute force
>   attacks which are well within the reach of a modestly financed
>   adversary.  As a result, DES has been deprecated, and replaced by the
>   Advanced Encryption Standard [AES].  Nonetheless, many applications
>   continue to rely on DES for security, and designers and implementers
>   continue to provide support for it in new applications.  While this
>   is not always inappropriate, it frequently is.  This note discusses
>   DES security implications, so that designers and implementers can
>   make judicious decisions regarding its use.
>
>A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kelly-saag-des-implications-00.txt
>
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---

From: Paul Hoffman <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2006 14:39:28 -0800

At 1:47 PM -0800 1/30/06, Scott G. Kelly wrote:
>Some time ago, Russ Housley asked if someone would write a note for 
>implementers regarding the security implications of using DES. This 
>request derived from a recommendation in
>
>Anyway, here's the first cut at the draft. I intend to add an 
>appendix explaining why 3DES is still okay, and someone suggested 
>that maybe DESX should be discussed as well.  If you have 
>suggestions or comments, I'm all ears...

Apropos to this mailing list: maybe a bit more about user interfaces 
that have multiple choices for algorithms but that have "DES" as the 
default choice in drop-down menus being a Really Bad (and 
Unnecessary) Thing.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium