Subject: [IPsec] Question on the use of a raw RSA key

From: Scott C Moonen <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2009 11:47:15 -0500

RFC 4306 documents the use of a raw RSA key, but neither it nor RFC 4301 
make prescriptions about its use for authentication.  If an IKEv2 
implementation expects its peer to sign using a raw RSA key, is it 
expected that the implementation would configure on the PAD entry the 
expected public-key value for the peer (or a hash of the public-key 
value), and enforce that the key used matched the expected key?

I think this is indirectly implied by the following MUST in RFC 4945, but 
I wonder if it would be good for us to make it more explicit in ikev2bis:

   Because implementations may use ID as a lookup key to determine which
   policy to use, all implementations MUST be especially careful to
   verify the truthfulness of the contents by verifying that they
   correspond to some keying material demonstrably held by the peer.

Perhaps we could recommend that either the expected public key is 
explicitly configured on the PAD entry, or else allow for some sort of 
operator-intervention behavior as is commonly done with SSH and new or 
changed keys to be stored in known_hosts.

Scott Moonen ([email-masked])
z/OS Communications Server TCP/IP Development
http://scott.andstuff.org/
http://www.linkedin.com/in/smoonen

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