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To: ipseckey@sandelman.ca
Subject: [IPSECKEY] Re: ipseckey out of iesg  (part deux)
In-reply-to: Your message of "Mon, 08 Dec 2003 16:19:52 PST."
             <Pine.NEB.3.96L.1031208161424.14096D-100000@fledge.watson.org> 
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    IESG> Thomas Narten:

    IESG> Discuss:
    IESG> Meta issue (this is why I'm putting in a discuss):
    IESG> 
    IESG> Intro (actually no part of the document) actually explains what this
    IESG> RR is useful for. Consider a reader not familar with this effort who
    IESG> would like to understand why this RR is needed, who uses it, and in
    IESG> what situations its useful.  For instance, it would be useful to
    IESG> include an example of how the RR is expected to be used. I.e., it's
    IESG> not until halfway down the document that one figures out the RR could

I use the word "entity" rather than end system. Perhaps this is wrong.

The document now reads:

Abstract

   This document describes a new resource record for DNS.  This record
   may be used to store public keys for use in IPsec systems.  The
   record also includes provisions for indicating what IP address (v4 or
   v6) should be contacted when establishing an IPsec tunnel with the
   entity in question.

   This record replaces the functionality of the sub-type #1 of the KEY
   Resource Record, which has been obsoleted by RFC3445.

...

1. Introduction

   It postulated that there is an end system desiring to establish an
   IPsec tunnel with some remote entity on the network.  This system,
   having only a DNS name of some kind (forward, reverse or even
   user@FQDN) needs a public key to authenticate the remote entity.  It
   also desires some guidance about whether to contact the entity
   directly, or whether to contact another entity, as a gateway to that
   entity.

   The IPSECKEY RR provides a storage mechanism for such items as the
   public key, and the gateway information.

   The type number for the IPSECKEY RR is TBD.

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From owner-ipseckey-outgoing@lox.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca  Wed Dec 10 20:39:28 2003
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To: ipseckey@sandelman.ca
Subject: [IPSECKEY] Re: ipseckey out of iesg 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Mon, 08 Dec 2003 16:19:52 PST."
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The IESG has made the following comments, which you can read at:

    https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/pidtracker.cgi?command=print_ballot&ballot_id=1082&filename=draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr

I include the comments below, as a quote, and am responding to them,
as I act on them.

    IESG> Last Call to expire on: 2003-11-17

    IESG>         Please return the full line with your position.

    IESG>                       Yes  No-Objection  Discuss  Abstain
    IESG> Harald Alvestrand    [   ]     [ XX]     [ X ]     [   ]
    IESG> Steve Bellovin       [ X ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
    IESG> Bill Fenner          [   ]     [ X ]     [   ]     [   ]
    IESG> Ned Freed            [   ]     [ X ]     [   ]     [   ]
    IESG> Ted Hardie           [   ]     [ X ]     [   ]     [   ]
    IESG> Russ Housley         [   ]     [ X ]     [   ]     [   ]
    IESG> Allison Mankin       [ X ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
    IESG> Thomas Narten        [   ]     [   ]     [ X ]     [   ]
    IESG> Jon Peterson         [   ]     [ X ]     [   ]     [   ]
    IESG> Margaret Wasserman   [   ]     [ X ]     [   ]     [   ]
    IESG> Bert Wijnen          [   ]     [   ]     [ X ]     [   ]
    IESG> Alex Zinin           [   ]     [ X ]     [   ]     [   ]

    IESG> 2/3 (9) Yes or No-Objection opinions needed to pass.

    IESG> DISCUSSES AND COMMENTS:
    IESG> ======================
    IESG> Ned Freed:

    IESG> Comment:
    IESG> No IPR boilerplate

  Added. I didn't find anything in the IRP WG's documents with a template.
I took one from the first RFC I found that had one, which happened to be
3584.txt. 

    IESG> Ted Hardie:

    IESG> Comment:
    IESG> This text:
    IESG> 
    IESG> 2.1 IPSECKEY RDATA format
    IESG> 
    IESG>    The RDATA for an IPSECKEY RR consists of a precedence value, a
    IESG>    public key, algorithm type, and an optional gateway address.
    IESG> 
    IESG> seems to leave out gateway type, described in section 2.4.  The
    IESG> rest of the document is clear, but it would probably be good to add
    IESG> it in here. 

  Fixed.

    IESG> Allison Mankin:

    IESG> Comment:
    IESG> Instead of RFC1521 for Base64 (v. old), reference RFC3548.

  Done.

    IESG> In the examples, replace ip6.int with ip6.arpa.

  Already done in my copy.

    IESG> In the IANA Considerations, there's a typo:
    IESG> 
    IESG> This document creates an IANA registry for the algorithm type field.
    IESG> 
    IESG>    Values 0, 1 and 2 are defined in Section 2.3.  Algorithm numbers 3
    IESG>    through 255 can be assigned by IETF Consensus (see RFC2434 [6]).
    IESG> 
    IESG>    This document creates an IANA registry for the gateway type field.
    IESG> 
    IESG>    Values 0, 1, 2 and 3 are defined in Section 2.4.  Algorithm
    IESG>    numbers 4 
                                                                            
    IESG>            ^ Gateway type
    IESG>    through 255 can be assigned by Standards Action (see RFC2434 [6]).

  Fixed.

    IESG> Thomas Narten:

    IESG> Discuss:
    IESG> Meta issue (this is why I'm putting in a discuss):
    IESG> 
    IESG> Intro (actually no part of the document) actually explains what this
    IESG> RR is useful for. Consider a reader not familar with this effort who
    IESG> would like to understand why this RR is needed, who uses it, and in
    IESG> what situations its useful.  For instance, it would be useful to
    IESG> include an example of how the RR is expected to be used. I.e., it's
    IESG> not until halfway down the document that one figures out the RR could
    IESG> identify a gateway one connects to to create an IPsec tunnel to a
    IESG> particular site. But the RR is keyed by an address. Why does one need
    IESG> to map from the address to a gateay? I suspect 1 or 2 paragraphs
    IESG> would to the trick.
    IESG> 
    IESG> Specific comments:
    IESG> 
    IESG> Abstract could be a lot better. Reading it, one doesn't really know
    IESG> what this document is about or how the RR is used.

  Hmm. The purpose of this WG is to replace the functionality lost in the
RFC3445. 2535 doesn't say what the record is for either. So I feel that this
is really putting a higher standard on this record than there was in 2535.

  In addition, we carefully avoided saying very much about what the key
means, (semantics), since that goes towards usage. We did say that any system
that defines semantics must specify this stuff. Having grumbled, my next
message contains suggested text, since I want to highlight this.

    IESG> 
    IESG> >    The RDATA for an IPSECKEY RR consists of a precedence value, a public
    IESG> >    key, algorithm type, and an optional gateway address.
    IESG> 
    IESG> picture also shows a 'gateway type' field...

  Already caught above.

    IESG> 
    IESG> > 2.2 RDATA format - precedence
    IESG> > 
    IESG> >    This is an 8-bit precedence for this record.  This is interpreted in
    IESG> >    the same way as the PREFERENCE field described in section 3.3.9 of
    IESG> >    RFC1035 [2].
    IESG> 
    IESG> say "unsigned"? also, why not just specify the semantics of the
    IESG> preference here, rather than pointing to a (rather unrelated) MX
    IESG> record RR? Hunting for the MX text in another document seems
    IESG> suboptimal (and results in an odd normative reference).

  Chairs? Copy and paste from 1035?
  We already reference 1035 for other reasons.

    IESG> >    Gateways listed in IPSECKEY records with  lower precedence are to be
    IESG> >    attempted first.  Where there is a tie in precedence, the order
    IESG> >    should be non-deterministic.
    IESG> 
    IESG> Note: the above text seems out of place, given the previous paragraph
    IESG> which just points to MX. Can't you just specify the behavior here (in
    IESG> its entirety) and remove the normative dependency?

  We could do that. Chairs?

    IESG> >    3  A wire-encoded domain name is present.  The wire-encoded format is
    IESG> >       self-describing, so the length is implicit.  The domain name MUST
    IESG> >       NOT be compressed.
    IESG> > 
    IESG> 
    IESG> "wire-encoded" could be made more precise. I.e., Refer to DNS spec
    IESG> (and specific section?). (There is better text later in the draft,
    IESG> actually) 

  I've added a reference to 1035, 

    IESG> >    A 32-bit IPv4 address is present in the gateway field.  The data
    IESG> >    portion is an IPv4 address as described in section 3.4.1 of RFC1035
    IESG> >    [2].  This is a 32-bit number in network byte order.
    IESG> > 
    IESG> >    A 128-bit IPv6 address is present in the gateway field.  The data
    IESG> >    portion is an IPv6 address as described in section 2.2 of RFC1886
    IESG> >    [7].  This is a 128-bit number in network byte order.
    IESG> 
    IESG> Why are (apparently normative) references to other RRs given here?
    IESG> Can't the format just be written out here, since it's basically one
    IESG> sentence saying N-bits in network byte order?

  Chairs? 
  The reference seems appropriate to me, but I don't care.

    IESG> > 
    IESG> >    This document updates the IANA Registry for DNS Resource
    IESG> >    Record Types 
    IESG> >    by assigning type X to the IPSECKEY record.
    IESG>  
    IESG> Add:
    IESG> 
    IESG> This document creates two new IANA registries, both specific to the
    IESG> IPSECKEY Resource Record.

  Done.

    IESG> Jon Peterson:

    IESG> Comment:
    IESG> 
    IESG> The end of Section 4 says:
    IESG> 
    IESG>    Any user of this resource record MUST carefully document their trust
    IESG>    model, and why the trust model of DNSSEC is appropriate, if that is
    IESG>    the secure channel used.
    IESG> 
    IESG> Does that really mean "any user"? Do we require end-users of our 
    IESG> specifications to generate documentation these days? If this is
    IESG> instead referring to derivate specifications or IETF-shepherded
    IESG> operational models based on these RRs, it should say so explicitly
    IESG> here. 

now reads:

   Any derivative standard that makes use of this resource record MUST
   carefully document their trust 
   model, and why the trust model of DNSSEC is appropriate, if that is
   the secure channel used.

    IESG> Nit: Should we encourage/require people who use xml2rfc to use the
    IESG> &lt;?rfc  
    IESG> compact="yes"?> directive? The amount of whitespace that is
    IESG> generated otherwise is a little bothersome.

  Didn't know about it.
  Hmm. My version doesn't have that. I will look later, when online.

    IESG> Bert Wijnen:

    IESG> Bigger issue:
    IESG> 
    IESG> - The examples use the reverse DNS records to convey IPSECKEY record.
    IESG> Does this have some unstated assumptions about the deployment of
    IESG> IPSECKEY (e.g., to be usable, the participating nodes should record
    IESG> the RRs in reverse records), or is this just a coincidence?
    IESG> I note that the document does not discuss the deployment at all, but
    IESG> that is probably intentional.
    IESG> 
    IESG> If there is no connection to the reverse records, I'd suggest
    IESG> rewording at least 3 of the 5 examples to use e.g. "nodeX.example.com
    IESG> IN IPSECKEY ..."; if there is a requirement for reverse records, this
    IESG> issue needs to be explicitly discussed.. DNS deployment folks might
    IESG> have something to say about that :-)

  Chairs. Reverse is clearly in scope here.
  Can you discuss with Bert?

    IESG> Nits:
    IESG> 
    IESG> - Reorder sections 2.3 and 2.4 to be in the saem order as the fields.

  Done.

    IESG> - Replace the references to RFC1886 with RFC3596.

  Done.

    IESG> - Add IPR section

  Done.

    IESG> - Rename the draft shortname (at each page header) from "ipsecrr" to
    IESG> something else.

  Any suggestions? 

    IESG> - Remove the dot from the title and upper-case it.

  upper-case what? "IPsec"? the whole thing?
  I'll ask Bert directly.

]       ON HUMILITY: to err is human. To moo, bovine.           |  firewalls  [
]   Michael Richardson,    Xelerance Corporation, Ottawa, ON    |net architect[
] mcr@xelerance.com      http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/mcr/ |device driver[
] panic("Just another Debian GNU/Linux using, kernel hacking, security guy"); [
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From mcr@lox.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca  Mon Dec 15 11:49:31 2003
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From owner-ipseckey-outgoing@lox.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca  Mon Dec 15 15:29:30 2003
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Hi, I posted my comments on Wednesday.
They are at:
     http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/lists/html/ipseckey/msg00390.html
     http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/lists/html/ipseckey/msg00391.html

I had to get the newest XML RFC bibliography to be able to format with
the suggested updates to various RFCs. (They really are new)

I would appreciate some feedback on this.
  http://www.sandelman.ca/SSW/ietf/ipsec/key/ has the -08 draft.

Repeat of questions:

    IESG> say "unsigned"? also, why not just specify the semantics of the
    IESG> preference here, rather than pointing to a (rather unrelated) MX
    IESG> record RR? Hunting for the MX text in another document seems
    IESG> suboptimal (and results in an odd normative reference).

  Chairs? Copy and paste from 1035?
  We already reference 1035 for other reasons.

    IESG> >    Gateways listed in IPSECKEY records with  lower precedence are
    IESG> >    to be 
    IESG> >    attempted first.  Where there is a tie in precedence, the order
    IESG> >    should be non-deterministic.
    IESG>
    IESG> Note: the above text seems out of place, given the previous paragraph
    IESG> which just points to MX. Can't you just specify the behavior here (in
    IESG> its entirety) and remove the normative dependency?

  We could do that. Chairs?

    IESG> Bert Wijnen:

    IESG> Bigger issue:
    IESG>
    IESG> - The examples use the reverse DNS records to convey IPSECKEY record.
    IESG> Does this have some unstated assumptions about the deployment of
    IESG> IPSECKEY (e.g., to be usable, the participating nodes should record
    IESG> the RRs in reverse records), or is this just a coincidence?
    IESG> I note that the document does not discuss the deployment at all, but
    IESG> that is probably intentional.
    IESG> 
    IESG> If there is no connection to the reverse records, I'd suggest
    IESG> rewording at least 3 of the 5 examples to use e.g. "nodeX.example.com
    IESG> IN IPSECKEY ..."; if there is a requirement for reverse records, this
    IESG> issue needs to be explicitly discussed.. DNS deployment folks might
    IESG> have something to say about that :-)

  Chairs. Reverse is clearly in scope here.
  Can you discuss with Bert?

]       ON HUMILITY: to err is human. To moo, bovine.           |  firewalls  [
]   Michael Richardson,    Xelerance Corporation, Ottawa, ON    |net architect[
] mcr@xelerance.com      http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/mcr/ |device driver[
] panic("Just another Debian GNU/Linux using, kernel hacking, security guy"); [
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.2 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Finger me for keys

iQCVAwUBP94WdYqHRg3pndX9AQFTuQP/cdslnnRDy0Pz++oR2F7rwTs9BPRTcwVL
GF98nnR/k5y4dBbFeXXxB0LbOB529ZEeApiAUT7jFzinABZB6kbBRPAiGJF+iH+t
RRCm/8RK+dBwFf03RuZoi3c64UivnivBVN5q7fqfDjG698KDWLoYn9EjERscn9N2
FFSJMBmtoRA=
=jvH1
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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From owner-ipseckey-outgoing@lox.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca  Mon Dec 15 16:24:54 2003
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Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2003 16:19:28 -0500
From: Rob Austein <sra+ipseckey@hactrn.net>
To: ipseckey@sandelman.ca
Subject: Re: [IPSECKEY] new draft -08
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At Mon, 15 Dec 2003 15:15:50 -0500, Michael Richardson wrote:
> 
>     IESG> Bert Wijnen:
> 
>     IESG> Bigger issue:
>     IESG>
>     IESG> - The examples use the reverse DNS records to convey IPSECKEY record.
>     IESG> Does this have some unstated assumptions about the deployment of
>     IESG> IPSECKEY (e.g., to be usable, the participating nodes should record
>     IESG> the RRs in reverse records), or is this just a coincidence?
>     IESG> I note that the document does not discuss the deployment at all, but
>     IESG> that is probably intentional.
>     IESG> 
>     IESG> If there is no connection to the reverse records, I'd suggest
>     IESG> rewording at least 3 of the 5 examples to use e.g. "nodeX.example.com
>     IESG> IN IPSECKEY ..."; if there is a requirement for reverse records, this
>     IESG> issue needs to be explicitly discussed.. DNS deployment folks might
>     IESG> have something to say about that :-)
> 
>   Chairs. Reverse is clearly in scope here.
>   Can you discuss with Bert?

See "if there is a requirement for reverse records, this issue needs
to be explicitly discussed."

The issue is not whether or not IPSECKEY belongs in the reverse tree
(everyone on this list knows that it does, and Bert now knows too,
because I told him).  The issue is that the draft doesn't explain
this, it just assumes that the reader is already an expert on
opportunistic IPSEC and that this is therefore obvious.

Given that the reverse tree is, in general, notorious for bad
maintenance, Bert is correct that the doc should explain why stuffing
IPSECKEY RRs into the reverse tree is the right thing to do anyway.
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From owner-ipseckey-outgoing@lox.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca  Tue Dec 16 07:59:58 2003
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Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2003 13:46:47 +0100
From: Jean-Jacques Puig <Jean-Jacques.Puig@int-evry.fr>
To: ipseckey@sandelman.ca
Subject: [IPSECKEY] New draft -08- misc
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Hi !

  I've just reviewed -08 draft. Apart from the 'reverse' topic, there's
little to nothing to add.

-
  I have, however, a question related to terminology: when we refer to
entries in the reverse tree, do we consider these as names (of the form
x.y.z.t.in-addr.arpa. or ip6.arpa.) or as addresses when writing about
them.  An example would be, should we say:

  a) ipseckey RR is associated with a name (regardless of forward/reverse)
    or
  b) ipseckef RR is associated with a name or an address ?

  Para 1.1 and 1.2 are concerned by this terminology decision:
  1.1
  > that is to be associated with a Domain Name System (DNS) name for use
  1.2
  > It is expected that there will often be multiple IPSECKEY resource
  > records at the same name.
  
  I think a) is the correct one, but b) explicitly remind of the reverse
aspect.

-
  In the abstract:
  > This document describes a new resource record for DNS.  This record
  > |  may be used to store public keys for use in IPsec systems.  The
  > |  record also includes provisions for indicating what IP address (v4 or
  > |  v6) should be contacted when establishing an IPsec tunnel with the
  > |  entity in question.

  I suggest replacing 'what IP address (v4 or v6)' by 'which system'. Pb is
gateway field may be a name and map to several IPs.

-
  2.5
  > The gateway field indicates a gateway to which an IPsec tunnel may be
  > created in order to reach the entity named by this resource record.
                                         ^^^^^^^^
  Can we say the end system is named by the resource record ?! I would
replace 'named by' by 'owning'.

-
  There's a lot of references to 1035, which looks perfectly OK for me, but
I understood from comments that referring for short sentences that could
have been inserted verbatim is not appreciated. I only point this because
on the "wire-encoded" note, a new reference to 1035 has been added :).
   
-
  In the security considerations:
  > In cases where the end-to-end integrity of
  > the IPSECKEY RR is suspect, the end client MUST restrict its use of
  > the IPSECKEY RR to cases where the RR owner name matches the content
  > of the gateway field.

  I would like to spawn a quick reflexion about what if the content of
the gateway field is an address within the same subnet as the RR owner ?
Would it make sense to use this information when end-to-end integrity of
the record is suspect ? As there is a MUST here, the question may be
consensual.

-
  In the comments, T.Narten mentioned:
  > I.e., it's
  > not until halfway down the document that one figures out the RR could
  > identify a gateway one connects to to create an IPsec tunnel to a
  > particular site.

  The word 'identify' is troublemaker. Obviously this was not done on
purpose, and most people would understand 'locate', because this is exactly
what is meant in the record. However, I wonder if we had any discussion
about how the RR relates to the identity used in ISAKMP/IKE. I think we do
not want to get stuck on this topic in the draft and keep it for models
specs referring to ipseckey, but may be an appropriate default practice
should be mentioned. I also realized that adding an identity field in the
RR might have made sense in some 'me tarzan - you jane' scenarii. Comments
?

- 
  Lastly, regarding xml2rfc, the following directives may suit some needs
  :) (available on 1.21 version):

<?rfc strict="yes" ?>
<?rfc compact="yes" ?>
<?rfc subcompact="no" ?>
<?rfc toc="yes" ?>
<?rfc tocdepth="2" ?>
<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?>

  For symbolic references ([RFCnnnn] instead of [N]):

<?rfc symrefs="yes" ?>

Though people often favor symbolic references, note that there is still a
lot of editorial work to do when moving from numeric to symbolic (look at
that DNS mess).

-
Note: FI, IPR boilerplates are in 2026, section 10.4.

-- 
Jean-Jacques Puig

[homepage] http://www-lor.int-evry.fr/~puig/
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From owner-ipseckey-outgoing@lox.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca  Tue Dec 16 15:38:22 2003
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To: ipseckey@sandelman.ca
cc: Rob Austein <sra+ipseckey@hactrn.net>
Subject: Re: [IPSECKEY] new draft -08 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Mon, 15 Dec 2003 16:19:28 EST."
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>>>>> "Rob" == Rob Austein <sra+ipseckey@hactrn.net> writes:
    >> Chairs. Reverse is clearly in scope here.  Can you discuss with Bert?

    Rob> See "if there is a requirement for reverse records, this issue needs
    Rob> to be explicitly discussed."

    Rob> The issue is not whether or not IPSECKEY belongs in the reverse tree
    Rob> (everyone on this list knows that it does, and Bert now knows too,
    Rob> because I told him).  The issue is that the draft doesn't explain
    Rob> this, it just assumes that the reader is already an expert on
    Rob> opportunistic IPSEC and that this is therefore obvious.

  okay.
  so what question does some text have to answer?

  Is it:
      "where is the IPSECKEY RR found?"
     
  or: "is the reverse map the place to find IPSECKEY RR?"

  To me, the location of the record has a lot to do with the semantics of
the record. You need to know what question was being asked of DNS to know
if the record will be found there.

]       ON HUMILITY: to err is human. To moo, bovine.           |  firewalls  [
]   Michael Richardson,    Xelerance Corporation, Ottawa, ON    |net architect[
] mcr@xelerance.com      http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/mcr/ |device driver[
] panic("Just another Debian GNU/Linux using, kernel hacking, security guy"); [

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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iQCVAwUBP99qpoqHRg3pndX9AQEoYAP+NwS9QQDbjrp7K8B79ExOYyLNNCCL0Gvq
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From owner-ipseckey-outgoing@lox.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca  Tue Dec 16 15:58:53 2003
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Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2003 15:51:30 -0500
From: Rob Austein <sra+ipseckey@hactrn.net>
To: ipseckey@sandelman.ca
Subject: Re: [IPSECKEY] new draft -08 
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At Tue, 16 Dec 2003 15:27:20 -0500, Michael Richardson wrote:
> 
> >>>>> "Rob" == Rob Austein <sra+ipseckey@hactrn.net> writes:
>     >> Chairs. Reverse is clearly in scope here.  Can you discuss with Bert?
> 
>     Rob> See "if there is a requirement for reverse records, this issue needs
>     Rob> to be explicitly discussed."
> 
>     Rob> The issue is not whether or not IPSECKEY belongs in the reverse tree
>     Rob> (everyone on this list knows that it does, and Bert now knows too,
>     Rob> because I told him).  The issue is that the draft doesn't explain
>     Rob> this, it just assumes that the reader is already an expert on
>     Rob> opportunistic IPSEC and that this is therefore obvious.
> 
>   okay.
>   so what question does some text have to answer?
> 
>   Is it:
>       "where is the IPSECKEY RR found?"
>      
>   or: "is the reverse map the place to find IPSECKEY RR?"
> 
>   To me, the location of the record has a lot to do with the semantics of
> the record. You need to know what question was being asked of DNS to know
> if the record will be found there.

"What is the usage model for the IPSECKEY RR, and why does this usage
model imply that the reverse tree is where one would normally expect
to find IPSECKEY RRs?"
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Subject: [IPSECKEY] I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-08.txt
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the IPSEC KEYing information resource record Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: A method for storing IPsec keying material in DNS
	Author(s)	: M. Richardson
	Filename	: draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-08.txt
	Pages		: 16
	Date		: 2003-12-16
	
This document describes a new resource record for DNS.  This record
may be used to store public keys for use in IPsec systems.  The
record also includes provisions for indicating what IP address (v4 or
v6) should be contacted when establishing an IPsec tunnel with the
entity in question.

This record replaces the functionality of the sub-type #1 of the KEY
Resource Record, which has been obsoleted by RFC3445.

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From owner-ipseckey-outgoing@lox.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca  Tue Dec 16 19:16:05 2003
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To: ipseckey@sandelman.ca
Subject: Re: [IPSECKEY] new draft -08 
In-reply-to: Your message of "Tue, 16 Dec 2003 15:51:30 EST."
             <20031216205130.4619C18E4@thrintun.hactrn.net> 
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----


>>>>> "Rob" == Rob Austein <sra+ipseckey@hactrn.net> writes:
    >> To me, the location of the record has a lot to do with the semantics
    >> of the record. You need to know what question was being asked of DNS
    >> to know if the record will be found there.

    Rob> "What is the usage model for the IPSECKEY RR, and why does this
    Rob> usage model imply that the reverse tree is where one would normally
    Rob> expect to find IPSECKEY RRs?"  

  I don't see a way to answer that without writing down semantics.
  I thought we weren't going there.

  If we are, then this becomes the OE WG.

]       ON HUMILITY: to err is human. To moo, bovine.           |  firewalls  [
]   Michael Richardson,    Xelerance Corporation, Ottawa, ON    |net architect[
] mcr@xelerance.com      http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/mcr/ |device driver[
] panic("Just another Debian GNU/Linux using, kernel hacking, security guy"); [



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.2 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Finger me for keys

iQCVAwUBP9+dX4qHRg3pndX9AQH+zgQAtEQRt+BIn0+lMMwoTcwvMSFjtYmJazY2
EfR74ObFWjRktRAmqSAUCFxAkouLSMh0wRm165YbxXSzQb0/y/iaY1TzrSelxFEo
WoF1F1AFRVIHw0jV3W6H0rxCN0xVWiNGrkcVk+Ipfw0jro26Tv3nYuBQ5POhOFF3
GdWvtawuCHc=
=0QQQ
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From owner-ipseckey-outgoing@lox.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca  Tue Dec 16 23:40:10 2003
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From: Sam Weiler <weiler@watson.org>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca>
cc: ipseckey@sandelman.ca
Subject: Re: [IPSECKEY] Re: ipseckey out of iesg 
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On Wed, 10 Dec 2003, Michael Richardson wrote:
> 
>     IESG> Thomas Narten:
> 
>     IESG> Intro (actually no part of the document) actually explains what this
>     IESG> RR is useful for. Consider a reader not familar with this effort who
>     IESG> would like to understand why this RR is needed, who uses it, and in
>     IESG> what situations its useful.  For instance, it would be useful to
>     IESG> include an example of how the RR is expected to be used. I.e., it's
>     IESG> not until halfway down the document that one figures out the RR could
>     IESG> identify a gateway one connects to to create an IPsec tunnel to a
>     IESG> particular site. But the RR is keyed by an address. Why does one need
>     IESG> to map from the address to a gateay? I suspect 1 or 2 paragraphs
>     IESG> would to the trick.
>     IESG> 
>     IESG> Specific comments:
>     IESG> 
>     IESG> Abstract could be a lot better. Reading it, one doesn't really know
>     IESG> what this document is about or how the RR is used.
> 
>   Hmm. The purpose of this WG is to replace the functionality lost in the
> RFC3445. 2535 doesn't say what the record is for either. So I feel that this
> is really putting a higher standard on this record than there was in 2535.

2535 was also nearly unreadable.  Perhaps we should hold ourselves to
a higher standard. 

I don't think Thomas was asking us to codify anything -- he was asking
for explanation.  Let's give it to him.

-- Sam

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