Subject: RE: [Isms] Multiple access control models

From: "Wijnen, Bert (Bert)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 27 Aug 2005 16:21:00 +0200

Inline

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email-masked] 
> [mailto:[email-masked]]On
> Behalf Of David B Harrington
> Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 23:15
> To: [email-masked]
> Subject: [Isms] Multiple access control models
> 
> 
> Hi,
> 
> I think #1 can be achieved by describing in an ISMS security model how
> the vacmSecurityToGroupTable gets populated by additional sources, and
> augmenting the VACM MIB module with source information; this info can
> also provide the information necessary to delete session-specific rows
> when the session closes. 
> 
> There are two major architectural problems with this approach - it is
> totally dependent on VACM being the only ACM model the solution will
> work with, and any security model that utilizes AAA to populate the
> table creates dependencies between specific models in the security
> subsystem and specific models in the AC subsystem. That is contrary to
> the RFC3411 architectural philosophy.
> 

I am not sure I understand this discussion.

If we add entries to the vacmXxxTables in the snmpVacmMib module,
then WHY does that have to be done such that it can be used by other
possible Access Control Model(s) in the future?

Is the fact that the VACM mib module is defined in a VACM specific
document not indicative of the fact that we intend(ed) it to be used
specifically by VACM (and possibly not by other ACM models)?

If in the future a new ACM gets added, then that modular document 
will have to specify how it uses current SNMP USM info 
(securityModel, securityLevel, securityName) to map it into its
access control mechanisms. 

So if by that time we have defined how the SSH Security Model
maps into VACM, then that new ACM will also have to define how
SSH Security Model maps into that new ACM.

Or am I hallucinating again?

Bert

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---

From: "David B Harrington" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2005 10:25:45 -0400

> From: Wijnen, Bert (Bert) [mailto:[email-masked]] 

> I am not sure I understand this discussion.
This discussion is difficult to follow because we have no concrete
proposal on the table to discuss, but are talking purely in
generaltities and assumptions. 

I recommend that this WG get a concrete proposal for how to pass
authorization information into the access control subsystem, or into
the VACM model, so we can actually see how the proposal would address
the architectural issues, and then adjust the approach to be
architecturally correct if necessary.

Lacking such a concrete proposal, I suggest the new charter focus on
message security issues, as covered in TMSM and the SSH model, and put
the authorization issue off until we have a concrete proposal to start
from.

dbh