Subject: [NEXTEL-1] Robert Schwaninger on 800 MHz Interference and The "Scam Plan"

From: [email-masked]
Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2003 18:30:52 -0400

Robert Schwaninger on 800 MHz Interference and The "Scam Plan"

800 MHz Interference -
A Different Perspective for Public Safety

By Robert H. Schwaninger
October, 2003

They came and spoke and cajoled and had private sessions with public safety
managers, to explain what will occur when rebanding at 800 MHz happens.
Speaking like dutch uncles with a private agenda, APCO's representatives,
egged on by their new partner, Nextel, reached out to as many public safety
entities as they could buttonhole, pressing their collective desire for 800
MHz rebanding. But in the end, do you have the full story? Do you know
what's at stake?

If you read the FCC docket, you will likely come away with the disturbing
feeling that everyone and no one makes sense. That's what happens when a
hundred lawyers all have their say on paper. You will even notice that
public safety has broken into camps, both pro and con on rebanding. So,
what's right? And, more importantly, what's the right thing to do?

To assure a balanced, informed discussion reaches you, I have put out this
piece. And in the interest of disclosure, I have a dog in this fight. I
represent Small Business in Telecommunications, a trade organization that
opposes rebanding. But-the views in here are purely my own. So, why put it
out? Because sometimes issues are so important to the future of
telecommunications regulation, that to do less would be a violation of my
own principles.

The Allocation Problem

APCO and Nextel have pointed their collective finger at the FCC and have
criticized the agency for the current allocation and use of the 800 MHz
channels. Touting rebanding, these entities have couched their argument to
suggest that rebanding will fix what the agency broke. But logic and history
tell us otherwise.

Over the last twenty years, no two entities have been more vocal and
influential in the FCC's decisions regarding 800 MHz than APCO and Nextel.
The entire landscape of allocation, including interleaving and all use of
channels between 861-869 MHz, can be traced to the efforts of these two
entities, to divide the pie in a way that best suits them.

It can be fairly stated that Nextel has done a better job in forwarding its
agenda, but the NPSPAC channels did not appear from heaven. That allocation
had APCO's backing and impetus. So, if the position on the radio spectrum of
the NPSPAC channels is now viewed as a problem, some responsibility for the
problem must be shared with the proponents of the allocation.

Nor can one ignore the influence of the entities' primary manufacturer,
Motorola. One of the most effective lobbyist in Washington, Motorola stood
not against, but for, each past allocation and used its considerable
political might to forward past efforts.

With the fingerprints of APCO and Nextel all over the past rule makings
regarding allocation and use of the 800 MHz spectrum, it is somewhat
disingenuous for them now to use those same fingers to point at the FCC
which appears to have done little more than both entities' bidding.

The Interference Problem

Back in 1991 when the Fleet Call waiver was not yet granted, Fleet call (now
Nextel) stated to the FCC that its use of multi-site, digital operations
would not cause harmful interference to analog operations. Based in part on
this claim, the FCC granted the waiver that led to the creation of the ESMR
system, consolidation of spectrum in the hands of Nextel, and the build-out
of the first digital, cellular system.

Noting the fact that the FCC believed this claim without adequate technical
assurances, that Nextel felt compelled to make the claim
underscores its now forgotten understanding that its operations were subject
to the admonitions of rule and law that its operations not cause
interference to existing analog systems.

Since that time, Nextel has constructed thousands of sites to keep up with
its very successful business operations. However, between 1991
and about 1998, the problem of interference was only occasional. Then
reported incidents began to steadily increase.

It began with incidents of adjacent channel interference. Analog operators
noticed that digital operations caused spurious energy to be placed in
adjacent bands, thus desensing receivers. If the mobile units were operated
by public safety entities, Nextel would sometimes fix the problem
reluctantly by deactivating the offending channel. If the problem was
suffered by a commercial operator, the solution might take much, much
longer.

Over the past five years, the demand for cellular service has increased
dramatically. The market has about a 55% saturation rate and the number
of subscribers is beginning to flatten. But what continues to rise each year
is the minutes of usage (MOU) that each subscriber demands. In short, people
are using their cell phones more often.

To meet the demands of dramatically rising MOU, cell companies, including
Nextel, are constructing more and more cell sites to provide the frequency
reuse which is required to serve their customer base. And the cell sites are
being constructed at lower heights to avoid internal interference problems.

To facilitate the demand for sophisticated services and to assure building
penetration, these low sites are employing down-tilt antennas and relatively
high radiated power to compensate for the vagaries of propagation in urban
envirom-nents. And although these redesigns are certainly increasing the
reliability of cellular operations, the effect from signal saturation is the
horribly increasing number of interference problems which
the 800 MHz proceeding addresses.

"The evidence is clear that cellular operators knew that problems would
arise, and proceeded nonetheless."

If you read the rhetoric of rebanding advocates, it suggests that the
interference caused by the redesign of cellular systems was nearly a
surprise. But, no telecommunications professional could believe this feigned
innocence. The evidence is clear that cellular operators knew that problems
would arise, and proceeded nonetheless.

The interference caused by use of low site, high powered, multi-channel,
digital operations in proximity to analog uses was fully known. But the
chase for subscribers, revenues, and market share were simply too
tantalizing for cellular operators to ignore. So, they continued to build
these sites and did so with increasing and dangerous vigor.

Nextel's position in the spectrum and its choice to use hybrid combiners
exacerbated the threat to public safety's use of its existing systems. Now,
the landscape would be saturated with spurious emissions from
intermodulation products and adjacent channel emissions which would combine
to devastate the reliability of analog public safety systems across the
country.

Legality Of Interfering Operations

To justify its actions, Nextel proclaimed in its White Paper that its
operations were fully legal. Its logic was that it was operating licensed
radio systems, employing type accepted equipment, thus its, albeit
regrettable, interference production was not evidence of illegal operations.

In an unfortunate act, the FCC appeared to agree with Nextel's justification
in the Notice of Proposed Rule Making. Were this comment not contained
within a non-decisional document, which seeks comments to all that is
contained therein including, presumably, this statement, the FCC's cavalier
approach to the duties of licensees would be devastating to years of
precedent.

The history of FCC enforcement is filled with fines paid by persons who
operated licensed radio systems, employing type accepted equipment, which
operations were found to be illegal. For example, operators on shared
channels licensed under Part 90 have been found to have violated the FCC
rules when they engage in operations which cause harmful interference to the
other, sharing operator.

"Nextel has no authority to operate, i.e. create electromagnetic energy,
outside its authorized bandwidth."

Nextel's innocence is also belied by a simple application of Section 301 of
the Communications Act and a review of Nextel's licenses. Nextel is licensed
to operate on specific channels, employing a specific bandwidth. Nextel has
no authority to operate, i.e. create electromagnetic energy, outside its
authorized bandwidth. Since most incidents of harmful interference arise
from mobile units receipt of energy which is transmitted
outside the authorized bandwidth of the interfering carrier, the
transmissions are necessarily unauthorized, i.e. illegal.

Nextel's claims to the contrary are simply wrong and the entities which have
shared in this improper conclusion have done serious damage to the statutory
rights of licensees to operate undisturbed.

Double Dealing Standard

Having represented more operators and licensees than I can remember, I have
learned a few things about law and FCC enforcement. One of the axioms has
always been, the interfering operator is charged with the obligation to
cease the interference and pay the cost of preventing future incidents. The
"you broke it, you fix it" rule of law.

However, in a break with that logical tradition, the interference at 800 MHz
has been subject not to this simple formula, but to a negotiation. The
Best Practices Guide is a result of these negotiations which sought to
define 800 MHz interference and its resolution in terms of an engineering
study or a consulting agreement or worse, a shifting of the burden to solve
the problem from the interfering operator onto the victim.

Despite its platitudes, the Best Practices Guide is a placebo. It does not
solve problems. It is rather a prolonged methodology in studying a problem,
using endless engineering and copious use of spectrum analyzers, to devise a
recordable set of data. It assigns no true responsibility and does not
contain a concrete set of steps to create a rapid remedy. But, damn, it
worked for the authors.

It was devised as a negotiated reaction to the public safety interference
problem. That the document is flawed is obvious in what it does not propose.
The Best Practices Guide does not propose this method of determining and
correcting the source of interference: Step One: Identify the location of
the cell site that is closest to the known location of interference. Step
Two: Shut off the cell site. Step Three: Try the radios and if they work,
keep the cell site off until the cell operator can insure safe operations.

As a public safety entity you might wonder why this approach was not used.
To appreciate the changing dynamics of law, one looks also to the changing
and overlapping dynamics of business.

The group that wrote the Best Practices Guide included APCO, Nextel, and the
cellular operators. Nextel and the cellular operators were looking to avoid
the possibility of having to shut down or cease building sites and were also
looking to give themselves the appearance of being reasonable (think
possible lawsuits). APCO was looking to appear something other than impotent
on the subject and did not have the resources or desire to take the matter
into court. In the background, Motorola was trying to avoid the fact that it
was the chief supplier of both interfering operator equipment and the
victims' mobile units.

The Best Practices Guide allowed all parties to claim a kind of victory
through cooperation. And just like the product of so many blue-ribboned
panels, it merely delayed persons from taking the hard steps to fix the
problems that were arising more frequently.

The proponents of rebanding now denigrate the Best Practices Guide, calling
it a failure and incapable of providing a remedy to the interference
problem. Again, the criticism is coming from the chief authors of that
document that knew then that the Best Practices Guide was a flaccid,
semi-standard that benefitted no one except consulting engineers. Most
importantly, it was not rule or law, thus, toothless and useless.

But what the earlier effort lacked in effectiveness in solving interference,
it more than made up for in weakening the rights of victimized licensees.
That document suggests that interference complaints can be pulled out of the
FCC field office and dropped on the conference table for the purpose of
negotiation. This immediate legacy of the Best Practices Guide is the most
dangerous.

It suggests that interference by broadband carriers is negotiable, even when
its chief victims are public safety entities. Commercial power might replace
law.

The Furor

Despite the attempts to ameliorate the problem by negotiation among the
largest representatives of 800 MHz use, the reality of increasing
interference went on unabated. The incidents of interference continued and
increased, and the negotiated method was predictably ineffective against the
hundreds of millions of dollars being spent to build more and more low site
cells.

The trouble was brought center stage on September 11, 2001 with reports of
problems suffered by first responders in accessing their radio systems. And
two months later, Nextel filed its White Paper with the FCC, claiming that
rebanding was necessary to solve the problem and that it was willing to
shoulder some of the financial burden of rebanding, in exchange for the
FCC's awarding it 10 MHz of spectrum above 1,900 MHz.

The groundwork for this audacious effort had already been sown. The FCC was
made aware politically of the need to solve a problem which appeared, in
part, due to the agency's failure to take more definitive steps in the past
to correct the interference. Local politicians and newspapers picked up the
theme. It was quickly wrapped into a Homeland Security issue. And, to garner
APCO's support, the Nextel plan favored greater use
of the 800 MHz spectrum for public safety, at the expense of innocent
business and industrial users.

In what must be viewed as one of the strangest, but seemingly effective,
campaigns on the consciousness of public safety users, Nextel positioned
itself on the side of its primary victims, public safety, while pointing a
finger at its other victims, business and industrial radio operators. Nextel
pit public against private use, and stood in the center directing rhetorical
traffic to keep its victims on opposite sides of the discussion. In essence,
Nextel was claiming it was pro-public safety and to prove it, it would help
public safety drive utilities, SMR operators, and other Nextel competitors
out of the band.

Strangely, APCO did nothing to note this odd formation of bedfellows. APCO
saw spectrum availability and a chance to look less impotent than it had
during the earlier, temporary negotiated agreement with broadband carriers.
Rebanding would provide APCO the chance to claim two victories, resolution
of interference and additional spectrum for its constituents. Faced with
this tantalizing potential, it threw its lot behind the Nextel deal and gave
a questionable proposal the political legs it needed.

APCO was seemingly unconcerned with either obtaining the assurances of
success that the Nextel proposal lacked or the effect that adoption
of the Nextel plan would have on the way that the FCC might view
interference problems for decades to come. The short-term, public relations
benefits of looking strong in wielding its power to obtain additional
spectrum, was given priority over the long-term effect that its support
might have on the equity of licensee responsibility.

Although originally weak opponents of rebanding, PCIA and ITA also joined
with Nextel and APCO, in a political/legal combining of persons seeking a
highly compromised position. Their joining added additional credibility to
the Nextel plan and, in an unfortunate attempt at give-away, they endorsed
Nextel's receipt of a valuable block of spectrum above 1,900 MHz. Meanwhile,
SBT, UTC, CTIA, MARFAC, NAM, and others lined up against the rebanding
proposal, each one challenging both the legal and equitable aspects of the
plan.

The Rebanding Proposal

The rebanding proposal, in essence, would require thousands of public safety
and private systems to be relocated on the band, allowing Nextel to finally
achieve contiguous spectrum above 861 MHz. Nextel would forego some spectrum
to effect the plan, and would also give back to the FCC
its holdings at 700 MHz which it received pursuant to the guardband auction.
 Nextel would also contribute its holdings at 900 MHz (over at least a
four-year period) and in exchange, would receive a nationwide license to
operate on 10 MHz of spectrum above 1,900 MHz.

The 10 MHz of spectrum would be held in the name of a newly created entity,
which would be operated by a trustee. The trustee would allow the license
for the spectrum to be used as collateral on a promise to provide up to $850
million to finance relocation, while also providing Nextel the ability to
construct and operate facilities on the subject spectrum.

The $850 million would be paid to a committee made up of frequency
coordinators and Nextel to pay licensees the cost of relocation. Any entity
which resisted relocation would have its licenses summarily cancelled. Any
arbitration employed regarding disputes would be limited to the issue
of costs, since the "new" channels upon which an entity might be placed
would be within the discretion of the committee. The FCC would be little
more than a rubber stamp for the committee's decisions.

The trustee would enter into a contract with the committee, pledging the
stock and/or channels owned by the new entity which would be the licensee of
the 10 MHz of spectrum, as security for its promise to provide the $850
million in financing. The terms of that contract or a draft of that
agreement has never been presented to the FCC.

The rebanding proposal is more complex than the above description, however,
its essential parts are identified above. And by merely looking at these
parts, one cannot conceive of why anyone, other than Nextel, might support
the plan as written.

The plan asks the FCC to adopt rules based on a private contract between
entities that do not exist. Neither the 10 MHz licensee nor the committee
exist and their respective makeup is in extreme doubt. That the terms of
this agreement have not been written or presented is even more disturbing.
But, the most disturbing element is that the fact that a private contract
cannot serve as the basis for rule making. For, how would the FCC enforce
it? A breach of private contract is not a violation of the agency's rules.
No violation, no enforcement.

Nor could affected licensees enforce the contract. A rule of law is that
only the persons who enter into a contract can sue under it. Licensees do
not sign the agreement and, to be sure, the contract will not turn them into
named third party beneficiaries with standing to sue. So. if your public
safety entity is damaged as a result of Nextel's or the committee's breach
of the contract, you are out of legal options.

In fact, during the pendency of the rebanding, your right to petition for
perceived problems to your system are greatly reduced. The plan undermines
the rights of licensees provided under Section 303 of the Act, and instead
calls for summary cancellation of licenses held by persons who resist
relocation. How this draconian language got past any licensee association
remains a mystery.

Finally, if the $850 million is not enough to finance relocation, there is
no mechanism for increasing the amount. In fact, Nextel would claim that it
fully performed and no further liability rests with it. Therefore, the plan
has no safeguards against a partial relocation, the results of which would
be disastrous.

Ignoring the obvious problem of launching a four-year relocation based on a
contract that does not exist, the entire plan lacks any legal foundation.

I am also disturbed by the fact that the plan has yet to make clear what
contribution or participation Nextel Partners, Inc. will have in effecting
the plan. Nextel Partners, Inc. is barely mentioned in all of the documents
filed by proponents and the language contained within those comments is so
vague that one cannot tell how much of the $850 million will be spent on
this single sister company of Nextel. What is certain is that Nextel
Partners, Inc. will not be contributing to the financing of rebanding, even
though it is and obvious beneficiary of the plan.

Ignoring The Obvious

The plan, spread throughout numerous comments, fails to address the issue of
statutory authority, even though this discussion seems fundamental. Think
about it. If you wanted the FCC to adopt a new rule, wouldn't you begin your
request by saying something like, "in accord with Section [something] of the
Act, we ask that the agency adopt a rule that says [whatever you want]?" You
won't find this language in the rebanding proposal. Why not? Because there
isn't any statute upon which the plan rests.

I contend that the authors of the plan know full well that it is without any
statutory foundation. So, why do they press it? One would have to explore
the individual motives of each proponent of the plan to answer that
question.

Some lack the political resources to threaten a court challenge, and thus
are motivated to go along to make their entity look like they are part of
the mainstream, working diligently on the "inside" to cut their members a
good deal. Some have their egos tied up in the plan. Some, are under
economic pressure from Nextel to join or suffer future losses. Some are tied
to the idea of additional spectrum for public safety entities, regardless of
the cost. Some see a chance to make a buck on rebanding. And even the chance
of its becoming law cannot be harmful to Nextel's stock price.

However, whatever these motives for support, one must be struck by the
obvious solution which is ignored by the proponents. Why doesn't each
proponent call for Nextel and other low-site cellular operators to fix the
problem, by requiring immediate remedies to interference and agreeing to
future rules which would limit the ability to construct sites that will
likely cause interference? Said simply, an extension of the time-tested
theory,
"you broke it, you fix it."

If the cause of the interference was known, which it was, and avoidable,
which it was, why would any association go along with a plan that not only
does not require the interfering party to immediately discontinue the
interfering operations, but also enables the operator to reband thousands of
systems so that at the end of the process, that entity is rewarded with
valuable spectrum in exchange for belatedly acting in accord with the FCC
rules?

Since when do we play "Let's Make A Deal" with entities causing harmful
interference? When did licensees' rights become negotiable?

And, more importantly, when did the Communications Act become irrelevant and
subject to compromise on the issue of compliance?

We have arrived at this disagreeable place due to the failure of the FCC to
demand compliance with Section 301 of the Act from broadband carriers. This
acquiescence to the political and economic powers of the largest
telecommunications entities is, frankly, appalling. At its core, it suggests
that a single-channel operator's rights are different and less important
than the rights of the largest carriers. This position is reprehensible to
anyone who still believes in equal justice.

Stated most simply, if the FCC Enforcement Bureau would demand immediate
action from a public safety operator that operates in variance with law,
particularly one that was causing harmful interference to another public
safety operator, why isn't the same legal standard applied to this matter?
This rather basic issue is being ignored by the plan's proponents. However,
the remainder of the industry should not allow its exhaustion or frustration
to divert its eyes from the obviousness of this point. If you do, you have
accepted forever a second class status that may never be corrected.

Technical Solutions

You may have read about the technical solutions placed before the FCC by
Motorola and then, UTC and CTIA. The recommended solutions mirror those
suggested rules put forth by SBT near the beginning of this proceeding.
SBT's recommended rules are attached hereto for your examination and
consideration.

I wrote these proposed rules with a specific goal in mind, to address
thoroughly the root causes of the interference problems, while promoting the
rights of affected operators to quietly enjoy their use of their spectrum.
The later, UTC/CTIA version is a lighter version, but essentially attempts
to address the same issues.

Please take the time to read these suggested rules and see if you think that
adoption of these rules would provide ample protection against and
remediation of hannful interference at 800 MHz. I admit, no public safety
entity gets one more kilohertz of spectrum from adoption of these rules.
But increasing public safety's allocation of 800 MHz spectrum was always a
side element of this proceeding. It only came center stage as a means of
providing a carrot to the stick of ongoing interference, to coerce public
safety entities into supporting Nextel's rebanding.

The rules place the burden on interfering operators while protecting the
victims. They provide greater communications, reaction time, prevention, and
information for public safety entities. The proposed rules promote the
rights of all licensees, while imposing the responsibility of equitable and
proper operation on broadband carriers.

Unlike the work of Nextel and its dwarves of supporters, these rules are
neither fairy tale nor outside the jurisdiction of the FCC and could be
adopted immediately. They do not pit classes of innocent licensees against
one another. Rather, they promote the existing responsibility of all persons
to avoid and correct interference. And, following adoption, the results
would be immediate and would not take four years of rebanding time before
the effects would be known.

We have heard from Nextel that technical solutions will not work. Nextel is
wrong. Any problem created by technology can be solved by technology. If use
of hybrid combiners creates too great a threat, then [pardon my directness]
stop using the damn things! If downtilt antennas create a problem, then
don't use them. If there is a direct correlation between the height of
antennas and the ability of mobile units to receive signal, then raise the
antenna heights of the offending stations. The list goes on.

Unlike Nextel's proposal, this one was never couched as an ultimatum to the
industry or the FCC. The "take it all or leave it" language of the rebanding
proposal is offensive. Rather, these technical rules were created
specifically to begin a necessary discussion of the problem without polemic
or rhetoric or to promote a "what's in it for me" agenda. The proposed rules
were written with a single idea in mind, what steps need to be taken to
protect the authorized use of the spectrum by analog operators, shifting the
discussion from revenue to remedy?

If the only reason for not examining and arriving at technical solutions is
because your agency would not have a possible opportunity to achieve
additional spectrum, then these proposed rules will not serve that
single-minded objective. If, however, you can see that these rules would
protect and make more usable what your agency already has, while maintaining
your rights to future operation, not only at 800 MHz, but on all channels,
then the rational nature of your examination and consideration begins to be
clear.

Conclusion

There will be persons who will be offended by the contents of this piece and
will again wonder why I have spoken up. There's nothing new there. I have
been risking people's ire for over twenty years by writing what I believed
was appropriate without checking polls or pocketbook to confirm the
political correctness of my actions.

The fact is that there is something fundamentally important about this rule
making. It is turning entire legions of otherwise well-thinking persons into
suckers. The issues have too often been controlled by public relations
rather than the public interest. When greed can be sold as largesse, it is
time for someone to say something.

Adoption of the Nextel plan would reduce forever the rights of operators to
operate free of harmful interference, and increase uncertainty in the value
of an FCC license for the foreseeable future. It would reward an entity for
its participation in creation of interference, without demanding full
restitution.

Finally, I wish to touch upon something that has been bothering me since
this proceeding began. When Nextel's representatives promote its business
strategy as being assistance to "first responders" ask them why they didn't
first respond by spending the capital to avoid creation of the interference
in the first instance. I will not stand upon ground zero and claim a higher
ground, for the purpose of promoting an economic agenda. And I deplore those
that do.

About the Author:

Robert H. Schwaninger, Jr. is the President of the law firm of Schwaninger &
Associates, P.C. of Washington, D.C.; General Counsel to the association,
Small Business in Telecommunications; and a fellow of the Radio Club of
America. His sister is a police officer in Ohio. He can be reached at
[email-masked]

PROPOSED NEW RULES

[Add to definitions at 90.71

Low-site cellular facilities. Facilities producing digital emissions which
have the following characteristics: (1) use of twenty or more 800 MHz
channels at a single location and (2) with antennas situated at either a
height of less than 30 meters above ground level or less than 135 meters AAT
and (3) which provide automatic handoff capacity to associated mobile units
and (4) provide interconnected service to associated mobile units.

Add as new subsection 90.173(o)]

Persons operating low-site cellular facilities shall take reasonable actions
to avoid the creation of harmful interference to licensed systems, including
that interference caused by intermodulation products, out of band emissions,
sideband noise, and desensitizing of receivers; and shall take such actions
as are identified herein at section 90.638.

[Add as new subsection 22.352(d)]

Persons operating low-site cellular facilities shall take reasonable actions
to avoid the creation of harmful interference to licensed systems, including
that interference caused by intermodulation products, out of band emissions,
sideband noise, and desensitizing of receivers; and shall take such actions
as are identified herein at section 22.354.

[ Add as new sections 90.638 and 22.3541 Operation of low-site cellular
facilities:

(a) Operators of low-site cellular facilities will perform the following:

(i) Cause to be recorded with the Cellular Data Warehouse a record of the
call sign, location and technical operating parameters of each low-site
cellular facility operated by them, including the specific channels
employed; the effective radiated power; the height above ground of the
transmitting antenna; the height above average terrain of the transmitting
antenna; intermodulation products observed at the antenna feedline; receive
strength of undesired signals observed pursuant to testing at 30 degree
radials at a distance of 50 meters from the antenna supporting structure of
the facility, which levels are greater than -90dbm; and such other
reasonable and relevant information as may be determined by the Cellular
Data Warehouse. All such information shall be certified by the operator's
Contact Personnel.

(ii) Cause to be recorded with the Cellular Data Warehouse the names,
addresses, telephone number, email address, geographic areas of
responsibility, and title of each person designated by the operator to serve
as its Contact Personnel for receiving and responding immediately to all
inquiries or complaints of harmful interference, and participation in
resolution of all such complaints, including providing to the Contact
Personnel the authority to discontinue operations of any low-site cellular
facility.

(iii) Cause to be recorded with the Cellular Data Warehouse information
which identifies the location of all cell sites operated by the low-site
cellular facility operator, which includes the call sign, geographic
coordinates and street address of all such cell sites.

(iv) In the event that the operator of low-site cellular facility changes
the technical characteristics of an existing facility or the identity of its
Contact Personnel, the operator shall inform the Cellular Data Warehouse of
such amendments to its information including all revised recording of
intermodulation products and receive strength of undesired signals, with
such amendments to be received by the Cellular Data Warehouse no more than
two days following the making of such change.

(b) Operators of low-site cellular facilities shall cause each such facility
to be operated in accord with the following restrictions:

(i) No facility will be operated at power levels of greater than 20 watts
effective radiated power

(ii) No facility will be operated on frequencies below 861 MHz, except such
sites as exist upon the adoption of this rule.

(iii) No facility will employ downtilt antennas which direct the signals
more than 20 degrees downward from the horizontal plane.

(iv) No facility will be situated such that the level of the surrounding
terrain within 100 meters of the facility is situated less than 20 meters
below the height of the antenna.

(v) No new facility will be made operational, except for testing purposes,
until that information required according to this rule section, is provided
to the Cellular Data Warehouse.

(vi) All facilities existing upon the adoption of this rule will be
identified by location, call sign, antenna height above ground, channels
employed, and AAT of the antenna, within 120 days following the adoption of
this rule, with such information to be provided to the Cellular Data
Warehouse.

(vii) All facilities will be deemed operated on a secondary basis, subject
to the acceptance of interference and the requirement to discontinue
operation in the event that any such facility creates interference.

(viii) All facilities will be capable of discontinued operations within one
hour of receipt by Contact Personnel any emergency request made by a public
safety entity.

(ix) Notwithstanding the foregoing, operators may request specific waivers
of these restrictions for individual facilities which are situated on
mountaintop or at remote locations, which waiver requests must be served on
licensees of all 800 MHz facilities within a 35-mile radius of the subject
facility for the purpose of allowing those licensees to comment upon such
requests.

(c) Upon being informed by the Cellular Data Warehouse or the Commission's
personnel or directly by an operator complaining of interference from the
operation of a low-site cellular facility, the operator of that facility
will perform the following:

(i) Direct all such communications to the operator's Contact Personnel for
resolution.

(ii) If the communications includes an emergency request for assistance from
a public safety entity, the operator will immediately direct its personnel
to discontinue operation from the suspected facility, which discontinuation
of operation will occur within one hour following receipt of the emergency
request.

(iii) If no emergency request from a public safety entity is included in the
interference complaint, the Contract Personnel will dispatch personnel to
examine and test the suspected facility for operations which might be
creating the harmful interference. If the operator's personnel is unable to
resolve the harmful interference within forty eight hours of the operator's
receipt of the complaint, the facility's operation will be discontinued
until such resolution is achieved.

(iv) All persons making complaints of harmful interference and responding to
such complaints are required to act with full candor with each other and the
Commission's personnel, provide all necessary information regarding the
interference, supply reasonably all personnel required to cooperate in
resolving the interference, and participate in ongoing discussions regarding
the correction of any interference problem.

(v) In the event that a responding operator determines that the cause of the
interference is due to, in whole or in part, to the operation by another
carrier of another cell situated within 100 meters of the operator's
suspected cell, the responding operator shall notify the other carrier and
the other carrier and its operation of that cell shall be subject to the
rules contained within this section.

(vi) Within ten days following the resolution of the interference, the
responding carrier(s) shall cause to be recorded with the Cellular Data
Warehouse a report of the complaint and the resolution of the complaint,
including all relevant technical information and comments by all interested
persons.

Source: SBT Reply Comments in FCC Docket 02-55

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