Subject: [NEXTEL-1] Full Report-AVIATION SECURITY- Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access

From: [email-masked]
Date: Tue, 08 Jun 2004 20:17:21 -0400

GAO
June 2004

AVIATION SECURITY- Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of
Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls Report to
Congressional Requesters

==================================================================================

Page 1 GAO-04-728 Aviation Security
June 4, 2004

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable Jim Turner

Ranking Minority Member

Select Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

In November 2001, shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks,
President Bush signed into law the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act, or ATSA (Pub. L. No. 107-71). The act established the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), giving it responsibility
for securing all modes of transportation, including aviation. One of
TSA’s first challenges imposed by the act was to improve the security of
airline passenger and baggage screening activities, activities for which
TSA has direct responsibility. The agency is also taking action to
address provisions of the act to improve three other areas of aviation
security: the security of airport perimeters (such as airfield fencing
and access gates), the adequacy of controls restricting unauthorized
access to secured areas (such as building entry ways leading to
aircraft), and security measures pertaining to individuals who work at
airports. Recent media reports of security breaches and other illegal
activities, such as drug smuggling, taking place at some airports
highlight the importance of strengthening security in these areas. Taken
as a whole, these areas, along with passenger and baggage screening,
comprise key elements of the aviation security environment at commercial
airports, both individually and as a nationwide system.

You requested that we examine TSA’s efforts to strengthen security
related
to perimeter and access controls. This report assesses TSA’s efforts to
(1) evaluate the security of airport perimeters and the controls that
limit access into secured airport areas, (2) help airports implement and
enhance perimeter security and access controls by providing funding and
technical guidance, and (3) implement measures to reduce the potential
security risk posed by airport workers. Due to TSA’s concern that the
public release of some of our detailed findings could compromise
aviation security, we also issued a restricted version of this report.

Page 2 GAO-04-728 Aviation Security

To perform these assessments, we analyzed TSA data on security
evaluations conducted and funds distributed to commercial airports for
security improvements. We also reviewed pertinent legislation,
regulatory requirements, and policy guidance. To determine to what
extent TSA had met requirements, we discussed with our Office of General
Counsel specific requirements contained in three sections of the act:

• Section 106 (requirements for evaluating airport access controls,
testing and evaluating security technologies, and providing technical
and financial support to small and medium-sized airports);

• Section 136 (recommending commercially available measures to prevent
access to secure airport areas and developing a deployment strategy for
available technology at all large airports); and

• Section 138 (performing background checks for all employees with
unescorted access to secured airport areas, among others).  We obtained
and analyzed TSA data on security breaches, covert testing, inspections
of airport compliance with security regulations, and vulnerability
assessments. (TSA’s covert testing data and information on the test
program are classified and are the subject of a separate classified GAO
report.) We discussed the threat scenarios used in TSA vulnerability
assessments with TSA officials to identify those related to perimeter
and access control security. We obtained and analyzed data from the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and TSA on perimeter and access
controlrelated security funds distributed to commercial airport
nationwide. We reviewed reports on aviation security issued previously
by GAO and the Department of Transportation Inspector General.  In
addition, we conducted site visits at 12 commercial airports to observe
airport security procedures and discuss issues related to perimeter and
access control security with airport operator officials. These were
Boston Logan International Airport, Atlanta Hartsfield Jackson
International Airport, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport,
Washington Dulles International Airport, Orlando International Airport,
Tampa International Airport, Miami International Airport, Los Angeles
International Airport, San Francisco International Airport, Middle
Georgia Regional Airport, Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport, and Columbus
Metropolitan Airport. At 10 of these airports, we analyzed a sample of
records to verify that the procedures to reduce the security risk of
airport workers were followed.
We also discussed security issues with TSA airport and headquarters
officials, airport security coordinators at each of the nation’s 21
largest

Page 3 GAO-04-728 Aviation Security

and busiest airports (referred to by TSA as “category X” airports), as
well as airport industry representatives. More detailed information on
our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I. We conducted our
review from June 2003 through March 2004 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

TSA has begun evaluating the security of airport perimeters and the
controls that limit access into secured airport areas, but has not yet
determined how the results of these evaluations could be used to make
improvements to the nation’s airport system as a whole. Specifically,
TSA is conducting regulatory compliance inspections, covert testing of
selected security procedures, and vulnerability assessments at selected
airports.  These evaluations—though not yet completed—have identified
perimeter and access control security concerns. For example, TSA
identified instances where airport operators failed to comply with
existing security requirements, including access control-related
regulations. (Our evaluation of TSA’s covert testing of airport access
controls is classified and is discussed in a separate classified
report.) In addition, TSA identified threats to perimeter and access
control security at each of the airports where vulnerability assessments
were conducted in 2003.

In January 2004, TSA temporarily suspended its assessment efforts to
conduct higher-priority vulnerability assessments dealing with airport
vulnerability to shoulder-fired missiles. TSA plans to begin conducting
joint vulnerability assessments with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) but has not yet determined how it will allocate existing resources
between its own independent airport assessments and the new joint
assessments, or developed a schedule for conducting future vulnerability
assessments. In addition, TSA has not yet determined how to use the
results of its inspections in conjunction with its efforts to conduct
covert testing and vulnerability assessments to enhance the overall
security of the nation’s commercial airport system.

TSA has helped some airports enhance perimeter and access control
security by providing funds for security equipment, such as electronic
surveillance systems. TSA has also begun efforts to evaluate the
effectiveness of security-related technologies, such as biometric
identification systems. Responsibility for funding most airport security

projects shifted in December 2003 from FAA to TSA. As a result, TSA is
developing new policies to determine how to review, approve, and
prioritize security project funding. However, TSA has not yet begun to
gather data on airport operators’ historical funding of security
projects
and current needs to aid the agency in setting funding priorities. Nor
has

Results in Brief

TSA developed a plan for implementing new technologies or balancing the
costs and effectiveness of these technologies with the security needs of
individual airports and the commercial airport system as a whole.  TSA
has taken some steps to implement measures to reduce the potential
security risk posed by airport workers. However, at the time of our
review, TSA had not fully addressed all related requirements in the 2001
Aviation and Transportation Security Act. For example, TSA required
fingerprintbased criminal history records checks and security awareness
training for most, but not all, airport workers called for in the act.
TSA relies on background checks as a method of screening most airport
workers in lieu of physical screening, as is conducted for passengers
and their baggage.  However, TSA has not analyzed the security threat
posed by airport workers in terms of the potential costs and security
benefits of physically screening all airport workers. Further, TSA has
not addressed the act’s provision that calls for the agency to require
that airport vendors with direct access to the airfield and aircraft
develop security programs to address security measures specific to
vendor employees.

TSA said that expanding requirements for background checks and security
awareness training for additional workers and establishing requirements
for vendor security programs would be costly to implement and would
require timeconsuming rule-making efforts to assess potential impacts
and obtain and incorporate public comment on any proposed regulations.
This report contains recommendations to the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) to help the department articulate and justify
future decisions on how best to proceed with security evaluations, fund
and implement security improvements—including new security
technologies—and implement additional measures to reduce the potential
security risks posed by airport workers. We provided a draft of this
report to TSA officials who generally concurred with our findings and
recommendations. TSA’s written comments are presented in appendix III.

Full Report-http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04728.pdf

------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> 
Make a clean sweep of pop-up ads. Yahoo! Companion Toolbar.
Now with Pop-Up Blocker. Get it for free!
http://us.click.yahoo.com/L5YrjA/eSIIAA/yQLSAA/61FxlB/TM
--------------------------------------------------------------------~-> 

-- 
    "NEXTEL-1 IT'S NOT JUST NEXTEL"
  Note The New address 
Subscribe to Nextel-1: http://www.groups.yahoo.com/subscribe/NEXTEL-1

  "NEXTEL2 FOR iDEN SOFTWARE DEVELOPERS"
Subscribe to Nextel2: http://www.groups.yahoo.com/subscribe/NEXTEL2

  "WIRELESS FORUM HOMELAND SECURITY GROUP"
     The Complete Resource for Wireless Homeland Security.
Subscribe to WFHSG:  http://www.groups.yahoo.com/subscribe/WFHSG

Yahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
     http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NEXTEL-1/

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
     [email-masked]

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
     http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/