Subject: [mpowr] SUMMARY: Mailing List Management Discussion

From: Margaret Wasserman <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2004 07:52:59 -0500

One of the subjects that we discussed in some depth on this
list is how/if a WG chair should be able to revoke the posting
privileges of disruptive mailing list participants.

This discussion started with a concrete proposal from James
Kempf, in which he suggested that we establish a mailing list
"Code of Conduct" and formalize a process for how WG chairs
could revoke the posting privileges of individuals who violate
that code. (Thanks, James!)

One person voiced strong support for the proposal as written
(Alex Rousskov).  Alex Rousskov later argued against the
proposal as unnecessary.

Several people voiced support for the idea of allowing WG
chairs to revoke the posting privileges of disruptive
individuals, but had issues with James proposal and/or
did not comment on it specifically (Margaret Wasserman,
John Klensin, Spencer Dawkins, Harald Alvestrand,
Melinda Shore, Dave Crocker).

One person made unambiguous statements against the idea
that WG chairs should be allowed to revoke the posting
privileges of disruptive individuals (Alex Conta).

There were several specific objections to James' proposal:

     - Concerns that James' proposal was more complex
       than necessary (Margaret Wasserman, James Kempf,
       John Klensin).  No one disagreed.

     - Concerns that allowing anyone to revoke posting
       privileges is a violation of the right to free
       speech (Alex Conta).  Margaret Wasserman, Harald
       Alvestrand and John Klensin disagreed that this
       is a free speech issue.  Others continued to speak
       in favor of some type of policy in this area,
       despite this objection.

     - A concern that allowing WG chairs to revoke
       posting privileges would raise our liability
       (Raised by James Kempf, quoting Scott Bradner).
       Margaret Wasserman disagreed.

     - A concern that chairs might abuse this authority
       to quash dissenting opinion (Alex Conta, Alex
       Rousskov).  Several others indicated that a
       requirement for AD approval and/or the
       appeals process would handle this situation
       (Margaret Wasserman, James Kempf, John Klensin,
       Harald Alvestrand, Dave Crocker).

     - Assertions that it is unnecessary to revoke the
       posting privileges of disruptive participants
       because list members could use mail filters
       instead (Alex Conta, Alex Rousskov).  Several
       people pointed out that filtering is ineffective
       or would cause a larger problem (Margaret
       Wasserman, Melinda Shore, Spencer Dawkins,
       James Kempf).

So, based on this discussion, I will assert the following:

(1) There is rough consensus among the people active on this
list that WG chairs should be allowed to revoke the posting
privileges of disruptive participants with AD approval and
the possibility of appeal.

(2) There is rough consensus among the people active on this
list that the details of James' proposal are too process-heavy,
and that we need a lighter-weight proposal.

However, this discussion has only involved eight of the
approximately fifty people subscribed to this list.  Do
others have opinions on this topic?

Margaret Wasserman and John Klensin also discussed the
possibility that the IESG could conduct an experiment by
temporarily granting this authority to WG chairs (for
three to six months) to see what happens.

Would anyone object if we made a proposal to the IESG to
try such an experiment?  Does anyone want to write up a
specific proposal along those lines?  James, do you want
to try again?

Margaret

_______________________________________________
mpowr mailing list
[email-masked]
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mpowr

---

From: Pekka Savola <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 16:50:10 +0200 (EET)

> others have opinions on this topic?

Yes, WG chairs should be able to do this, with AD approval if deemed 
necessary.

(A trivial part of that already exists for WG chairs who unsubscribe 
the WG members whose emails start bouncing when their accounts are 
deleted etc. -- it may be worth considering whether this requires the 
same process or not as well)

Yes, I think James's proposal is unnecessarily heavy-weight, but if 
there was consensus for it, I wouldn't object.  The result is more 
important than the means.

One other possibility is to provide a pointer, in the subscribe
message, to an IETF web page describing the mailing list code of
conduct, and spam the code of conduct to all the existing subscribers
at some point.  If Note Well is deemed to be binding this way, I fail 
to see why a Code of Conduct would require a heavier process..

> specific proposal along those lines?  James, do you want

I think doing such an experiment would be a great idea, and I strongly 
favor it.  Anything which helps us go forward is a good thing :-)

-- 
Pekka Savola                 "You each name yourselves king, yet the
Netcore Oy                    kingdom bleeds."
Systems. Networks. Security. -- George R.R. Martin: A Clash of Kings

---

From: "Joel M. Halpern" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2004 10:31:58 -0500

It seems to me that with reasonable clarity (not binding rules, just clear 
descriptions of the goals) the WG chairs should be able to temporarily 
revoke WG posting privileges.  Requiring AD notification / concurrence / 
review seems reasonable.  The current procedures requiring full IESG 
approval is probably more limitation than we need.

Yours,
Joel M. Halpern

---

From: "David Partain (LI/EAB)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 16:34:33 +0100

Greetings,

> privileges of disruptive mailing list participants.

[summary deleted]

First, a question.  Is this problem _really_ that big?
I've followed many working group mailing lists (primarily in
the O&M area) for years and can remember only a single example
of a person that I felt legimately could have been tossed off.

I must admit that I have a hard time getting particularly worked
up about this one way or another.  However, rather than being
one of the silent lurkers, I fall into the "boot 'em off!" camp.
I personally believe strongly that the overwhelmingly large
percentage of people simply Behave Properly, but it's entirely
reasonable to have a way to deal with those who don't.  If we
want to codify what "properly" means, okay (not that it'll
be easy).

My preference, though, would be that, rather than trying to
create the IETF's Miss Manners, we simply rely on checks &
balances and people doing the Right Thing.  Something along the
lines of

 - Bad Person begins to trash the mailing list
 - Chair(s) kindly requests that Bad Person behave
 - Bad Person persists to trash progress to the point where the
   Chair(s) determine it's hopeless
 - Chair(s) contact relevant ADs.  If both agree that Bad Person
   is misbehaving, s/he's Outta There.

We can be benign dictators and quarantine them for increasingly
long periods of time.

I don't think it's too much to ask that people behave themselves
within the context of the IETF.  Having 3 or 4 people (depending
on whether there are 2 co-chairs) determining what "behaving" is
seems entirely sufficient to me.

> the possibility of appeal.

Cool.

> and that we need a lighter-weight proposal.

Does the above qualify as a proposal?

Cheers,

David

---

From: David Meyer <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 08:12:00 -0800

>> the possibility of appeal.

	Agree.

>> and that we need a lighter-weight proposal.

	Agree.

>> others have opinions on this topic?

	See above :-)

>> specific proposal along those lines?  James, do you want

	I don't have a specific proposal at this time, but what I
	would like to see in any such proposal are:

	(i).	For the experiment itself:

		(a).	Well-defined (and clearly documented)
			guidelines describing the conditions and
			situations under which such privileges
			may be revoked 

		(b).	A well-defined appeals process

		(c).	A well-defined reinstatement policy

	(ii).	For executing the experiment

		(a).	A well-defined and documented experimental
			design, including 

		(b).	One or more controls (i.e., we need
			something to compare to; it's going to be
			really hard to have the "control-WG" that
			doesn't have the experimental policy in
			place, so we need to think that one out a
			little)

		(c).	A well defined "experiment sunset" timer

		(d).	Well defined evaluation criteria and metrics
			(of course, without this, we really don't
			have an "experiment" in any sense of the
			word I understand)  

	Thanks,

	Dave

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 09:25:19 -0800

> important than the means.

Even though I made the proposal, I agree.

> to see why a Code of Conduct would require a heavier process..

I think it would make sense to have a Code of Conduct, and make people aware
of it as is done with the Note Well.

> favor it.  Anything which helps us go forward is a good thing :-)

I'm not exactly sure what you mean by an experiment. Do you mean:

1) Write up the Code of Conduct,
2) Set up a mailing list for an existing or proposed WG that requires a
click thorough on the Code of Conduct to join,
3) Get IESG approval for the WG chairs to be able to remove anyone who
doesn't abide by the Code of Conduct according to some set of rules that
involve notifications of the distruptor

which is what I proposed, or do you mean:

1) Write up the Code of Conduct,
2) Spam it to existing list particpants or make sure that it gets in the
infopack distributed by the Secretariat like the Note Well at face to face
meetings or something else to make sure that people are aware of it,
3) Get IESG approval for the WG chairs to remove someone without any
specific rules but requiring AD approval

which is a simplified version that is more in line with what Margaret
proposed originally,

or something else?

                jak

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 09:29:38 -0800

David,

I'm not sure how often the problem occurs, but when it does, it can
effectively destroy the ability of a WG to do any technical work. Most of
the good technical people fold up their tents and migrate elsewhere when a
distruptor appears on a mailing list. It results in lasting damage to the WG
that can make it almost impossible to get any really good technical work out
of it. At least, that has been my experience

---

From: Alex Rousskov <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 10:44:21 -0700 (MST)

On Fri, 9 Jan 2004, Margaret Wasserman wrote:

> One person voiced strong support for the proposal as written (Alex
> Rousskov).  Alex Rousskov later argued against the proposal as
> unnecessary.

Looks like my multiple personality disorder is coming back together
with amnesia! I do not recall doing any of the two mutually exclusive
things above. Maybe there are more than two personalities; that would
explain the amnesia part. :-)

> (1) There is rough consensus among the people active on this list
> that WG chairs should be allowed to revoke the posting privileges of
> disruptive participants with AD approval and the possibility of
> appeal.
>
> (2) There is rough consensus among the people active on this list
> that the details of James' proposal are too process-heavy, and that
> we need a lighter-weight proposal.

I agree on both counts. However, I note that different people will
interpret a "lighter-weight proposal" differently. Some believe we
just need to document that Chairs can do whatever they want (as long
as the AD approves). Some believe that a very simple but documented
"warning" procedure must be followed. I belong to the second camp.

> Margaret Wasserman and John Klensin also discussed the possibility
> that the IESG could conduct an experiment by temporarily granting
> this authority to WG chairs (for three to six months) to see what
> happens.

While I like testing, in this simple case covering a very rare
condition, any dedicated testing would be a waste of time. We are not
likely to get enough sample points to claim any statistical
significance. We will waste time arguing about performance criteria
and other experiment setup issues (there are already messages being
posted about that).

Let's document a simple set of rules and IESG can enable it
immediately after the usual review stages. If enabling these rules
causes serious problems, IESG can always suspend them immediately by
instructing ADs to stop approving suspension requests.

> try such an experiment?

I would, for two reasons:
  - we need to document rules before we can experiment
  - we cannot stage a useful experiment for these rules

> Does anyone want to write up a specific proposal along those lines?
> James, do you want to try again?

Here is an existing proposal we should not ignore, BTW:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-mrose-ietf-posting-04.txt
Marshall suggests a relatively heavy procedure but with a long-term
(1 year) suspension.

FWIW, here are the simple rules skeleton I have in mind:

    - A Chair that wants to terminate P's posting privileges must
      issue a public warning on the WG mailing list. This warning
      is equivalent to the Chair gauging WG rough consensus that
      P's posting privileges should be terminated if the situation
      does not improve immediately after the message reaches P.

    - If the situation does not improve, and the WG rough
      consensus does not change, the Chair can seek ADs
      approval to terminate P's posting privileges. AD approval
      is required to terminate P's posting privileges.

    - Posting privileges must not be terminated for more than
      30(?) calendar days.

    - P has the right to object/appeal termination, even if there
      was WG rough consensus to terminate.

    - P must not change their e-mail address or use similar
      aliasing tricks in order to re-enable posting rights.
      However, there are no technical measures to enforce this
      rule.

    - Posting privileges for non-WG lists cannot be terminated.

    - All IETF WG lists subscribers are explicitly notified of the
      new rules 14(?) days before the rules kick in. This ensures
      that most subscribers are aware of the new rules.

    - All new WG list subscribers are explicitly notified of the
      new rules at the time of subscription

Alex.

---

From: David Meyer <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 10:15:41 -0800

>>       does not improve immediately after the message reaches P.

	It will not be possible to verify that any "message
	reaches P", so that clause doesn't seem too useful. Can
	you state your intention there differently?
>>     - If the situation does not improve, and the WG rough

	Define "improve"

>>       consensus does not change, the Chair can seek ADs

	Define "change"

>>     - Posting privileges must not be terminated for more than

	Sounds reasonable.

>>       was WG rough consensus to terminate.

	(i).	Appeal through what process?

	(ii).	To whom is the appeal made?

	(iii).	Are the appeals and their outcomes public (and
		can they be used as precedent for later appeals)?

>>     - Posting privileges for non-WG lists cannot be terminated.

	Do you mean such as [email-masked]?

>>       new rules at the time of subscription

	Otherwise sounds reasonable.

	Dave

---

From: Margaret Wasserman <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2004 13:10:01 -0500

Hi Alex,

>explain the amnesia part. :-)

I'm sorry if I misunderstood...  I was not trying to
misrepresent your input.  You were the first responder to
James' proposal, and your response was very supportive.
But, later you indicated that it might not be necessary to have a
procedure for removing disruptive participants because the other
participants could use mail filters to avoid seeing disruptive
mail.

I didn't consider these statements to be quite as mutually exclusive
as my (perhaps too short) summary made them sound...

But, I was not completely certain whether to place you in the "for"
or "against" category for purposes of gauging consensus on the idea
that WG chairs should be allowed to temporarily revoke the posting
privileges of disruptive participants, so I had you mentally
categorized as "unknown".

The rest of your most recent post makes it pretty clear that you
would agree with a set of rules that would allow WG chairs to
temporarily suspend the posting privileges of disruptive
posters, with appropriate warnings, AD approval and the possibility
of appeal.  Is that a fair interpretation?

Margaret

---

From: Pekka Savola <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 20:00:02 +0200 (EET)

> I'm not exactly sure what you mean by an experiment. Do you mean:

Ok.. let me try to clarify.

> involve notifications of the distruptor

Not quite..
 
> which is a simplified version that is more in line with what Margaret

I though something along the lines of the above.  Even 2) could be
partially omitted at this point as long as there exists some
documentation of the experiment and the process (e.g., maybe announce
it on IETF-Announce, and put it in with the new WG lists).

Quoting Margaret:

.. such an experiment wouldn't even require any (or many) rules, or
spamming the code of conduct; I thought the main idea of the proposal
was just to give this authority to some or all of the WG chairs, and
see how they exercise it (if they do) .. and tune the process based on
the results.

(I don't have strong feelings on what to experiment, as long as it's 
light-weight enough.)

I guess I'm quite confident that such power would not be misused, and 
if there were any "grey areas", running a live experiment might be 
able to flush them out.

---

From: Alex Rousskov <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 12:00:19 -0700 (MST)

> 	you state your intention there differently?

The intention is to give P a reasonable chance to shut up _before_ his
posting rights are revoked. This is just a sketch, of course. If
details are important at this stage, the draft should say something
like

	The warning is considered to reach P if any of the following
	is true:
	- P has responded to the warning
	- the warning has been received through the mailing list
	  by any list member 5(?) hours ago

The above should cover cases where Chair's e-mail did not go through
(immediately or at all) for technical reasons (most e-mail bounces are
detected in 4 hours) and gives P some time to notice the message.

We cannot engineer a process guarantee that P saw the warning. We must
rely on a timeout, and we can debate whether 5 hours is enough. Note
that a smart chair would try to talk to P before issuing a formal
warning, so in most cases P should not be surprised (which means that
some Ps will try to sabotage the process if they can; one cannot
sabotage a timeout though).

> >>       consensus does not change, the Chair can seek ADs

These are all up to the WG consensus to define on a case-by-case
basis, as gauged by the Chair, as usual. We cannot define them as we
cannot define "disruption". WG can agree on the situation assessment.

The killer idea here is that the Chair is not just "acting up" but is
gauging the consensus to terminate posting rights. If the Chair makes
the wrong call, the WG can use the usual means of correcting the
Chair's decision. The Chair cannot say "you must shut up because I
want you to and the AD is fine with that". The Chair can only say "you
must shut up because the WG thinks so and the AD is fine with that".

> 		can they be used as precedent for later appeals)?

I would prefer to leave these details for appeal-savvy IETFers to
polish. I hope there is a standard IETF appeal process that can be
applied here "as is". Is there?

> 	Do you mean such as [email-masked]?

Yes, and [email-masked], [email-masked], etc. Any public list
without a formal WG charter/Chair. Such lists may have their own
management mechanisms, of course. Our scope is a WG mailing list.

Thanks,

Alex.

---

From: David Meyer <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 11:38:23 -0800

>> 	  by any list member 5(?) hours ago

	Seems reasonable, + or - some delta.

>> sabotage a timeout though).

	Sure.

>> applied here "as is". Is there?

	Section 3.2 of 2418 seems to allow for the entire
	activity being discussed here. However, unlike Section 4
	of 2418, it does not cite section 3.4 (Contention and
	appeals) as a mechanism for resolution. This should
	probably be fixed when 2418 gets updated. BTW, section
	6.5 of 2026, which all of this points at, would seem be
	sufficient to capture the desired process. 

>> management mechanisms, of course. Our scope is a WG mailing list.

	Gotcha.

	Dave

---

From: Alex Rousskov <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 13:19:32 -0700 (MST)

On Fri, 9 Jan 2004, Margaret Wasserman wrote:

> privileges of disruptive participants,

I probably belong to the weird IETF minority that does not necessarily
have a well-formed "for" or "against" opinion at the start of a
discussion. I like to play devils advocate, sometimes against self.
This naturally makes it hard to summarize consensus based on a
unstructured discussion, but Robert complained enough about that
already :-).

> temporarily suspend the posting privileges of disruptive posters,
> with appropriate warnings, AD approval and the possibility of
> appeal.  Is that a fair interpretation?

I agree that the above are basic principles we should built upon.

I would also add "WG rough consensus" as the most important principle.
Since disruptions make forming and gauging consensus difficult, we
have a conflict that we would have to resolve with more fast-acting
power given to either the Chair or the participant in question. The
specifics of the proposal would make this choice clear.

For example, Marshall's draft-mrose-ietf-posting gives more
fast-acting power to the participant while using a long-term
punishment to balance things off. The rules I posted give more
fast-acting power to the Chair while using a short-term punishment.

Marshall's rules essentially assume that the disruption disease is
usually very difficult to identify correctly, and that sick
participants cannot be "cured". The rules I posted assume that most
disruptions are easy to identify, and that sick participants will be
cured by (or die from) a simple treatment. Neither of the assumptions
is going to be 100% true, of course.

Alex.

---

From: Alex Rousskov <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 13:28:40 -0700 (MST)

On Fri, 9 Jan 2004, Pekka Savola wrote:

> spamming the code of conduct; I thought the main idea of the
> proposal was just to give this authority to some or all of the WG
> chairs, and see how they exercise it (if they do) .. and tune the
> process based on the results.

I would be opposed to such an experiment because its implied
assumption that we can measure success and tune based on results does
not hold in this case. We are talking about rare, exceptional
circumstances and, hence, we are unlikely to get enough sampling
points, especially if the rules work OK.

> I guess I'm quite confident that such power would not be misused,
> and if there were any "grey areas", running a live experiment might
> be able to flush them out.

I suspect we will get no results short-term and inconclusive results
long-term (some problems, some success stories). Thus, we will end up
in the same situation we are today, except some people will claim that
the "results" prove their point that Chairs should have more/less
power.

IMHO, we should document the rules, pass the usual IETF review
process, and then ask IESG to enabled them. IESG can always
immediately disable the rules in case of a disaster by asking ADs not
to approve any Chair requests. So we are safe from the worst case
scenario point of view.

Alex.

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 13:34:03 -0800

The point was made that disruptions are (or should be) rare occurances and
that running an experiment with one or a few WGs may not collect much data.
I agree. I think it would make more sense for the IESG to delegate the
mailing list removal power for some period of time (perhaps a year or two),
then keep careful track of what happens. At the end of the trial period, the
exact procedure can be adjusted based on the results of the trial.

            jak

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 13:26:15 -0800

Alex,

I don't think you can invoke WG concensus for cases like this. The problem
is, when a serious disruption is in progress, community-based decision
making is effectively under assault by the distruptor and the normal WG
decision making process has broken down. To restore that environment, the
disruptor must be given the opportunity to shut up and behave, then, if they
don't, they need to be shut down as quickly as possible. The disruptor has
basically broken the rules of community-based decision making. (I'm speaking
from experience here).

Of course, there is always the possibility that the WG chair makes a
judgement error, which is why consulting the AD is a good idea. So I'd say:
send a private email warning to the disruptor and contact the AD (actually,
a phone conversation with the AD is probably a better idea than email just
to make sure there is no misunderstanding, though an email followup where
the AD says "I agree" should also occur to establish a paper trail in case
there is an appeal). Then, if the disruptor continues to disrupt, remove
from the list and post a notice to the list saying "So and so has been
removed from the list for not following good mailing list conduct, they will
be reinstated when the penalty period is over".

As for what consitutes a disruption, that's again a judgement call, but I
think having a written code of email conduct for guidance to WG chairs and
ADs would be very helpful in reducing the number of judgement errors.

            jak

---

From: Alex Rousskov <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 14:45:04 -0700 (MST)

On Fri, 9 Jan 2004, James Kempf wrote:

> I don't think you can invoke WG concensus for cases like this.

I do not see why not. Your arguments below seem to be unrelated to WG
consensus (they may be related to WG ability to communicate consensus
efficiently, which is a very different thing).

When issuing a formal warning, the Chair should be reasonably sure
that the WG would support Chair actions (and participants would
express that opinion in the absence of the disruption). That means the
Chair is gauging/expressing WG rough consensus. As usual, the Chair
may be wrong, but it does not change the justification for these
rules or guidelines for the Chair.

In other words, we are telling the Chairs to act if they think the WG
would support such an action and NOT when they think the WG would be
better off after Chair's action. The Chair is expressing WG consensus
rather than her own opinion.

> The problem is, when a serious disruption is in progress,
> community-based decision making is effectively under assault by the
> distruptor and the normal WG decision making process has broken
> down.

True. Fortunately, WG Chair does not need any community-based decision
making process to declare rough consensus, which is all that is needed
to issue a warning. If the Chair is wrong, many times, s/he will be
fired.

> To restore that environment, the disruptor must be given the
> opportunity to shut up and behave, then, if they don't, they need to
> be shut down as quickly as possible. The disruptor has basically
> broken the rules of community-based decision making. (I'm speaking
> from experience here).

Agreed. The rules I posted do exactly that.

> judgement error, which is why consulting the AD is a good idea. So
> I'd say: send a private email warning to the disruptor and contact
> the AD (actually, a phone conversation with the AD is probably a
> better idea than email just to make sure there is no
> misunderstanding, though an email followup where the AD says "I
> agree" should also occur to establish a paper trail in case there is
> an appeal). Then, if the disruptor continues to disrupt, remove from
> the list and post a notice to the list saying "So and so has been
> removed from the list for not following good mailing list conduct,
> they will be reinstated when the penalty period is over".

I believe the rules I posted allow for the above to happen but create
no load for the AD if the warning works. The AD does not need to be
involved if the WG cured itself.

BTW, the rules I posted are missing a rule to publicly declare a
decision to revoke P's posting rights. That should be added.

> As for what consitutes a disruption, that's again a judgement call,
> but I think having a written code of email conduct for guidance to
> WG chairs and ADs would be very helpful in reducing the number of
> judgement errors.

Agreed.

Alex.

---

From: Alex Rousskov <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 14:48:04 -0700 (MST)

On Fri, 9 Jan 2004, James Kempf wrote:

> I think it would make more sense for the IESG to delegate the
> mailing list removal power for some period of time (perhaps a year
> or two), then keep careful track of what happens. At the end of the
> trial period, the exact procedure can be adjusted based on the
> results of the trial.

Furthermore, we do not need a trial period to adjust the procedure
based on past results. We can adjust the procedure as needed when and
if we have enough results. Document and enable the rules. Then monitor
and make adjustments as needed, as usual. No need for a special case
here, IMO.

Alex.

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 14:19:07 -0800

> efficiently, which is a very different thing).

Concensus is a process that involves not only people forming opinions but
also communicating them in a group setting. If the ability to communicate is
disrupted, the concensus process is disrupted.

            jak

---

From: Melinda Shore <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 17:27:19 -0500

> disrupted, the concensus process is disrupted.

Bingo.  If things get so bad that someone needs to be removed
from the mailing list to get back on track, the process is
not working and cannot be used to fix itself.  Defining, even
informally, a mechanism for repairing the process is very
worthwhile.

Melinda

---

From: Alex Rousskov <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 15:42:18 -0700 (MST)

-- was: Re: [mpowr] SUMMARY:  Mailing List Management Discussion

On Fri, 9 Jan 2004, Melinda Shore wrote:

> > Concensus is a process that involves not only people forming
> > opinions but also communicating them in a group setting. If the
> > ability to communicate is disrupted, the concensus process is
> > disrupted.
>
> Bingo.  If things get so bad that someone needs to be removed from
> the mailing list to get back on track, the process is not working
> and cannot be used to fix itself.  Defining, even informally, a
> mechanism for repairing the process is very worthwhile.

Sure, but is not the point we are discussing here, I think.

Let me try to clarify. I am asserting that the Chair must _always_
represent what she thinks the WG rough consensus is. It does not
matter whether the mailing list is being disrupted, not functioning at
all, or the IETF web site is down. All those disruptions make Chairs
gauging work more difficult and more risky, but still the Chair should
not do Foo if she thinks that WG rough consensus would be against Foo.

All WG Chair actions should imply the following template:

	"I gauge WG rough consensus as Foo.
	 Therefore, I do X."

Under no circumstances (even if the mailing list is not working at
all or whatever), the Chair should use the following template:

	"I believe X is the right thing to do.
	 Therefore, I do X,
	 regardless of what I gauge WG rough consensus to be"

This is a fundamental principle used by the rules I posted.

Hope this clarifies,

Alex.

---

From: Melinda Shore <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 17:52:39 -0500

On Friday, January 9, 2004, at 05:42 PM, Alex Rousskov wrote:
> all, or the IETF web site is down.

Sure it does.  If you've been through one of these things you
know that you cannot have the discussion required to determine
consensus.  I think that this is one of those rare cases where
you have to trust your chair and know that there's an appeals
process if the chair really is behaving arbitrarily.

Melinda

---

From: Dave Crocker <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 15:03:57 -0800

Folks,

>  process if the chair really is behaving arbitrarily.

I hope that my oft-stated concerns about individuals being given "authority" 
which permits individual abuse provides some contrast to the fact that I 
entirely agree with Melinda.

d/
--
Dave Crocker <dcrocker-at-brandenburg-dot-com>
Brandenburg InternetWorking <http://brandenburg.com>

---

From: Alex Rousskov <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 16:16:55 -0700 (MST)

> process if the chair really is behaving arbitrarily.

Sure it does not. If you've been through one of these things you know
that you cannot have any discussion at all, and you know that WG
participants want to discuss technical matters. Hence, it is
reasonable for Chair to declare a rough consensus that the work is
being disrupted and the situation is out of control. That is, it is
reasonable to assume that, given a filtered medium, Chair's
declaration of rough consensus would have been supported.

BTW, this is related to the "silent consensus" thread. In that thread,
some argued that no quorum or voices are needed to declare consensus.
This is a similar situation because the Chair assumes that no voices
can be _heard_ because of the disruptions.

Can a Chair _declare_ or _formulate_ consensus in the presence of
noisy input?  Yes.  Chairs do that all the time.

Alex.

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 15:28:47 -0800

Agree.

            jak

---

From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2004 15:25:50 -0800

When I think of running an experiment, I think of something like:

- Define the ruleset we want to test
- Declare that from March 1(?), in all WGs with the first letter from A to 
K, the new ruleset applies; in WGs from L to Z, the old rule of IESG 
decision applies.
- At the end of 3 (or 6) months, the WG chairs get asked:
  - Did you remove anyone from the list?
  - Was there a time when you wanted to remove a person from the
    list, but did not?
  - Was there a time when you removed someone from the list, and
    afterwards decided that you made the wrong decision?

That should give us some real data - or some real data saying that this 
isn't a problem......

---

From: Alex Rousskov <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2004 16:59:04 -0700 (MST)

> That should give us some real data - or some real data saying that this

The only measurable indication of a problem would be a large number of
successful(?) appeals. No experiment is required to notice that and
suspend/adjust new rules.

The above questions and the answers to the above questions can be
interpreted and manipulated in many ways and, hence, they are real
noise and not real data.

You may even distort the results by running the experiment. It may
look like a double blind study, but it is not because the subjects
know whether they were given a placebo and because the subjects may
want the real thing instead.

Alex.

---

From: Pekka Savola <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2004 10:46:14 +0200 (EET)

> That should give us some real data - or some real data saying that this 

Sounds good to me, even though I'd inform the WG chairs before the 
experiment on what questions (or in general, what kind of information) 
will be asked of them later on, so that they can keep notes on the 
data (e.g., whether they wanted to remove someone, or why they did / 
did not do it) to be collected.

The period would probably have to be at least 6 months (or the like).

---

From: Alex Conta <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2004 11:32:51 -0500

Margaret,

For what is worth, here are some clarifications to your interpretation 
of my messages, and position. Please see bellow:

Margaret Wasserman wrote:
> [...].

"Disruptive" is quite vague, which is the a problem.  Trying to narrow 
down the meaning:

a) "Disruptive" because messages are completely outside the technical 
context of the WG mailing list?
I would not defend posting rights for this type of messages.

b) "Disruptive" because messages have a technical content that is in 
opposition to other opinions, including that of the chair?
I am strongly defending posting rights for technical content messages.

c)"Disruptive" because messages have a technical content mixed with "bad 
language"?
I am not defending the users of bad languages.

But this poses the problem of defining and gaging "bad language", in 
particular in the international environment of the IETF, where not 
everyone's first language is English.

Messages of type a) are quite rare - I haven't seen them on lists that 
I've followed, some of these lists being active for many years.

For b) and c), giving to the WG chairs the role of "gaging" the 
language, in the same time with the role of "shutting down" the sender, 
in the current context of roles, makes it a BIG problem, because the 
chair is allowed to be part of the technical debate/work.

There are IMO two easy solutions to this BIG problem:

1) maintain the current situation, which is, do not put both the role of 
"shutting down" and "gaging" language into the WG chairs hands.

2) change the WG roles, by giving only process and people roles, and 
removing the technical role.

Regards,
Alex

> [...]
> ___________________________________________
> mpowr mailing list
> [email-masked]

---

From: Alex Conta <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2004 13:29:51 -0500

> disrupted, the concensus process is disrupted.

The principle of consensus stated by Alex is important, if the power is 
to be given to the WG chairs.

I do not follow James reasoning, of why consensus can be disrupted - the 
chain from "disruptive messages", to "communication disruptive", and 
then to "consensus disruptive".

Realistically, I do not see the possibility, from a technical 
perspective, of X's messages considered disruptive, impeding on messages 
sent by the WG chairs to the list, and members of the list responding to 
the WG chairs, to measure consensus. Is there something that I am missing?

Regards,
Alex

---

From: Margaret Wasserman <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2004 14:14:53 -0500

Hi Alex,

>Realistically, I do not see the possibility, from a technical perspective, 
>of X's messages considered disruptive, impeding on messages sent by the WG 
>chairs to the list, and members of the list responding to the WG chairs, 
>to measure consensus. Is there something that I am missing?

I'll give you an example...

Let's say that a mailing list is being disrupted by one person (X)
issuing personal attacks and repeated threats against other WG
participants who disagree with him, both privately and on the list.
These could be threats of violence, threats of legal action, or
threats to contact that person's boss and report misconduct. I have
been on the receiving end of all three types of threats in my IETF
experience, so they do happen.  In fact, one person did contact my
boss, but that's another story...

The WG chair believes that X's repeated attacks and threats are
disrupting the WG mailing list by (1) intimidating some people
and/or making them reticent to express their views, (2) driving
away key contributors who are not willing to tolerate this type
of behaviour, (3) discouraging new people who might bring
energy and perspective to the group and/or (4) causing other
people to resort to abuse and threats in response.

The reason she believes the four things outlined above is
that people have told her so -- in fact, two IAB or IESG
members who have provided valuable input in the past have
told her that they are no longer willing to follow her mailing
list because of the tone and the N/S ratio.  The responsible
AD has told her two or three times that she needs to do
"something" to bring the mailing list under control.

This may sound far fetched to you, but my understanding is that
this will sound familiar to people whose mailing lists have
been disrupted by this type of behaviour.

The WG chair has asked X, privately, to modify his behaviour,
and her attempts were greeted with the expected insults and
threats.  After a couple of private warnings, the WG chair
sent a message to the list, warning X that if he does not
change his behaviour, she will rescind his posting rights,
and X responded with an accusation that the chair has some
type of conflict of interest and should step down.  No one
defended X.  One person responded to X, defending the chair,
and X responded with threats.

Now what?  Do you really think that it would be useful for
the WG chair to make a consensus call (which usually takes
two weeks) on the WG mailing list before she revokes X's
posting privileges for 30 days?  How would she interpret
the results?  Should she somehow include the people who
are no longer reading the mailing list because of X's
antics?  How does she count the people who are too
intimidated to respond publicly?

In these cases, it is typically clear to everyone involved
what should happen.  The WG chair should be able to do a
quick check with the AD and then do the right thing.

I agree with your statements that the WG chair should not
be able to remove someone from the mailing list for holding
an opposing technical view, but I just can't believe (in
a system that requires AD approval and includes an appeal
process) that a WG chair could get away with doing that.

Margaret

[Disclaimer:  The incidents described in this message are
fictional.  Any resemblance to actual events or persons,
real or imaginary, is purely coincidental.]

---

From: Alex Conta <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2004 21:48:01 -0500

Technically, I cannot see how, as long as Email functions,  the WG 
members could not communicate with the WG chairs, and vice-versa.

However, a scenario in which I can see the inability of detecting 
consensus is that in which things get out of hand, nobody listening to 
the WG chair, because of the WG chair's poor people management skills.

I think IETF should avoid instating a new rule just to compensate for 
possible poor management skills of a few WG chairs.

Alex

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2004 19:15:25 -0800

Alex,

> the WG chairs, to measure consensus. Is there something that I am missing?

I think what you are missing is not having been a Working Group chair or
perhaps even been in a Working Group that has had to suffer through one of
these disruptive incidents. They have nothing to do with technical
differences of opinion, in fact, the disruptions don't involve technical
matters at all (though the disruptor may phrase them as being technical in
order to avoid being accused of bringing up peripheral matters). What
happens is that the Working Group ceases to do any good technical work (or
in the case that I was involved in, any work at all for a period of 6
months), and essentially suffers irreperable damage. Getting good technical
work out of a Working Group after a major distruption is almost impossible.
The Working Group becomes a drag on the IETF's resources, because it
produces little value.

Obviously interpreting from your postings, you've had the experience of a
Working Group chair, in some sense, abusing their position to squelch your
or someone else's technical input because it contradicted the chair's
opinion. I'm sensitive to that experience, but I believe that, in the
balance, a disruption that essentially destroys a Working Group's ability to
function effectively is more serious, because it is an attack on the basic
values of community-based decision making, and results in a large drain on
resources that the IETF cannot afford (and I mean that in both an
energy/motivation as well as a financial sense). A disagreement between a
technical contributor and a Working Group chair in which the Working Group
chair abuses their power that is brought to an Area Director or appealed has
a high probability of succeding in removing the Working Group chair. On the
other hand, after a disruptive incident, it is almost impossible to rescue
the nuked Working Group.

            jak

---

From: Alex Conta <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2004 23:23:30 -0500

Hi Margaret,

Thanks for the imaginary example. I wish you referred me to a real one - 
a mailing list archive for instance. It would have had more convincing 
power.

In response, please consider a counter example - it is possible to 
imagine a similar scenario to yours in a company, large or small.

How is this series of threats usually or legally dealt with? The 
supervisor refers the case to its manager, and Human Resources. They 
research the case, and take appropriate actions, which may include 
punishment, all the way to firing the perpetrator.

One could say, that rights for such actions, including firing a 
perpetrator, should be given to the supervisor. But for employee 
protection against abuses, this is not done, and without being an 
expert, I believe labor laws are quite explicit and strict.

The equivalence between supervisor-WG chair, manager-AD, HR-IESG is 
straight forward.

Going back to your example, the threats should have been reacted 
appropriately by the AD; the AD has not done its job, so there were 
grounds for appropriate action against the AD.

In conclusion, as I said before, I would have no problem with the 
mailing list removal power in the WG chairs hands, if the WG chair was 
only people and process manager.

As long as that is not the case, I am really afraid that there is too 
much danger for abuse, in particular if WG consensus, plus very precise 
rules for measuring "disruptive behavior" are not required, and I would 
feel more comfortable, and I think it is easier to leave the rules the 
way they are - that power stays with the ADs, and the ADs are measured 
in doing their jobs in that respect.

Regards,
Alex

Margaret Wasserman wrote:

>> perspective, of X's messages considered disruptive, impeding on 
>> messages sent by the WG chairs to the list, and members of the list 
>> responding to the WG chairs, to measure consensus. Is there something 
>> that I am missing?
> 
>

---

From: Alex Conta <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2004 00:53:45 -0500

James,

James Kempf wrote:

> [...]  these disruptive incidents. They have nothing to do with technical
> matters at all [...] What
> happens is that the Working Group ceases to do any good technical work 
 >([...] 6 months [...]) and essentially suffers irreperable damage.
> Getting good technical

Was this perhaps possible because of a particular (unfortunate) 
combination of people and process management skills between a WG chair 
and AD?

>  [...] but I believe that, in the
> energy/motivation as well as a financial sense).

Aren't ADs supposed to do their job, and be recalled if they do not?
Is there also a theoretical possibility that an AD may not always want a 
WG or a WG chair succeed?

> A disagreement between a
> a high probability of succeding in removing the Working Group chair. 
 > On the other hand, after a disruptive incident, it is almost
 > impossible to rescue the nuked Working Group.

In the case which you've described, in the context of current rules, 
wasn't the job of the AD to act to protect the WG?

 From what you describe, it seems, that with all the implications of a 
"nuked WG", it was quite easy for an AD to ignore and not act at the 
abuse of the WG.

You consider a high probability for the AD to protect an individual in a 
WG, and act against a WG chair abuse.

I seriously doubt that high probability. It does not make sense, for a 
very simple and obvious reason:

if it was easy for an AD to ignore the abuse of an entire WG by an 
individual, it will be much easier for an AD to ignore the abuse of an 
individual in a WG, by a WG chair.

In concluding, I will say this again, the problem is simply the 
combination of roles and powers. I would not see a problem with WG 
chairs having the power over the mailing list, if the chair's role would 
be people and process management only. With WG chairs having technical 
roles, the mailing list power best stays IMO with the ADs, as it was and 
is now.

Regards,
Alex

---

From: "Spencer Dawkins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2004 06:27:18 -0600

Two points, and I'll try to be brief...

The WG chair cannot prohibit WG participants from reading the mailing
list, cannot prohibit WG participants from sending private e-mail to
other WG participants ("can you believe what the WG chair has done
now? please flame her on the mailing list for me if you disagree"),
cannot prohibit WG participants from sending private e-mail to the
responsible ADs or the IESG as a whole, and has to be pretty careful
to notice WG participants who create new identities, subscribe to the
mailing list, and say "I totally agree with BogonOne, and this is
totally unfair and wrong" (see the ASRG mailing list archives before
providing counterexamples).

If any of these points were not true, I'd be very concerned about WG
chairs booting posters. They are all true, so I'm not. I happen to
like the idea of public notification that the WG chair is taking this
action, including notification of both responsible ADs, but more
process than this seems excessive to me. If the ADs don't care when WG
chairs boot people they disagree with, more than once, more things are
broken than mailing list management.

And, having said this ... we're still talking about mailing list
management. Is this the biggest problem WG chairs face today? Is this
the biggest problem that WGs need empowering to deal with?

If we were a working group, I'd ask for a consensus call so we could
move on. Since we're not, I'm not sure WHAT the halting problem looks
like...

Spencer

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Margaret Wasserman" <[email-masked]>
To: "Alex Conta" <[email-masked]>
Cc: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>; "Alex Rousskov"
<[email-masked]>; <[email-masked]>
Sent: Saturday, January 10, 2004 1:14 PM
Subject: Re: [mpowr] SUMMARY: Mailing List Management Discussion

> >Realistically, I do not see the possibility, from a technical
perspective,

---

From: Margaret Wasserman <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2004 07:40:59 -0500

>Thanks for the imaginary example. I wish you referred me to a real one - a 
>mailing list archive for instance. It would have had more convincing power.

Try the IPR WG archive.  The IESG chose to rescind Todd Glassey's posting
privileges because of Todd's postings to that list and some private mail
that he sent in response to others' posts to the list.  Because Todd chose to
appeal the decision, the situation is fairly well-documented in the IESG's
response to Todd's appeal, which can be found at:

http://www.ietf.org/IESG/APPEALS/iesg_todd_glassey.txt

Please note, though, that my example was not the Todd Glassey case
in disguise.  I don't personal recall enough the details of that
case to say what warnings were given to whom when and/or how people
responded, etc.

I don't personally know of any other case where it was necessary to
revoke posting privileges...

As interesting as the exchanges on the IPv6 WG mailing list have
occasionally been, most people have kept their disagreement (even
vehement ones) well within the bounds of professional behaviour.
And everyone who has strayed from those bounds has always modified
his or her behaviour, even apologizing in some cases, after a
private warning from the WG chairs, so no further action has been
warranted.

>punishment, all the way to firing the perpetrator.

Have you ever been involved in a situation where one person in a
company was threatening another?  I have, and the company did not
engage in a lengthy process to "investigate" before taking action.
The person making the threat was escorted to HR by security within
minutes of making the threat (which was not against me, BTW) and
I never saw him again.

I have a friend who was involved (as the manager) in a similar
situation at another company, and exactly the same procedure was
followed.

In this type of case, I believe that the AD can act as "HR", it
doesn't require the full IESG.

>In conclusion, as I said before, I would have no problem with the mailing 
>list removal power in the WG chairs hands, if the WG chair was only people 
>and process manager.

I think that we will just have to accept our disagreement on this
point.

Personally, I don't believe that we could find ~230 people in the
IETF would take a non-technical WG management role, so I don't
believe it is practical to pursue the approach that you are
recommending.

Margaret

---

From: Margaret Wasserman <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2004 07:50:54 -0500

Hi Spencer,

>the biggest problem that WGs need empowering to deal with?

While I don't think that this is the biggest problem, it may be one
of the more tractable ones.

>move on. Since we're not, I'm not sure WHAT the halting problem looks

Since we're not a WG, and I'm the closest thing that we have (for
the moment anyway) to a WG moderator, I already made the consensus
call -- we seem to have rough consensus on this list that WG chairs
should be able to temporarily revoke the posting privileges of
disruptive individuals with AD approval and the possibility of
appeal.

Alex's dissenting opinion was already noted in the consensus
determination, so his clarification of his opinion hasn't changed it.
I would like to hear opinions from those who have not expressed
an opinion, if they have any thoughts on this topic.

We're not a WG yet, so we can't have WG documents, etc...  If we
did, we'd have a chair, and I'd hope that chair would be appointing
someone to write our thoughts up in a WG draft.  In the meantime, it
would be good to get an individual draft that we can tune through
Seoul and discuss at a BOF there (presumably the same BOF where
we try to figure out if a WG is needed in this area).  Do you want
to take a shot at it?

What other things do we think that an MPOWR WG could/should do?

Margaret

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2004 10:23:05 -0800

Hi Alex,

> combination of people and process management skills between a WG chair

No, it happened because the disruptor was trying to intimidate the Working
Group chairs and AD so that they would form a design team including the
distruptor in order that the disruptor would get their name on a Standards
Track draft. The disruptor did this by publically discrediting the Working
Group chairs and AD on the mailing list, including the charges of conflict
of interest Margaret mentioned, and privately sending threads of violence.

It isn't the AD's and the WG chair's fault. They're acting in good faith,
trying to resolve the problem by reasoning with the disruptor both in public
and private, etc.

> WG or a WG chair succeed?

Alex, an AD can't remove someone today. It requires the entire IESG to agree
according to 2026. It only takes one IESG member to block removing someone,
plus given the IESG's busy schedule, the topic might not get on the agenda
for a month, at which point, the Working Group may be so far gone that it
isn't salvagable. Typically what happens in a case like this is that the AD
whose Working Group is under attack goes to the IESG with the management
problem, but the other ADs don't see the problem because they aren't
involved in it, so they cite the need to remain open, etc. when the AD who
has the problem is being publically disparaged on the Working Group list,
while perhaps privately fearing for their bodily safety due to possible
threats, and watching their Working Group get nuked; all while trying to
reason with someone who is simply beyond reason.

> wasn't the job of the AD to act to protect the WG?

I'm not sure what case you mean. The case of a chair abusing their power to
shut down an alternative voice?

> "nuked WG", it was quite easy for an AD to ignore and not act at the

No, I don't think so.

In the case of a WG chair attempting to abuse their power, if the victim
goes to the AD, they aren't attempting to personally attack the chair and
AD, they are trying to point up a process violation. That's a huge
difference. The mailing list log is going to show a series of carefully
reasoned emails by the victim on the technical topic under dispute, and
perhaps at the end a few emotional ones by the chair telling the victim to
shut up or declaring phony concensus for the WG chair's opinion, with the
victim at the end perhaps saying that they are going to take the case to the
AD and maybe appeal. Perhaps there are even a few from other Working Group
members supporting the victim's technical opinion. In contrast, in a nuclear
attack, the mailing list will show an increasingly emotional series of notes
from the disruptor that have nothing to do with technical matters, and a
series from the Working Group chair and AD that are attempting to reason
with the disruptor, perhaps terminated by emails from the chair or AD
warning the disruptor to stop. There are rarely any supporting emails in
this case, and there even might be a few from other working group members
telling the distruptor to stop.

So if the victim of a Working Group power abuse case goes to the AD after
the Working Group chair has declared phony concensus, the AD should be able
to see what is going on from the email trail. It should be pretty easy at
that point for the AD to either speak to the chair to reopen the issue, or
if the abuse is ongoing to remove the chair. If the AD doesn't take any
action, the victim can appeal and for sure the victim should let the Nomcom
know when election time happens.

> individual in a WG, by a WG chair.

I'm not sure I understand your point. In the case of a disruptor, the AD
isn't ignoring the abuse, (s)he is usually trying to get the person calmed
down and quiet so technical work can continue. In the case of abuse of power
by a chair, if the AD doesn't agree, its possible that its the ADs fault,
and it is also possible that it isn't. That's why the appeals process and
Nomcom are there. Some appeals are upheld by the IESG upon reexamination.

> roles, the mailing list power best stays IMO with the ADs, as it was and

I agree there needs to be a re-examination of the WG chair's role, I'm not
sure I agree with just making it a process one however, since I think it
might make it hard to recruit WG chairs. The mpowr draft has a few
suggestions which move in the direction of limiting the WG chair's
involvement in technical matters, but I think that should be a topic for
discussion in another thread.

            jak

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2004 10:30:16 -0800

> What other things do we think that an MPOWR WG could/should do?

I think we need to have a discussion about how to get bad ideas to fail
early and what is the role of the WG chair and document editor in general.

            jak

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2004 10:26:51 -0800

Spencer,

Mailing list management is not the biggest problem, but to the extent that a
disruption attack fatally damages a WG that then continues to limp along
while producing little of technical value, it is an enormous drain on IETF
resources. After a successful attack, the IESG might as well simply disband
the WG. Getting this particular problem fixed will go a long way toward
making sure that WGs have a higher probability of succeding.

            jak

---

From: Margaret Wasserman <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2004 16:24:06 -0500

Hi James,

>early...

What are your thoughts on how to do this?

I've heard a number of people discuss revisions to the WG creation,
chartering, re-chartering and milestone processes that might help
in this area.  Are those the types of changes that you are proposing,
or do you have other ideas?

Margaret

---

From: Margaret Wasserman <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2004 16:36:29 -0500

>I think we need to have a discussion about... what is the role of
>the WG chair and document editor in general.

I agree.

I've been quite active in three IETF areas (INT, OPS and GEN), I've
been a WG chair for several years, I have been teaching WG chairs
training for a couple of years now, and I am now on the IESG.
This has given me a lot of exposure to WG chairs throughout the
IETF, and given me an opportunity to discuss the WG chair role
with many WG chairs and other participants.

The more time I have spent on this topic, the clearer it has become
that we have little common understanding/consensus in the IETF about
what the role of a WG chair is today, never mind what we think it
should be...

I believe that the role of the document editor/author is similarly
vague and poorly understood.

One of the problems that we identified in the Problem Statement was
that IETF participants and leaders are inadequately prepared for
their roles, but I think it goes far deeper than that.  We
don't have well-enough defined roles that it is possible to prepare
people for them.  The roles are largely defined by the people who
fill them, and are constantly changing based on who is filling
other related roles.

This type of charismatic organization (which can less flatteringly
be called a "cult of personality") works really well for a small,
highly focused group of people who share common goals (like the
early IETF or a start-up company), and really breaks down as the
group grows and experiences an influx of people with different
experiences and views (like the IETF of today).

So, personally, I believe that whether or not we decided to change
the roles of WG chairs and authors/editors, we do need to better
formalize and document the IETF leadership roles -- most notably the
WG chair and document author/editor roles, because those roles
involve so many people and there is so little clarity about those
roles today.

What do others think?

Margaret

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2004 16:40:07 -0800

Hi Margaret,

> or do you have other ideas?

It would certainly be possible to tighten up chartering and re-chartering.
Goal completion timing should be more realistic instead of the typical "bid
to win" 6 month WG completions, and wording of charters should more
precisely reflect what the WGs goals are. The IESG could have a blanket
policy to not accept _any_ requests for additional charter items until the
existing work items were done. This would ensure that the WG was able to
complete something before letting them move on. And perhaps IETF could have
a six month provisionary study period for new WGs, after which the idea
would either fast fail or be chartered. This would prevent "BOFs" for
hanging on for a year or more while the IAB and IESG made up its collective
mind about the idea.

But there's still a problem, and I think the resistance to letting the WG
chair say "no" touches it directly.

The problem is that if one is to classify ideas into "good" and "bad" then
there either needs to be some written, objective criteria on which to judge
or one has to depend on people with experience and knowledge to filter the
ideas. Since the former is only possible to a very limited extent in
engineering (and to a even lesser extent in such a new discipline as
computer science and networks), in practice, filtering good ideas from bad
tends to depend on knowledge and experience of people.

Now in a certain sense, the concensus process, to the extent that it doesn't
privilege anyone's idea over others, is directly contradictory to this
(please, no flames, I support concensus, I am just trying to point out a
problem). It is possible (in fact, I have seen it happen in WGs) where a
larger group of inexperienced people gets behind a bad idea despite the
attempts by the more experienced people to point out the flaws in the idea,
so the WG chair has no choice but to call concensus for the bad idea, or let
the WG continue to thrash until the people behind the bad idea give up (if
they do), thus delaying the standard. One of the reasons why the quality on
WG documents may have declined so much over the last 5 years is that IETF
has been getting such an influx of newcomers that the concensus process may
have allowed them to essentially overrule the experienced people in many
cases.

In practice, the control IETF has now on this is that the IESG has the last
word, and the ISEG is nothing if not _the_ most experienced network
engineers the community has. So, in essence, they do get the last word on
quality, except the work is overwhelming them. The problem with workload can
certainly be helped by some of the proposals we're discussing in a separate
thread to use one or several review boards, but I don't think having one or
several review boards is going to help much to fast fail bad ideas. It will
help if reviews are done earlier, since the bad ideas will be detected
earlier, but that still won't prevent them from getting into the documents
in the first place, and the people who have ownership of them are going to
be just as upset when they are told by a review board that their document
isn't suitable for publication as they are now when the IESG tells them
that. Having early reviews will thus detect the problems earlier, but, as
anybody who has looked into quality control knows, the best way to doing
quality control is not to have the defects there in the first place.

Certainly, giving the WG chair or perhaps the Document Editor a filtering
role would help fast fail ideas, but it wouldn't guarantee that the ideas
which failed were bad, since many WG chairs and Document Editors are
themselves not that experienced. The IETF could up the bar on the experience
required to be a Document Editor or WG chair but then we would have to
figure out some way to get people with experience and how to get
inexperienced people to have enough experience that they would qualify (and
it seems more likely that we would get enough experienced people to
volunteer to be on a review board than to be a WG chair or Document Editor).
Also, privileging one or several people's viewpoint in the WG would
definitely be a major change to the current consensus-based decision making
process.

Perhaps the problem is self limiting, in the sense that the inexperienced
people who are in IETF may ultimately learn enough that bad ideas will stop
appearing so frequently in documents, or perhaps early review will provide
ADs with enough leverage to take action sooner and disband a WG that
consistently produces bad ideas in its documents and argues with the review
board about quality control when the review board is trying to help them
improve. In the end, maybe we are going to just have to live with IETF
standards taking longer to develop than those of other STOs, in order that
we can preserve consensus based decision making and quality review.

Does anybody else have any thoughts about how to reconcile consensus-based
decision making with failing bad ideas early?

                jak

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2004 16:42:25 -0800

> involve so many people and there is so little clarity about those

I think it would help to have a clearer set of guidelines about what is
expected from a WG chair and authors/editors. 2418 is not very clear. That
said, I think the guidelines need to be specific with respect to fostering
good WG functioning and not the kind of general "job description" guidelines
that HR departments often generate.

            jak

---

From: "David Partain (LI/EAB)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2004 08:52:08 +0100

Good Monday,

On Friday 09 January 2004 18.29, James Kempf wrote:
> distruptor appears on a mailing list. It results in lasting damage to the
> WG that can make it almost impossible to get any really good technical work
> out of it. At least, that has been my experience

Yep, I understand.  I guess I was just trying to get a feel for
whether this is a Big Deal or a corner case.  My hunch (without
any real evidence to back it) is that it's an aberration
and should be treated as one.  Aberrations should not be the
primary focus of our "policies" but rather mechanisms that are
as simple as possible should be put in place to deal with them
when they occur.  My short list was a (half-baked) attempt to
suggest an approach to the "simple as possible" bit.

Cheers,

David

-- 
Wireless Access Networks       E-mail:  [email-masked]
Ericsson Research              Tel:     +46 13 28 41 44
P.O. Box 1248                  ICQ:     175164860
SE-581 12 Linköping            Yahoo:   david_partain
Sweden                         http://linlab.ericsson.se/ietf

---

From: Alex Rousskov <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2004 10:41:29 -0700 (MST)

On Sun, 11 Jan 2004, Margaret Wasserman wrote:

> I believe that whether or not we decided to change the roles of WG
> chairs and authors/editors, we do need to better formalize and
> document the IETF leadership roles -- most notably the WG chair and
> document author/editor roles, because those roles involve so many
> people and there is so little clarity about those roles today.

I would find "better documentation" useful. As for the "better
formalize" part, I am not sure what you mean, but perhaps better
documentation will tell us what roles are too informal to be called
IETF roles (impossible to document what they really are in general).

Thanks,

Alex.

---

From: Alex Rousskov <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2004 15:43:51 -0700 (MST)

On Sun, 11 Jan 2004, James Kempf wrote:

> One of the reasons why the quality on WG documents may have declined
> so much over the last 5 years is that IETF has been getting such an
> influx of newcomers that the consensus process may have allowed them
> to essentially overrule the experienced people in many cases.

> filtering good ideas from bad tends to depend on knowledge and
> experience of people.

> the concensus process, to the extent that it doesn't privilege
> anyone's idea over others, is directly contradictory to this

> Does anybody else have any thoughts about how to reconcile
> consensus-based decision making with failing bad ideas early?

If your starting observation is that newcomers generate bad ideas that
old timers can easily spot, then the solution is trivial: restrict
vital decision making to old timers and those they trust. We already
do that at IESG level, essentially. It's easy to propagate similar
Oracle powers to experienced Chairs, for example.

This will, of course, reduce the number of newcomers who are willing
to be slaves in a volunteer organization. However, since there were
apparently no serious problems before the "influx of newcomers" you
describe, reduction in fresh blood should not be a big deal, right?

IMO, the job of oldtimers is to build an infrastructure that invites
and accommodates newcomers while _gradually_ giving them more powers
based on their _contribution_, not just "experience" as measured in
IETF years. This is an ideal, of course. You cannot have that kind of
infrastructure with a pure consensus-based process (that is why IETF
is not run by consensus throughout; we have IESG). You cannot have
that with "IETF experience rules!" process either.

Whether it makes sense to stop consensus at Chair level as opposed to
IESG level probably depends on whether we can get virtually all Chairs
to be perceived and trusted as true experts and unbiased Oracles. It
is a trust and respect that allows volunteer organizations to have a
decision making hierarchy. Can we find hundreds of genuinely trusted
and respected Chairs?

If not, then early review is the best we can do to kill bad ideas
early.

Alex.

---

From: David Meyer <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2004 15:02:32 -0800

On Sun, Jan 11, 2004 at 04:40:07PM -0800, James Kempf wrote:
>> we can preserve consensus based decision making and quality review.>
> 

	This is the crux of the problem, wouldn't you say? Oh,
	and BTW, I have seen no evidence that this problem is,
	as you say, self limiting. Quite the contrary (in some
	cases any way): we can all point to some set of some bad
	ideas that seem to have a life of their own, and continue
	to come back in new and creative forms. In many such
	cases, the experience that is gained is frequently how to
	game the system, rather than how to do produce better
	engineering. This is one of the things we watch when
	considering these proposals.

	Dave

---

From: David Meyer <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2004 15:13:16 -0800

>> 	engineering. This is one of the things we watch when

s/we watch/we need to watch/

>> 	considering these proposals.

Sorry about that

Dave

---

From: "David Partain (LI/EAB)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2004 11:36:03 +0100

Hi,

I'm going to snip liberally...

> On Sun, 11 Jan 2004, James Kempf wrote:
[snip snip]
jk> Does anybody else have any thoughts about how to reconcile
jk> consensus-based decision making with failing bad ideas early?

On Monday 12 January 2004 23.43, Alex Rousskov wrote:
[snip snip]
ar> If not, then early review is the best we can do to kill bad ideas
ar> early.

My take on this topic: Yes, we absolutely need to have some
mechanism(s) in place for early review.  This would be useful
both for pruning Bad Stuff and for improving Good Stuff.

That said, this won't be even remotely trivial.  I just don't
see how we can get away from the fact that that would require
a set of experienced people outside the WG who can provide an
"IESG-like" review at semi-regular intervals in a document's
path through the WG.  But those reviews must also have
"IESG-like" weight, or the exercise may indeed be pointless.
We seem to be loathe to giving anyone this kind of weight for
fear of introducing yet another group of IETF insiders who can
act with impunity...

Compounding the problem is that I just don't see where we'll
find all of these experienced people whose employers are willing
to sponsor this work or who're willing to read IDs instead of
reading to their kids.  I'd rather read The Cat in the Hat
anytime :-)

And then there's the A Word...  If we have the goal of killing
"bad" ideas early in the process, someone (or ones) has to have
the authority to do so, (hopefully) backed by WG concensus.
If we don't invest the reviewers with some sort of veto power,
and the WG can just tell 'em to find the nearest lake, what's
the point?  That strikes me as a collosal waste of everyone's
time.  Human nature ensures that if a review body returns
a _Bad_ verdict to a working group, they're going to put up
a fight.  "Did you call my baby ugly!? Them's fightin' words!"
It's just inevitable.  I don't have the faintest idea how to
reconcile the need for someone to say, "Stop that now!" and
the WG's concensus decision that it's great stuff.

So, I'd love to see early review, but ...

Who will a working group listen to?  They currently must
listen to the IESG.  Is the IETF willing to invest reviewers
with similar weight?

Where are these fabled reviewers?  Does nomcom have to find
them?  Do they volunteer and go through a screening process?  Can
they be "fired"?

What do we do if the WG refuses to acknowledge that an idea is
"bad" and forges ahead?  Won't that likely mean it'll just get
bounced back by the IESG?

  - Do we say, "Appeal to the IESG"?  My guess is that this
    will happen _every single time_.  That's not suddenly
    going to lighten the load of an AD...

  - Do we add a note to their IESG file saying "This WG is doing
    stupid stuff but won't listen to us.  You get to deal with it
    when it gets to you."?  That strikes me as pretty pointless.

What role do(es) the chair(s) have in all of this?  Are they
simply the messenger between the reviewers and the working
group?  The advocate of the consensus decision?

To reiterate:  I think we need this.  I just don't know if we
(the IETF) are willing to do what it seems to imply -- give
someone besides the IESG veto power.

Cheers,

David

---

From: John C Klensin <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2004 08:34:00 -0500

Harald,

--On Friday, 09 January, 2004 15:25 -0800 Harald Tveit 
Alvestrand <[email-masked]> wrote:

> - Declare that from March 1(?), in all WGs with the first
> letter from A to K, the new ruleset applies; in WGs from L to
> Z, the old rule of IESG decision applies.
> That should give us some real data - or some real data saying
> that this isn't a problem......

I'd add two things to your list, which I consider fairly 
important:

	(1) A request to the WG participants for input on
	whether they feel happier or unhappier with the changes
	in place, with "happier" specifically focused on "feel
	that the WG is more effective", "feel that it is easier
	to contribute", "feel that the S/N ratio in the WG's
	discussions is better", etc., and "unhappier" including
	the opposite of these.   We shouldn't just be asking the
	Chairs about impacts.
	
	(2) A mechanism for early discontinuance of the
	"experiment" if there are severe and obvious
	consequences.  While I personally think that is
	unlikely, if the process led to a lot of appeals with
	which the IESG agreed, it would be time to immediately
	stop, and either give it up or readjust the rules in
	some fashion.

Using the mailing list management situation as an example, I 
would consider "fewer disruptions than before and an improved 
S/N ratio" to make the procedural change a wild success.   But 
it would give zero data under your proposal and, indeed, under 
that proposal as written, might convince people that there was 
no problem, since no one was removed nor was there the strong 
temptation to remove anyone.  Similarly, I would consider 
"warned someone in private and they decided to behave, where 
previous warnings had been unheeded" to be a sign of huge 
success, and your list of questions is unlikely to capture that 
one either.

        john

<tirade>
p.s. To anyone inclined to raise the "it isn't really an 
experiment, since there is no design control group and no 
placebo" argument, please give it a rest.  I am _not_ singling 
anyone out here -- that comment is made by someone, usually 
someone different, every time someone uses the word "experiment" 
around the IETF.  Virtually any experiment (e.g., a change in 
the rules with a monitored and evaluated outcome) on a 
social/behavioral system requires working with the subjective 
evaluations of participants and/or observers as to what 
happened.  If you exclude anything that is not subject to a 
carefully managed cross-plot or split-plot design, or even 
everything on which no exogeneous variates can unexpectedly 
occur in the system, then there are no experiments except in 
agriculture, and fewer of those than is generally believed.  In 
more careful designs than I am suggesting above (because I don't 
think the design and implementation time is justified), there 
are sometimes-complex techniques to lay a basis for comparing 
pre- and post-test opinions but they still don't involve design 
control groups or placebo controls.  The latter, in their purest 
form, are applicable only if _all_ variation not measured by the 
experiment can be excluded and that is, in practice, nearly 
impossible (double-blind placebo-based tests are just intended 
to minimize the most obvious causes).

If you need some really good examples from the "experimental" 
literature, read some of the papers evaluating treatments the 
claim to reduce perceived pain levels.  Then, for a change in 
pace, read Wittgenstein's discussions on how someone accurately 
communicates levels of pain to someone else.

I try to discourage my statistician colleagues who are not 
trained in network design from doing their own networks, and 
believe that this community should return the favor.
</tirade>

---

From: Eric Rosen <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2004 11:03:24 -0500

> It is possible (in fact, I have seen it happen in WGs) where a
> so the WG chair has no choice but to call consensus for the bad idea, or let
> they do), thus delaying the standard. 

I certainly  agree that  this is a  very significant  problem.  A WG  can be
packed with folks  who barely know what  IP is, and it is  difficult for the
chair to say  "your opinions don't carry much weight  because you don't know
what you are talking about."

> engineers the community has. 

Unfortunately, this  part is baloney.   Members of the IESG  have frequently
expressed  contempt  for  certain   WGs,  even  if  positions  of  technical
leadership in those  WGS are held by folks whose ideas  have been helping to
shape the Internet for over 20 years.  

What's  needed is some  way to  interpret "consensus"  as "consensus  of the
clueful", where  "clueful" means "has  expertise in the field",  rather than
"agrees with me".

Most of  the arguments about whether  WG chairs should  be further empowered
are really  arguments about whether the  chairs can be  trusted to interpret
"consensus" properly.

---

From: Alex Rousskov <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2004 13:49:18 -0700 (MST)

On Tue, 13 Jan 2004, David Partain (LI/EAB) wrote:

> Who will a working group listen to?

From process point of view, the working group does not have to listen
to any reviewer. They can, technically, mark each submitted review
with "we disagree" and let IESG resolve all the conflicts.

> They currently must listen to the IESG.  Is the IETF willing to
> invest reviewers with similar weight?

IETF should be willing and able to design exit criteria that allow
some documents to get published without IESG involvement. This does
not assign same weight to reviewers as to IESG, but it does assign
some weight.

In other words, reviewers can "clear" a document (if all reviewers and
the WG agrees and there is sufficient coverage). However, reviewers
cannot kill the document. Only IESG can.

> them?  Do they volunteer and go through a screening process?  Can

This is where proposals differ a lot. I advocate an open pool of
volunteers without a special screening process, but with "trusted by
AD", "trusted by IESG" or similar flags that are assigned to _some_
fabled reviewers by ADs, IESG, etc.

> "bad" and forges ahead?

Wait for IESG to decide. It would be nice to design some procedure for
IESG to decide sooner (early) rather than at PS stage.

> Won't that likely mean it'll just get bounced back by the IESG?

Yes, it is likely. However, we can only have a single vetoing entity
for each document. Having two vetoing entities (one for each document
category or whatever) seems too complicated to me. So IESG remains the
final conflict resolution entity.

> What role do(es) the chair(s) have in all of this?  Are they simply
> the messenger between the reviewers and the working group?  The
> advocate of the consensus decision?

The chair has no special role in this process, IMO. I do not see a
need for messenger here. If there is a human messenger, we need to
care about the message integrity and delivery.

Instead, each document has a single point of contact: a dedicated WG
e-mail address (or author's address for individual submissions).
Notification of submitted reviews or any status changes are
automatically sent to that address.

> To reiterate:  I think we need this.  I just don't know if we (the
> IETF) are willing to do what it seems to imply -- give someone
> besides the IESG veto power.

I do not think review implies that reviewer has a veto power. A
reviewer is an analyst or an advisor. A reviewer does not have to be a
decision maker.

Alex.

---

From: James M Galvin <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2004 13:46:39 -0500 (EST)

I'm replying to the first message in this thread but I have kept up with
the discussion to date.

There is one point that has not been made in this discussion far.
Personally, I believe a Working Group Chair should have the authority to
revoke posting privileges and further believe they would have it if it
was not explicitly assigned to the IESG by documented procedures.

I say this because I view a mailing list as an extension of a meeting,
if not as a meeting itself.  In a physical meeting a Chair is well
within their authority to have a disruptive participant removed.  Most
working groups are not run strictly according to Robert's Rules of Order
but it seems pretty straightforward to me.

The "check" in a physical meeting is the person won't be removed if the
Chair does not get the support of the other participants.  The balance
is a person can always appeal to the AD/IESG.

So why should it be any different for a mailing list?  Do we really need
to document this?

I agree.  If there's a process at all I can see a fairly lightweight
documentation of a process:

1. one private warning
2. one public warning
3. revocation of privilege

Perhaps the public warning needs to stand for a week before the posting
is actually revoked.  This ensures that if the community disagrees with
the revocation there is sufficient time to comment.

I can also imagine an escalating revocation period, perhaps a week to
start, then a month, then 3 months, then 6 months, and then a year.  But
perhaps too short a period will make it used too quickly and too often
so we should start with a month or three.  This can certainly be
discussed further.

And a participant who has had posting privileges revoked can always
appeal to the relevant AD.  The AD should have the authority to act
without the full consensus of the IESG.  I think this is important only
because the IESG may need at least 2 weeks to formally react at all.

And the basis for revoking posting privileges should be "obvious when it
is present."  Someone objected to that characterization but I think it
is just fine.  The working group has a charter and there is a reasonable
understanding and expectation of forward progress and what it means.  If
a working group agrees with the Chair I don't see a serious problem.

And there is always the appeal.

I don't believe an experiment would be useful.  I just don't believe
there will be enough data points to make it useful.

I suggest we simply start with a fairly simple process and procedures
and incrementally revise it as needed.  The most important thing we need
is the understanding that revoking posting privileges is a legitimate
implementation of a reaction to disruptive individuals.  That's all.  A
Chair's job is to run a meeting and revoking posting privileges is not
much different than withholding the microphone or "revoking the floor."

Keep in mind a person can always get their input heard.  As has been
pointed out elsewhere they can still read the messages, check out the
archive, and send private messages to whoever they want.  This is no
different than being banned from a physical meeting and needing to talk
one-on-one with other participants about your point of view.

Jim

---

From: "Spencer Dawkins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2004 21:33:24 -0600

If a tirade is completely correct and justified, is it still a tirade?

Spencer, who does have a masters degree in a quantitative social
science and very little urge to exercise that side of my brain in the
IETF...

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "John C Klensin" <[email-masked]>
To: "Harald Tveit Alvestrand" <[email-masked]>; "Pekka Savola"
<[email-masked]>
Cc: <[email-masked]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 13, 2004 7:34 AM
Subject: Re: [mpowr] Experiment design

---

From: Mark Allman <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2004 09:19:58 -0500

David-

You definately raise a whole lot of good questions (probably better
suited for ICAR, but...).  Thanks!

But, I want to say a few words about this...

> "IESG-like" weight, or the exercise may indeed be pointless.

I am not sure I agree with this...

  * First, if the WG and the reviewers are 180-degrees different in
    their thinking then it would seem as if the WG chair could
    reasonably say that there is no consensus.  That would assume that
    the reviewers would then work closely with the WG to fix things (or,
    they wouldn't be part of the WG consensus determination).  That may
    or may not happen -- sort of depends on what the early review
    mechanism looks like.

  * Given a high quality review team it would seem as though the WG
    would ignore the reviewers at their own peril.  Take a hot-button
    sort of issue like congestion control.  If the reviewers said "hey,
    you need some congestion control or this won't fly" (with a few more
    words, etc.) and the WG says "nope, we don't want it, we don't need
    it, we can't have it" and the consensus of the WG is to forward the
    document to the IESG then it isn't a "late surprise", rather it's a
    "late problem" of the WG's creation when the IESG sends the document
    back.  I would think that when the WG and the reviewers are
    completely at odds it could be the WG chair's job to try to work
    through the issues.  (Maybe bring in more reviewers or bring in an
    AD or IAB member or other senior IETFer to try to explain the
    rational behind some objection (e.g., "must have CC").  It would
    behoove the WG to work with the reviewers in the long run, I think.
    (And, yes, sometimes that is going to be tough for the WG to
    understand.) 

  * If the WG is stubborn and shoots the document to the IESG anyway
    then the early review doesn't necessarily help with the "IESG
    overload" problem.  But, it seems that early
    cross-area/functional/whatever review could well present
    opportunities to work out issues earlier rather than later.  And,
    WGs (and, specifically, WG chairs) should be wise enough to attempt
    to work through the issues and not just say "we disagree".

  * In the blatant cases where the WG chair does not try to work through
    the issues then the IESG overload problem can be helped by the IESG
    replacing the WG chair.
    
Maybe we are thinking about authority a little to much.  Maybe we should
be thinking in terms of collaboration and seeing how far that will take
us (a theme others have raised repeatedly).

allman

--
Mark Allman -- ICIR -- http://www.icir.org/mallman/

---

From: "Spencer Dawkins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2004 21:12:22 -0600

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Mark Allman" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Cc: <[email-masked]>
Sent: Tuesday, January 20, 2004 8:19 AM
Subject: Re: [mpowr] Re: Getting Bad Ideas to Fail Early

>     (And, yes, sometimes that is going to be tough for the WG to

See, the thing is, reviewers are people, too. Do high quality
reviewers need "help"? As Mark points out, if you have people standing
in meetings and on mailing lists saying "this is wrong, this needs
help, this is misguided...", the WG does not have consensus, even if
all the people saying this are "new". The IETF doesn't have
membership, and IETF WGs don't have membership. When we act like the
reviewers are "outsiders", it seems to me that we go off in the weeds
and try to figure out ways to make insiders pay attention to
outsiders, whether they want to or not.

But it's not about insiders paying attention to outsiders, it's about
listening to people who are willing to help, if you'll only listen.

>     to work through the issues and not just say "we disagree".

This WG chair behavior is key.

> us (a theme others have raised repeatedly).

I think this is absolutely correct. I don't know why it seems more
obvious tonight than previously.

I like the mailing list name (although having the "m" stand for
"management" is wrong), but it feels like we're slipping away from
"empower" and into "power", and we just don't seem to work effectively
when it's a power issuee.

---

From: "David Partain (LI/EAB)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2004 12:31:32 +0100

Greetings,

Apologies for my silence...

I recognize that this has morphed into an icar discussion.
Perhaps we should move this thread there.  I've tried to cut out
stuff where I didn't really have any more to say.

> with "we disagree" and let IESG resolve all the conflicts.

This is certainly one world view.  Another possible world view is
that the IETF decides to create a review process that a WG must
listen to.  Yet another world view is that we should depend upon
WGs to do the Right Thing in dealing with constructive criticism
and take the proper technical decision.  I'm sure there are a
plethora of other possibilities as well.

> some documents to get published without IESG involvement.

Why is that the case?  I'm unconvinced that that would be a good
thing.

> cannot kill the document. Only IESG can.

Again, isn't that what has to be decided?  I'm unconvinced one
way or another.  I see real value in "review early, review often"
and with a sledgehammer that can be 

One of my big concerns, however, is that I very seriously doubt
that there are going to be very many cases where reviewers are
going to be able to point to clear "principles of the Internet"
in using their sledgehammer.  I suspect that those wanting to
weild a sledgehammer are going to want to do so more because of
gut reactions, some overriding sense of unease.  I'm certain that
they'll be able to point out technical reasons, but I don't know
if it'll be possible to point to particular clauses in our
ephemeral Internet architecture.

> IESG to decide sooner (early) rather than at PS stage.

Might be a very good idea, but at the risk of making them
interrupt driven, which I personally find to be a hard way
to work.

Cheers,

David

---

From: "David Partain (LI/EAB)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2004 15:38:06 +0100

Hi all,

Thanks, Mark, for your answer.

On Tuesday 20 January 2004 15.19, Mark Allman wrote:
>     reasonably say that there is no consensus.

Agreed.  What happens after that is what's interesting.

>     That would assume that

Doesn't this (getting consensus) working assume (at least)
two things?  1. the working group has some reason to respect the
opinion (good people, history, quality of remarks, obviousness
of the problems they point out) and (2) the working group
isn't stacked with folks who have An Agenda that precludes
listening to criticism.  Not that _that_ would ever happen...

I _would love_ for things to work this way.  I fear, though,
that calling someone's baby ugly is invariably going to result
in a defensive posture.

>     would ignore the reviewers at their own peril.

Fair enough.  Perhaps a mechanism requiring review reports to go
to the IESG _as well as_ the WG would provide the necessary heads
up that something's amiss?

>     I would think that when the WG and the reviewers are
>     through the issues.

This isn't really that different from dealing with significant
conflicts within the WG constituency, is it?

>     (Maybe bring in more reviewers or bring in an

I think you and I agree.  Perhaps, though, a formalization of the
communication between the WG and reviewers which includes the
IESG in the loop -- without necessarily requiring that they _do_
something -- would be sufficient to make external reviews useful.

>     to work through the issues and not just say "we disagree".

If nothing else, it provides the IESG with some external "hard
facts", which are not always available to a sufficient extent
today (as I understand it).

> us (a theme others have raised repeatedly).

You cannot imagine how much I hope the result of this work is
exactly that -- a refinement / clarification of the consensus
process rather than an introduction of chains of authority.
Our consensus tradition is absolutely one of the strengths
of the IETF.  However, I fear for the long-term health of our
current system.

The source of my anxiety is more sociological than anything
else.  A consensus-driven process thrives in a setting where
there's a common set of values, where people "just know"
how things are done and don't violate these unwritten rules.
I live in a society (Sweden) where this is exactly the case
and things work relatively smoothly.  The crunch comes when the
homogeneity of the society is altered (as is happening here and
in the IETF now) and those common values cease to be as clear
to everyone.  This certainly has thrown things off kilter in
the IETF and I'm worried that any attempt to codify the "common
values" and "unwritten rules" is going to be very difficult.
I guess we'll all find out.

But now I'm babbling, so I'll move on...

Wishing you all a good weekend,

David

---

From: "James Kempf" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2004 13:57:28 -0800

David,

I think we need to make a distinction between the IESG approving publishing
a document, as currently, and a change where an individual AD could approve
a document. I can see a process where, if the reviews come in good and the
WG agrees to make any proposed changes, an individual AD is allowed to
simply approve publication without requiring the entire IESG to review or
even to have to read the reviewers comments. This could save the IESG a lot
of work. I can't see a case where the document gets approved automatically
without the AD's involvement. I believe there will always be an element of
judgement in deciding whether the reviews were adequate, the WG's response
was appropriate, etc. that one would want to have a knowledgable human in
the loop for publication approval.

            jak