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From: Vincent Roca <vincent.roca@inria.fr>
In-Reply-To: <7CD270C5-2E9F-45A5-B434-8A4EB6146C24@cisco.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2014 19:27:18 +0100
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References: <3CB35FCD-F9EA-4361-B290-3CBBE087C3B8@cisco.com> <5C96E649-6CF5-450E-9787-2C51D76DF2A5@cisco.com> <E6C9F0E527F94F4692731382340B3378025AA7@DENBGAT9EH2MSX.ww902.siemens.net> <E6C9F0E527F94F4692731382340B3378029F9D@DEFTHW99EH4MSX.ww902.siemens.net> <7CD270C5-2E9F-45A5-B434-8A4EB6146C24@cisco.com>
To: Brian Weis <bew@cisco.com>
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Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/msec/z9ePb0KSF5uS6B9N8oURXEpeFg4
Cc: msec@ietf.org, Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [MSEC] Review comments, was RE:  GDOI support for IEC 62351
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Hi Brian,

I finally gave a look at the document (draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9-03).
Here are my comments:
    =20
Section 2.2.  SA TEK Payload
----------------------------

** typo:
An GDOI_PROTO_IEC_61850 SA TEK includes =3D> A GDOI_PROTO_IEC_61850 SA =
TEK includes
                                           ^^
** typo:
represents a SPI =3D> represents an SPI
                               ^^
(there are many occurrences of "a SPI", is it volontary?)

** typo:
are define in Section 2.2. =3D> are defined in Section 2.2.X
                                       ^^
(several occurrences)
     =20
** There is a window of 2 keys (CK and NK). Each of them have timing =
values, representing
their validity time till it needs to be updated. As I understand, the CK =
will take the
value of the NK upon CK expiration. Potentially, the CK/NK timing values =
can be different.
Is it an issue (e.g. if the NK remaining lifetime is < CK remaining =
lifetime, the NK must
be updated before the CK) ? I imagine this is discussed elsewhere. A =
note might be useful.
    =20
Section 2.3:
------------             =20

** incoherencies:
there are several occurences of "KD payload", whereas it is written "Key =
Download Payload" elsewhere.
Also, section 1.3 mentions:
   KD    Key Download Payload
i.e. includes the payload in the KD acronym definition.

** Typo: "The KD TYPE MUST be TEK" =3D> "The KD Type MUST be TEK"
                                              ^^^^
  =20
** Fig 6: The figure mentions "KD Length", but this is a Key Packet.
Should it be the "Key Packet Length" instead?

Appendix A:
-----------

** I find it strange to provide actual field payloads, without =
respecting the field size. E.g.:
	OID=3D<06 0B 2A 86 48 CE 56 83 E3 1A 08 01 02>
is 13 byte long if I understand correctly, but in the figure, it only =
spans 3 bytes.
Same remark for the OID SP=3D<DER for 233.252.0.1> field.   =20

BTW, these figures are not numbered which makes it more complicated to =
reference them.

** I was also wondering if there are alignment requirements. In theory =
no as there is
no padding field. I haven't seen any note for this, whereas all figures =
are presented in
such a way that 16-bit fields are correctly aligned. A note could be =
added to section B.1.
  =20
** Fig p.19:=20
typo: There is a trailing "2" character in "RESERVED2".


Cheers,

   Vincent


Le 13 f=E9vr. 2014 =E0 23:20, Brian Weis a =E9crit :

> Hi Steffen,
>=20
> Many thanks for your comments on this draft. We have published a =
revised draft that I believe addresses each of your comments below.
> 	<http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9/>
> Let us know if you have any further comments.
>=20
> Thanks,
> Brian
>=20
> On Aug 6, 2013, at 11:10 PM, "Fries, Steffen" =
<steffen.fries@siemens.com> wrote:
>=20
>> Hi Brian,
>>=20
>> While re-reading my message I realized that I was only focused on the =
content review, not thinking about the embedding. The support IEC 62351 =
in GDOI payloads really helps in securing GOOSE and SV. In IEC TC 57 WG =
15 we discussed different approaches of securing this type of =
communication and the group-based approach based on GDOI was the one =
that coped best with the requirements. Hence, having this draft ensures =
the applicability within IEC 62351 by providing the required additional =
payloads.
>> Sorry for not mentioning that in the first place.
>>=20
>> Regards
>> 	Steffen
>>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: msec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:msec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Fries, Steffen
>> Sent: Dienstag, 6. August 2013 10:35
>> To: Brian Weis; msec@ietf.org
>> Cc: draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9@tools.ietf.org; Sean Turner
>> Subject: [MSEC] Review comments, was RE: GDOI support for IEC 62351
>>=20
>> Hi Brian,
>>=20
>> Thank you for compiling the draft. Meanwhile I had the chance to =
review the current draft. Most of the comments I have are actually more =
editorial nits than technical.
>>=20
>> Title: IEC 62351 Security Protocol support for GDOI
>> - After reading the document I would propose to change the title into =
"GDOI enhancements supporting IEC 62351 Security Mechanisms". The reason =
is that the payloads enhancements are defined for GDOI and are applied =
within IEC 62351. But maybe that is philosophical.
>>=20
>> Section 1.Introduction (page 3)
>> - In the first paragraph I would suggest to add the following =
sentence:
>> "The protection of the frames is defined within IEC 62351-6."
>>=20
>> - Last paragraph (page 3):
>> /r "This document defines GDOI payloads to distribute policy and =
keying
>>  material for IEC 61850, and defines the necessary information to
>>  ensure interoperability between IEC 61850 implementations."
>> /w "This document defines GDOI payloads to distribute policy and =
keying
>>  material to protect IEC 61850 data exchanges, and defines the =
necessary information to
>>  ensure interoperability between IEC 61850 implementations."
>>=20
>> Section 1.1 (page 4)
>> - two abbreviations are missing:
>> - CK	Current Key
>> - NK 	Next Key
>>=20
>> Section 2 (page 5)
>> - I would suggest adding one sentence stating, which payloads are =
being defined for IEC 61850 protection. All in all we have definitions =
for ID, SA TEK, and the KD payloads. To be frank, I wasn't quite sure, =
if it makes also sense to spent a subsection on the Security Association =
Payload more or less just stating that it is always used with "SA =
Attribute NP" set to 16 (SA TEK) as stated in the example in Appendix A.=20=

>>=20
>> Section 2.2 (page 7)
>> - Bullet list below figure 4
>> /r "OIDs defined in IEC 61850 declare the type of traffic to be =
encrypted."
>> /w "OIDs defined in IEC 61850 declare the type of traffic to be =
protected."=20
>> The application of the key material is defined in IEC 61850-90-5 (and =
will be included in IEC 62351-6)=20
>> and may be used for integrity protection and/or confidentiality =
protection.
>>=20
>> Section 2.2.3 (page 9)
>> - There are two confidentiality algorithms defined. Both are AES-CBC =
with different key length.
>> IEC 61850-90-5 specifies AES-GCM with the two stated key length. This =
should be double checked.
>>=20
>> Section 2.3  (page 10)
>> - There are two attributes for the TEK key:=20
>> - TEK_INTEGRITY_KEY if the key is associated with an IEC 61850-90-5 =
defined integrity algorithm=20
>> - TEK_ALGORITHM_KEY if the key is associated with an IEC 61850-90-5 =
defined confidentiality algorithm
>> I would suggest to rename the TEK_ALGORITHM_KEY to =
TEK_CONFIDENTIALITY_KEY to have the same association.
>>=20
>> Annex A (page 18)
>> - caption of figure states "Sample IEC-61850 SA  Payload" -> should =
this be enhanced to "Sample IEC-61850 SA  and SA TEK Payload"?
>>=20
>> Annex A (page 19)
>> - I calculated the KD Length of SPI=3D1 in the example to 62 =
(TEK_INTEGRITY_KEY, TEK_ALGORITHM_KEY, and the header). Currently 30 is =
stated. This should be verified.
>>=20
>> Okay so far for the review. As I said, mostly editorial.
>>=20
>> Regards
>> 	Steffen =20
>>=20
>> Steffen Fries
>> Siemens AG
>> Corporate Technology
>> CT RTC ITS
>> Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
>> 81739 Muenchen, Germany
>> Tel: +49 89 636-53403
>> Fax: +49 89 636-48000
>> mailto:steffen.fries@siemens.com
>>=20
>> Siemens Aktiengesellschaft: Chairman of the Supervisory Board: =
Gerhard Cromme; Managing Board: Joe Kaeser, Chairman, President and =
Chief Executive Officer; Roland Busch, Brigitte Ederer, Klaus Helmrich, =
Barbara Kux, Hermann Requardt, Siegfried Russwurm, Peter Y. Solmssen, =
Michael Suess; Registered offices: Berlin and Munich, Germany; =
Commercial registries: Berlin Charlottenburg, HRB 12300, Munich, HRB =
6684; WEEE-Reg.-No. DE 23691322=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: msec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:msec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Brian Weis
>> Sent: Freitag, 2. August 2013 21:28
>> To: msec@ietf.org
>> Cc: draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9@tools.ietf.org; Sean Turner
>> Subject: Re: [MSEC] GDOI support for IEC 62351
>>=20
>> Folks,
>>=20
>> Sean had some good feedback, and there is a new version now: =
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9-02>. GDOI =
implementers should note that both RFC 3547 and RFC 6407 relied upon the =
ID Types defined in the IPsec DOI, which wasn't quite the right thing to =
do. So please note that Section 4 (IANA Considerations) now adds a =
registry of ID types for the GDOI DOI. This came about because this I-D =
adds a new value.
>>=20
>> The GDOI DOI list of ID Types is copy-and-paste from the IPsec DOI, =
plus the new ID type added. So all of the old values are still valid, =
they are just administratively defined in the GDOI IANA registry now =
rather than the IPsec registry. This should not have a negative effect =
on implementations but it's worth pointing out.
>>=20
>> Comments on the Internet-Draft are still requested.
>>=20
>> Thanks,
>> Brian=20
>>=20
>> On Jul 23, 2013, at 1:56 AM, Brian Weis <bew@cisco.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>> Greetings,
>>>=20
>>> The IEC 62351 power utility automation standards group has chosen to =
use GDOI (RFC 6407) as their key management method to distribute group =
keys. The keys protect multicast traffic streams sent by devices =
monitoring the power grid, and other multicast streams as well. To do =
this they require some new GDOI payloads. This message is an invitation =
to review and comment on the new definitions, which are defined in =
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9-01>. Since the =
MSEC WG is not currently active, we hope to progress the draft as an =
individual submission soon and would appreciate any feedback. If you =
have comments, please post them to the MSEC list (msec@ietf.org) or send =
them to the authors (draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9@tools.ietf.org).=20
>>>=20
>>> Thanks,
>>> Brian=20
>>>=20
>>> --=20
>>> Brian Weis
>>> Security, Enterprise Networking Group, Cisco Systems
>>> Telephone: +1 408 526 4796
>>> Email: bew@cisco.com
>>>=20
>>=20
>> --=20
>> Brian Weis
>> Security, Enterprise Networking Group, Cisco Systems
>> Telephone: +1 408 526 4796
>> Email: bew@cisco.com
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> MSEC mailing list
>> MSEC@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/msec
>> _______________________________________________
>> MSEC mailing list
>> MSEC@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/msec
>=20
> --=20
> Brian Weis
> Security, Enterprise Networking Group, Cisco Systems
> Telephone: +1 408 526 4796
> Email: bew@cisco.com
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> MSEC mailing list
> MSEC@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/msec


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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">Hi =
Brian,<div><br></div><div>I finally gave a look at the document =
(draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9-03).</div><div>Here are my =
comments:</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;</div><div><font =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"'Courier New'">Section 2.2. &nbsp;SA =
TEK Payload<br>----------------------------<br><br>** typo:<br>An =
GDOI_PROTO_IEC_61850 SA TEK includes =3D&gt; A GDOI_PROTO_IEC_61850 SA =
TEK includes<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;^^<br>** typo:<br>represents a SPI =3D&gt; =
represents an SPI<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp;^^<br>(there are many occurrences of "a SPI", is it =
volontary?)<br></font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
face=3D"'Courier New'"><br></font></div><div><font =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"'Courier New'">** typo:<br>are define =
in Section 2.2. =3D&gt; are defined in Section 2.2.X<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;^^<br>(several =
occurrences)<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<br>** There is a window of 2 =
keys (CK and NK). Each of them have timing values, =
representing</font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
face=3D"'Courier New'">their validity time till it needs to be =
updated.&nbsp;As I understand, the CK will take =
the</font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"'Courier =
New'">value of the NK upon CK expiration. Potentially, the CK/NK timing =
values can be different.</font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span"=
 face=3D"'Courier New'">Is it&nbsp;</font><span class=3D"Apple-style-span"=
 style=3D"font-family: 'Courier New'; ">an issue&nbsp;(e.g. if the NK =
remaining lifetime is &lt; CK remaining lifetime, the NK =
must</span></div><div><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
style=3D"font-family: 'Courier New'; ">be&nbsp;</span><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: 'Courier New'; =
">updated before the CK) ? I imagine this is discussed elsewhere. A note =
might be useful</span><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
style=3D"font-family: 'Courier New'; ">.</span></div><div><font =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"'Courier New'">&nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp;<br>Section 2.3:<br>------------&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<br><br>** incoherencies:<br>there are several =
occurences of "KD payload", whereas it is written "Key Download Payload" =
elsewhere.<br>Also, section 1.3 mentions:<br>&nbsp; &nbsp;KD &nbsp; =
&nbsp;Key Download Payload<br>i.e. includes the payload in the KD =
acronym definition.<br><br>** Typo: "The KD TYPE MUST be TEK" =3D&gt; =
"The KD Type MUST be TEK"<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; ^^^^<br>&nbsp; =
&nbsp;<br>** Fig 6: The figure mentions "KD Length", but this is a Key =
Packet.<br>Should it be the "Key Packet Length" instead?<br><br>Appendix =
A:<br>-----------<br><br>** I find it strange to provide actual field =
payloads, without respecting the field size.&nbsp;E.g.:<br><span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>OID=3D&lt;06 0B 2A 86 48 CE 56 83 E3 1A 08 01 02&gt;<br>is 13 =
byte long if I understand correctly, but in the figure, it only spans 3 =
bytes.<br>Same remark for the OID SP=3D&lt;DER for 233.252.0.1&gt; =
field.&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;<br><br>BTW, these figures are not numbered =
which makes it more complicated to reference them.<br><br>** I was also =
wondering if there are alignment requirements. In theory no as there =
is<br>no padding field. I haven't seen any note for this, whereas all =
figures are presented in<br>such a way that 16-bit fields are correctly =
aligned. A note could be added to&nbsp;section B.1.<br>&nbsp; =
&nbsp;<br>** Fig p.19:&nbsp;<br>typo: There is a trailing "2" character =
in =
"RESERVED2".</font><br><br></div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div><br=
></div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;Vincent</div><div><br><div =
apple-content-edited=3D"true"><br></div><div><div>Le 13 f=E9vr. 2014 =E0 =
23:20, Brian Weis a =E9crit :</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div>Hi =
Steffen,<br><br>Many thanks for your comments on this draft. We have =
published a revised draft that I believe addresses each of your comments =
below.<br><span class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>&lt;<a =
href=3D"http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9/">http:=
//datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9/</a>&gt;<br>Let us =
know if you have any further comments.<br><br>Thanks,<br>Brian<br><br>On =
Aug 6, 2013, at 11:10 PM, "Fries, Steffen" &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:steffen.fries@siemens.com">steffen.fries@siemens.com</a>&gt=
; wrote:<br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">Hi =
Brian,<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">While =
re-reading my message I realized that I was only focused on the content =
review, not thinking about the embedding. The support IEC 62351 in GDOI =
payloads really helps in securing GOOSE and SV. In IEC TC 57 WG 15 we =
discussed different approaches of securing this type of communication =
and the group-based approach based on GDOI was the one that coped best =
with the requirements. Hence, having this draft ensures the =
applicability within IEC 62351 by providing the required additional =
payloads.<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Sorry for not =
mentioning that in the first place.<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Regards<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	=
</span>Steffen<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">-----Original =
Message-----<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">From: <a =
href=3D"mailto:msec-bounces@ietf.org">msec-bounces@ietf.org</a> =
[mailto:msec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Fries, =
Steffen<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Sent: Dienstag, 6. =
August 2013 10:35<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">To: Brian =
Weis; <a =
href=3D"mailto:msec@ietf.org">msec@ietf.org</a><br></blockquote><blockquot=
e type=3D"cite">Cc: <a =
href=3D"mailto:draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9@tools.ietf.org">draft-weis-gdoi-=
iec62351-9@tools.ietf.org</a>; Sean Turner<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Subject: [MSEC] Review comments, was RE: GDOI support for =
IEC 62351<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Hi =
Brian,<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Thank you for =
compiling the draft. Meanwhile I had the chance to review the current =
draft. Most of the comments I have are actually more editorial nits than =
technical.<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Title: IEC =
62351 Security Protocol support for GDOI<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">- After reading the document I would propose to change the =
title into "GDOI enhancements supporting IEC 62351 Security Mechanisms". =
The reason is that the payloads enhancements are defined for GDOI and =
are applied within IEC 62351. But maybe that is =
philosophical.<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Section =
1.Introduction (page 3)<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">- In =
the first paragraph I would suggest to add the following =
sentence:<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"> "The protection of =
the frames is defined within IEC 62351-6."<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">- Last =
paragraph (page 3):<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"> /r "This =
document defines GDOI payloads to distribute policy and =
keying<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"> &nbsp;material for IEC =
61850, and defines the necessary information =
to<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"> &nbsp;ensure =
interoperability between IEC 61850 =
implementations."<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"> /w "This =
document defines GDOI payloads to distribute policy and =
keying<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"> &nbsp;material to =
protect IEC 61850 data exchanges, and defines the necessary information =
to<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"> &nbsp;ensure =
interoperability between IEC 61850 =
implementations."<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Section 1.1 =
(page 4)<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">- two abbreviations =
are missing:<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"> - CK<span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>Current =
Key<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"> - NK <span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>Next =
Key<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote=
 type=3D"cite">Section 2 (page 5)<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">- I would suggest adding one sentence stating, which =
payloads are being defined for IEC 61850 protection. All in all we have =
definitions for ID, SA TEK, and the KD payloads. To be frank, I wasn't =
quite sure, if it makes also sense to spent a subsection on the Security =
Association Payload more or less just stating that it is always used =
with "SA Attribute NP" set to 16 (SA TEK) as stated in the example in =
Appendix A. <br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Section 2.2 =
(page 7)<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">- Bullet list below =
figure 4<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"> /r "OIDs defined in =
IEC 61850 declare the type of traffic to be =
encrypted."<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"> /w "OIDs defined =
in IEC 61850 declare the type of traffic to be protected." =
<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"> The application of the key =
material is defined in IEC 61850-90-5 (and will be included in IEC =
62351-6) <br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"> and may be used for =
integrity protection and/or confidentiality =
protection.<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Section 2.2.3 =
(page 9)<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">- There are two =
confidentiality algorithms defined. Both are AES-CBC with different key =
length.<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"> IEC 61850-90-5 =
specifies AES-GCM with the two stated key length. This should be double =
checked.<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Section 2.3 =
&nbsp;(page 10)<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">- There are =
two attributes for the TEK key: <br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"> - TEK_INTEGRITY_KEY if the key is associated with an IEC =
61850-90-5 defined integrity algorithm <br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"> - TEK_ALGORITHM_KEY if the key is associated with an IEC =
61850-90-5 defined confidentiality algorithm<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"> I would suggest to rename the TEK_ALGORITHM_KEY to =
TEK_CONFIDENTIALITY_KEY to have the same =
association.<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Annex A (page =
18)<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">- caption of figure states =
"Sample IEC-61850 SA &nbsp;Payload" -&gt; should this be enhanced to =
"Sample IEC-61850 SA &nbsp;and SA TEK =
Payload"?<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Annex A (page =
19)<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">- I calculated the KD =
Length of SPI=3D1 in the example to 62 (TEK_INTEGRITY_KEY, =
TEK_ALGORITHM_KEY, and the header). Currently 30 is stated. This should =
be verified.<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Okay so far for =
the review. As I said, mostly editorial.<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Regards<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><span =
class=3D"Apple-tab-span" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span>Steffen =
&nbsp;<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Steffen =
Fries<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Siemens =
AG<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Corporate =
Technology<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">CT RTC =
ITS<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Otto-Hahn-Ring =
6<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">81739 Muenchen, =
Germany<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Tel: +49 89 =
636-53403<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Fax: +49 89 =
636-48000<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><a =
href=3D"mailto:steffen.fries@siemens.com">mailto:steffen.fries@siemens.com=
</a><br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Siemens =
Aktiengesellschaft: Chairman of the Supervisory Board: Gerhard Cromme; =
Managing Board: Joe Kaeser, Chairman, President and Chief Executive =
Officer; Roland Busch, Brigitte Ederer, Klaus Helmrich, Barbara Kux, =
Hermann Requardt, Siegfried Russwurm, Peter Y. Solmssen, Michael Suess; =
Registered offices: Berlin and Munich, Germany; Commercial registries: =
Berlin Charlottenburg, HRB 12300, Munich, HRB 6684; WEEE-Reg.-No. DE =
23691322 <br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">-----Original =
Message-----<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">From: <a =
href=3D"mailto:msec-bounces@ietf.org">msec-bounces@ietf.org</a> =
[mailto:msec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Brian =
Weis<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Sent: Freitag, 2. August =
2013 21:28<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">To: <a =
href=3D"mailto:msec@ietf.org">msec@ietf.org</a><br></blockquote><blockquot=
e type=3D"cite">Cc: <a =
href=3D"mailto:draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9@tools.ietf.org">draft-weis-gdoi-=
iec62351-9@tools.ietf.org</a>; Sean Turner<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Subject: Re: [MSEC] GDOI support for IEC =
62351<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Folks,<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Sean had some =
good feedback, and there is a new version now: &lt;<a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9-02">http://t=
ools.ietf.org/html/draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9-02</a>&gt;. GDOI =
implementers should note that both RFC 3547 and RFC 6407 relied upon the =
ID Types defined in the IPsec DOI, which wasn't quite the right thing to =
do. So please note that Section 4 (IANA Considerations) now adds a =
registry of ID types for the GDOI DOI. This came about because this I-D =
adds a new value.<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">The GDOI DOI =
list of ID Types is copy-and-paste from the IPsec DOI, plus the new ID =
type added. So all of the old values are still valid, they are just =
administratively defined in the GDOI IANA registry now rather than the =
IPsec registry. This should not have a negative effect on =
implementations but it's worth pointing out.<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Comments on the =
Internet-Draft are still requested.<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Thanks,<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Brian =
<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">On Jul 23, 2013, at 1:56 AM, Brian Weis &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bew@cisco.com">bew@cisco.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Greetings,<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">The IEC 62351 power utility =
automation standards group has chosen to use GDOI (RFC 6407) as their =
key management method to distribute group keys. The keys protect =
multicast traffic streams sent by devices monitoring the power grid, and =
other multicast streams as well. To do this they require some new GDOI =
payloads. This message is an invitation to review and comment on the new =
definitions, which are defined in &lt;<a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9-01">http://t=
ools.ietf.org/html/draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9-01</a>&gt;. Since the MSEC =
WG is not currently active, we hope to progress the draft as an =
individual submission soon and would appreciate any feedback. If you =
have comments, please post them to the MSEC list (<a =
href=3D"mailto:msec@ietf.org">msec@ietf.org</a>) or send them to the =
authors (<a =
href=3D"mailto:draft-weis-gdoi-iec62351-9@tools.ietf.org">draft-weis-gdoi-=
iec62351-9@tools.ietf.org</a>). =
<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Thanks,<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">Brian =
<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">-- =
<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Brian Weis<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">Security, Enterprise Networking =
Group, Cisco Systems<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><blockquote type=3D"cite">Telephone: +1 408 526 =
4796<br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Email: <a =
href=3D"mailto:bew@cisco.com">bew@cisco.com</a><br></blockquote></blockquo=
te><blockquote type=3D"cite"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">-- =
<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Brian =
Weis<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">Security, Enterprise =
Networking Group, Cisco Systems<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Telephone: +1 408 526 4796<br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">Email: <a =
href=3D"mailto:bew@cisco.com">bew@cisco.com</a><br></blockquote><blockquot=
e type=3D"cite"><br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">_______________________________________________<br></blockqu=
ote><blockquote type=3D"cite">MSEC mailing =
list<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><a =
href=3D"mailto:MSEC@ietf.org">MSEC@ietf.org</a><br></blockquote><blockquot=
e type=3D"cite"><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/msec">https://www.ietf.org/m=
ailman/listinfo/msec</a><br></blockquote><blockquote =
type=3D"cite">_______________________________________________<br></blockqu=
ote><blockquote type=3D"cite">MSEC mailing =
list<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><a =
href=3D"mailto:MSEC@ietf.org">MSEC@ietf.org</a><br></blockquote><blockquot=
e type=3D"cite"><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/msec">https://www.ietf.org/m=
ailman/listinfo/msec</a><br></blockquote><br>-- <br>Brian =
Weis<br>Security, Enterprise Networking Group, Cisco =
Systems<br>Telephone: +1 408 526 4796<br>Email: <a =
href=3D"mailto:bew@cisco.com">bew@cisco.com</a><br><br>___________________=
____________________________<br>MSEC mailing list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:MSEC@ietf.org">MSEC@ietf.org</a><br>https://www.ietf.org/ma=
ilman/listinfo/msec<br></div></blockquote></div><br></div></body></html>=

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