Subject: RE: [nemo] Section 8 comment in IESG review

From: "Soliman Hesham" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2004 07:40:58 -0500

Hi Mattias, 

 > 
 > I basically agree with you. I think there may be two use 
 > cases here with 
 > slightly different assumptions:
 > 
 > 1. All MRs and HA belong to the same administrative domain. They can 
 > have a single trust level (domain key).

=> Agreed.

 > 
 > 2. MRs belong to different administrative domains or the HA 
 > and the MRs 
 > belong to different domains. Obviously they don't trust each other.
 > 
 > In 1) it would be ok to separate BU authorization from 
 > routing protocol 
 > authorization. In 2) it wouldn't. What you propose is to 
 > always go with 
 > the assumption that entities don't trust each other and that we have 
 > multiple trust relationships.

=> Agreed. I was just thinking of a general HA
that might end up supporting both types of MRs
(i.e. trusted and not trusted). So unless further
configuration is done to distinguish between
the two cases the HA won't know the difference.

 > 
 > I'm just curious how difficult one can consider it is 
 > (implementation-wise) to exchange information a RIPng 
 > process with the 
 > HA function inside the HA.

=> It depends on the platform of course, but it also
depends on whether a copy of the prefix table/BCE
is available to user space processes (e.g. in a file).

Hesham

 > /Mattias

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From: Mattias Pettersson <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 01 Apr 2004 15:06:23 +0200

> the two cases the HA won't know the difference.

Yeah, you wouldn't want to mix the two cases.

Thinking a bit more on this; maybe what we originally intended was to 
allow different kinds of network configurations.

In my example 1) above, the administrator would possibly want to use 
routing protocols _as the only mechanism_ to pass prefixes and routing 
information from MR to HA (and not include them in BUs). It is then up 
to the IGP daemon to authorize the MR and the prefixes, if need be.

In 2), the administrator would possibly want to use BUs _as the only 
mechanism_ to pass prefixes from the MR to HA. In this case it is up to 
the HA function to autorize the MR and the prefixes.

Now I'm not sure whether we still want to keep the specs open for such 
configurations. It is ultimately up to the administrator of the HA to 
make sure routing information is correct and that no MR steals another 
MR's traffic.

I think my original intention was to try to keep IGP and NEMO 
independent. That would mean that their respective authorization would 
also be kept independent. Now, is that a good idea?

> is available to user space processes (e.g. in a file).

And all IGP protocols (or at least their implementations on NEMO-enabled 
routers) must be updated to be able to handle this?

/Mattias

---

From: Mattias Pettersson <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 01 Apr 2004 15:06:23 +0200

/Mattias

---

From: Vijay Devarapalli <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 02 Apr 2004 11:44:59 -0800

> also be kept independent. Now, is that a good idea?

exactly. I prefer not mixing them up at all.

if there is sufficient trust between the MR and HA and they are
configured to exchange routing updates, just do that. nothing
for NEMO to do here. NEMO only creates the bi-directional tunnel
(and few other things).

if IGP cannot be run, the MR includes prefixes in binding update
in explicit mode.

Vijay