Subject: Re: Anybody know details about Schneier's "flaw"?

From: [email-masked]
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2002 16:27:08 -0500

According to the link posted by someone else, (www.counterpane.com/pgp-attack.html), "We also recommend changes in the OpenPGP standard [3 ]to educe the 
effectiveness of ou attacks in these settings."

Are the people activly working on the -bis draft aware of this?

--John

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From: Jon Callas <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2002 23:20:20 -0700

On 8/14/02 2:27 PM, "[email-masked]" <[email-masked]> wrote:

> According to the link posted by someone else,
> (www.counterpane.com/pgp-attack.html), "We also recommend changes in the
> OpenPGP standard [3 ]to educe the

Yes, we are aware of it. We released bis-06 on Monday with language in it to
address this. We were advised about this a month ago, and have had quite a
good email conversation with the authors about it.

The text that is in there is some talk in the sections on compression, which
say that a decompression error should be considered to be a security
problem, not a data problem (in other words, don't typically let the user
have the damaged plaintext), and some language that recommends encouraging
people to use MDCs. There is also a relatively long section in Security
Considerations. Take a look, I think you'll like it.

    Jon

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From: [email-masked] (Lutz Donnerhacke)
Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2002 07:51:35 +0000 (UTC)

>Considerations. Take a look, I think you'll like it.

Fine. I don't support Schneiers Claim to withdraw 'uncompressed'-compression.