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Date: Sun, 2 Dec 2018 19:01:51 -0600
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Ronald Tse <tse@ribose.com>
Cc: "openpgp@ietf.org" <openpgp@ietf.org>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>, Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
Message-ID: <20181203010151.GG54918@kduck.kaduk.org>
References: <87y3aosju2.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <B64F4A5B-1894-4B01-9DAE-3C7A19C772BF@ribose.com> <14036.1543342928@contrail-ubm16-mdb.svec1.juniper.net> <B6F2B98A-E960-4189-A579-E29916079904@ribose.com> <875zwhvef3.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <sjmmuptyszn.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <20181201001941.GE87441@kduck.kaduk.org> <348B9107-4726-4899-A980-FD3BEB2A0BA5@ribose.com>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] rfc4880bis and draft-openpgp-iana-registry-updates-01
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On Sat, Dec 01, 2018 at 07:21:43AM +0000, Ronald Tse wrote:
>    Hi Ben, Derek,
> 
>      Derek is absolutely right, here.
> 
>    I fully agree that managing two documents is more complex than handling
>    one.
> 
>      I'll note that for TLS 1.3 we did separate documents, RFCs 8446 and
>      8447,
>      since there were a *lot* of registry changes and we did want a permanent
>      record of them, but that split caused a lot of extra work to ensure
>      things
>      were synchronized during AUTH48.
> 
>    However, the OpenPGP IANA update document was created from a suggestion by
>    the Security AD, where the TLS registry update model was the acceptable
>    role model to follow. RFC 8447 is at 17 pages; this document is close to
>    30 - the OpenPGP IANA registries are numerous and changes to them many,
>    since a lot of them have been dilapidated since the days of 2440.
>    If we merge this into 4880bis and remove them at publication, we're adding
>    30 pages (temporarily) and then maybe removing 25 at publication. And we
>    lose the permanent record that RFC 8447 provides for TLS. Perhaps there is
>    an argument that the registries of OpenPGP aren't as important (!) as
>    TLS's for permanent record keeping, and therefore should be relegated to
>    an Internet-Draft, but it doesn't sound like a good reason to forgo that.
>    Given that the IETF process has already processed the pair of 8446/8447
>    successfully in a synchronized way, would it be possible that it's even
>    easier this time round?

Most of the pain of 8447 was on the WG chairs and AD to manually do
consistency checks.  I don't expect much of an efficiency gain from
practice, but I suppose there are probably ways to distribute the work that
we did not explore very well for 8447.

-Ben


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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: Ronald Tse <tse@ribose.com>, "openpgp\@ietf.org" <openpgp@ietf.org>, Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] rfc4880bis and draft-openpgp-iana-registry-updates-01
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Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> writes:

> Most of the pain of 8447 was on the WG chairs and AD to manually do
> consistency checks.  I don't expect much of an efficiency gain from
> practice, but I suppose there are probably ways to distribute the work that
> we did not explore very well for 8447.

And we don't have a WG chair here.......

> -Ben

-derek
-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant


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From: Ronald Tse <tse@ribose.com>
To: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
CC: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, "openpgp@ietf.org" <openpgp@ietf.org>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
Thread-Topic: [openpgp] rfc4880bis and draft-openpgp-iana-registry-updates-01
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/openpgp/w6kgLXUvFMO2nXGhJF4aRWeghgs>
Subject: Re: [openpgp] rfc4880bis and draft-openpgp-iana-registry-updates-01
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I thought we were only left with a mailing list without a WG... ;-)

In any case, could the consistency checks can be done by the authors and RF=
C editors instead?

On Dec 4, 2018, at 12:58 AM, Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com<mailto:derek@iht=
fp.com>> wrote:

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu<mailto:kaduk@mit.edu>> writes:

Most of the pain of 8447 was on the WG chairs and AD to manually do
consistency checks.  I don't expect much of an efficiency gain from
practice, but I suppose there are probably ways to distribute the work that
we did not explore very well for 8447.

And we don't have a WG chair here.......

-Ben

-derek
--
      Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
      derek@ihtfp.com<mailto:derek@ihtfp.com>             www.ihtfp.com<htt=
p://www.ihtfp.com>
      Computer and Internet Security Consultant

_____________________________________

Ronald Tse
Ribose Inc.

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<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
</head>
<body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break:=
 after-white-space;" class=3D"">
I thought we were only left with a mailing list without a WG... ;-)
<div class=3D""><br class=3D"">
</div>
<div class=3D"">In any case, could the consistency checks can be done by th=
e authors and RFC editors instead?<br class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; t=
ext-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: norm=
al; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-w=
rap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-=
space;" class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
</div>
</div>
<div>
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">On Dec 4, 2018, at 12:58 AM, Derek Atkins &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:derek@ihtfp.com" class=3D"">derek@ihtfp.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div>
<br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kaduk@mit.edu" class=
=3D"">kaduk@mit.edu</a>&gt; writes:<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">Most of the pain of 8447 was on the WG=
 chairs and AD to manually do<br class=3D"">
consistency checks. &nbsp;I don't expect much of an efficiency gain from<br=
 class=3D"">
practice, but I suppose there are probably ways to distribute the work that=
<br class=3D"">
we did not explore very well for 8447.<br class=3D"">
</blockquote>
<br class=3D"">
And we don't have a WG chair here.......<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
<blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">-Ben<br class=3D"">
</blockquote>
<br class=3D"">
-derek<br class=3D"">
-- <br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Derek Atkins &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;617-6=
23-3745<br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=3D"mailto:derek@ihtfp.com" clas=
s=3D"">derek@ihtfp.com</a> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=3D"http://www.ihtfp.com" class=3D"">www.iht=
fp.com</a><br class=3D"">
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Computer and Internet Security Consulta=
nt<br class=3D"">
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br class=3D"">
<div class=3D"">_____________________________________<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
Ronald Tse<br class=3D"">
Ribose Inc.<br class=3D"">
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_CF7883D36D474790AF434945B0903972ribosecom_--


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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: Ronald Tse <tse@ribose.com>
Cc: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, "openpgp\@ietf.org" <openpgp@ietf.org>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] rfc4880bis and draft-openpgp-iana-registry-updates-01
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Ronald Tse <tse@ribose.com> writes:

> I thought we were only left with a mailing list without a WG... ;-)

Exactly.

> In any case, could the consistency checks can be done by the authors and RFC
> editors instead?

Do YOU want to go ask them to do all this work?  Seriously?  That's
pretty unfair, just to meet some personal sense of "better".

Let's just make the changes in 4880bis and make everyone's life easier,
at the expense of potentially losing the historical reference if we
decide to remove the IANA actions from the final RFC.

N.B. that we don't have to remove the actions if we don't want to.

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant


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From: Ronald Tse <tse@ribose.com>
To: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
CC: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, "openpgp@ietf.org" <openpgp@ietf.org>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] rfc4880bis and draft-openpgp-iana-registry-updates-01
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From nobody Fri Dec  7 06:44:48 2018
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Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2018 15:44:41 +0100
From: Hanno =?UTF-8?B?QsO2Y2s=?= <hanno@hboeck.de>
To: openpgp@ietf.org
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Subject: [openpgp] Enigmail XSA issue with WKD and HTTP authentication
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Cross-posting this here as I believe this is something that should be
clarified in the WKD draft/standard.

There's an issue in Enigmail that can potentially be abused for
phishing attacks involving WKD and HTTP authentication.

Web Key Directory or WKD [1] is a feature where OpenPGP keys can be
fetched via a defined web address of the form
https://example.org/.well-known/./openpgpkey/hu/[zbase32_sha1_hash_of_local=
_part]

Enigmail automatically tries to fetch WKD keys already when writing a
mail, so simply having a mail address in "To" will cause an HTTPS
request.

When the server answers with a HTTP authentication challenge (HTTP code
401) then Enigmail/Thunderbird would open up an HTTP login window.
While the login window will show the hostname, this can be very
confusing for a user. If randomly a login window pops up within a mail
client it's plausible that some users will enter their email
credentials. Here's a video to illustrate the issue:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DeFSMBX98XiE

Similar attacks in browsers have previously been described as
"Cross-Site-Authentication" or XSA [2].

I think it would be good if the WKD draft would be updated to clarify
that a client should never answer to any 401 authentication requests
from the server.


I discovered this together with Moritz Tremmel (We discovered this by
accident due to a server serving HTTP authentication requests for
every path starting with a dot). After we reported this to Enigmail we
learned that this was previously reported in the public bug tracker:
https://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/bugs/890/

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-koch-openpgp-webkey-service-07
[2]
http://www.joachim-breitner.de/blog/56-Like_XSS,_just_simpler_and_harder_to=
_prevent__The_Cross_Site_Auth_(XSA)_Attack

--=20
Hanno B=C3=B6ck
https://hboeck.de/

mail/jabber: hanno@hboeck.de
GPG: FE73757FA60E4E21B937579FA5880072BBB51E42


From rogerandrea.ellenberger@students.bfh.ch  Sat Dec  8 07:17:23 2018
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From: Roger Ellenberger <rogerandrea.ellenberger@students.bfh.ch>
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To: <openpgp@ietf.org>
CC: =?UTF-8?Q?Fl=c3=bchmann_Tobias?= <tobias.fluehmann@students.bfh.ch>
Date: Sat, 8 Dec 2018 16:16:59 +0100
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Subject: [openpgp] IND-CPA security of OpenPGP's ElGamal implementation
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Hi,

We are currently working on a Firefox extension which allows us to
encrypt and decrypt OpenPGP messages using partially-trusted remote
keystores. We perform the asymmetric decryption operations on these
remote keystores using a threshold ElGamal scheme. We develop this
extension as our thesis project at Bern University for Applied Sciences.

ElGamal is our preferred asymmetric algorithm since we make use of
threshold cryptography and the threshold scheme of ElGamal is much
simpler compared to threshold RSA.

Working on the decryption of OpenPGP messages we saw in the section 5.1
of RFC4880 that the symmetric key $s$ with algorithm identifier and
checksum is encoded and padded using PKCS#1 v1.5 EME encoding. The
result of the EME encoding $eme_encode(s) = m$ then is encrypted using
ElGamal.

A short recap of ElGamal: We use the Groups Z*_p and G_q for ElGamal,
where p is a safe prime, $q = (p-1)/2$ and $G_q$ is a subgroup of
$Z*_p$. Encryption is defined as follows:

$
enc(y, r, m):   G_q x Z_q x G_q -> G_q x G_q
             :=  (c_1, c_2) = (g**k mod p, m * y**k mod p)
$

According literature one need to map $m$ into $G_q$ to guarantee that
ElGamal ist IND-CPA secure. According the RFC this check is not
performed, but an encoding/padding is applied to the plaintext.

Long story short: We would like to know what the considerations have
been to use ElGamal combined with a PKCS-EME encoding, since without the
encoding/padding it actually lacks of CPA security. Unfortunately we did
not find any authoritative reference which give a statement about
ElGamal security when $m$ is not in G_q but padded.

Thank you very much in advance for your help.


Best regards,
Tobias and Roger


From nobody Sat Dec  8 10:43:16 2018
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] IND-CPA security of OpenPGP's ElGamal implementation
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On Sat, Dec 8, 2018 at 7:21 AM Roger Ellenberger
<rogerandrea.ellenberger@students.bfh.ch> wrote:
><snip>
> Long story short: We would like to know what the considerations have
> been to use ElGamal combined with a PKCS-EME encoding, since without the
> encoding/padding it actually lacks of CPA security. Unfortunately we did
> not find any authoritative reference which give a statement about
> ElGamal security when $m$ is not in G_q but padded.

I suspect the only leak is one bit, namely whether or not m is a
quadratic residue mod p or not. The impact on the security is minimal.
But why not use threshold IECS as https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6637
does and avoid this quirk?

>
> Thank you very much in advance for your help.
>
>
> Best regards,
> Tobias and Roger
>
> _______________________________________________
> openpgp mailing list
> openpgp@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/openpgp



-- 
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
--Rousseau.


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From: Jon Callas <joncallas@icloud.com>
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Date: Sat, 8 Dec 2018 16:44:25 -0800
Cc: Jon Callas <joncallas@icloud.com>, openpgp@ietf.org, =?utf-8?Q?Fl=C3=BChmann_Tobias?= <tobias.fluehmann@students.bfh.ch>
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To: Roger Ellenberger <rogerandrea.ellenberger@students.bfh.ch>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] IND-CPA security of OpenPGP's ElGamal implementation
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> On Dec 8, 2018, at 7:16 AM, Roger Ellenberger =
<rogerandrea.ellenberger@students.bfh.ch> wrote:
>=20
> [=E2=80=A6]
>=20
> Long story short: We would like to know what the considerations have
> been to use ElGamal combined with a PKCS-EME encoding, since without =
the
> encoding/padding it actually lacks of CPA security. Unfortunately we =
did
> not find any authoritative reference which give a statement about
> ElGamal security when $m$ is not in G_q but padded.
>=20
> Thank you very much in advance for your help.

What a wonderful idea. I really like it.

The short answer to your question is that there aren=E2=80=99t any =
references. I concur with Watson that any issue is minimal, especially =
if you=E2=80=99re using Elgamal keys that are 3K to 4K.

A longer answer is that OpenPGP is pretty much the first substantial =
protocol to use Elgamal keys. Back in the late =E2=80=9890s, when =
patents were an issue, the then "PGP 3=E2=80=9D system which became =
=E2=80=9CPGP 5=E2=80=9D and then that became standardized as OpenPGP, =
wanted an alternative to RSA. The RSA patent expired in the year 2000, =
but the discrete log patents expired in =E2=80=9997. Thus, there was a =
real reason for wanting a discrete  log option. They picked Elgamal =
because you can use it more or less as if it were RSA. As time went on, =
Elgamal signatures fell by the wayside over DSA, leaving Elgamal for =
encryption.

Derek Atkins might remember more, because a lot of those original =
decisions were made by some combination of him, Colin Plumb, and Hal =
Finney.

	Jon


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Subject: Re: [openpgp] IND-CPA security of OpenPGP's ElGamal implementation
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At 08.12.18 / 16:16 Roger Ellenberger wrote:

> According literature one need to map $m$ into $G_q$ to guarantee that
> ElGamal ist IND-CPA secure. According the RFC this check is not
> performed, but an encoding/padding is applied to the plaintext.

I stumble upon the same problem [1] when creating DKGPG some months ago. 
In my oppinion it cannot be solved without revising ElGamal in the RFC. 
Maybe the work of Sakurai and Shizuya [2] can help to understand some 
implications of the RFC authors choice at that time.

[1] slide #17 of https://www.nongnu.org/libtmcg/dg81_slides.pdf
[2] https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/3-540-49264-X_28.pdf

Best regards,
Heiko.


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To: Jon Callas <joncallas@icloud.com>
CC: <openpgp@ietf.org>, =?UTF-8?Q?Fl=c3=bchmann_Tobias?= <tobias.fluehmann@students.bfh.ch>
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From: Roger Ellenberger <rogerandrea.ellenberger@students.bfh.ch>
Openpgp: preference=signencrypt
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Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2018 11:14:10 +0100
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] IND-CPA security of OpenPGP's ElGamal implementation
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On 12/9/18 1:44 AM, Jon Callas wrote:
>> On Dec 8, 2018, at 7:16 AM, Roger Ellenberger <rogerandrea.ellenberger@students.bfh.ch> wrote:
>>
>> […]
>>
>> Long story short: We would like to know what the considerations have
>> been to use ElGamal combined with a PKCS-EME encoding, since without the
>> encoding/padding it actually lacks of CPA security. Unfortunately we did
>> not find any authoritative reference which give a statement about
>> ElGamal security when $m$ is not in G_q but padded.
>>
>> Thank you very much in advance for your help.
> 
> What a wonderful idea. I really like it.
Very appreciated. We're thrilled you like it.

> 
> The short answer to your question is that there aren’t any references. I concur with Watson that any issue is minimal, especially if you’re using Elgamal keys that are 3K to 4K.
> 
> A longer answer is that OpenPGP is pretty much the first substantial protocol to use Elgamal keys. Back in the late ‘90s, when patents were an issue, the then "PGP 3” system which became “PGP 5” and then that became standardized as OpenPGP, wanted an alternative to RSA. The RSA patent expired in the year 2000, but the discrete log patents expired in ’97. Thus, there was a real reason for wanting a discrete  log option. They picked Elgamal because you can use it more or less as if it were RSA. As time went on, Elgamal signatures fell by the wayside over DSA, leaving Elgamal for encryption.
We already supposed that there might be historical reasons for that. So
that's exactly the sort of reply we hoped to get. That's awesome. Thanks
a lot Jon.

> 
> Derek Atkins might remember more, because a lot of those original decisions were made by some combination of him, Colin Plumb, and Hal Finney.
> 
> 	Jon
> 
We are pleased to get as much information as possible if anymore
remembers more. However Jon's answer is already a big leap forward.


Cheers
Tobias and Roger


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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: Jon Callas <joncallas=40icloud.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Roger Ellenberger <rogerandrea.ellenberger@students.bfh.ch>, =?utf-8?Q?Fl=C3=BChmann?= Tobias <tobias.fluehmann@students.bfh.ch>, <openpgp@ietf.org>, Jon Callas <joncallas@icloud.com>
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Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2018 11:21:18 -0500
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] IND-CPA security of OpenPGP's ElGamal implementation
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Jon Callas <joncallas=3D40icloud.com@dmarc.ietf.org> writes:

> A longer answer is that OpenPGP is pretty much the first substantial
> protocol to use Elgamal keys. Back in the late =E2=80=9890s, when patents=
 were
> an issue, the then "PGP 3=E2=80=9D system which became =E2=80=9CPGP 5=E2=
=80=9D and then that
> became standardized as OpenPGP, wanted an alternative to RSA. The RSA
> patent expired in the year 2000, but the discrete log patents expired
> in =E2=80=9997. Thus, there was a real reason for wanting a discrete log
> option. They picked Elgamal because you can use it more or less as if
> it were RSA. As time went on, Elgamal signatures fell by the wayside
> over DSA, leaving Elgamal for encryption.
>
> Derek Atkins might remember more, because a lot of those original
> decisions were made by some combination of him, Colin Plumb, and Hal
> Finney.

As I recall, we added DSA and ElGamal to attempt to work around the RSA
patents.  For a while, IIRC, PGP3/5 did not even support RSA at all,
making it harder to interact with PGP2 -- at least for a short while.
This was all back in 1996-1997 when this work was done.

> 	Jon

-derek
--=20
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant


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From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
To: Hanno =?utf-8?Q?B=C3=B6ck?= <hanno@hboeck.de>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Enigmail XSA issue with WKD and HTTP authentication
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On Fri,  7 Dec 2018 15:44, hanno@hboeck.de said:

> I think it would be good if the WKD draft would be updated to clarify
> that a client should never answer to any 401 authentication requests
> from the server.

Is this okay:

  A client MUST not accept a HTTP authentication challenge (HTTP code
  401) because the information in the Web Key Directory is public and
  needs no authentication.  Allowing an authentication challenge has the
  problem to easily confuse a user with a password prompt and tricking
  him into falsely entering the passphrase used to protect his private
  key or to login to his mail provider.
=20=20


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

=2D-=20
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.

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From nobody Fri Dec 14 02:07:08 2018
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From: Hanno =?UTF-8?B?QsO2Y2s=?= <hanno@hboeck.de>
To: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Enigmail XSA issue with WKD and HTTP authentication
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On Fri, 14 Dec 2018 10:02:46 +0100
Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> wrote:

>   A client MUST not accept a HTTP authentication challenge (HTTP code
>   401) because the information in the Web Key Directory is public and
>   needs no authentication.  Allowing an authentication challenge has
> the problem to easily confuse a user with a password prompt and
> tricking him into falsely entering the passphrase used to protect his
> private key or to login to his mail provider.

Sounds good.

--=20
Hanno B=C3=B6ck
https://hboeck.de/

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From: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
To: wk@gnupg.org, Hanno =?utf-8?Q?B=C3=B6ck?= <hanno@hboeck.de>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Enigmail XSA issue with WKD and HTTP authentication
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Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> writes:

> On Fri,  7 Dec 2018 15:44, hanno@hboeck.de said:
>
>> I think it would be good if the WKD draft would be updated to clarify
>> that a client should never answer to any 401 authentication requests
>> from the server.
>
> Is this okay:
>
>   A client MUST not accept a HTTP authentication challenge (HTTP code

You should capitalize this as "MUST NOT" (and not "MUST not").

>   401) because the information in the Web Key Directory is public and
>   needs no authentication.  Allowing an authentication challenge has the
>   problem to easily confuse a user with a password prompt and tricking
>   him into falsely entering the passphrase used to protect his private
>   key or to login to his mail provider.
>   
>
>
> Shalom-Salam,
>
>    Werner

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745
       derek@ihtfp.com             www.ihtfp.com
       Computer and Internet Security Consultant


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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Enigmail XSA issue with WKD and HTTP authentication
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On Fri, 14 Dec 2018 15:12, derek@ihtfp.com said:

>>   A client MUST not accept a HTTP authentication challenge (HTTP code
>
> You should capitalize this as "MUST NOT" (and not "MUST not").

Right.  I always have to fix up these.


Salam-Shalom,

   Werner

=2D-=20
Die Gedanken sind frei.  Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz.

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From nobody Fri Dec 14 15:13:31 2018
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Enigmail XSA issue with WKD and HTTP authentication
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On Fri 2018-12-14 10:02:46 +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Fri,  7 Dec 2018 15:44, hanno@hboeck.de said:
>
>> I think it would be good if the WKD draft would be updated to clarify
>> that a client should never answer to any 401 authentication requests
>> from the server.
>
> Is this okay:
>
>   A client MUST not accept a HTTP authentication challenge (HTTP code
>   401) because the information in the Web Key Directory is public and
>   needs no authentication.  Allowing an authentication challenge has the
>   problem to easily confuse a user with a password prompt and tricking
>   him into falsely entering the passphrase used to protect his private
>   key or to login to his mail provider.

The explanation and justification part here is very clear, and i agree
it should be included.  But is "accept an HTTP authentication challenge"
the same thing as "make an HTTP authentication prompt visible to the
user" ?

how about something more like "a WKD client MUST treat an HTTP response
code 401 the same way it treats a 404…"

   --dkg