Subject: [OSPF] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying-06.txt

From: Acee Lindem <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2013 19:19:02 +0000

This version includes the key table clarifications to packet transmission and reception that I talked about in the IETF 88 OSPF WG meeting. Hopefully, we can WG last call this draft soon.
Thanks,
Acee

Begin forwarded message:

From: <[email-masked]<mailto:[email-masked]>>
Date: November 25, 2013 1:54:13 PM EST
To: Manav Bhatia <[email-masked]<mailto:[email-masked]>>, Sam Hartman <[email-masked]<mailto:[email-masked]>>, Dacheng Zhang <[email-masked]<mailto:[email-masked]>>, Acee Lindem <[email-masked]<mailto:[email-masked]>>
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying-06.txt

A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying-06.txt
has been successfully submitted by Manav Bhatia and posted to the
IETF repository.

Filename: draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying
Revision: 06
Title: Security Extension for OSPFv2 when using Manual Key Management
Creation date: 2013-11-25
Group: ospf
Number of pages: 13
URL:             http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying-06.txt
Status:          http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying
Htmlized:        http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying-06
Diff:            http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying-06

Abstract:
  The current OSPFv2 cryptographic authentication mechanism as defined
  in RFC 2328 and RFC 5709 is vulnerable to both inter-session and
  intra-session replay attacks when using manual keying.  Additionally,
  the existing cryptographic authentication schemes do not cover the IP
  header.  This omission can be exploited to carry out various types of
  attacks.

  This draft proposes changes to the authentication sequence number
  mechanism that will protect OSPFv2 from both inter-session and intra-
  session replay attacks when using manual keys for securing OSPFv2
  protocol packets.  Additionally, we also describe some changes in the
  cryptographic hash computation so that we eliminate most attacks that
  result from OSPFv2 not protecting the IP header.

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