Subject: [RTG-DIR] RtgDir review: draft-ietf-opsec-routing-protocols-crypto-issues-04.txt

From: Young Lee <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 04 May 2010 15:49:26 -0500

Hello,

I have been selected as the Routing Directorate reviewer for this draft. The
Routing Directorate seeks to review all routing or routing-related drafts as
they pass through IETF last call and IESG review. The purpose of the review
is to provide assistance to the Routing ADs. For more information about the
Routing Directorate, please see
http://www.ietf.org/iesg/directorate/routing.html

Although these comments are primarily for the use of the Routing ADs, it
would be helpful if you could consider them along with any other IETF Last
Call comments that you receive, and strive to resolve them through
discussion or by updating the draft.

Document: draft-ietf-opsec-routing-protocols-crypto-issues-04.txt

Reviewer: Young Lee
Review Date: 4 May, 2010 
IETF LC End Date: 10 May, 2010 
Intended Status: Informational

Summary: 
I have some minor concerns about this document that I think should be
resolved before publication.

Comments: 
This document is clearly written and easy to understand. 

Major Issues: 
No major issues found.

Minor Issues: 
Section 1: Can you give a bit more explanation why the MD5 digest algorithm
is not suitable for future implications? 

Section 1.1: At the end of the first paragraph, can you give the reference
for the literature on the discovery of feasible collision attacks against
MD4, etc.? 

Section 3: In the second paragraph, what is ESP? It would be helpful to
include Terminology Section upfront to describe all the acronyms. 

Section 3.1: In the first paragraph, what is SA? 

Nits: 
Abstract

s/router ./router.

---

From: "Bhatia, Manav (Manav)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 5 May 2010 08:09:20 +0530

Hi Young,

Thanks for the review!

> Minor Issues: 
> Section 1: Can you give a bit more explanation why the MD5 digest algorithm is not suitable for future implications? 

I think there is enough evidence about attacks on MD5. Though we are still far from direct impact on routing protocols there is clear consensus in IETF about deprecating its use towards a more secure algorithm. You could look at two recent RFCs that add support for HMAC-SHA for OSPF [RFC 5709] and ISIS [RFC 5310].

> Section 1.1: At the end of the first paragraph, can you give the 
> reference for the literature on the discovery of feasible collision attacks against MD4, etc.? 

Will add a reference in the next revision.

[REF] Xiaoyun Wang, Xuejia Lai, Dengguo Feng and Hongbo Yu, "Collisions for hash functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128, and RIPEMD", Crypto 2004 Rump Session

> 
> Section 3: In the second paragraph, what is ESP? It would be helpful to include Terminology Section upfront to describe all the acronyms. 

Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303]

> Section 3.1: In the first paragraph, what is SA? 

Security Association

> s/router ./router.

Will do.

Thanks, Manav

---

From: Young Lee <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 15:43:21 -0500

Hi Joel and Bhatia,

I don't have any more issue on MD5. Thanks for your explanation. It may help
the reader if you would say:

"The MD5 digest algorithm was not designed to be used in the way most
routing protocols are using it which has potentially serious future
implications. There have been recent RFCs that support more secure
algorithms than MD5 such as HMAC-SHA for OSPF [RFC 5709] and ISIS [RFC
5310], respectively." 

Best Regards,
Young

-----Original Message-----
From: Joel Jaeggli [mailto:[email-masked]] 
Sent: Sunday, May 09, 2010 2:40 PM
To: Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
Cc: Young Lee; [email-masked]; [email-masked];
[email-masked]
Subject: Re: RtgDir review:
draft-ietf-opsec-routing-protocols-crypto-issues-04.txt

On 05/04/2010 07:39 PM, Bhatia, Manav (Manav) wrote:
> Hi Young,
> 
> Thanks for the review!
> 
>> Minor Issues: 
>> Section 1: Can you give a bit more explanation why the MD5 digest
algorithm is not suitable for future implications? 
> 
> I think there is enough evidence about attacks on MD5. Though we are still
far from direct impact on routing protocols there is clear consensus in IETF
about deprecating its use towards a more secure algorithm. You could look at
two recent RFCs that add support for HMAC-SHA for OSPF [RFC 5709] and ISIS
[RFC 5310].

the reading for the security area directors (pasi) was that
recommendation to avoid using md5 is sensible notwithstanding  a lack of
specific circumstances in which it is possible to subvert.

> [REF] Xiaoyun Wang, Xuejia Lai, Dengguo Feng and Hongbo Yu, "Collisions
for hash functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128, and RIPEMD", Crypto 2004 Rump
Session

---

From: Joel Jaeggli <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 09 May 2010 12:39:58 -0700

---

From: "Bhatia, Manav (Manav)" <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 11 May 2010 03:27:09 +0530

Hi Young,

Will add this in the next revision.

Joel - Do we come out with the next revision now, or do we do it after the IESG review?

Cheers, Manav 

> From: Young Lee [mailto:[email-masked]] 
> Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2010 2.13 AM
> To: 'Joel Jaeggli'; Bhatia, Manav (Manav)
> Cc: [email-masked]; [email-masked]; 
> Subject: RE: RtgDir review:

---

From: Joel Jaeggli <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 10 May 2010 19:09:39 -0700

given the impact of the proposed text I think it can wait for auth48
unless somebody on the on the iesg thinks otherwise.

joel