Subject: [saag] Request for review and consensus -- draft-hartman-webauth-phishing

From: Lisa Dusseault <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 3 Sep 2008 13:41:39 -0700

You may have seen this draft a year ago; Sam is back working on it and  
produced version -09 last month.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hartman-webauth-phishing-09

If you've reviewed it before, please take a look at the changes.  If  
you'd like to review it, please do.  I'm the shepherd for this draft,  
so comments can be sent to me, to Sam as author, to [email-masked] 
, or to the IETF general list as appropriate.

In addition to getting general input, I'd like to get a sense of  
whether we have consensus on a couple things.

a).  The statement including "IETF recommends", from section 1.1 of  
the draft:

    "In publishing this memo, the IETF recommends making available
    authentication mechanisms that meet the requirements outlined in
    Section 4 in HTTP user agents including web browsers.  It is hoped
    that these mechanisms will prove a useful step in fighting phishing.
    However this memo does not restrict work either in the IETF or any
    other organization.  In particular, new authentication efforts are
    not bound to meet the requirements posed in this memo unless the
    charter for those efforts chooses to make these binding  
requirements.
    Less formally, the IETF presents this memo as an option to pursue
    while acknowledging that there may be other promising paths both now
    and in the future."

b) Whether the document should require mutual authentication (section  
4.4).

Thanks,
Lisa D.
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From: [email-masked] (Peter Gutmann)
Date: Fri, 05 Sep 2008 03:26:10 +1200

Lisa Dusseault <[email-masked]> writes:

>[...]
>b) Whether the document should require mutual authentication (section 4.4).

Yes, absolutely!  The whole reason why phishing works is that the site is
never authenticated, without mutual auth (and specifically strong mutual auth,
e.g. some form of cryptographic challenge-response mechanism rather than the
pretend-auth of "do you recognise this image?" that some US banks have
adopted) you've not really achieving much.

Peter.