Subject: [Sandbox-mailoutput] [Django development] Internal WG Review: Remote ATtestation ProcedureS (rats)

From: IETF Secretariat <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 14:17:33 -0800

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Subject: Internal WG Review: Remote ATtestation ProcedureS (rats)
From: IETF Secretariat <[email-masked]>
To: "The IESG" <[email-masked]>, "The IAB" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2019 14:17:33 -0800

A new IETF WG is being considered in the IETF. The draft charter for this WG
is provided below for your review and comment.

Review time is one week.

The IETF Secretariat

Remote ATtestation ProcedureS (rats)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Current status: Proposed WG

Chairs:
  Nancy Cam-Winget <[email-masked]>
  Roman Danyliw <[email-masked]>

Assigned Area Director:
  Benjamin Kaduk <[email-masked]>

Security Area Directors:
  Eric Rescorla <[email-masked]>
  Benjamin Kaduk <[email-masked]>

Mailing list:
  Address: [email-masked]
  To subscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats
  Archive: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/

Charter: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-rats/

Introduction
==========

Relying parties require evidence about the trustworthiness of remote system
components [RFC4949] they interact with. Remote attestation procedures (RATS)
enable relying parties to establish a level of confidence in the
trustworthiness of remote system components by creating and processing
attestation evidence. A relying party can then decide whether to consider a
remote system component trustworthy or not.

To improve the confidence in a system component's trustworthiness a relying
party may require evidence about: * system component identity, * composition
of system components, including nested components, * roots of trust, *
assertion/claim origination or provenance, * manufacturing origin, * system
component integrity, * system component configuration, or * operational state
and measurements of steps which led to the operational state.

While domain-specific attestation mechanisms such as Trusted Computing Group
(TCG) Trusted Platform Module (TPM)/Trusted Software Stack (TSS), Fast
Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance attestation and Android Keystore attestation
exist, there is no interoperable way to create and process attestation
evidence to make determinations about system components among relying parties
of different manufactures and origins.

Goals
=====

This WG will standardize formats for describing assertions/claims about
system components and associated evidence; and procedures and protocols to
convey these assertions/claims to the relying parties.  While a relying party
may use reference values to assess the assertions/claims the procedures for
this activity are out of scope for this WG.

The working group will cooperate and coordinate with other IETF WG such as
TEEP, SUIT and SACM as appropriate.  The WG will also evaluate prior work
such as NEA and proprietary attestation technologies.

Program of Work
==============

The working group will develop standards supporting interoperable remote
attestation procedures for system components. The main deliverables are as
follows.

1. Specify a terminology, architecture and use cases that enable explicit (a
set of verifiable assertion/claims is transported in the attestation) and
implicit (a set of assertions/claims is implied by possession of a secret)
attestation techniques.  The architecture may include a system security model
for the signing key material and involve at least the system component,
system component provider, and the relying authority.

2. Standardize an information model for assertions/claims which provide
information about system components characteristics scoped by the specified
use-cases.

3. Standardize data models that implements and secures the defined
information model (e.g., CBOR Web Token structures [RFC8392], JSON Web Token
structures [RFC7519]).

4. Standardize interoperable protocols to securely convey assertions/claims.

Milestones: