From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan  9 13:00:36 2004
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From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@east.sun.com>
To: ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
Subject: IETF in Seoul.
Reply-to: sommerfeld@east.sun.com
Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2004 13:00:17 -0500
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The next IETF meeting will be in Seoul, South Korea.  

History over the past couple years has shown this working group tends
to have fairly sparse attendance at non-north-american IETF's.

I'll be in Seoul, but before I request a meeting slot I'd like to hear
from active WG participants to get a sense as to whether we'll have
critical mass for any of our work areas..

						- Bill


From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan  9 15:41:18 2004
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Subject: Re: IETF in Seoul.
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From: nisse@lysator.liu.se (Niels =?iso-8859-1?q?M=F6ller?=)
Date: 09 Jan 2004 21:41:01 +0100
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Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@east.sun.com> writes:

> History over the past couple years has shown this working group tends
> to have fairly sparse attendance at non-north-american IETF's.

Hmm, why is the statistics so bad for Europe? There are quite a few
ssh developers living over here, as far as I know. (I've only ever
been to one ietf meeting, in Oslo a few years ago, but it turned out
there was no secsh meeting that time. Oslo is just some five hours by
train from home).

> I'll be in Seoul, but before I request a meeting slot I'd like to hear
> from active WG participants to get a sense as to whether we'll have
> critical mass for any of our work areas..

I won't be there.

/Niels


From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan  9 16:06:45 2004
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Date: Fri, 09 Jan 2004 22:06:43 +0100
From: Jon Bright <jon@siliconcircus.com>
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Subject: Re: IETF in Seoul.
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Niels Möller wrote:

> Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@east.sun.com> writes:
> 
>> History over the past couple years has shown this working group
>> tends to have fairly sparse attendance at non-north-american
>> IETF's.
> 
> Hmm, why is the statistics so bad for Europe? There are quite a few 
> ssh developers living over here, as far as I know. (I've only ever 
> been to one ietf meeting, in Oslo a few years ago, but it turned out 
> there was no secsh meeting that time. Oslo is just some five hours by
>  train from home).

Now that I've started taking a slightly more active part in this WG, I'd
certainly be happy to go to any IETF within reasonable travelling
distance (which for me means within about 1000km of Dortmund, Germany),
*but* it's difficult to justify the $500 outlay for the registration
fee.  Adding intercontinental airfare and hotel costs to that makes it 
even less possible.  A quick estimate shows attending the IETF in Seoul 
would cost 1533EUR before hotel costs, probably 2000EUR including hotel, 
probably 2500EUR by the time incidentals are added.  For (e.g.) Sun, 
this is a drop in the ocean - for us, unless there's some benefit of 
attendance I'm unaware of, the cost/benefit doesn't work out.  I'd guess 
this applies to a lot of people who don't have large corporate 
employers/sponsors.

>> I'll be in Seoul, but before I request a meeting slot I'd like to
>> hear from active WG participants to get a sense as to whether we'll
>> have critical mass for any of our work areas..

I won't be there :-)

-- 
Jon Bright
Silicon Circus Ltd.
http://www.siliconcircus.com



From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Sat Jan 10 11:03:58 2004
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On Friday, January 09, 2004 22:06:43 +0100 Jon Bright 
<jon@siliconcircus.com> wrote:

> *but* it's difficult to justify the $500 outlay for the registration

I wouldn't expect that to change anytime soon.  The fee changes depending 
on how much the conference venue costs, but that's only a little on the 
high side.  And remember, the IETF is losing money...

> I won't be there :-)

I will


From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Thu Jan 15 11:56:26 2004
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From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
Subject: Last Call: 'Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the SSH Transport 
         Layer Protocol' to Proposed Standard 
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The IESG has received a request from the Secure Shell WG to consider the 
following document:

- 'Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the SSH Transport Layer Protocol '
   <draft-ietf-secsh-dh-group-exchange-04.txt> as a Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action.  Please send any comments to the
iesg@ietf.org or ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2004-01-29.

The file can be obtained via
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-secsh-dh-group-exchange-04.txt



From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan 16 11:18:04 2004
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From: "Glen Matthews" <glen@montreal.hcl.com>
To: <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>
Subject: Certificate authentication
Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2004 11:16:41 -0500
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Hi,

  sorry for the dumb question (if it is dumb) but I can't see any drafts
dealing with certificate authentication in ssh. ssh.com seems to support
this, and I see a patch for openssh by Roumen Petrov - but is there any
position from the wg on this?

Glen Matthews



From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan 16 12:32:19 2004
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From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@east.sun.com>
To: "Glen Matthews" <glen@montreal.hcl.com>
cc: ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
Subject: Re: Certificate authentication 
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Fri, 16 Jan 2004 11:16:41 EST."
             <004c01c3dc4c$206e7180$b801040a@mtlglenltp2> 
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>   sorry for the dumb question (if it is dumb) but I can't see any drafts
> dealing with certificate authentication in ssh. ssh.com seems to support
> this, and I see a patch for openssh by Roumen Petrov - but is there any
> position from the wg on this?

the position of the WG chair is that he'd very much like to find
someone willing to write a document on the topic.  everyone who has
stepped forward to do this hasn't delivered yet.

"Please send text."


						- Bill


From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan 16 20:57:55 2004
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From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: glen@montreal.hcl.com, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
Subject: Re: Certificate authentication
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"Glen Matthews" <glen@montreal.hcl.com writes:

>sorry for the dumb question (if it is dumb) but I can't see any drafts
>dealing with certificate authentication in ssh. ssh.com seems to support
>this, and I see a patch for openssh by Roumen Petrov - but is there any
>position from the wg on this?

I looked at this a while back and the group consensus is that no two people
can agree on how to handle it :-).  I went through the list archives
collecting all the comments on this, it starts around July'01 with:

  For x.509 certificates using rsa keys, SSH Communications 3.0 appears to be
  using PKCS #1 with MD5.

That doesn't describe the format, merely what's inside the RSA bignum... and
the debate then fizzled out again.  There's another post from August '01:

  I would suggest we include the following text in section documenting
  "x509v3-sign-rsa":

  The "x509v3-sign-rsa" key format has the following specific encoding:

     string    "x509v3-sign-rsa"
     byte[n]   x.509v3 compatible der encoded certificate data

  The resulting signature is encoded as follows:

     string    "x509v3-sign-rsa"
     string    rsa_signature_blob

  Variants to this go in the other x.509 sections as appropriate.

  In addition, I would suggest that we note that signatures made with x509v3-
  sign-rsa keys MUST use the SHA-1 hash, and be done using PKCS1.

but then later he says:

  So, we decided to change x.509v3 certificates to use pkcs7 signatures,
  because otherwise, there is no way to know what hashing algorithm was used.

  There are currently two such algorithms defined:

        x509v3-sign-rsa      RECOMMENDED  sign    X.509 certificates (RSA key)
        x509v3-sign-dss      RECOMMENDED  sign    X.509 certificates (DSS key)

      The "x509v3-*" key format has the following generic encoding:

        string    "x509v3-*"
        string    x.509v3 compatible der encoded certificate data

      The resulting signature is encoded as follows:

        string    "pkcs7"
        string    PKCS-7 signature, DER encoded

      The "x509v3-sign-rsa" method indicates that the key
      (or one of the keys in the certificate) is an RSA-key.

      The "x509v3-sign-dss".  As above, but indicates that the key (or
      one of the keys in the certificate) is a DSS-key.

which never appeard in the RFC.  There's a  followup in Jan'02 asking why it's
not present yet, and several other ones indicating that no two people can
agree on how to do this, including the [editorial comment deleted] suggestion
to use:

   The certificate formats based on ssh-rsa extend the public key
   format to include certificate data:

     string    "ssh-rsa-x509v3" / "ssh-rsa-spki" / "ssh-rsa-pgp"
     mpint     e
     mpint     n
     string    certificate

which practically guarantees that one or more implementations will use the e
and n from outside the cert (particularly ones only pretending to do X.509),
completely voiding the purpose of having the cert in the first place.  Even
ssh.com don't seem to know what to do:

  moreover, implementations supporting x509 (e.g. ssh.com) currently send

        string  "DER-encoded cert"

  without even sending the key type.

   Certificates and public keys are encoded as follows:

     string   certificate or public key format identifier
     byte[n]  key/certificate data

  so, i'm confused by the draft and the implementations.

Markus Friedl then comments that:

  This is obviously wrong,

Bill Sommerfeld finally sums it up with:

  i do not want to hold up the core drafts waiting for folks to figure out how
  to use x.509 with ssh.

and Damien Miller followed up with the observation that:

  The current spec is too vague to implement.

There were further comments more recently which indicated that interest in
doing X.509 with SSH was sufficiently low that no-one cared too much about
this issue anyway.

Peter.


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From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: sommerfeld@east.sun.com
Subject: Re: Certificate authentication
Cc: ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
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Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@east.sun.com> writes:

>the position of the WG chair is that he'd very much like to find someone
>willing to write a document on the topic.  everyone who has stepped forward
>to do this hasn't delivered yet.
>
>"Please send text."

Two questions:

1. What sort of text do you need here?  Just something to define the format
   for the cert and the signature?  That should be simple enough, however...

2. Does anyone really care about this?  As my previous post indicated,
   interest in this seems pretty much nonexistant, is it worth doing a draft
   that no-one cares about?  To use the tree-in-a-forest analogy, if I send in
   a draft and no-one implements it...

Peter.


From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Sat Jan 17 03:35:20 2004
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From: Derek Fawcus <dfawcus@cisco.com>
To: ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
Subject: Re: Certificate authentication
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On Sat, Jan 17, 2004 at 03:01:41PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@east.sun.com> writes:
> 
> >the position of the WG chair is that he'd very much like to find someone
> >willing to write a document on the topic.  everyone who has stepped forward
> >to do this hasn't delivered yet.
> >
> >"Please send text."
> 
> Two questions:
> 
> 1. What sort of text do you need here?  Just something to define the format
>    for the cert and the signature?  That should be simple enough, however...
> 
> 2. Does anyone really care about this?  As my previous post indicated,
>    interest in this seems pretty much nonexistant, is it worth doing a draft
>    that no-one cares about?  To use the tree-in-a-forest analogy, if I send in
>    a draft and no-one implements it...

Well I'm actually for the simple approach at the moment:
   rip all text referring to certificates from the current draft.

DF


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From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: dfawcus@cisco.com, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
Subject: Re: Certificate authentication
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Derek Fawcus <dfawcus@cisco.com> writes:

>Well I'm actually for the simple approach at the moment:
>   rip all text referring to certificates from the current draft.

I could live with that.  That seems to be the de facto profile for certs at
the moment anyway.

Peter.


From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Sat Jan 17 04:21:24 2004
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Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2004 09:21:21 +0000
From: Derek Fawcus <dfawcus@cisco.com>
To: ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
Subject: Re: Certificate authentication
Message-ID: <20040117092121.B12113@edinburgh.cisco.com>
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On Sat, Jan 17, 2004 at 09:54:12PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Derek Fawcus <dfawcus@cisco.com> writes:
> 
> >Well I'm actually for the simple approach at the moment:
> >   rip all text referring to certificates from the current draft.
> 
> I could live with that.  That seems to be the de facto profile for certs at
> the moment anyway.

Yeah.  Then if we (WG) ever get our act together wrt certificates,  we can
produce a new draft specific to cert. use...

DF


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On Sat, 17 Jan 2004, Derek Fawcus wrote:

> Yeah.  Then if we (WG) ever get our act together wrt certificates,  we can
> produce a new draft specific to cert. use...

There are lots of people in the Grid community using SSH with 
certificates using the GSI GSSAPI interface. This route has the advantage
that it doesn't need any further specification ...

Simon.



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Cc: sommerfeld@east.sun.com, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
Subject: Re: Certificate authentication
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From: nisse@lysator.liu.se (Niels =?iso-8859-1?q?M=F6ller?=)
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pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes:

> 2. Does anyone really care about this?  As my previous post indicated,
>    interest in this seems pretty much nonexistant, is it worth doing a draft
>    that no-one cares about?  To use the tree-in-a-forest analogy, if I send in
>    a draft and no-one implements it...

Personally, I don't care much about x.509, it seems too complex and
broken to ever do any reasonable security with.

I'd like to do spki certificates, but at the moment it's not a high
priority either.

/Niels


From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Sun Jan 18 04:02:01 2004
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From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: nisse@lysator.liu.se, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz
Subject: Re: Certificate authentication
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nisse@lysator.liu.se (Niels =?iso-8859-1?q?M=F6ller?=) writes:

>I'd like to do spki certificates, but at the moment it's not a high priority
>either.

Speaking of SPKI, it's not just X.509 that has the issue with being
underspecified, both SPKI and PGP have the same problem.  Instead of removing
these portions entirely, how about adding a note to say that the identifiers
for X.509/SPKI/PGP are reserved for possible future standardisation?  That way
if in the future someone decides they want to get some mechanism standardised,
the identifiers are already defined.

Peter.



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Subject: Re: Certificate authentication
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From: nisse@lysator.liu.se (Niels =?iso-8859-1?q?M=F6ller?=)
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pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes:

> Speaking of SPKI, it's not just X.509 that has the issue with being
> underspecified, both SPKI and PGP have the same problem.  Instead of removing
> these portions entirely, how about adding a note to say that the identifiers
> for X.509/SPKI/PGP are reserved for possible future standardisation?

Makes sense to me.

As for spki, the only spki-ish I do yet is in the representation of
the "known-hosts" database, where I use acl:s of the form

(acl (entry (subject (public-key (rsa-pkcs1-sha1 (n |AMxUKL4vuu8WvsMpkc/
                                                     bt6ZcdJ7UJxCwaDVOEg
                                                     pd0ZMEhWZK2bEUwtH06
                                                     TimrUDbNa/wSxaFbdta
                                                     FRcCF1XrxkMAfi39Gfu
                                                     cPasFQEDbv2FABRwT06
                                                     gc3uMGCv4ElqkDi6I+6
                                                     zoWZNMbQEulEqnHyncz
                                                     HUVoHrmeedD+oEsxB37
                                                     9|)
                                                 (e "#"))))
            (tag (ssh-hostkey org.gnu.savannah))))

Note the reversed domain name, that is to make it possible to use
acls/certificates with (tag (ssh-hostkey (* prefix org.gnu.))) to
represent the capability of representing any machine under gnu.org.

/Niels


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Peter Gutmann wrote:

> which never appeard in the RFC.  There's a  followup in Jan'02 asking why it's
> not present yet, and several other ones indicating that no two people can
> agree on how to do this, including the [editorial comment deleted] suggestion
> to use:
> 
>    The certificate formats based on ssh-rsa extend the public key
>    format to include certificate data:
> 
>      string    "ssh-rsa-x509v3" / "ssh-rsa-spki" / "ssh-rsa-pgp"
>      mpint     e
>      mpint     n
>      string    certificate

IIRC it was I that suggested this encoding and then promptly retracted
it after a good night's sleep. I had hoped that this bit of embassasment
would lay undisturbed in the list archives. Anyway:

- I think that the certificate hostkeys or userauth should be specified
in separate drafts.

- I'd prefer that no more changes be made to the current drafts so as
not to (yet again) delay them.

- If changes absolutely have to be made, then I would prefer the current
wording around certificate encoding to be converted to references to
external specifications.

- I don't think that the current wording should just be deleted, as at
least one implementation (ssh.com, and possibly people who are using
patched OpenSSH) does use host-key certificates with the specified
encoding name.

-d



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Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2004 08:50:35 +0100 (CET)
From: maf@appgate.com
Subject: Re: Certificate authentication
To: ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
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On 19 Jan, Damien Miller wrote:
> IIRC it was I that suggested this encoding and then promptly retracted
> it after a good night's sleep. I had hoped that this bit of embassasment
> would lay undisturbed in the list archives. Anyway:

Isn't the internet wonderful:-)

> - I think that the certificate hostkeys or userauth should be specified
> in separate drafts.

I have no problems with this.

> - I'd prefer that no more changes be made to the current drafts so as
> not to (yet again) delay them.

Agreed.

> - I don't think that the current wording should just be deleted, as at
> least one implementation (ssh.com, and possibly people who are using
> patched OpenSSH) does use host-key certificates with the specified
> encoding name.

We have implemented certificate support both for authentication and
hostkeys in the AppGate software. But since the drafts were unclear we
have used private names (i.e. @appgate.com) for them.

	/MaF
-- 
Martin Forssen <maf@appgate.com>              Development Manager
Phone: +46 31 7744361                         AppGate Network Security AB


From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Wed Jan 21 16:29:27 2004
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Guys,

Get ready for Connectathon 2004!  The 18th annual interoperability
testing event for engineers only will be held Feb. 19-26, 2004 in
San Jose, California.  For the past 3 years, Connectathon booth space
has sold out!  Get your registration forms and fees in early and take
advantage of registration discounts available through December 19th.

Connectathon, sponsored by Sun Microsystems, Inc., hosts over 40
companies annually in an effort to test and debug source code which
utilize the following technologies and protocols:

NFS versions 2, 3 and 4
NFS over RDMA
NFSv4 replication and migration
Kerberos
IPv6
IPsec
Mobile IPv6
Secure Shell

Based on demand, in addition we are considering to offer:

LDAP
NDMP
CIFS
iSCSI

If you are interested in testing any of the above 4 protocols, please
send a note to Cthon@sun.com and we'll gauge interest.  Or if you have a

suggestion for another technology, feel free to contact us as well.

Testing continues 24 hours per day.  Technology testing coordinators
will organize testing procedures and test suite material.  In addition,
there will be seminars and speakers addressing various topics.

The registration deadline is February 6, 2004.  But don't wait that
long!  And Early Bird Discount on booth fees is available to those who
register and pay by December 19, 2003.  For the past 3 years,
Connectathon has sold out of booth space.  Please get your registration
materials in quickly to avoid disappointment.  Go to
http://www.connectathon.org to download all forms and information.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Audrey Van
Belleghem at audrey@vanb.com or (408) 358-9598.

We look forward to seeing you at the 18th annual Connectathon event!

Audrey Van Belleghem
Connectathon Manager



From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Tue Jan 27 01:12:11 2004
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Date: Tue, 27 Jan 2004 08:11:50 +0200
From: Roumen Petrov <openssh@roumenpetrov.info>
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
CC: glen@montreal.hcl.com, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
Subject: Re: Certificate authentication
References: <200401170157.i0H1vi402152@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Peter Gutmann wrote:
> "Glen Matthews" <glen@montreal.hcl.com writes:
> [SNIP]
> >   moreover, implementations supporting x509 (e.g. ssh.com) currently send
> 
>         string  "DER-encoded cert"

In [SSH-USERAUTH] section 3.3 definition is public key blob. X.509 equivalent is exactly "DER-encoded cert".
Wenn a packet contain X.509 certificates and we would like to compute signature we MUST use ASN.1 DER encoding.

> 
>   without even sending the key type.
> 
>    Certificates and public keys are encoded as follows:
> 
>      string   certificate or public key format identifier
>      byte[n]  key/certificate data
> 

Might definition in [SSH-TRANS] is confusing. Where is public key blob ?

Is "public key blob" == string(format identifier)+byte[n](key data)
or might "public key blob" == byte[n](key data) ?

Of course we know that "public key blob"[SSH-USERAUTH] == "key format"[SSH-TRANS]

>   so, i'm confused by the draft and the implementations.

In case of X.509 certificates "key format" should be ASN.1 DER encoded only,
i.e. without format identifier since X.509 cert. contain all necessary information.

> 
> [SNIP]
>  

About signatures: this is the true/real question.
In case of x509v3-sign-rsa we can use MD5 or SHA-1 hash.
In my implementation we can select preffered rsa hash. Client and server accept authentication packets with both hashes.
Since SHA-1 is preferred in [PKIXPROF] might is good [SSH-TRANS] document to contain lines:
   After 31 December 2004 all SSH implementation MUST use SHA-1 hash to compute x509v3-sign-rsa resulting signature.
   Until that date, conforming SSH may be assumed MD5 and SHA-1 hash based resulting signature as different.

What sort of signature to use in case of x509v3-sign-dss: same as described in [SSH-TRANS] for "ssh-dss" or to
use ASN.1 encoding for dsa-sig(r,s) as is defined in [PKIXALGS] and as is in some SecSH implementations ?


References:
[SSH-TRANS]     Ylonen, T., "SSH Transport Layer Protocol", I-D
                 draft-ietf-transport-17.txt, Oct 2003.

[SSH-USERAUTH]  Ylonen, T., "SSH Authentication Protocol", I-D
                 draft-ietf-userauth-18.txt, Oct 2003.

[PKIXPROF]      Housley, R., Polk, T, Ford, W. and Solo, D., "Internet
                 X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
                 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
                 April 2002.

[PKIXALGS]      Bassham, L., Polk, W. and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
                 Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
                 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
                 Lists (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.

Roumen



From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Tue Jan 27 01:12:59 2004
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To: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
CC: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, glen@montreal.hcl.com,
        ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
Subject: Re: Certificate authentication
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Damien Miller wrote:
> [SNIP]
> - I think that the certificate hostkeys or userauth should be specified
> in separate drafts.
> [SNIP]

[SSH-USERAUTH] document should be changed too.



From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Wed Jan 28 16:43:46 2004
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To: ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
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Hi there! Sorry for an e-mail out of the blue, but I just did a search for the term web based project management software on Google and found openssh.com ranked 15. Since I publish a related website about Computers - Software (it's strictly informational, so I'm definitely NOT a competitor of yours), I'd like to link to your site.
 
My site is one of the best resources for info in our category. Because of this great info, I get a pretty decent amount of visitors...so if I link to you, your site should get some nice traffic as well.
 
I think you'll see that my site is pretty clean and high quality. I consider my site a good product, and I only request to link to other quality sites. I would ask that you also link to my site in exchange. So you know, I've already linked to you and will keep it there for a few days until I hear from you. If you're interested in swapping links for good, please reply back so I can get you all of the pertinent information.
 
Thanks!
 
Christine A. Peterson
RAC IM: 312297.



From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Thu Jan 29 19:10:56 2004
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From: "Brent McClure" <mcclure@swcp.com>
To: <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>
References: <200401170157.i0H1vi402152@cs.auckland.ac.nz> <400B3BB3.80602@mindrot.org> <40160163.20500@roumenpetrov.info>
Subject: clarification of "compulsory" attributes in publickey subsystem
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2004 17:10:49 -0700
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Could I get some clarification about the "compulsory" flag in the
publickey subsystem draft?
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-secsh-publickey-subsystem-00.txt

The draft talks about how a client can send a "listattributes" request
and the server will respond with zero or more of these responses:

     string    "attribute"
     string    attribute name
     boolean   compulsory

Here is the draft's description of compulsory:

   The "compulsory" field indicates whether this attribute will be
   compulsorily applied to any added keys (irrespective of whether the
   attribute has been specified by the client) due to administrative
   settings on the server.  If the server does not support
   administrative settings of this nature, it MUST return false in the
   compulsory field.

What was the rationale for the compulsory flag? I want to make sure
I understand what we're supposed to do with this flag.

thanks, Brent




From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan 30 11:41:52 2004
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From: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>
To: "'Darren Tucker'" <dtucker@zip.com.au>, kerberos@mit.edu, krbdev@mit.edu,
        heimdal-discuss@sics.se
cc: "OpenSSH Devel List" <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
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Darren,

I have been doing some testing and I noticed a problem with the server
implementation of GSSAPI authentication within the open ssh snapshot
(openssh-SNAP-20040124.tar.gz).  

The draft (draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-07) states:

   Since the user authentication process by its nature authenticates
   only the client, the setting of the mutual_req_flag is not needed for
   this process.  This flag SHOULD be set to "false".

The client sets this to true, not really a problem.  Our modified f-secure
client does the same thing.  However, if GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG is not set, then
the open ssh server rejects the connection.  The following line of code
(from gss-serv.c):

        /* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then
         * we flag the user as also having been authenticated
         */

        if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
            (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE))
{
                if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
                        fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
        }


This requires the client to set GSS_C_MUTUAL, which conflicts with the
draft. 

-dan

-----Original Message-----
From: Darren Tucker [mailto:dtucker@zip.com.au] 
Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2004 6:46 PM
To: kerberos@mit.edu; krbdev@mit.edu; heimdal-discuss@sics.se
Cc: OpenSSH Devel List
Subject: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes

(I hope this message is appropriate for these lists.  If not, please 
tell me and I won't do it again.)

Hi All.
	There will be a new release of OpenSSH in a couple of weeks.  This 
release contains Kerberos and GSSAPI related changes that we would like 
to get some feedback about (and hopefully address any issues with) 
before the release.

	I encourage anyone with an interest in Kerberos/GSSAPI support in 
OpenSSH to try a snapshot [1] and send feedback.

Changes in OpenBSD's OpenSSH and -Portable:
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/11/17 11:06:07
      replace "gssapi" with "gssapi-with-mic"; from Simon Wilkinson;
      test + ok jakob.
    - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/12/23 16:12:10
      implement KerberosGetAFSToken server option. ok markus@, beck@
    - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/11/02 11:01:03
      remove support for SSH_BUG_GSSAPI_BER; simon at sxw.org.uk

Changes in -Portable only
  - (dtucker) Only enable KerberosGetAFSToken if Heimdal's libkafs
    is found.  with jakob@	
  - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Use krb5-config where available for
    Kerberos/GSSAPI detection, libs and includes.  ok djm@

Additionally, as a side effect of the last change, the test for libkafs 
is now independant of the Heimdal test, so should a version that works 
with MIT Kerberos be available it will be used.

All but the last are in the 20040122 snapshot, and the last will be in 
20040123 and up.

Please follow-up to the OpenSSH devel list (cc: the Kerberos lists if 
you consider it appropriate).

[1] ftp://ftp.ca.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/snapshot/ or 
one of the mirrors listed at http://openssh.com/portable.html#mirrors

-- 
Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip.com.au)
GPG key 8FF4FA69 / D9A3 86E9 7EEE AF4B B2D4  37C9 C982 80C7 8FF4 FA69
     Good judgement comes with experience. Unfortunately, the experience
usually comes from bad judgement.

_______________________________________________
krbdev mailing list             krbdev@mit.edu
https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/krbdev



From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan 30 16:44:52 2004
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Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2004 16:43:51 -0500
From: Jeffrey Hutzelman <jhutz@cmu.edu>
To: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>,
        "'Darren Tucker'" <dtucker@zip.com.au>, kerberos@mit.edu,
        krbdev@mit.edu, heimdal-discuss@sics.se
cc: OpenSSH Devel List <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
Message-ID: <1448470000.1075499031@minbar.fac.cs.cmu.edu>
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On Friday, January 30, 2004 09:41:26 -0700 "Wachdorf, Daniel R" 
<drwachd@sandia.gov> wrote:

> The client sets this to true, not really a problem.  Our modified f-secure
> client does the same thing.  However, if GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG is not set,
> then the open ssh server rejects the connection.  The following line of
> code (from gss-serv.c):
>
>         /* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then
>          * we flag the user as also having been authenticated
>          */
>
>         if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
>             (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major ==
> GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {
>                 if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
>                         fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
>         }
>
>
> This requires the client to set GSS_C_MUTUAL, which conflicts with the
> draft.

Indeed, it does.  The server is not supposed to check the state of the 
mutual_flag of a context accepted for gssapi-with-mic user auth.  I know 
the draft is not entirely clear on this point; would it help if there were 
text indicating the server MUST NOT do this?


Also, I've not actually read this code, other than what's quoted above, but 
I hope that's not the only place that flags are checked.  I'm assuming the 
openssh code actually implements -07 and 'gssapi-with-mic'.  In the new 
method, the client's final message is either SSM_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC or 
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, depending entirely on whether 
GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG is set.  The server is REQUIRED to fail the authentication 
if the client sends the wrong message; this means the value of 
GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG must be tested.


-- Jeffrey T. Hutzelman (N3NHS) <jhutz+@cmu.edu>
   Sr. Research Systems Programmer
   School of Computer Science - Research Computing Facility
   Carnegie Mellon University - Pittsburgh, PA



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From: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>
To: "'Jeffrey Hutzelman'" <jhutz@cmu.edu>,
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cc: "OpenSSH Devel List" <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
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No, there is another place in the code where GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG is checked.
It then either verifies the MIC or processes an EXCHANGE_COMPLETE message.

-dan


-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Hutzelman [mailto:jhutz@cmu.edu] 
Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 2:44 PM
To: Wachdorf, Daniel R; 'Darren Tucker'; kerberos@mit.edu; krbdev@mit.edu;
heimdal-discuss@sics.se
Cc: OpenSSH Devel List; ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes

On Friday, January 30, 2004 09:41:26 -0700 "Wachdorf, Daniel R" 
<drwachd@sandia.gov> wrote:

> The client sets this to true, not really a problem.  Our modified f-secure
> client does the same thing.  However, if GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG is not set,
> then the open ssh server rejects the connection.  The following line of
> code (from gss-serv.c):
>
>         /* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then
>          * we flag the user as also having been authenticated
>          */
>
>         if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
>             (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major ==
> GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {
>                 if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
>                         fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
>         }
>
>
> This requires the client to set GSS_C_MUTUAL, which conflicts with the
> draft.

Indeed, it does.  The server is not supposed to check the state of the 
mutual_flag of a context accepted for gssapi-with-mic user auth.  I know 
the draft is not entirely clear on this point; would it help if there were 
text indicating the server MUST NOT do this?


Also, I've not actually read this code, other than what's quoted above, but 
I hope that's not the only place that flags are checked.  I'm assuming the 
openssh code actually implements -07 and 'gssapi-with-mic'.  In the new 
method, the client's final message is either SSM_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC or 
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, depending entirely on whether 
GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG is set.  The server is REQUIRED to fail the authentication 
if the client sends the wrong message; this means the value of 
GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG must be tested.


-- Jeffrey T. Hutzelman (N3NHS) <jhutz+@cmu.edu>
   Sr. Research Systems Programmer
   School of Computer Science - Research Computing Facility
   Carnegie Mellon University - Pittsburgh, PA




From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan 30 17:47:38 2004
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Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2004 16:46:41 -0600 (CST)
From: Ben Lindstrom <mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org>
To: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>
cc: "'Jeffrey Hutzelman'" <jhutz@cmu.edu>, <kerberos@mit.edu>,
        <krbdev@mit.edu>, <heimdal-discuss@sics.se>, <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>,
        OpenSSH Devel List <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>
Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
In-Reply-To: <AC89BDA1E3CCBC42B9CA5B50FE7934D3066F112F@es10snlnt.sandia.gov>
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I need someone to look at this and get back to us ASAP in regards to if
this will break GSSAPI-WITH-MIC.

If this does break something.  GET US A PATCH NOW or live with broke
GSSAPI-WITH-MIC support for 6 months.

If it is just a "clean up" thing that can be handled after 3.9 release.
Fine, but I don't want to listen to 6 months of whining if it is. <weak
smile>

- Ben



On Fri, 30 Jan 2004, Wachdorf, Daniel R wrote:

> No, there is another place in the code where GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG is checked.
> It then either verifies the MIC or processes an EXCHANGE_COMPLETE message.
>
> -dan
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jeffrey Hutzelman [mailto:jhutz@cmu.edu]
> Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 2:44 PM
> To: Wachdorf, Daniel R; 'Darren Tucker'; kerberos@mit.edu; krbdev@mit.edu;
> heimdal-discuss@sics.se
> Cc: OpenSSH Devel List; ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
> Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
>
> On Friday, January 30, 2004 09:41:26 -0700 "Wachdorf, Daniel R"
> <drwachd@sandia.gov> wrote:
>
> > The client sets this to true, not really a problem.  Our modified f-secure
> > client does the same thing.  However, if GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG is not set,
> > then the open ssh server rejects the connection.  The following line of
> > code (from gss-serv.c):
> >
> >         /* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then
> >          * we flag the user as also having been authenticated
> >          */
> >
> >         if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
> >             (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major ==
> > GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {
> >                 if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
> >                         fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
> >         }
> >
> >
> > This requires the client to set GSS_C_MUTUAL, which conflicts with the
> > draft.
>
> Indeed, it does.  The server is not supposed to check the state of the
> mutual_flag of a context accepted for gssapi-with-mic user auth.  I know
> the draft is not entirely clear on this point; would it help if there were
> text indicating the server MUST NOT do this?
>
>
> Also, I've not actually read this code, other than what's quoted above, but
> I hope that's not the only place that flags are checked.  I'm assuming the
> openssh code actually implements -07 and 'gssapi-with-mic'.  In the new
> method, the client's final message is either SSM_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC or
> SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, depending entirely on whether
> GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG is set.  The server is REQUIRED to fail the authentication
> if the client sends the wrong message; this means the value of
> GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG must be tested.
>
>
> -- Jeffrey T. Hutzelman (N3NHS) <jhutz+@cmu.edu>
>    Sr. Research Systems Programmer
>    School of Computer Science - Research Computing Facility
>    Carnegie Mellon University - Pittsburgh, PA
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> openssh-unix-dev mailing list
> openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org
> http://www.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev
>



From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan 30 17:53:31 2004
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From: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>
To: "'Ben Lindstrom'" <mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org>,
        "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>
cc: "'Jeffrey Hutzelman'" <jhutz@cmu.edu>, kerberos@mit.edu, krbdev@mit.edu,
        heimdal-discuss@sics.se, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org,
        "OpenSSH Devel List" <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>
Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
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Ben,

This will break GSSAPI_WITH_MIC if clients don't do GSS_C_MUTUAL as outlined
by the standard.  Ie - follow the standard and it wont work.  So I guess
that means it's broke.

I can get a patch to you, what version of the source should I patch, a
nightly snapshot?

-dan

-----Original Message-----
From: Ben Lindstrom [mailto:mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org] 
Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 3:47 PM
To: Wachdorf, Daniel R
Cc: 'Jeffrey Hutzelman'; kerberos@mit.edu; krbdev@mit.edu;
heimdal-discuss@sics.se; ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org; OpenSSH Devel List
Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes


I need someone to look at this and get back to us ASAP in regards to if
this will break GSSAPI-WITH-MIC.

If this does break something.  GET US A PATCH NOW or live with broke
GSSAPI-WITH-MIC support for 6 months.

If it is just a "clean up" thing that can be handled after 3.9 release.
Fine, but I don't want to listen to 6 months of whining if it is. <weak
smile>

- Ben



On Fri, 30 Jan 2004, Wachdorf, Daniel R wrote:

> No, there is another place in the code where GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG is checked.
> It then either verifies the MIC or processes an EXCHANGE_COMPLETE message.
>
> -dan
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jeffrey Hutzelman [mailto:jhutz@cmu.edu]
> Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 2:44 PM
> To: Wachdorf, Daniel R; 'Darren Tucker'; kerberos@mit.edu; krbdev@mit.edu;
> heimdal-discuss@sics.se
> Cc: OpenSSH Devel List; ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
> Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
>
> On Friday, January 30, 2004 09:41:26 -0700 "Wachdorf, Daniel R"
> <drwachd@sandia.gov> wrote:
>
> > The client sets this to true, not really a problem.  Our modified
f-secure
> > client does the same thing.  However, if GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG is not set,
> > then the open ssh server rejects the connection.  The following line of
> > code (from gss-serv.c):
> >
> >         /* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then
> >          * we flag the user as also having been authenticated
> >          */
> >
> >         if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
> >             (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major ==
> > GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {
> >                 if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
> >                         fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
> >         }
> >
> >
> > This requires the client to set GSS_C_MUTUAL, which conflicts with the
> > draft.
>
> Indeed, it does.  The server is not supposed to check the state of the
> mutual_flag of a context accepted for gssapi-with-mic user auth.  I know
> the draft is not entirely clear on this point; would it help if there were
> text indicating the server MUST NOT do this?
>
>
> Also, I've not actually read this code, other than what's quoted above,
but
> I hope that's not the only place that flags are checked.  I'm assuming the
> openssh code actually implements -07 and 'gssapi-with-mic'.  In the new
> method, the client's final message is either SSM_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC
or
> SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, depending entirely on whether
> GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG is set.  The server is REQUIRED to fail the
authentication
> if the client sends the wrong message; this means the value of
> GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG must be tested.
>
>
> -- Jeffrey T. Hutzelman (N3NHS) <jhutz+@cmu.edu>
>    Sr. Research Systems Programmer
>    School of Computer Science - Research Computing Facility
>    Carnegie Mellon University - Pittsburgh, PA
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> openssh-unix-dev mailing list
> openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org
> http://www.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev
>




From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan 30 17:53:43 2004
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Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2004 16:48:25 -0600
From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com>
To: Jeffrey Hutzelman <jhutz@cmu.edu>
Cc: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>,
        "'Darren Tucker'" <dtucker@zip.com.au>, kerberos@mit.edu,
        krbdev@mit.edu, heimdal-discuss@sics.se, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org,
        OpenSSH Devel List <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>
Subject: Re: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
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On Fri, Jan 30, 2004 at 04:43:51PM -0500, Jeffrey Hutzelman wrote:
> Indeed, it does.  The server is not supposed to check the state of the 
> mutual_flag of a context accepted for gssapi-with-mic user auth.  I know 
> the draft is not entirely clear on this point; would it help if there were 
> text indicating the server MUST NOT do this?

For completeness' sake, yes.  The client (SHOULD NOT | MAY) set
GSS_C_MUTUAL for gssapi-with-mic, but the server MUST ignore the state
of the GSS_C_MUTUAL flag for gssapi-with-mic.

> Also, I've not actually read this code, other than what's quoted above, but 
> I hope that's not the only place that flags are checked.  I'm assuming the 
> openssh code actually implements -07 and 'gssapi-with-mic'.  In the new 
> method, the client's final message is either SSM_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC or 
> SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, depending entirely on whether 
> GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG is set.  The server is REQUIRED to fail the authentication 
> if the client sends the wrong message; this means the value of 
> GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG must be tested.

Right.  Further, the text should say that the server MAY always reject
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE since there's no generic
interface for determining whether a context doesn't have the GSS_C_INTEG
flag set because the client left it off or because the mechanism doesn't
support GSS_C_INTEG.

Nico
-- 


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To: Ben Lindstrom <mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org>
Cc: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>,
        "'Jeffrey Hutzelman'" <jhutz@cmu.edu>, krbdev@mit.edu,
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Subject: Re: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
References: <Pine.BSO.4.44.0401301643190.27267-100000@etoh.eviladmin.org>
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans@mit.edu>
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2004 17:54:27 -0500
In-Reply-To: <Pine.BSO.4.44.0401301643190.27267-100000@etoh.eviladmin.org> (Ben
 Lindstrom's message of "Fri, 30 Jan 2004 16:46:41 -0600 (CST)")
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>>>>> "Ben" == Ben Lindstrom <mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org> writes:

    Ben> I need someone to look at this and get back to us ASAP in
    Ben> regards to if this will break GSSAPI-WITH-MIC.

It may make some conforming clients break but does not create a
security problem.

Some client implementers may choose to introduce an extra round trip
(which is what setting the mutual required flag does) in order to
interoperate with OpenSsh if the code is released in the current
state.

Really, that's probably OK if it happens.

I'd class this as a minor conformance issue, but not a huge deal.



From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan 30 17:59:35 2004
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From: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>
To: "'Sam Hartman'" <hartmans@mit.edu>,
        "Ben Lindstrom" <mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org>
cc: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>,
        "'Jeffrey Hutzelman'" <jhutz@cmu.edu>, krbdev@mit.edu,
        ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org, kerberos@mit.edu, heimdal-discuss@sics.se,
        "OpenSSH Devel List" <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>
Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2004 15:59:22 -0700
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Well,

It could be a problem. If someone has implemented a client and doesn't do
mutual auth (as the standard says they should), they could be broken.  

The fix is easy.  Just remove:

(*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
            (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))

from the if statement.  

I have already tested this out, it works fine.  I will make a diff if
someone tells me what to base if off of.

-----Original Message-----
From: Sam Hartman [mailto:hartmans@mit.edu] 
Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 3:54 PM
To: Ben Lindstrom
Cc: Wachdorf, Daniel R; 'Jeffrey Hutzelman'; krbdev@mit.edu;
ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org; kerberos@mit.edu; heimdal-discuss@sics.se; OpenSSH
Devel List
Subject: Re: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes

>>>>> "Ben" == Ben Lindstrom <mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org> writes:

    Ben> I need someone to look at this and get back to us ASAP in
    Ben> regards to if this will break GSSAPI-WITH-MIC.

It may make some conforming clients break but does not create a
security problem.

Some client implementers may choose to introduce an extra round trip
(which is what setting the mutual required flag does) in order to
interoperate with OpenSsh if the code is released in the current
state.

Really, that's probably OK if it happens.

I'd class this as a minor conformance issue, but not a huge deal.




From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan 30 18:12:11 2004
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Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2004 17:11:12 -0600 (CST)
From: Ben Lindstrom <mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org>
To: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>
cc: "'Sam Hartman'" <hartmans@mit.edu>, "'Jeffrey Hutzelman'" <jhutz@cmu.edu>,
        <krbdev@mit.edu>, <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>, <kerberos@mit.edu>,
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        OpenSSH Devel List <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>
Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
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On Fri, 30 Jan 2004, Wachdorf, Daniel R wrote:

> Well,
>
> It could be a problem. If someone has implemented a client and doesn't do
								^^^^^^^^^^
> mutual auth (as the standard says they should), they could be broken.
   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

This right here is the key to me.  If someone is not following the RFC.
Then I say let them complaint to their vendor.

Again I ask.. As the code stands are *WE* in RFC compliance?  If not we
need it fixed.

As for what to base it off of.  Pick a recent snapshot.  Not as if the
GSSAPI-WITH-MIC code has drasticly changed in the last few days.

- Ben



From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan 30 18:25:49 2004
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From: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>
To: "'Ben Lindstrom'" <mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org>,
        "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>
cc: "'Sam Hartman'" <hartmans@mit.edu>, "'Jeffrey Hutzelman'" <jhutz@cmu.edu>,
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Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2004 16:25:34 -0700
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No.

1 - RFC states GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG SHOULD not be used.  The current open ssh
server requires that it be used.

2 - RFC also allow for gss mechanisms that don't have GSSAPI integrity.
Servers can then choose to disallow it. As far as I can tell from the code,
any client which doesn't (or cant) have the GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG set cannot
connect.  I can't test this because Kerberos-gssapi uses integrity.

-dan

-----Original Message-----
From: Ben Lindstrom [mailto:mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org] 
Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 4:11 PM
To: Wachdorf, Daniel R
Cc: 'Sam Hartman'; 'Jeffrey Hutzelman'; krbdev@mit.edu; ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org;
kerberos@mit.edu; heimdal-discuss@sics.se; OpenSSH Devel List
Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes



On Fri, 30 Jan 2004, Wachdorf, Daniel R wrote:

> Well,
>
> It could be a problem. If someone has implemented a client and doesn't do
								^^^^^^^^^^
> mutual auth (as the standard says they should), they could be broken.
   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

This right here is the key to me.  If someone is not following the RFC.
Then I say let them complaint to their vendor.

Again I ask.. As the code stands are *WE* in RFC compliance?  If not we
need it fixed.

As for what to base it off of.  Pick a recent snapshot.  Not as if the
GSSAPI-WITH-MIC code has drasticly changed in the last few days.

- Ben




From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan 30 18:57:50 2004
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From: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>
To: "'Ben Lindstrom'" <mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org>,
        "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>
cc: "'Sam Hartman'" <hartmans@mit.edu>, "'Jeffrey Hutzelman'" <jhutz@cmu.edu>,
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Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
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Here is a patch.  it was based of the 2004-12-24 snapshot (I had trouble
getting todays to compile).

*** ../openssh/gss-serv.c       Mon Nov 17 04:18:22 2003
--- gss-serv.c  Fri Jan 30 16:35:24 2004
***************
*** 117,124 ****
         * we flag the user as also having been authenticated
         */

!       if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
!           (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE))
{
                if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
                        fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
        }
--- 117,123 ----
         * we flag the user as also having been authenticated
         */

!       if(ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
                if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
                        fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
        }

-dan

-----Original Message-----
From: Ben Lindstrom [mailto:mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org] 
Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 4:11 PM
To: Wachdorf, Daniel R
Cc: 'Sam Hartman'; 'Jeffrey Hutzelman'; krbdev@mit.edu; ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org;
kerberos@mit.edu; heimdal-discuss@sics.se; OpenSSH Devel List
Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes



On Fri, 30 Jan 2004, Wachdorf, Daniel R wrote:

> Well,
>
> It could be a problem. If someone has implemented a client and doesn't do
								^^^^^^^^^^
> mutual auth (as the standard says they should), they could be broken.
   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

This right here is the key to me.  If someone is not following the RFC.
Then I say let them complaint to their vendor.

Again I ask.. As the code stands are *WE* in RFC compliance?  If not we
need it fixed.

As for what to base it off of.  Pick a recent snapshot.  Not as if the
GSSAPI-WITH-MIC code has drasticly changed in the last few days.

- Ben



------_=_NextPart_000_01C3E78C.AC2A5900
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*** ../openssh/gss-serv.c	Mon Nov 17 04:18:22 2003=0A=
--- gss-serv.c	Fri Jan 30 16:35:24 2004=0A=
***************=0A=
*** 117,124 ****=0A=
  	 * we flag the user as also having been authenticated=0A=
  	 */=0A=
  =0A=
! 	if (((flags =3D=3D NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&=0A=
! 	    (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major =3D=3D =
GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {=0A=
  		if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))=0A=
  			fatal("Couldn't convert client name");=0A=
  	}=0A=
--- 117,123 ----=0A=
  	 * we flag the user as also having been authenticated=0A=
  	 */=0A=
  =0A=
! 	if(ctx->major =3D=3D GSS_S_COMPLETE) {=0A=
  		if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))=0A=
  			fatal("Couldn't convert client name");=0A=
  	}=0A=

------_=_NextPart_000_01C3E78C.AC2A5900--



From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan 30 19:42:40 2004
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To: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>
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        heimdal-discuss@sics.se,
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Subject: Re: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
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Daniel,

My personal belief is that its too late in this release cycle to make 
this change. As the author of the GSSAPI code in OpenSSH, I completely 
accept your comments - we're not (currently) RFC compliant. However, I'm 
aware of a number of vendors who have successfully performed interop 
testing against the current code base. Given the extremely short 
timelines to release, I'd rather delay a change of this nature until we 
have more time to evaluate and test it.

Cheers,

Simon.





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From: Jeffrey Hutzelman <jhutz@cmu.edu>
To: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>,
        "'Ben Lindstrom'" <mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org>
cc: krbdev@mit.edu, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org, kerberos@mit.edu,
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Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
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On Friday, January 30, 2004 16:25:34 -0700 "Wachdorf, Daniel R" 
<drwachd@sandia.gov> wrote:

> No.
>
> 1 - RFC states GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG SHOULD not be used.  The current open ssh
> server requires that it be used.
>
> 2 - RFC also allow for gss mechanisms that don't have GSSAPI integrity.
> Servers can then choose to disallow it. As far as I can tell from the
> code, any client which doesn't (or cant) have the GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG set
> cannot connect.  I can't test this because Kerberos-gssapi uses integrity.
>
> -dan
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ben Lindstrom [mailto:mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org]
> Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 4:11 PM
> To: Wachdorf, Daniel R
> Cc: 'Sam Hartman'; 'Jeffrey Hutzelman'; krbdev@mit.edu;
> ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org; kerberos@mit.edu; heimdal-discuss@sics.se; OpenSSH
> Devel List
> Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
>
>
>
> On Fri, 30 Jan 2004, Wachdorf, Daniel R wrote:
>
>> Well,
>>
>> It could be a problem. If someone has implemented a client and doesn't do
> 								^^^^^^^^^^
>> mutual auth (as the standard says they should), they could be broken.
>    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
> This right here is the key to me.  If someone is not following the RFC.
> Then I say let them complaint to their vendor.
>
> Again I ask.. As the code stands are *WE* in RFC compliance?  If not we
> need it fixed.
>
> As for what to base it off of.  Pick a recent snapshot.  Not as if the
> GSSAPI-WITH-MIC code has drasticly changed in the last few days.

For some reason, I'm not seeing Ben's messages.  Perhaps the mail path from 
him to me is just really long.

In any case...

The spec says clients SHOULD set mutual_req to "false", which means not 
requesting mutual authentication.  I know of no mechanisms which will do 
mutual auth (and produce a context with mutual_flag set) if the client sets 
mutual_req to "false".

What this means is that a compliant client is _likely_ not to work with the 
openssh server as it stands.  It is possible to be compatible with openssh 
and still be compliant (SHOULD means approximately "do this unless you have 
a good reason not to"); however, not all compliant clients will be 
compatible with openssh.  Note that the openssh client is an example of a 
client that interoperates with the openssh server (AFAIK) and is compliant 
(at least, with respect to this issue).

The spec does not specifically prohibit openssh's current behaviour, but it 
is likely to cause interop problems.  IMHO, the fact that this is not 
specified more clearly is an oversight -- the spec does not provide enough 
information to write interoperable clients and servers.  Thank you both for 
finding this; I'll be addressing the issue in the next version.

-- Jeffrey T. Hutzelman (N3NHS) <jhutz+@cmu.edu>
   Sr. Research Systems Programmer
   School of Computer Science - Research Computing Facility
   Carnegie Mellon University - Pittsburgh, PA



From ietf-ssh-owner-secsh-archive=odin.ietf.org@NetBSD.org  Fri Jan 30 22:10:04 2004
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From: Jeffrey Hutzelman <jhutz@cmu.edu>
To: "Wachdorf, Daniel R" <drwachd@sandia.gov>,
        "'Ben Lindstrom'" <mouring@etoh.eviladmin.org>
cc: krbdev@mit.edu, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org, kerberos@mit.edu,
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Subject: RE: Pending OpenSSH release: contains Kerberos/GSSAPI changes
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(Just to pick nits...  Note that this is not yet an RFC.  Hopefully that 
will change sometime in the next few months, but at the moment it's still 
an internet-draft.)


On Friday, January 30, 2004 16:25:34 -0700 "Wachdorf, Daniel R" 
<drwachd@sandia.gov> wrote:

> 2 - RFC also allow for gss mechanisms that don't have GSSAPI integrity.
> Servers can then choose to disallow it. As far as I can tell from the
> code, any client which doesn't (or cant) have the GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG set
> cannot connect.  I can't test this because Kerberos-gssapi uses integrity.

This is legitimate behaviour.  See the last paragraph of section 3.6, at 
the top of page 15:

   It is a site policy descision for the server whether or not to permit
   authentication using GSSAPI mechanisms and/or contexts which do not
   support per-message integrity protection.  The server MAY fail the
   otherwise valid gssapi-with-mic authentication if per-message
   integrity protection is not supported.

Note the use of the word "MAY", which means "do whatever you want".  We 
actually expect that most server operators will want to accept 
gssapi-with-mic only in cases where integrity is supported,  There was a 
fairly length discussion of this issue on the ietf-ssh list last October or 
so.

-- Jeffrey T. Hutzelman (N3NHS) <jhutz+@cmu.edu>
   Sr. Research Systems Programmer
   School of Computer Science - Research Computing Facility
   Carnegie Mellon University - Pittsburgh, PA



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 Williams's message of "Fri, 30 Jan 2004 16:48:25 -0600")
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I'd prefer client MAY mutual auth rather than client SHOULD NOT mutual
auth.

If the server does not implement gss-keyex then a sufficiently clever
client can get some of the benefits of gss-keyex in some situations by
requesting mutual.



