Subject: Re: [sidr] new draft

From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2011 10:47:27 -0500

At 11:57 PM -0500 1/29/11, Danny McPherson wrote:
>...
>
>That said, I do hope we don't assume that discussions of path security in a
>routing protocol should be constrained by the RPKI architecture itself.
>
>-danny

Danny,

I'm a bit puzzled by your final comment above.

Path secruity includes the origin AS, and the RPKI is the mechanism 
adopted by SIDR to validate the origin AS assertion for an AS path. 
So, in that sense, more extensive path secruity approaches will rely 
on the RPKI, at least for the origin AS.

I have assumed that folks planned to take advantage of the ASN 
assertions in RPKI certs in support of path security mechanisms, in 
some form. (For origin AS verification we need only the address 
assertions in certs, but we have always described the RPKI as 
encompassing both address and ASN allocations.)

I think reliance on the RPKI for validated assertions re both types 
of resources is appropriate for path secruity, irrespective of the 
mechanisms used to verify As path info.

Steve

---

From: Danny McPherson <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2011 10:59:27 -0500

On Feb 3, 2011, at 10:47 AM, Stephen Kent wrote:
> Path secruity includes the origin AS, and the RPKI is the mechanism adopted by SIDR to validate the origin AS assertion for an AS path. So, in that sense, more extensive path secruity approaches will rely on the RPKI, at least for the origin AS.
> 
> I have assumed that folks planned to take advantage of the ASN assertions in RPKI certs in support of path security mechanisms, in some form. (For origin AS verification we need only the address assertions in certs, but we have always described the RPKI as encompassing both address and ASN allocations.)
> 
> I think reliance on the RPKI for validated assertions re both types of resources is appropriate for path secruity, irrespective of the mechanisms used to verify As path info.

I agree with everything you say in the text above - I'm merely referring to the WG charter issues that quelled previous discussions of path _anything on this mailing list and in this working group in the past.  I trust I don't need to provide references..

-danny

---

From: Christopher Morrow <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2011 11:38:56 -0500

> I agree with everything you say in the text above - I'm merely referring to the WG charter issues that quelled previous discussions of path _anything on this mailing list and in this working group…

and if the charter is amended to include 'hey, we also should try to
secure the path, eh?' that'd bring this to a close, yes?
(noting that I do think path verification/validation/security is
important and I think we should address it in SIDR)

-chris
<co-chair-ski-coat-on>

---

From: "Murphy, Sandra" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2011 11:35:22 -0500

The working group charter does not currently address path security.

But there is always the possibility of modification of the charter,
particularly as we seem to have finally managed to achieve consensus on
a lot of our current work.

--Sandy

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf
Of
> Danny McPherson
> Sent: Saturday, January 29, 2011 11:57 PM
> To: [email-masked]
> Subject: Re: [sidr] new draft
> 
> 
> On Jan 27, 2011, at 12:16 PM, Stephen Kent wrote:
> 
> >
> > I'd like SIDR to consider adopting a threat model for BGP path
secruity
> > as a WG item, and offer this as a starting point for the discussion
(if
> > the WG agrees to pursue this topic).
> 
> 
> Thanks Steve for posting this, as many have noted path security
> is necessary and very important to secure inter-domain routing.
> 
> For the chairs,
> As a point of order, are we agreeing now that the WG is going to
address
> path security?  In resource certification repositories?  or routing
> protocols
> themselves?  Given that my _comments previously were constrained by
> this, I do hope we agree addressing path security will now be in
charter
> and
> within scope of the WG - or perhaps we create a new WG that works on
items
> beyond resource certification and RPKI and focuses on routing
protocols
> - or if they're attempting to adapt current protocols (e.g., BGP) then
the
> extensions be performed in those respective working groups (e.g.,
IDR)?
> 
> That said, I do hope we don't assume that discussions of path security
in
> a
> _______________________________________________
> sidr mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr

---

From: Stephen Kent <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2011 16:50:23 -0500

At 10:59 AM -0500 2/3/11, Danny McPherson wrote:
>...
>
>I agree with everything you say in the text above - I'm merely 
>referring to the WG charter issues that quelled previous discussions 
>of path _anything on this mailing list and in this working group in 
>the past.  I trust I don't need to provide references..
>
>-danny

Danny,

I agree that the charter issue needs to be addressed.  I was just replying
to your comment re reliance on the RPKI.

Steve

---

From: Karen Seo <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2011 12:30:47 -0500

I support adoption of this as a WG item (assuming charter issues are 
addressed.)

>Folks,
>
>I have posted an individual submission ( draft-kent-bgpsec-threats-00.txt)
>as a first cut at a threat model for BGP path secruity, based on use 
>of the RPKI that this WG has developed, and based on the use of 
>digital signatures applied to AS path info in BGP update messages. 
>Since path secruity is the next topic that the WG is poised to 
>address (as we complete work on the RPKI document set)
>it seemed like an appropriate time to submit a threat model of this sort.
>
>I'd like SIDR to consider adopting a threat model for BGP path secruity
>as a WG item, and offer this as a starting point for the discussion (if

---

From: Randy Bush <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2011 05:06:46 +0800

> I support adoption of this as a WG item

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