Subject: [ietf-tls] AES outstanding issues

From: Pete Chown <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2000 12:23:15 +0000

Okay, these are the outstanding issues that I can see with the AES
draft.  Let's go and bang our heads against the wall -- by the time
we've been going for a while we will probably be able to imagine that
there is some kind of consensus! :-)

1.  Key lengths.  I think the options here are:

    a.  Do nothing -- have 128-bit key lengths only.

    b.  Add 256-bit keys.

    c.  Add 192-bit and 256-bit keys.

    What do people think about these choices?  I proposed that the
    interoperability rules should use 128-bit keys and no one has
    raised any objection to this.  If you have an objection but have
    been too shy, please come forward now... :-)

2.  Interoperability.  Ericsson are concerned that the current
    interoperability rules will force mobile devices to support
    forward secrecy when they don't have the processing power to do
    so.

3.  Block length.  I can't see any problem here -- I will just clarify
    in the next draft that we are talking about 128-bit blocks.

4.  I have also been sent a few minor corrections in private mail but
    there is nothing contentious there.  These will be corrected in
    the next draft.

If I have missed your issue please let me know.

It's good fun doing this...  I'll never think of UN negotiations and
things in quite the same way either! :-)

-- 
Pete

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From: "Simon Blake-Wilson" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2000 19:03:03 -0500

Hi Pete,

I'd like to support the idea that a server is required to support a range of
cipher suites, while the client is required to support only one of these. It
seems to me like it is in 'the general interest' to support connections from as
wide a range of client devices as possible ...

Best regards. Simon

Pete Chown <[email-masked]> on 12/06/2000 07:23:15 AM

Please respond to "IETF Transport Layer Security WG"
      <[email-masked]>

To:   "IETF Transport Layer Security WG" <[email-masked]>
cc:    (bcc: Simon Blake-Wilson/Certicom)
Subject:  [ietf-tls] AES outstanding issues

    b.  Add 256-bit keys.

--
Pete

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From: Ben Laurie <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2000 14:13:10 +0000

>     been too shy, please come forward now... :-)

I think at least b, and c if we can be bothered.

>     forward secrecy when they don't have the processing power to do

Then they are broken. Forward secrecy should not be optional. We should
probably allow consenting adults that don't care to configure it away
though.

>     in the next draft that we are talking about 128-bit blocks.

Agreed.

Cheers,

Ben.

--
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html

"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff

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