Subject: [TLS] PR#950: Unpredictable certificate_request_context values.

From: Eric Rescorla <[email-masked]>
Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2017 11:42:39 -0700

https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/950
Target merge date: Tuesday

I have just posted PR#950, which recommends that servers generate
unpredictable
context values for CertificateRequest in post-handshake client
authentication. This
prevents attacks in which an attacker who has temporary access to the
client's
private key can forge valid CertificateVerify messages.

Note that this is not an enormously large improvement because an attacker
who
has temporary access the private key can do a bunch of other stuff, like
forging
a complete handshake message, but I can imagine some artificial scenarios
where it might be useful, for instance if the user's private key is an HSM
and
so the attacker has permanent control of the user's machine but can't get
him
to generate an arbitrary number of private key operations without detection.

Unless I have missed something, this seems like harmless advice, so I tend
to think we should add it. Comments welcome

-Ekr

---

From: Benjamin Kaduk <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 17 Apr 2017 15:07:18 -0500

On 04/16/2017 01:42 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_tlswg_tls13-2Dspec_pull_950&d=DwMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=BjaFsdt8oZioHhmwlbgMF3WDFeiFsVIRexCKXzHIAUc&s=t6YKj0u1crtFYnjfk8z-a1r1HtpZNW0t5dnZGwUQIWY&e=>
>
> Note that this is not an enormously large improvement because an
> attacker who
> has temporary access the private key can do a bunch of other stuff,
> like forging
> where it might be useful, for instance if the user's private key is an
> HSM and
> so the attacker has permanent control of the user's machine but can't
> get him

Sounds like a good idea.

-Ben