]> Universität Bremen TZI

Bremen D-28359 Germany bergmann@tzi.org

Ericsson AB

Stockholm 164 80 Sweden john.mattsson@ericsson.com

Ericsson AB

Stockholm 164 80 Sweden goran.selander@ericsson.com

sec ace Internet of Things (IoT) Internet of Things IOT OAuth Access Token This document updates "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)" (RFC 9202) by specifying that the profile applies to TLS as well as DTLS.

Introduction The Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework defines an architecture for lightweight authentication between the Client, Resource Server (RS), and Authorization Server (AS), where the Client and RS may be constrained. "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)" only specifies the use of DTLS for transport layer security between the nodes in the ACE architecture but works equally well for Transport Layer Security (TLS) . For many constrained implementations, the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) over UDP is the first choice, but when deploying ACE in networks controlled by other entities (such as the Internet), UDP might be blocked on the path between the Client and the Resource Server, and the Client might have to fall back to CoAP over TCP for NAT or firewall traversal. This dual support for security over TCP as well as UDP is already supported by the Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) profile . This document updates by specifying that the profile applies to TLS as well as DTLS. It only impacts the transport layer security channel between the Client and Resource Server. The same access rights are valid in case transport layer security is provided by either DTLS or TLS. The same access token can be used by either DTLS or TLS between a given (Client, RS) pair. Therefore, the value coap_dtls in the ace_profile parameter of an Authorization Server to Client (AS-to-Client) response or in the ace_profile claim of an access token indicates that either DTLS or TLS can be used for transport layer security.

Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts described in and .

Specific Changes to RFC 9202 The main changes to specified in this document are limited to replacing "DTLS" with "DTLS/TLS" throughout the document. This essentially impacts the use of secure transport, as described in Sections , , , and . In addition to this, the Client and Resource Server behavior is updated to describe the case where either or both DTLS and TLS may be available, as described in the following section.

Connection Establishment Following the procedures defined in , a Client can retrieve an access token from an Authorization Server in order to establish a security association with a specific Resource Server. The ace_profile parameter in the Client-to-AS request and AS-to-Client response is used to determine the ACE profile that the Client uses towards the Resource Server. The ace_profile parameter indicates the use of the DTLS profile for ACE, as defined in . Therefore, the Client typically first tries using DTLS to connect to the Resource Server. If this fails, the Client MAY try to connect to the Resource Server via TLS. As resource-constrained devices are not expected to support both transport layer security mechanisms, Clients and Resource Servers SHOULD support DTLS and MAY support TLS. A Client that implements either TLS or DTLS but not both might fail in establishing a secure communication channel with the Resource Server altogether. Nonconstrained Clients and Resource Servers SHOULD support both TLS and DTLS. Note that a communication setup with an a priori unknown Resource Server typically employs an initial unauthorized resource request, as illustrated in . If this message exchange succeeds, the Client SHOULD first use the same underlying transport protocol for the establishment of the security association to the Resource Server (i.e., DTLS for UDP, and TLS for TCP). As a consequence, the selection of the transport protocol used for the initial unauthorized resource request also depends on the transport layer security mechanism supported by the Client. Clients that support either DTLS or TLS but not both SHOULD use the transport protocol underlying the supported transport layer security mechanism for an initial unauthorized resource request to the Resource Server, as in .

IANA Considerations In the "ACE Profiles" registry, the Description and Reference fields have been updated as follows for coap_dtls:

Name:

coap_dtls

Description:

Profile for delegating client Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments by establishing a Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) channel between resource-constrained nodes.

CBOR Value:

1

Reference:

, RFC 9430

Security Considerations The security consideration and requirements in , TLS 1.3 , and BCP 195 also apply to this document.

References Normative References Informative References

Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank for reviewing this specification.